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 In 416 BCE, Athens subjected the people of Melos to an act of genocide.  All Melian 
men were executed and all its women and children were enslaved.  None of this was 
unexpected.  Melos's oligarchs had been told what would happen if they defied Athens.  The 
Athenians had been perfectly clear that Melos had no alternative.  Nonetheless, the oligarchs 
chose to resist.  It was a decision characterised by folly, poor risk assessment, refusal to 
accept reality, irrational emotional attachment, and breakdown of dialogue.  
  
 Melos's fate has disturbing parallels with our reluctance or inability to address climate 
change.  We know what causes climate change, we have been warned about it for half a 
century, we know that its consequences will be ruinous, and we know what to do, so why 
don't we address it? 
 
 Our collective failure to act seems to defy explanation; consequently, the problems of 
climate change appear intractable.  Both suppositions are wrong, but they expose deep-seated 
flaws in how we deal with existential threat.  By exploring the origins of our intellectual 
inheritance, and applying research in fields such as neuropsychology and social theory, we 
can throw light on our failure, but no monograph has hitherto combined these strands. 
 
 This study employs historical criticism to investigate the ancient origins of folly, 
decision theory to show our deficiencies in assessing risk, neuropsychology to understand the 
importance of our emotional brain, and social identity theory to understand the New 
Testament roots of some modern attitudes to climate change. 
 
 The major part of this study examines failure of dialogue.  The hermeneutic concept of 
fusing ancient and modern horizons is discussed and applied to the Melian genocide and, in 
particular, to the dialogues of Plato – the foundation documents of our dialogic tradition.  A 
broad selection of dialogues is examined to demonstrate the critical importance of Plato's 
dramatic settings and characterisations.  The result is a list of characteristics by which Plato 
portrays the value, methods, pitfalls and dynamics of dialogue.  Some of these points are used 




 One major, and unexpected, finding was that Plato's dialogues signify a retreat from the 
agora – the political and commercial heart of society.  I conclude it is time to reclaim the 




































BCE  before the common era (e.g., Socrates died in 399 BCE)  
C  centigrade (e.g., 2C = two degrees centigrade) 
CE  common era (e.g., St Augustine died in 430 CE)   
CFC  chlorofluorocarbon  
GHG(s) greenhouse gas(es) 
CO2  carbon dioxide 
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
OCD  The Oxford Classical Dictionary 
ppm   parts per million 




 Names of ancient works are in italics.  For example, Timaeus is the name of Plato's 
dialogue in which Timaeus is the main speaker.  
 
 Plato's dialogues are cited in the standard Stephanus system of page numbers and letter 
sections.  These are printed in the margins of most translations.  For example, Protagoras 
323b refers to Stephanus page 323, section b, of that dialogue. 
 
 Aristotle's works are cited in the standard Bekker system of pages, columns and line 
numbers.  Again, these are printed in the margins of most translations.  For example, Topics 
105a15-20 refers to Bekker page 105, column a, lines 15 to 20.  Occasionally I have also 
cited book and section numbers in which a Bekker reference appears [e.g., Rhetoric 2.3 




 I use the terms 'climate change' and 'global heating' interchangeably.  The latter is now 
generally preferred to 'global warming'.  The GHGs we emit are heating the atmosphere: 




This is the way the world ends 




 Climate change first entered my consciousness in the mid-1970s.  This was not precocity 
on my part; I was 20 and more interested in motor racing than science or politics.  Most 
people in Australia and elsewhere who listened to national radio or read broadsheet 
newspapers would by this time, certainly by 1980, have heard about the greenhouse effect 
and the threat posed by oil and coal consumption.  Over four decades later, writing a thesis 
about global inaction to mitigate the threat was a deflating experience. 
 
 This is a philosophical study, though of limited engagement with current philosophical 
argument about climate change.  Take, for example, John Broome's discussion of 
intergenerational justice in his 2012 book Climate Matters.  He asks readers to consider a 
person (Sarah) alive 150 years from now whose life has been vitiated by global heating: 
could Sarah claim that our generation has done her an injustice by not addressing climate 
change?2  Broome thinks she could not,3 but he overlooks a more fundamental point.  Sarah is 
comfortably remote from us, so we don't have a lot of emotional investment in the argument, 
but what about a person (let's call her Iris) alive 40 years from now (in 2060) whose life has 
also been diminished by climate change, probably not by as much as Sarah's, but 
demonstrably poorer than it could have been?  Could Iris claim that the present (2020) 
generation, in which she is a child, had done her an injustice?  We should have no problem 
imagining what Iris would be thinking because we are her equivalent from the perspective of 
1980 – 40 years ago when action on climate change should have been underway.  We are 
rightly incensed that government policies four decades ago failed to address climate change, 
 
1 The last two lines of T. S. Eliot's The Hollow Men (1925).  The final stanza of this poem has the same 
rhythm as the nursery rhyme 'Here we go round the mulberry bush'.  It is a paradigm of bathos.  
2 John Broome, Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming World (New York: W. W. Norton, 2012) 61. 
3 Broome's argument is based on Derek Parfit's 'non-identity problem' [Reasons and Persons (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986) 351-379].  This argument is refuted by Peter Lawrence [Justice for Future 
Generations (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015) 41-43] and by David Coady and Richard Corry 




thereby blighting our lives and making it harder for us to take adequate action.4  We certainly 
think governments of 1980 have treated us unjustly by not acting when they knew they 
should, and could, have acted, even though they were well informed about the consequences 
of inaction.  With this in mind I have devoted a chapter to the history of climate change to 
illuminate my contention that we should think of ourselves as a 'future' generation – from the 
standpoint of 1980 – now affected by global heating.  We are rightly angry now; Iris's and 
Sarah's generations will be angrier still.        
 
 This monograph does not argue about the existence of climate change.  I take for granted 
that global heating is a scientific fact, that it is an existential threat to the human and natural 
worlds, and that 'we' – mainly governments, particularly those of high-carbon-emission 
countries – should address it vigorously and urgently.  So why don't we?  Why have our 
efforts so far been piecemeal and mostly ineffective?     
 
 There are myriad reasons for our failure; some of them suggest deep-seated human 
frailties and limitations.  This study examines a few: folly, poor assessment of risk, neglect of 
appeal to the emotional brain, and dysfunctional governance.  Of necessity these are cross-
disciplinary investigations.  I am less interested in philosophical argument about why we 
should act than in casting light on why we don't.  There are sound, rational reasons for 
addressing climate change, but if rational argument were able to carry the day then we would 
be well on the way to fixing the problem.  Attempts to argue people into action are usually 
futile unless we realise that governments, groups or individuals are more often motivated by 
emotion than reason, and may as easily act against their own best interests as for them.  
 
 The reason for inaction that interests me most is failure of dialogue.  The inability of 
2019's UN Climate Change Conference to deliver an agreement was a paradigm of such 
failure.  But why are we so poor at dialogue when, from the works of Plato, it forms one of 
the pillars of our (western) intellectual tradition?  Of course this tradition does not encompass 
some huge GHG emitters such as China and India, but genuine dialogue has the capacity to 
transcend cultural boundaries.  In any case, among the most obtuse and internationally 
uncooperative countries with regard to climate change are America and Australia.  
 
4 Wildfires of historically unmatched intensity in California and Australia, and bleaching of the Great 
Barrier Reef, are merely better known examples of countless existing effects of global heating.   
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Unsurprisingly, both are also internally riven by conflict over their environmental 
responsibilities.  Both are suffering from dialogic breakdown.  Either our dialogic tradition is 
deficient or it must be revisited and reviewed if we are to understand what is going wrong.        
 
 With this in mind, I am applying philosophy to the issue of climate change but I am also 
applying climate change – specifically our failure to address it – to philosophy.  Philosophy 
should cause us to think about or rethink climate change, but global heating changes 
everything,5 including the ways we approach and think about philosophy.  It is appropriate, 
then, to review the foundation documents of our philosophical inheritance, more so as they 
are also the foundation of our dialogic tradition.  To this end I examine Plato's works not so 
much for their ideas as for the dramatic frameworks in which he presents and shapes 
dialogue.   
 
 Here is an example of what I mean.  Val Plumwood argues that: 
 
Platonic philosophy is organised around the hierarchical dualism of the sphere of 
reason over the sphere of nature, creating a fault-line that runs through virtually 
every topic discussed: love, beauty, knowledge, art, education, ontology.6   
 
Plumwood's interpretation of Plato is forceful and compelling.  To overcome human/nature 
dualism she urges us to pursue an 'exhilarating and many-dimensional' life in 'active dialogue 
with earth others'.7  In advocating such dialogue, Plumwood asks how far we are entitled to 
impose ourselves on, or assert ourselves against, an earth other, and whether one party must 
always adapt to the other, and how much we expect to share.  She notes that exchanges 
between self and other should be multiple and contextual rather than single and stereotypical.  
Plumwood does not realise, however, that all these points are addressed by Plato.  Of course 
Platonic dialogue is between people, not with earth others, but the dynamics of dialogue – its 
complexity and contextual character, and requirement for compromise and generosity – are 
all explored by Plato.  Moreover, some of these dynamics have little to do with verbal 
 
5 Echoing This Changes Everything by Naomi Klein. 
6 Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London: Routledge, 1993) 81. 
7 Ibid., 139.  'Earth others' are non-human beings in nature whose needs, purposes and goals must be 
acknowledged and respected.   
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exchange and much more to do with a dialogue's dramatic location.  For example, any 
adequate construal of the Republic – which is largely about the ideal city – must ask why its 
narrative setting is within a private dwelling in Piraeus, though it is narrated by Socrates, who 
was notorious for haunting the public spaces of Athens.   
 
 Plato's works do not provide a solution to our dialogic failure, but they do throw light on 
something we have forgotten or neglected: we usually do better when effective dialogue 
underpins our attempts to grapple with important matters.  Plato shows us that dialogue can 
be mutually beneficial, illuminating and effective, but also frustrating, difficult, ad hoc and 
occasionally dangerous.  
 
 This monograph consists of three parts.  The first two chapters establish the hermeneutic 
and factual bases for this study.  Chapter 1 discusses the interpretation of ancient texts – 
mainly Plato, but also Thucydides – in light of modern concerns, some of which derive from 
our inheritance of ancient traditions.  This chapter draws in particular on Hans-Georg 
Gadamer's work on the fusing of ancient and modern hermeneutic horizons.  Chapter 2 
establishes the historical bedrock of this study: climate change is neither a novel crisis nor a 
recent idea.  Our inability to address a long-standing and familiar problem suggests 
fundamental inadequacies in our social, political and intellectual inheritance.   
 
 Chapters 3 to 8 investigate the most salient of these deficiencies.  Chapter 3 deals with 
folly, examining its long history and ubiquity, and chapter 4 discusses assessment of risk.  
Chapter 5 combines the two by examining a paradigm of folly exacerbated by poor risk 
assessment – the genocide of ancient Melos.  This chapter is an example of the hermeneutic 
methods discussed in chapter 1.  Chapter 6 examines the difference between our rational and 
emotional brains, and finds that failure to appeal to the latter may be a significant component 
in our failure to address climate change.  This chapter also studies the likelihood that global 
heating fails to trigger appropriate avoidance responses.  Chapter 7 looks at the role of 
millenarian theology within the evangelical church in America in attempting to understand 
why evangelicals tend to deny climate change and vote for Donald Trump.  Chapter 8 
investigates political decision-making, discourse and governance.  J. L. Austin's ideas about 
speech acts are examined to explain why certain people or groups can speak but still have no 
voice.  This chapter concludes with a study from Aristotle's Rhetoric to throw light on the 
counter-intuitive persuasiveness of some politicians.            
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 Chapters 9 to 12 discuss the core of this monograph: the failure of dialogue.  These 
chapters establish the characteristics of dialogue and suggest a forum in which dialogue can 
be conducted.  Chapter 9 examines the ideas of Stuart Hampshire in attempting to enunciate 
minimal conditions for dialogue.  This chapter also looks at the possibilities and problems of 
a digital dialogic forum.  Chapter 10 comprises an in-depth study of the dramatic settings and 
characters from a broad selection of Plato's dialogues.  The aim is to identify dialogic 
characteristics which can inform, prepare, warn and encourage those who participate in 
dialogue about matters of existential import.  Chapter 11 articulates these characteristics, a 
product of taking seriously the idea that ancient and modern hermeneutic horizons can inform 
and illuminate each other.  Chapter 12 addresses a practical problem: in what sort of forum 
can genuine dialogue occur? 
 
 In summary, this thesis is about climate change and Plato.  It attempts to clarify our 
failure to address the former, and attempts to read the latter afresh in light of that failure.     
       
What matters most: avoiding bathos 
 The final paragraph in volume 1 of Derek Parfit's last major work is the following: 
   
What now matters most is that we rich people give up some of our luxuries, ceasing 
to overheat the Earth's atmosphere, and taking care of this planet in other ways, so 
that it continues to support intelligent life.  If we are the only rational animals in the 
universe, it matters even more whether we shall have descendants during the billions 
of years in which that would be possible.8  
 
Volumes 2 and 3 conclude with similar statements.  At first reading these conclusions are a 
bit lame, particularly when each is preceded by a volume of outstanding argument about, and 
analysis of, morality by one of the sharpest philosophers of the last half century.  It is as if 
Parfit ran out of steam and, philosophically enervated, threw off a few trite conclusions.  I 
was keen for each volume to close with something more inspiring, perhaps moral 
philosophy's equivalent of 'Workers of all countries, Unite!'.  However, Parfit has the tone 
exactly right – a skilful use of bathos to prompt thought about our future.  The human story 
begins with bathos: in attempting to become wise, Adam and Eve's eyes are opened not to 
 
8 Derek Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 419. 
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cosmological secrets but merely to their need for clothes.  Like T. S. Eliot, Parfit is warning 
us not to allow the human story to expire in bathos.9  To that end, his volumes are 
philosophical parables: the worthiness of what precedes does not preclude a subdued end.  
After the magnitude of human achievement – in cosmology, technology, literature, 
architecture and art to mention an obvious few – it would be bathetic if we failed to attain the 
comparatively modest goal of not undermining the conditions that allowed those 





9 Eliot was also aware of a common theme in nearly all Jewish and early Christian eschatological 
literature: the end will resemble the beginning. ['Eschatology' is discourse about the end-time.] 
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Hermeneutics rests upon dialogical foundations: to interpret a text means to enter into a 
conversation with it, direct questions to it, and allow oneself to be questioned by it.1 
 
Chapter 1 
Ancient and Modern Hermeneutic Horizons 
 
Introduction 
 In December 2019, the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Madrid produced 
frustration and exhaustion, but no agreement.  Representatives from the assembled countries 
were more than adequately briefed about the consequences of not reducing GHG emissions, 
but still failed to achieve an international pact to address global heating.  As one delegate 
said, 'It was more than disappointing.  People were in tears in the halls.  I think a lot of people 
just felt sick.'2  Why did dialogue fail so miserably, particularly when nearly all participants 
were in general agreement about the problem and the solution?  Perhaps the impediment is 
endemic within modern society: an inability to discuss, let alone address, a global threat 
which is largely a by-product of the economic systems on which we all depend.  It is more 
likely, however, that we possess the wherewithal to tackle climate change but that our 
modern horizons – the products of our cultural, social and historical inheritance – have 
become narrow and stale.  We need to broaden and refresh our inheritance, and the best way 
to do so is to review and re-energise that part of our horizon in which dialogue is paramount – 
the part founded on and informed by the works of Plato. 
 
Hermeneutics 
 Hermeneutics began with the interpretation of canonical texts such as Homer and the Old 
and New Testaments.3   It is now applied to fields such as sociology, psychology and 
jurisprudence.  The last-mentioned is a familiar example of hermeneutics in practice.  If we 
consider the US Supreme Court, for example, the justices endeavour to interpret a text – the 
Constitution – with reference to a matter before them.  This is far from straightforward if, as 
 
1 Jean Grondin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics, Joel Weinsheimer trans. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1994) 74. 
2 Karen Middleton, 'Carryover regardless', The Saturday Paper (21 December 2019 - 24 January 2020).  
3 For a succinct introduction to modern hermeneutics see Joel Weinsheimer, Philosophical Hermeneutics 
and Literary Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991) 1-23. 
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is often the case, that matter is not mentioned in the Constitution because it could not have 
been envisaged in the late 1700s.  The hermeneutic task, then, is to bridge the gap between 
the present and a text written over two centuries ago.  The court's job is to understand what 
the Constitution meant in its own day and what it means to modern citizens.  Clearly this is 
more than an antiquarian exercise of investigating the past for its own sake.  Rather, it 
acknowledges that past and present are in dialogue with each other and that this dialogue 
informs and changes both.  The court's ruling not only establishes what is lawful in the 
present but also changes how the Constitution is read.                  
 
 This example highlights a fundamental point about creative tension between past and 
present.  This tension is produced by recognising what the text does not or could not say and 
by accepting the text as authoritative in, or relevant to, a situation that is alien to its original 
context.  When we read Plato's dialogues, then, we are not looking for tips on how to address 
a problem about which Plato knew nothing.  Rather, we accept his works as authoritative – in 
the sense that they are among the foundation documents of our intellectual tradition – and as 
relevant in that we share important subject matter with them – in particular, anxiety about the 
condition of political dialogue and the poverty of language.  
 
 Plato's dialogues were written in, and were a response to, a period of political 
disintegration and moral dissolution.  In and of itself this is not especially significant: 
probably most people, in most periods of history, have thought much the same about the era 
in which they live.  What is significant, however, is that Plato's response consisted of 
dialogues, not treatises: he is making us part of the conversation, not telling us what to think.  
Further, his dialogues focused largely on one person – Socrates – who participated minimally 
in politics and was himself a victim of political and personal malice.  Socrates was not a 
political lodestar; he was an irritant whose unwelcome questions exposed the ignorance of 
those who took for granted their right to exercise power.      
 
Horizons of interpretation 
 We accept as a truism that a work of literature may render different meanings in the 
various situations and periods in which it might be read.  For example, Albert Camus' La 
Peste (The Plague) may be read as an allegory of German occupation of France in the Second 
World War, but when Covid-19 is stalking the world most people will read it as the story of a 
modern city struck by plague.  When Camus says that, before the plague ended, the residents 
9 
 
of Oran could hear trains whistling and ships hooting in their imagination as the city's 
quarantine was lifted, we share their anticipation of release from 'lockdown'.4   
 
 With qualifications, this truism extends to great works of philosophy.  For example, few 
of us would now read Aristotle as Thomas Aquinas read him, let alone as Aristotelians of the 
1400s and 1500s read him to promote witch-hunting.5  On the other hand, we often engage 
with great works as if they were written to address today's issues – surely a criterion for 
regarding them as great.  For instance, a course in political philosophy would be threadbare if 
it did not include discussion of Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Politics.  As J. L. Ackrill 
asserted about Aristotle – the same is true of Plato – we don't merely want to gain some 
understanding of him: we want to understand the specific philosophical problems he 
confronted.  To that end, 'we are entitled to engage him in argument as if he were a 
contemporary'.6  Ackrill's instinct is sound; while our 'entitlement' does not circumvent the 
basic hermeneutic problem of interpreting an ancient text, we do think we are engaging in 
much more than a historical exercise.  We feel there is a discussion going on between us and 
Aristotle, and as with any discussion we unavoidably bring our own viewpoints to it.  Hans-
Georg Gadamer described this as the fusing of horizons – ours with that of the text we are 
interpreting.7  The metaphor is appropriate.  Our hermeneutic horizon is the range of what we 
can 'see', in terms of meaning and understanding, from our vantage point.  Like a visual 
horizon, it is not closed or fixed; it is the epistemic area in which we move and which moves 
with us.   
 
 The study in chapter 5 of Athenian destruction of Melos is an example of fused horizons.  
Thucydides' account is able to inform our failure to address climate change, and our modern 
horizon throws light on what went wrong with Melos – poor risk assessment mixed with folly 
– and what happened – genocide, a term that did not exist before 1944.           
 
4 Albert Camus, The Plague, Stuart Gilbert trans. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1960) 222. 
5 As Jeffrey Russell noted in Mephistopheles (Ithaca, NY: Cornel University Press, 1986) 30.  For a brief 
account about the importance of Aristotelianism to the witch craze, see Brian P. Levack, The Witch-Hunt 
in Early Modern Europe, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1995) 60-64. 
6 J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle the Philosopher (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) 2. 
7 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd English ed., W. Glen-Doepel trans.; rev. Joel Weinsheimer 
and Donald G. Marshall (London: Sheed & Ward, 1989) 302-307. 
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 Horizons are both individual and societal.  Each of us is born into a certain cultural 
horizon, but that horizon does not determine an individual's or group's outlook.  When we 
speak of a person's narrow horizon we concomitantly imply that other people (we usually 
mean ourselves) are not so limited.  Importantly, the individual with a narrow horizon tends 
to over-value what is nearest to him or her, whereas somebody with a broader horizon is 
better able to grasp the relative value of things, whether near (in time and/or space) or far.8  
Whether horizons are narrow or broad, we cannot escape them.  We might think we could 
work out the interpretation of a text by abstracting ourselves from the limits of our horizon, 
but this is neither possible nor desirable: without a horizon we have nowhere from which, and 
nothing with which, we can approach the text.  
 
 Horizons are also gendered.  As Michèle Le Doeuff noted with regard to a definitive 
interpretation: 
 
If a man and a woman read the same text in a radically different way, where will we 
find the angel who, having read the text, can understand the difference, and to whom 
will that angel explain it?9  
 
This should not be a cause for despair.  As Le Doeuff rightly argues, even though it is very 
likely there are differences between the ways a woman and a man read the same text, there is 
no need to regard these differences as radical and definitive, 'which would render all debate 
either impossible or pointless'.10  Instead, we can use our historical and cultural understanding 
to analyse how and why readings are different, and thereby challenge our own interpretation 
and the horizon that produced it.  To return briefly to Aristotle, his assertion that 'we must 
look upon the female character as being a sort of natural deficiency'11 is important for 
understanding why European witch-hunts killed so many woman, but that understanding 
must also be informed by asking why this Aristotelian stereotype of women existed for 
 
8 This point is of particular import for addressing climate change.  If we over-value what is nearer to us we 
will tend to under-value, or even ignore, what is distant, such as the more confronting effects of global 
heating.      
9 Michèle Le Doeuff, Hipparchia's Choice, Trista Selous trans. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991) 65. 
10 Ibid, 65-66. 
11 Generation of Animals 775a14. 
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centuries without becoming deadly.  In short, the horizons of both an ancient text and its 
interpreters are always in motion, and each illuminates the other.  The ancient text I interpret 
will already have formed part of the horizon I bring to that text, and my interpretation will in 
turn change its and my horizons.   
 
 Clearly the fusing of horizons does not mean either sloughing off our modern identities 
before entering an ancient and alien world unconnected with our own, or imposing on an 
ancient horizon to the degree that it reflects only our image and manifests only our interests.  
Instead, the task is to see the past on its own terms, transposing ourselves into its horizon, 
letting it speak to us so we might understand what it is attempting to say.  In this way we 
should discern that an ancient text is not trying to answer our questions, though it may 
illuminate the way we think about them.  Rather, if we are to understand an ancient text then 
we must try to work out the question to which that text was intended as an answer,12 or the 
matter on which the text was a comment. 
 
 When approaching ancient texts with the prejudices and preconceptions that constitute 
our horizons, we cannot entirely avoid reading some of our concerns into those texts, and we 
do so either intentionally or inadvertently.  Examples of the latter include histories in which 
the voices and roles of women are neglected,13 while examples of the former include works in 
which dollops of Marxist theory are applied.  For instance, Geoffrey de Ste Croix's Class 
Struggle in the Ancient World is a paradigm of applying Marx's ideas of class and class 
 
12 A point asserted by R. G. Collingwood in his Autobiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978) 
31-33.  Collingwood was both archaeologist and philosopher, and he applied this interpretative method to 
his fieldwork.  He was, for example, the first archaeologist to ask seriously about the purpose of Hadrian's 
Wall in northern England – that is, to what problem was it the solution?  Collingwood rightly insisted that 
stating its purpose as 'frontier defence' was no more informative than asserting of a marine engine that its 
purpose is to drive a ship.  Collingwood noted that several features of the wall made it less useful for 
defence.  He postulated that its main purpose was as an elevated sentry-walk, a view that was and is 
generally accepted [ibid. 128-129].   
13 For example, Abraham Malherbe's Social Aspects of Early Christianity might be expected to devote 
considerable attention to women in the early church – the importance of women is very evident in the New 
Testament – but he mentions only one – Phoebe, a deacon in the Roman church (Romans 16.1).  Moreover, 
Malherbe does not notice the importance of Paul's acknowledgement of his social dependence on Phoebe 
[Social Aspects of Early Christianity, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983) 98]. 
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struggle to understand what happened in the ancient world.  The general thesis of this work 
has been partially, though not entirely, refuted,14 but no-one could deny that de Ste Croix 
brought to our attention the vast number of people whose lives and practices had hitherto 
existed as little more than historical backdrop, even though Greek and Roman societies could 
not have existed without them.  With regard to our pursuit, the importance of de Ste Croix 
(and others like him) lies not only in how he approached the ancient world but also in what 
that approach meant for our world.  As he forcefully asserted: 
 
Let us be clear about one thing.  Whereas descriptions of ancient society in terms of 
some category other than class – status, for instance – are perfectly innocuous, in the 
sense that they need have no direct relevance to the modern world (which will of 
course need to be described in terms of a completely different set of statuses), an 
analysis of Greek and Roman society in terms of class, in the specifically Marxist 
sense, is indeed … something threatening, something that speaks directly to every 
one of us today and insistently demands to be applied to the contemporary world.15                   
 
 De Ste Croix is both over- and understating the case.  He is right about the capacity of 
ancient texts (and other evidence, but we are concentrating on texts) to speak forcefully to the 
modern world, but wrong in thinking they do so only when we approach them with theories 
that are relevant to us, particularly if they pose a welcome (for some) threat to our social 
equilibrium.  De Ste Croix's view is that if Marx's analysis, largely developed from his 
investigations into 19th century capitalist society,16 were also able to explain events and 
transformations in ancient societies, then its claim to relevance for our world cannot be 
ignored.  The obvious problem with this view is that if Marx's class analysis were found 
wanting with regard to the ancient past then it would not be relevant to us either.  It's worth 
responding to de Ste Croix using his own example of ancient status as irrelevant to the 
 
14 Michael Grant rightly noted that 'the greater part of the history of Greece and Rome witnessed no overt 
class struggle at all' [Greeks and Romans: A Social History (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1992) 
136]. 
15 G. E. M. de Ste Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World (London: Duckworth, 1981) 45 
[italics in original]. 
16 As Marx asserted, analysis of bourgeois society 'also allows insights' into the structures and relations of 
production of the vanished societies from which it was built.  'The bourgeois economy thus supplies the 
key to the ancient' [Grundrisse, Martin Nicolaus trans. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973) 105].  
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modern world.  It is surely not 'innocuous' and irrelevant to the modern world to discover that 
ancient pagan texts condemned Christians for providing aid without regard to the social merit 
of the recipient.17  Australia and America are not alone among ostensibly Christian 
countries18 whose view of welfare recipients is much closer to the pagan attitude – most 
recipients are undeserving – than the less judgemental and non-discriminatory Christian ideal.  
Even though de Ste Croix was right in asserting that ancient and modern notions of status are 
very different, for a country like the United States, where about two-thirds of citizens identify 
as Christian, it is not difficult to see how an ancient horizon could be threatening in its 
insistent demand to be applied to our world.19 
 
Plato's dialogues  
 Except for some letters (of which only one is possibly genuine) all of Plato's works are 
dialogues of one form or another.  The earliest written works of western philosophy to have 
survived, they comprise the foundation documents of our intellectual tradition.  This is 
important: it is dialogue – argument with other people about matters dear to them – that 
primordially underpins our tradition, rather than treatises about those matters.20  Contrary to a 
 
17 E. A. Judge, Social Distinctives of the Christians in the First Century (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 
2008) 154. 
18 'Ostensibly Christian' in that state and federal legislatures in both countries acknowledge their Christian 
heritage by, for example, reading prayers at the beginning of sitting days.  In Australia, the federal 
government and most state governments mark the opening of each new parliament with a church service.  
The official motto of the United States is 'In God We Trust'.  It appears on US currency.   
19 Even though Christianity is declining in the United States, 65% of Americans still identify as Christian, 
while the percentage who have no religion has increased to 26% ['In U.S., Decline of Christianity 
Continues at Rapid Pace', Pew Research Centre (17 October 2019)].  By comparison, in Britain 38% 
identify as Christian, while 52% have no religion [J. Curtice et al. eds, British Social Attitudes: The 36th 
Report (London: The National Centre for Social Research, 2019) 1-2].  A more telling point, however, is 
the extreme unlikelihood of an atheist becoming US president.  Even President Trump parades his (highly 
unlikely) adherence to Christianity.  Notoriously, on 1 June 2020 he displayed a bible in front of St John's 
episcopal church near the White House.  However, in doing so he demonstrated he knew nothing about his 
own evangelical support base: he held up a Revised Standard Version (RSV) instead of a version 
acceptable to evangelicals, such as the Authorised Version or the New International Version.  The RSV is 
rejected by most evangelicals as a 'liberal' bible.      
20 As it happens, nobody after Plato came close to producing dialogues of such philosophical profundity 
and literary quality.  The only other philosopher to have written dialogues of nearly comparable quality is 
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popular misquotation of A. N. Whitehead, Plato did not set the agenda for all subsequent 
western philosophy,21 but there can be little doubt that if we want to cast some light on our 
current inability to communicate adequately and resolve matters effectively then we must 
revisit Plato's dialogues.  Why, though, is this important given that climate change is a global 
problem, not a specifically western phenomenon?  After all, there are plenty of countries and 
cultures that possess little or no western heritage.   The answer is twofold.  First, western 
countries inescapably bring their cultural heritage to international dialogue, and they will be 
better at it if they understand how their own dialogic tradition works or fails to work.  
Second, Plato's dialogues are more than discussions about a set of ideas.  Importantly, and 
inextricably, they show us what dialogue is like, what its pitfalls are, what happens when 
people disagree and so on.  In this regard they are pan-cultural, the heritage of anybody who 
questions and converses with other people about why they hold certain views.   
 
 Moreover, as Gadamer asserted, dialogue is 'not the art of being able to win every 
argument'.22  He is right; dialogue is not a contest, but his assertion should be extended 
beyond live interlocutors to horizons.  The openness required between parties to a dialogue, 
the willingness to question and be questioned, should similarly be exercised by us towards an 
ancient text.  In short, we are having a conversation with Plato, not trying to defeat him in 
argument or impose our horizon on his.  We are approaching the text on its own merits and 
listening to what it has to say, even if, at first glance, we might have trouble discerning its 
relevance.   
 
 Listening to Plato entails taking seriously the dramatic settings, characters and other 
devices he employs to facilitate the progression of his dialogues.  In particular, he wrote 
 
David Hume, but his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion seem forced and artificial compared with 
Plato's best works.  Aristotle also wrote dialogues, but regrettably none has survived.   
21 The full quote in context is: 'The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition 
is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.  I do not mean the systematic scheme of thought which 
scholars have doubtfully extracted from his writings.  I allude to the wealth of general ideas scattered 
through them.  His personal endowments, his wide opportunities for experience at a great period of 
civilization, his inheritance of an intellectual tradition not yet stiffened by excessive systematization, have 
made his writings an inexhaustible mine of suggestion' [Process and Reality (New York: The Free Press, 
1978) II.I.I #39].  Whitehead clearly enunciated why we still read, or need to read, Plato. 
22 Gadamer, 367. 
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under the shadow of Socrates' condemnation and death.  This alone is a salutary reminder that 
dialogue always take place within a context – often not of our choosing, perhaps under a 
menace we cannot escape but for which we were not responsible, and with people of ill-will, 
goodwill or no will at all.  
 
Understanding as application 
 Conversation is more than just hearing what the other person says.  If I am speaking to 
someone but am curtly or silently dismissive of what she is saying, then I am not listening in 
the sense of attempting to understand her point of view and why she holds it.  Rather, the 
conversation has become a routine in which she vents her views but they have no purchase in 
my life.  On the other hand, if I were listening I would apply her views to my life.  This does 
not mean uncritical acceptance of her message; it means taking seriously what she says, and 
considering and responding to her message within the context of my life.  Of course I might 
reject what she said, but my rejection will be informed by, and responsive to, the matters she 
raised.  In short, I actively apply her message to my life.  Such application may take a variety 
of forms – disagreement, revising my views, taking some action, and so on – but they all 
entail that I have to some degree understood what she said. 
 
 Our conversation with ancient texts is similar, except that the respective horizons are 
different.  I share the same, or a largely overlapping, horizon with a live interlocutor, whereas 
my conversation with an ancient text might involve an attempt to fuse very disparate 
horizons.  Listening to the text means taking seriously its claim to have something to say, 
treating it as more than a philological exercise, and applying it to our own situation.  As 
Gadamer put it, 'understanding always involves something like applying the text to be 
understood to the interpreter's present situation. … Understanding here is always 
application.'23   
 
 Further, applying the text to my situation entails changing my horizon, which in turn 
changes the meaning of the text, which again modifies my horizon, and so on – a dialogue 
that never ceases because there is no bedrock interpretation of the text that can finally close 
the conversation.  In short, Plato's dialogues underpin our dialogic tradition, and reading them 
both informs and transforms that tradition.   
 
23 Gadamer, 308-309. 
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The modern horizon 
 Our view of the world is framed in part by our concerns about climate change and our 
collective inability to discuss it adequately, let alone do much about it.  We cannot abstract 
ourselves from those concerns when we read an ancient text.  Indeed, the fusion of ancient 
and modern horizons will inescapably reflect the shadows under which each is formed.  The 
death of Socrates is for Plato what global heating is for us insofar as each frames and shapes 
their respective discourses.  For example, Plato's dialogue about epistemology (Theaetetus) is 
framed by Socrates' indictment and death [142c, 210d], while climate change is the spectre 
that haunts so much of our moral, epistemological, economic, social and political discourse.24  
This does not mean that all discourse in these areas refers to climate change, nor do all of 
Plato's dialogues refer to Socrates' death, but even their respective absences are 
hermeneutically significant.  For example, while Socrates does not appear in the Laws, his 
absence prompts questions about Plato's intent, the role of this dialogue within his corpus 
(particularly its relation to the Republic), whether the ideas presented imply he has abandoned 
Socrates' legacy, and so on.  Similarly, the Australian Government's Open Government 
National Action Plan fails to mention anything about climate change, an absence that might 
be unremarkable except that the Government's stated goals for transparent and accountable 
government include sustainable development, human rights protection, and addressing 
inequality and injustice,25 none of which is now possible without also confronting global 
heating.  In short, these frames have a similar hermeneutic role: we cannot avoid them and, 
while they do not determine the meaning of any discourse, they have to be investigated and 
acknowledged if our interpretation of an ancient or modern text is to be a serious attempt to 
understand that text within its context and on its terms, and if we are to apply that text to our 
lives.   
 
Ancient and modern dialogic frames   
 Coming to grips with the Plato's dialogic frame does not necessarily include a better 
understanding of Athenian injustice and Socrates' fate.  Rather, it means attending to the 
 
24 There should be no surprise about including epistemology.  Familiar questions such as, 'In what sense do 
we know something if that knowledge does not motivate us to act?', have received a relevance boost from 
climate change.  
25 Australia's Second Open Government National Action Plan 2018-20 (Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet, 2018) 6. 
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dialogues' dramatic settings and characterisations in order to understand better the ways in 
which Plato fashioned his dialogues.  By investigating the beginning of our intellectual 
tradition and attempting to fuse ancient and modern horizons we might throw some light on 
the following questions: 
 
(1) Why do some dialogues fail while others are more successful? 
(2) What are the pitfalls or advantages in dialogue, as opposed to monologue or treatise? 
(3) What about personality clashes and ad hominin arguments? 
(4) What does 'location' mean, and is it important, in conducting a dialogue? 
(5) What are the implications of dialogic failure?                 
 
 The justification for undertaking this exercise is straightforward.  We exist in a given 
historical trajectory, so 'we are always already affected by history'.26  Consequently, when we 
investigate a matter, the worth of our investigation is to some degree determined by that 
trajectory, as are the things to be investigated.  The importance of an inquiry into the failure 
of contemporary political discourse reflects the importance of our dialogic heritage, and the 
things investigated – Plato's dialogues – comprise the ground and essence of that heritage.  
 
The key to interpreting Plato? 
 None of the above is proffered as the 'key' to reading Plato: there is no such key.  As 
Debra Nails rightly asserted, no dramatic or historical details provide 'a key for unlocking the 
meaning of any dialogue.  Some of the worst readings of Plato have been grounded on that 
indefensible assumption.'  Plato's philosophy is 'grounded in the specifics of his social and 
cultural environment', but not 'in the sense that it is an inevitable outcome of that 
environment'.27  Further, looking for a hermeneutic key in an overarching argument or 
doctrine abstracted from a dialogue – such as the theory of recollection, first mooted in the 
Meno – is also mistaken.  Of course these theories can be examined apart from their contexts 
– most philosophy courses study Plato in this way – but this fails to take seriously the ways in 
which Plato conducts philosophy as an irreducible interplay between specific details and 
general ideas.  Nobody else in western philosophy was so careful to conduct argument and 
 
26 Gadamer, 300. 




present ideas within definite situations populated by identifiable people.  Ergo, it is important, 
and sometimes vital, to know the dramatic details and characters.  The identity of an 
interlocutor might be critical in differentiating between a feasible and an improbable 
interpretation of a dialogue.         
 
 It hardly needs stating that this is not a new way of reading Plato.  Indeed, every 
generation reads Plato anew, and can hardly do otherwise.  We cannot abstract either Plato or 
ourselves from our respective locations.  The age in which we live, framed by the politics of 
climate change, is different from our forebears' age.  Climate change does not suggest, let 
alone determine, a way of reading Plato, but it is unavoidably part of the horizon we bring to 
our reading of his dialogues.  We are not looking to Plato for answers to our fears, 
disappointments and frustrations, but they will inevitably affect our reading of his texts.  
 
Conclusion 
 Plato's works entail that a, perhaps the, cornerstone of western intellectual thought is 
dialogue.  We must revisit these primordial dialogues if we are to refresh our understanding 
of what dialogue is and how it works, and why it underpins our intellectual tradition, and 
thereby inform ways in which we conduct contemporary dialogue. 
 
 The fusing of ancient and modern hermeneutic horizons is possible because they have 
subject matter in common.  Platonism is an intrinsic part of our intellectual inheritance, so it 
is inevitable for each horizon to inform the other to at least that degree.  Further, both 
horizons demand we confront a fundamental question that underlies Plato's dialogues and our 
predicament: can a society survive corruption of its language?  As Richard Palmer says, 
language 'is the repository of our whole culture's way of seeing'.28  If our language is slipshod 
 
28 Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969) 253.  Lest this be 
regarded as a peculiarly western problem, it is noteworthy that Confucius (550-480 BCE) raised a similar 
complaint.  When asked what his first initiative would be if he were put in charge of the country, 
Confucius replied that he would rectify the language so that the names of things matched their realities.  
His reasoning was that if words do not match their reality then language lacks clear objects towards or 
against which the actions of citizens can be directed.  Sound government becomes impossible because the 
properly directed social energy necessary to drive it is dissipated.  As Simon Leys notes, the whole 
Confucian enterprise could be summarised by stating that the socio-political order is built on correct use of 
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then our capacity to grasp concepts and understand problems is compromised.29  The mission 
of Socrates is instructive: we assume we know the meaning of words and concepts, and that 
other people share that meaning, but a little questioning might reveal we are talking at cross-
purposes or don't know what we are talking about.   
 
 For example, 'climate change' denotes atmospheric heating caused by GHGs, but its 
connotation includes 'recent global threat', 'most important moral issue of the twenty-first 
century', 'risk to future generations' and so on.  However, what if climate change were a 
phenomenon that should have been addressed decades ago, and what if the general concept of 
anthropogenic climate change were part of our inheritance from ancient and early-modern 
times?  We regard ourselves as responsible for the fate of future generations, but this 
perception looks different if we also see ourselves as victims of an earlier generation's 
inaction and therefore determined not to let the same thing happen to those who come after 
us.  The horizon of the recent past is coloured by our resentment against its leaders, but in 
turn this horizon poses the following question to us: isn't our resentment empty if we do 
nothing to prevent the next generation from resenting us?  The next chapter puts climate 
change in an unfamiliar hermeneutic context – as a phenomenon we have inherited and as an 






language [The Analects of Confucius, Simon Leys trans. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997) #13.3, and p. 
181]. 
29 I note, for example, George Orwell's lament that 'the English language is in a bad way' and that 'the 
decline of a language must ultimately have political and economic causes'.  The effect – impoverished 
language – can itself become a cause, reinforcing the original cause and in turn exacerbating the effect.  In 
this way, language becomes 'ugly and inaccurate because our thoughts are foolish, but the slovenliness of 
our language makes it easier for us to have foolish thoughts' ['Politics and the English Language' in The 




We need … a history, not of progress, but of delay; not of events, but of non-events; not of an 
inflexible logic, but of a sloppy logic; not of overdetermination, but of underdetermination.1  
 
Chapter 2  
Climate Change: nothing new under the sun 
 
Overview 
 The idea that climate can be affected by human activity has been part of western tradition 
for over two millennia.  The science of climate change has been extant for more than a 
century, and the need to address it has been pressing since the 1960s.  This chapter puts our 
meagre efforts to address climate change in those contexts.  We are rightly concerned about 
our failure to do anything substantial since, say, 2000, but this failure was preceded by two or 
three decades of inaction.  We are now the 'future generation' that should have been spared 
the deteriorating climate we have inherited.  Our task should be to ensure that the next 
generation does not feel as we now do.       
 
We are capable of effective action  
 In 1980, few might have predicted that so little would have been done to address climate 
change over the ensuing 40 years.  After all, related problems – air pollution caused by 
industrialisation and its products, thinning of the stratospheric ozone layer, and acid rain – 
had been addressed to some degree in most advanced economies, so there were relevant 
precedents for effective action.   
 
 For example, the Clean Air Act of 1970 was largely responsible for reducing aggregate 
emissions of six common pollutants in the United States by 73 percent since 1970.  Air 
quality improvement in London was also dramatic.  The capital's air had been poor since 
coal-burning proliferated in the 1200s, but it turned deadly in the 1800s.  A severe smog in 
December 1873 killed 500 people; over 2,000 succumbed in February 1880.  The infamous 
smog of December 1952 killed over 4,000; public outrage forced the government to act.  
Following the Clean Air Act of 1956, London's atmosphere improved markedly, mainly by 
 
1 David Wootton, Bad Medicine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 21. 
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replacing coal with smokeless fuels.  By 1970, smoke over London had decreased by 80 
percent, while December sunshine had increased by 70 percent.2   
 
 Embrace of pollution control by major industrial countries was one of the most 
'important popular political mobilizations of the twentieth century'.3  The reasons for it are 
instructive.  First, the social and economic costs of pollution began to outweigh industries' 
social licence to pollute.  Citizens and governments accepted certain levels of pollution as the 
cost of doing business, but much that had been acceptable in 1950 was unacceptable by 1980.  
Second, the percentage that polluting industries contributed to GDP was declining, so they 
lacked some of the political influence they once enjoyed.  Third, pollution control became 
profitable in its own right.  All of these reasons also apply to the generation of GHGs, but 
they have so far failed to curb our emissions.  One reason for this failure is straightforward: 
CO2 might be a pollutant in the denotative sense, but not in any regular connotative sense.  In 
normal linguistic usage, an 'air pollutant' – such as fine particulates, CFCs and sulphur 
emissions – both denotes and connotes a contaminate that should be eliminated from the 
atmosphere, whereas CO2 is essential for life, its atmospheric levels fluctuate throughout the 
year, a 'bit more' won't harm us, and so on.  In short, it largely fails to connote a sense of 
contamination.          
 
Closing the ozone hole 
 Unlike long overdue responses to air pollution, international response to diminishing 
stratospheric ozone was swift and emphatic.  The possibility that CFCs could deplete the 
planet's protective ozone was mooted in 1974, and confirmed in 1985.  The Montreal 
Protocol was agreed in 1987, with three subsequent amendments to tighten it.  CFC 
production fell sharply and had been almost eliminated by about 2010.  Though the ozone 
'hole' has been gradually shrinking since the early 1990s, the legacy of CFCs will be with us 
for the remainder of this century because their chemical stability enables them to remain in 
the stratosphere for about 100 years.  Moreover, the decline of atmospheric CFC-11 has 
 
2 Clive Ponting, A Green History of the World (London: Penguin, 1992) 358-359; J. R. McNeill, 
Something New Under the Sun (London: Penguin/Allen Lane, 2000) 66-67. 
3 McNeill, 107. 
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slowed, almost certainly because it is being illegally produced somewhere in East Asia.4  
Nonetheless, action to preserve stratospheric ozone was 'an extraordinary international 
response to an extraordinary problem'.5              
 
Transboundary pollution: acid rain 
 The third example, acid rain, is a paradigm of transboundary air pollution.  Sulphur 
dioxide and nitrogen oxides, produced by burning coal and sulphide ores, may be blown 
hundreds of kilometres after being emitted from tall smokestacks.  Once in the atmosphere, 
these gasses are transformed into sulphuric and nitric acids which combine with water vapour 
to fall as acid rain.  Downwind of the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley industrial belts, for 
example, rainfall acidity occasionally exceeded that of fizzy drink.6  By 1970, over half of 
lakes in the Adirondacks in upstate New York were too acidic to support fish life.   
 
 The problem of acidic precipitation was first identified by Scottish chemist R. A. Smith 
in 1852.  Smith coined the term 'acid rain' in 1859, and explained the phenomenon in detail in 
his 1872 monograph, Air and Rain.7  However, it was not until the 1970s (in North America) 
and 1980s (in Europe) that acid-producing emissions were tentatively addressed – 120-plus 
years after being identified.  Nonetheless, Europe's sulphur dioxide emissions have fallen by 
more than 70 percent since 1990.8       
 
 There were several reasons for this long period of inaction.  If one location is producing 
pollution, but other places are suffering its effects, the former feels less urgency than the 
latter to fix the problem, even where all parties are within a single country.  These difficulties 
are exacerbated when emitters and sufferers inhabit different countries.  Within and across 
borders, disparate centres of political power held different views about industrial production 
 
4 Josh Gabbatiss, 'Ozone hole-forming chemical emissions increasing and mysterious source in East Asia 
may be responsible', The Independent (16 May 2018). 
5 McNeill, 114. 
6 In West Virginia, rainfall could exceed the pH of vinegar [Ibid., 101]. 
7 S. J. Woodin, 'Environmental Effects of Air Pollution in Britain', Journal of Applied Ecology, vol. 26, no. 
3 (1989) 749. 
8 Tamra Gilbertson and Oscar Reyes, 'Carbon Trading – How it works and why it fails', Critical Currents, 




and would often work at cross-purposes, thereby frustrating possible agreements to curb 
pollution.  This situation was aggravated when the relationships of parties involved were 
unfriendly.  For example, Japan receives sulphur emissions from China, but relations between 
the two are testy at best.  But even friendly countries were often uncooperative.  Norway 
receives its acid rain largely from Great Britain, but Norway had been complaining about 
British pollution since the late 1800s.  Britain belatedly reduced its emissions because its own 
citizens and countryside were chocking; Norway's distress was irrelevant.  In short, political 
will was, and remains, rarely equal to the task of addressing transboundary pollution.  If 
governments find it difficult to address transboundary pollution, how much less likely are 
they to confront carbon emissions given that CO2 is not a poison, there are no 'downwind' 
victims, and those who suffer most from global heating might be on the other side of the 
world?  
 
The long gap from knowing to doing              
 Further, the hiatus from recognition of acid rain to doing something about it is a 
disconcerting precedent with regard to climate change.  In 1896, Swedish chemist Svante 
Arrhenius first described the process, including feedback exacerbation, by which Earth's 
temperature would be increased through humanity's production of CO2, mainly through 
combustion of fossil fuels.9  He and his colleague, Arvid Hogbom, calculated it would take 
about a thousand years for anthropogenic sources to double the concentration of CO2 in the 
atmosphere, so there was no need for alarm.10  Arrhenius and Hogbom's scientific 
calculations were fairly accurate, but they could not possibly foresee the astonishing 




9 British physicist John Tyndall is usually credited with discovering that CO2 absorbs infrared radiation [so 
Mike Hulme, Why We Disagree About Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
43-45] but American scientist Eunice Foote made the same discovery three years earlier.  Tyndall's 
research was published in 1859; Foote's was presented in 1856 and reported in 1857.  She noted that if the 
atmosphere once contained a higher proportion of CO2 then 'an increased temperature must have 
accompanied it' [Raymond P. Sorenson, 'Eunice Foote's Pioneering Research On CO2 And Climate 
Warming', Search and Discovery Article #70092 (2011)]. 





 In 1912, the widely read Popular Mechanics magazine noted that worldwide combustion 
of coal was adding 7 billion tons of CO2 annually to the atmosphere: 'This tends to make the 
air a more effective blanket for the earth and to raise its temperature.  The effect may be 
considerable in a few centuries.'  Like Arrhenius and Hogbom, the writer could not have 
anticipated the huge post-1945 increase in global energy consumption.  The writer also noted 
that, by adding CO2 to the atmosphere, 'men in generations to come shall enjoy milder 
breezes and live under sunnier skies', hardly an appropriate conclusion given that the article 
was prompted by northern hemisphere heatwaves of 1911.11      
 
Guy Callendar 
 In 1938, Guy Stewart Callendar presented a paper that linked the three primary 
components of anthropogenic climate change: the physical properties of CO2 , the 
atmosphere's rising concentration of CO2; and rising global temperature.
12  Callendar's 
research modelling was important in demonstrating that humanity's production of CO2, a tiny 
addition to a tiny percentage of the atmosphere, could raise global temperatures.  He regarded 
this increase as possibly beneficial in forestalling another ice age.    
 
Gilbert Plass  
 In 1953, Time Magazine reported the findings of Gilbert N. Plass, a Canadian-born 
physicist.  Plass noted the atmosphere's increasing concentration of CO2 and succinctly 
explained its greenhouse-like properties.  He calculated that if CO2 continued to increase at 
the current rate it would raise global temperatures by 1.5 degrees Fahrenheit (roughly 0.8 C) 
every 100 years.  He also described an exacerbating effect caused by slowing the rate at 
which heat is lost from the tops of clouds.13  
 
11 Francis Molena, 'Remarkable Weather of 1911: The Effect of the Combustion of Coal on the Climate – 
What Scientists Predict for the Future', Popular Mechanics (March 1912) 339-342.  Later in 1912, extracts 
from this article were printed in New Zealand and Australian newspapers.    
12 Hulme, 50. 
13 'As the blanket of CO2 gets thicker, it also prevents the tops of clouds from losing heat as rapidly as 
before.  The smaller temperature difference between cloud base and top cuts down the air currents which 
must circulate through the cloud before rain or snow can form.  Lowered rainfall will make a drier climate.  
Less cloud cover will be formed, more sunlight will reach the earth, and the average temperature will rise 
still higher.' ['Invisible Blanket', Time Magazine (25 May 1953)].  
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Revelle and Keeling: rising concentration of atmospheric CO2 
 Despite occasional acknowledgement, climate change remained of peripheral public and 
scientific interest until the 1950s when Californian oceanographer Roger Revelle showed that 
seawater absorbed CO2 at only one-tenth of the rate commonly assumed.  When Revelle's 
colleague, Charles Keeling, measured atmospheric CO2 he showed that Revelle was correct 
and that CO2 concentration was increasing inexorably.
14  Their findings prompted renewed 
investigation into human-induced global heating, but the first world conference on climate 
change did not take place until 1979, 20 years after Revelle's and Keeling's research.   
 
Frank Capra's Unchained Goddess  
 This two-decade interlude was not the result of ignorance or lack of high-profile 
messengers.  For example, in 1958 the popular Bell Telephone Science Hour screened The 
Unchained Goddess on American prime-time television.  Produced by Frank Capra, it was an 
educational film about meteorology.  Towards the film's end, one of its hosts warned that 
humankind 'may be unwittingly changing the world's climate' through the production of CO2, 
noting that 'our atmosphere seems to be getting warmer' and that 'a few degrees' rise in the 
Earth's temperature would melt the polar icecaps'.  If this were to occur, 'an inland sea would 
fill a good portion of the Mississippi Valley', and tourists would view the drowned towers of 
Miami through glass-bottomed boats.  Illustrative animation left little to the imagination.15     
 
Teller's warning 
 In 1959, Edward Teller – father of the hydrogen bomb and favourite of American 
government and industry – informed American oilmen about CO2's 'strange property' of 
transmitting visible light but absorbing infrared radiation emitted from Earth's surface, 
thereby causing a 'greenhouse effect'.  Teller warned that continued burning of fossil fuel will 
raise global temperatures and begin to melt the planet's icecaps.  He forecast that coastal 
cities such as New York would be submerged.16  
 
14 Richter, 31-34. 
15 The Unchained Goddess, The Bell System Science Series, screenplay by Frank Capra and Jonathan 
Latimer (1958).  
16 Benjamin Franta, 'On its hundredth birthday in 1959, Edward Teller warned the oil industry about global 
warming', The Guardian (1 January 2018). 
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 Teller's warning was not unheeded.  In 1968, the American Petroleum Institute (API) 
received a report it had commissioned from the Stanford Research Institute.17  This report 
also warned of melting icecaps and rising sea levels.  It noted that 'significant temperature 
changes are almost certain to occur by the year 2000 and these could bring about climate 
changes'.  The report also noted that fine particle emissions, largely caused by fossil fuel 
combustion, increased the reflectivity of Earth's atmosphere and might have moderated the 
heating trend of anthropogenic CO2.  However, this was not a reason for complacency, 
because fine particulates cause chronic health problems.  The authors were unsure about the 
effects of these long-lived pollutants on the global environment, but were in no doubt that 
potential damage 'could be severe'.  The report concluded by noting the irony of our serious 
concerns with small-scale events such as photochemical smog while we usually ignore 
abundant pollutants such as CO2 and submicron particles because they have little local effect 
but 'may be the cause of serious world-wide environmental changes'. 
 
President Johnson and the Science Advisory Committee  
 The API was not the only major institution to know about climate change.  Shortly after 
his inauguration early in 1965, President Johnson explained to Congress that its generation 
had changed the atmosphere's composition by using fossil fuels.  Johnson commissioned the 
Science Advisory Committee to investigate possible consequences.  The committee's report, 
issued later that year, warned of rising sea levels and increasing acidification of fresh water, 
among other disasters, and asserted that a coordinated global response was required to 
forestall catastrophe.18 
 
 Also in 1965, Kenneth Boulding warned that the oceans and atmosphere were not 
inexhaustible reservoirs: it might be 'fatally easy' for humanity to change the composition of 
either irreparably.  As an example he cited the greenhouse effect, warning it would destroy 
 
17 E. Robinson and R. C. Robbins, Sources, abundance, and fate of gaseous atmospheric pollutants, 
Stanford Research Institute (February 1968).  
18 Nathaniel Rich, 'Losing Earth: The Decade We Almost Stopped Climate Change', New York Times 
Magazine (1 August 2018) ch. 1. 
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the planet's existing ecological equilibrium and shift us to one that was far less amenable for 
human thriving.19 
 
The most influential paper on climate change – 1967 
 In 1967, Syukuro Manabe and Richard Wetherald published their results from modelling 
feedbacks and interrelationships between the various components of Earth's atmosphere.20  
They found that rising temperatures increase the concentration of atmospheric water vapour.  
Water vapour is a GHG, so the temperature rises further still – a positive feedback – but 
additional water vapour also increases cloud cover, reflecting solar radiation and thereby 
lowering the temperature – a negative feedback.  Manabe and Wetherald found that if the 
atmosphere's CO2 content were doubled then global temperature would rise by about 2C.  
Given that atmospheric CO2 has increased by almost 50 percent since the pre-industrial era, 
and that global temperature has increased by about 1C, their prediction was remarkably 
accurate.  
 
Bolin and Commoner  
 In 1970, Scientific American published 'The Carbon Cycle' by Bert Bolin.  He stated that 
since 1850 people had 'inadvertently been conducting a global geo-chemical experiment' by 
burning fossil fuels.21  The dynamic equilibrium that had long existed between major CO2 
reservoirs – the biomass, atmosphere, hydrosphere and soil – and on which the biosphere 
depends, had been disrupted; this might prove injurious or 'even fatal' to humanity.  Bolin 
predicted that atmospheric CO2 would reach 375-400 ppm by 2000.  He was not quite right: 
the concentration was 370 ppm in 2000 and first reached 400 in 2013.  It is now about 415 
ppm.            
 
 In 1971, Barry Commoner's bestseller The Closed Circle clearly described the process by 
which CO2 was converted to vegetation in the Carboniferous period, thereby lowering the 
 
19 Kenneth Boulding, 'Economics and Ecology' in Future Environments of North America, F. Fraser 
Darling and John P. Milton eds (Garden City, New York: The Natural History Press, 1966) 233. 
20 Syukuro Manabe and Richard T. Wetherald, 'Thermal Equilibrium of the Atmosphere with a Given 
Distribution of Relative Humidity', Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences, vol. 24, no. 3 (May 1967).  This 
is now regarded as the most influential climate change paper of all time. 
21 Bert Bolin, 'The Carbon Cycle', Scientific American, vol. 223, no. 3 (September 1970) 131. 
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atmosphere's concentration of CO2 and cooling the Earth, but this fossilised vegetation was 
being converted back into CO2, raising the atmospheric concentration.  He warned that 'the 
effect this may be having on the Earth's temperature is now under intense scientific 
discussion'.22 
 
Jule Charney: the government commissions another report 
 Despite the above examples – and there were plenty of others – almost no action was 
taken; not until the late 1970s did momentum for change build again.  In response to a request 
from the Office of Science and Technology Policy, Jule Charney, doyen of modern 
meteorology, assembled a study group to assess existing research on anthropogenic climatic 
change.  Charney's group met in July 1979 under the auspices of the National Research 
Council; its report was delivered several months later.  The group's findings were 
unequivocal: 
 
We now have incontrovertible evidence that the atmosphere is indeed changing and 
that we ourselves contribute to that change. … If carbon dioxide continues to 
increase, the study group finds no reason to doubt that climate changes will result 
and no reason to believe that these changes will be negligible.  The conclusions of 
prior studies have been generally reaffirmed.23  
 
The group noted that the world's oceans 'may be expected to slow the course of observable 
climatic change' but that 'a wait-and-see policy may mean waiting until it is too late'.24  After 
considering all known positive and negative feedback mechanisms, the group estimated that, 
if atmospheric CO2 were doubled, global heating would be about 3C, with a probable error of 
±1.5C.  Moreover, the group was 'unable to find any overlooked or underestimated physical 
effects' that could reduce global heating to 'negligible proportions'.25  The group estimated 
 
22 Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle (London: Jonathan Cape, 1971) 29-30.  Commoner was a leading 
biologist and renowned ecologist. 
23 National Research Council, Carbon Dioxide and Climate: A Scientific Assessment (Washington DC: The 
National Academies Press, 1979) vii-viii.  
24 Ibid, viii. 
25 Ibid, 1-3. 
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that CO2 would double by 2030, though if fossil fuel consumption were halved then this 
unwelcome milestone could be delayed by 15 to 20 years.26  
  
1979: time to act 
 Charney's report left little more to say.  Ken Caldeira, a leading climate scientist, asks his 
new students to identify the biggest breakthrough in climatic physics since 1979.  It's a trick 
question: there has been more research, refinement of models and so on, but no 
breakthrough.27  For over 40 years we have known nearly everything we needed to know if 
we wanted to address climate change.   
 
Overview: rising fossil fuel emissions 
 By the late 1960s the dangers of global heating caused by fossil fuel combustion were 
known and accepted by scientists who worked at or with the highest levels of American 
government.  However, almost no concomitant action was undertaken during the 10-plus 
years before the first World Climate Conference, held in Geneva in 1979.  This inactivity had 
profound consequences: well over half of all human-generated CO2 emissions have been 
produced since 1970.  GHG emissions increased on average by 1.3 percent per year from 
1970-2000.  From 2000 to 2010, 'despite a growing number of climate change mitigation 
policies', annual emissions increased by 2.2 percent.28  During both periods, about 78 percent 
of emissions were from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes.  The most important 
drivers of increased fossil fuel emissions are economic and population growth.  In 2000-
2010, the contribution from population growth remained roughly the same as 1970-2000, but 
the contribution from economic growth rose sharply.  In other words, more people are 
enjoying higher standards of living, and these standards usually entail greater consumption of 
fossil fuel.  In 2000-2010, even though fossil fuels were used more efficiently in producing 




26 Ibid, 6.  The current estimate is around 2050 or a few years later. 
27 Rich, ch. 11. 
28 IPCC 2014: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report, 45.  Of course 'policies' do not necessarily entail 
action, but they do indicate intent.  
29 Ibid., 46-47. 
30 
 
Who is to blame? 
 The obvious villain is the fossil fuel industry, but its program of denial did not get into 
stride until the late 1980s.  Indeed, in response to the Charney report, Exxon established its 
own CO2 research program.  This was familiar territory for Exxon.  Back in 1957, one of its 
predecessor companies, Humble Oil, had published a study which found that fossil fuel 
combustion had increased atmospheric CO2.  Moreover, an API study in 1958 confirmed 
Humble's findings.30  Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, both the petroleum industry and the 
American government had more than enough evidence to compel them to act, but the 
government failed to provide leadership or appropriate legislation. 
 
 However, in 1980 President Carter signed the Energy Security Act.  It directed the 
National Academy of Sciences to analyse the social and economic effects of climate change.  
Further, Congress invited over 20 experts to a meeting in Florida – appropriately, the venue 
was only five feet above sea level – to formulate a climate policy.  Momentum had built and 
action was nigh.  The 1980s could be the decade when climate change was addressed.   
 
President Reagan deregulates the environment  
 Then, in January 1981, Ronald Reagan became president.  Even members of his own 
party were concerned by the new president's strident opposition to environmental regulation.  
For example, he appointed Anne Gorsuch to direct the Environmental Protection Agency.  
She cut the agency's budget by 22 percent, curtailing its research and enforcement capacities.  
Democrats and Republicans accused her of dismantling the agency.31   
 
 Despite the new administration's environmental antipathy, climate change was still 
newsworthy.  In March 1982, James Hansen, Director of the Goddard Institute for Space 
Studies, gave evidence about the greenhouse effect before a congressional committee.  The 
committee's Republican members demanded action; Democrat members, including Al Gore, 
demurred, believing that a higher level of certainty was required if Congress were to be 
convinced to undertake reforms of the magnitude required.32  Gore derided Reagan's 
 
30 Rich, ch. 3. 
31 Patricia Sullivan, 'Anne Gorsuch Burford, 62, Dies; Reagan EPA Director', Washington Post (22 July 
2004). 
32 Rich, ch. 7. 
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environmental myopia, but some momentum had been lost.  Nonetheless, the issue retained 
significant clout.   
 
 Eager to position itself favourably in anticipation of legislative change, Exxon continued 
to invest in climatic research.  The corporation funded a climate change symposium in 
October 1982, sending the president of its research division, Edward David, former science 
adviser to President Nixon, to deliver the keynote address.  David asserted that the free 
market could not fix the greenhouse effect, and that Exxon's research into renewable energy 
would put it in the vanguard of action to combat global heating.33  The White House might 
resist change, but nobody could resist Exxon. 
 
Lost opportunity: National Academy of Sciences report, 1983 
 In October 1983, three years after being commissioned by President Carter, the National 
Academy of Sciences delivered its report on global heating.  The Academy's report was 
comprehensive, though contained little of substance that had not been addressed by the 
Charney group.  The Academy largely confirmed previous research, though its conclusions 
were very restrained.  Doubling of CO2 would raise temperatures by 1.5C to 4.5C, though 
'values in the lower half of this range are more probable'.  Atmospheric CO2 will probably hit 
600 ppm by about 2070, with a 1-in-4 possibility before 2050.  Indeed, additional CO2 
'should have beneficial effects on photosynthesis and water-use efficiency of agricultural 
plants'.34  Then came some bombshells: 
 
In view of the relatively large and inadequately unexplained fluctuations over the 
last century, we do not believe that the overall pattern of variations in hemispheric or 
global mean temperature or associated changes in other climatic variables yet 
confirms the occurrence of temperature changes attributable to increasing 
atmospheric CO2 concentration. 
 
 
33 Rich, ch. 8; and see Lisa Song, Neela Banerjee and David Hasemyer, 'Exxon Confirmed Global 
Warming Consensus in 1982 with In-House Climate Models', Inside Climate News (22 September 2015). 
34 National Academy of Sciences, Changing Climate: Report of the Carbon Dioxide Assessment 
Committee (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1983) 2, 91, 94. 
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Although a precautionary attitude toward any drastic changes in world climate is 
prudent, we do not know that there actually is a problem until we have completed 
the investigation of what changes in climates may occur and what damages or 
blessings they may bring.35  
 
The report asserted that future generations of Americans would be well placed to deal with 
climate change: 
 
The foreseeable consequences of climate change are no cause for alarm on a global 
scale but could prove to be exceedingly bad news for particular parts of the world.  
Generally, the more well-to-do countries can take in stride what may prove to be a 
reduction (probably not noticeable as such) by a few percent in living standards that 
will likely be greater per capita by more than 100% over today's.36     
 
The social and economic implications of climate change are largely unpredictable: 
 
Rapid climate change will take its place among the numerous other changes that will 
influence the course of society, and these other changes may largely determine 
whether the climatic impacts of greenhouse gasses are a serious problem. 
 
As a human experience, climate change is far from novel; large numbers of people 
now live in almost all climatic zones and move easily between them.37 
 
The Academy therefore recommended business as usual: 
 
We do not believe, however, that the evidence at hand about CO2-induced climate 
change would support steps to change current fuel-use patterns away from fossil 
fuels.38   
 
35 Ibid., 292, 450 (underlining in original). 
36 Ibid., 481.  Bangladesh was cited as one of the 'particular parts' of the world.  
37 Ibid., 3.  In essence, this paragraph is saying that people experience climate change whenever they move 
to a different climatic region.  The report's attempt to 'normalise' climate change is clear.   
38 Ibid., 4. 
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adding that such action was improbable: 
 
It is unlikely in the foreseeable future that national governments will embark on 
serious programs to reduce further their dependence on fossil fuels to protect the 
Earth's climate against change.39 
 
and that no country will act alone: 
 
Any single nation that imposes on its consumers the cost of further fuel restrictions 
shares the benefits globally and bears the costs internally.40 
 
Unsurprisingly, Exxon cancelled its CO2 research program and reverted to being a 
conventional fossil fuel supplier.  
 
 The report noted that some food-producing areas would receive less rain and therefore 
yield less food unless there were compensating improvements in water conservation or 
supply, or in agricultural technology.  Policy-makers would have to decide whether it was 
more economical to reduce production of CO2 or to increase the supply of water.  The report 
warned that defining the issue as 'the CO2 problem' would 'focus attention too exclusively on 
energy and fossil fuels, compared with the water or the rainfall problem or, more 
evenhandedly, the issue of climate change'41 – 'issue', not 'problem' of climate change. 
 
 The Academy then made a profoundly prescient statement: 
 
How the issue is named can affect its apparent character.  If the solution to 
foreseeable problems has to be reduced CO2 emissions, both the problem and the 
solution are global in a severe sense.42 
 
 
39 Ibid., 480. 
40 Ibid., 481. 




The Academy rightly argued that a ton of CO2 produced in one part of the world had the 
same effect as a ton produced somewhere else, so worldwide reductions would have to be 
agreed, whereas 'water development and conservation is usually a national responsibility or 
involves a few neighbouring countries'.  In other words, if you call increasing desiccation a 
'water problem' then it's your responsibility and you can address it locally, whereas if you call 
it a 'greenhouse gas problem' then it's everybody's responsibility – to the degree each country 
emits GHGs – and requires international agreement.  Clearly the former is much easier to 
ameliorate, and is politically more attractive, than the latter. 
 
The need for a trope 
 There is more to it, however.  Why did the thinning of stratospheric ozone attract 
vigorous and effective action?  After all, this action was robustly opposed by CFC producers 
and therefore required international agreements, and the problem mainly affected Antarctica 
and not the most populous parts of the world.  Of course, phasing out production of CFCs 
was much easier than achieving the same for fossil fuels, but an important reason for action is 
that the problem found an effective trope: there was a 'hole in the ozone layer'.  It is irrelevant 
that there is actually no hole and no ozone layer.  There is a very diffuse 'layer' of ozone (the 
ozonosphere) in the middle stratosphere, but its concentration of ozone molecules never 
exceeds 15 ppm and is usually less than 10 ppm.  The ozonosphere above Antarctica 
naturally attenuates between September and November, but this has been exacerbated by 
CFCs.43  The ozone hole of public nightmares was a series of coloured satellite images that 
depicted areas of lower ozone concentration.  The darker shades looked like a hole, so the 
problem found its trope.44  
 
 However, a trope must not only be evocative but also indicative of a solution.  Ozone had 
its hole; the obvious solution was to close it.  Importantly, ozone was quickly accepted as a 
'political' problem because political problems need to have identifiable and achievable 
 
43 The New York Public Library Science Desk Reference, Patricia Barnes-Svarney ed. (New York: 
Macmillan, 1995) 482-483. 
44 I am using 'trope' in the broad sense of words used in ways that change or extend their standard meaning.  
For example, in political discourse 'schools' stands for the education system, an instance of synecdoche.  
Tropes often convey a 'surplus' meaning.  'Schools' is so often used in combination with 'lack of funding' 
that its mere use connotes 'additional funding'.  
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solutions.  As things stand, global heating lacks a trope that might identify and drive a 
solution, and it is not yet a political problem in the above sense.  There was ample evidence 
for this in Australia's federal election of 2019.  Even though polling consistently found 
climate change to be a highly significant issue for the electorate, neither major party 
presented policies that reflected this importance.  Other important issues, such as public 
health, possess emotive tropes – hospitals and medical staff, for example – that in and of 
themselves also suggest a solution – more buildings and nurses.45  In the contest for political 
attention and funding, no political party is going to fund a very broad-ranging program with 
distant, amorphous goals and no catchphrase, rather than pay for a new clinic. 
 
Individual responsibility? 
 Neglecting to address climate change has not all been on the part of governments and 
corporations.  For example, Barry Jones was, and remains, one of the most comprehensively 
knowledgeable people in Australia.  He was federal minister for science from 1983 to 1990.  
His book Sleepers Wake! is a deeply researched and wide-ranging investigation about the 
ways technology will influence the future of work.  It was first published in 1982, so Jones' 
neglect to mention climate change was regrettable given that the first World Climate 
Conference had been held three years before.  The conference's focus had been the impact of 
global heating on agriculture, water, economies and so on; the implications of climate change 
for technology and employment were clearly significant.  Moreover, scientists from 50 
countries agreed unanimously that urgent action was necessary.46  The fourth edition of 
Sleepers Wake!, revised and enlarged, was published in 1995, but again climate change was 
overlooked.  In a chapter entitled 'What Is To Be Done?', comprising 23 categories of advice 
and discussion about 'a political program for survival and enhanced quality of life', the only 
mention of any environmental matter was 'an energy efficiency tax (a.k.a. "carbon tax")', but 
this was only with a view to inducing industry and consumers to find the most efficient ways 
 
45 This is probably the main reason preventive health, by far the most cost-effective approach to public 
health, rarely attracts adequate funding or attention.  Preventive health is open-ended and lacks an emotive 
symbol or goal.  Ergo, much more money is allocated for treating cancer – clinics, MRI machines and so 
on – than for preventing it.     
46 Later in 1979, leaders of the Group of Seven – the seven wealthiest countries – signed a resolution to 
reduce carbon emissions [Rich, Introduction].  
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to produce and use energy.47  Undoubtedly dozens of related books by lesser minds also 
failed to discuss climate change, but it is disquieting that a book about technology and the 
future, written in a country that will suffer more than most from global heating, should say 
nothing about it.   
 
 Jones' book is an instructive example of how predictions are made by extrapolating from 
current situations and paradigms.  The problem is that, when something novel arises, 
something that does not appear to fit our existing patterns of experience, we lack a handy 
framework from which to understand and deal with it.              
 
Summary 
 The above account largely concentrates on the United States because it was by far the 
largest single emitter of CO2 up to the turn of the century.
48  According to Nathaniel Rich, the 
years 1979 to 1989 constituted the 'decade we almost stopped climate change'.  America 
might, and indeed should, have taken the lead in addressing global heating, but – pace Rich – 
it was nowhere near to almost stopping climate change.  Several governments and 
administrations were genuinely concerned about the matter, but all baulked at the prospect of 
undertaking a comprehensive reorganisation of the country's transport and energy systems, let 
alone of persuading other countries to follow suit.  Some corporations, such as Exxon, 
engaged in research in order to anticipate and possibly take advantage of proposed 
legislation, but it is naïve to think that, without government leadership and coercion, 
corporations would or even could act in the long-term public interest. 
 
 In addition to curbing momentum on GHG mitigation, the National Academy of 
Sciences report also established the subjects, perspectives and directions of future debate: 
various climatic phenomena remain unexplained and some scientific evidence is still 
contested; future generations will be wealthier and better placed to deal with global heating; 
adaptation is cheaper and easier than mitigation; it is easier to discuss and deal with local 
problems than to address 'the CO2 problem'; climate change will be one of many future 
impacts on society, so undue emphasis on it is misplaced; any single country would be 
 
47 Barry Jones, Sleepers, Wake!, 4th ed. (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1995) 246-256. 
48 China's CO2 emissions overtook America's in about 2007. 
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unwise to act alone; and the costs of addressing climate change must be acceptable to 
consumers.       
 
Postscript 
 What about the relevant and successful policies noted above, such as those to combat air 
pollution?  Nearly half a century after the Clean Air Act, more Americans – 43.3 percent – 
than ever are now living in areas with unhealthy air.  Besides population growth, the 
overwhelming reason is climate change.49  Days with high concentrations of ground-level 
ozone (intensified by hot, sunny weather) are more frequent, as are days with high particulate 
pollution (exacerbated by windblown dust, and smoke from bushfires).  Climate change is 
already negating the hard-won successes of existing pollution laws. 
 
Climate change before global heating – deforestation and desiccation 
 The above account concentrates largely on the period following World War II, but our 
forebears have known about climate change since at least the 300s BCE.  Probably the first to 
write about the effects of human activity on climate was Theophrastus, an associate and then 
successor of Aristotle at the Lyceum in Athens.  Theophrastus noted that activities such as 
deforestation – which he linked to declining rainfall – and drainage could influence the 
climate of entire regions.  He observed that around Larisa, the chief city in Thessaly (northern 
Greece), there used to be a lake and other bodies of water.  When these were drained the 
region became colder and frosts more common, and the area was no longer able to sustain 
large olive trees.  The country around Philippi, in eastern Macedonia, became warmer after 
being drained and deforested.  Agriculture had been rendered impossible on Crete following 
extensive deforestation.50  Richard Grove applauds Theophrastus's 'precocious theories of 
desiccation' but notes that they do not seem to have motivated any ancient government to 




49 The State of the Air 2019, a report of the American Lung Association.  
50 Theophrastus, De causis plantarum, 5.14.2-5; De ventis, 13.  For a good overview see J. Donald Hughes, 
'Theophrastus as Ecologist', Environmental Review, vol. 9, no. 4 (winter, 1985) 296-306. 
51 Richard H. Grove, Ecology, Climate and Empire (Cambridge: White Horse Press, 1997) 44, and Green 
Imperialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 20. 
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Colonial climate change 
 Indeed, ideas about human-induced climate change do not reappear until the initial 
period of European colonialism in the early 1400s.  Spanish and Portuguese seizure of 
Atlantic islands – Madeira, the Canary Islands and the Azores – resulted in widespread 
clearing of forests.  According to his son and biographer, Ferdinand, Christopher Columbus 
knew 'from experience' that deforestation had reduced rainfall and mist on these islands.  He 
feared the same result if forests were removed from Caribbean islands.52  This was probably 
the first post-classical reference to desiccation caused by deforestation, and the forerunner of 
many over the following four centuries.53 
 
 There are a number of reasons for the importance of this period with reference to current 
thinking about climate change.  The first is that people were able to observe the rapidity with 
which their activities changed the environment.  Global heating is incremental and largely 
imperceptible, and much of Western Europe had long been deforested,54 but the newly 
exploited tropical landscapes were largely intact.  The deleterious effects of land-clearing on 
unspoiled regions were quickly evident.  This was a significant factor in promoting the 
influence of natural scientists whereby colonial governments became susceptible to pressure 
from this early environmental lobby.         
 
 Second, observations of landscape destruction stimulated dramatic growth of scientific 
interest in desiccation theories.  This led to large-scale forest conservation programs, 
 
52 Kenneth Thompson, 'Forests and Climate Change in America: Some Early Views', Climatic Change, 3 
(1980) 47.  
53 Columbus and those who came before and after him were right.  Tropical rainforests can influence 
precipitation on areas hundreds of kilometres downwind.  Deforestation reduces evapotranspiration of 
moisture from vegetation and soil, thereby reducing atmospheric humidity.  A 2012 study found that air 
passing over dense forest produces at least twice as much rain as air passing over sparse vegetation.  
This study forecast reductions of 12 percent (wet season) and 21 percent (dry season) in rainfall across 
the Amazon basin by 2050 if deforestation continued at the current rate [D. V. Spracklen, S. R. Arnold 
and C. M. Taylor, 'Observations of increased tropical rainfall preceded by air passage over forests', 
Nature, vol. 489 (13 September 2012) 282-285]. 
54 For example, almost all primeval English woodlands had been removed a millennium before the Roman 
conquest in 43 CE [Christopher Taylor, Introduction and commentary in W. G. Hoskins, The Making of 
the English Landscape (Sevenoaks, Kent: Hodder and Stoughton, 1988) 8, 17. 
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particularly in French and British colonies.  For example, in 1763 Pierre Poivre, the 
superintendent of Mauritius, delivered a speech in Lyons that specifically addressed the 
climatic consequences of deforestation – probably the first ever speech on climate change.  
Shortly thereafter, newly acquired British colonies in the Caribbean set aside large areas of 
mountain terrain as forest reserves for the 'protection of the rains'.55  They were the world's 
first forest reserves established for the specific purpose of preventing climatic degradation.  
Indeed, the ordinance issued in 1765 for Barbados states that forests should be preserved 'to 
prevent that drought which in these climates is the usual consequence of a total removal of 
the woods'.56  In 1769, Poivre establish similar reserves on Mauritius.  The idea that 
governments, informed by scientific expertise, would act to address climate change is more 
than two centuries old.  
 
 The third reason follows from the second, but highlights its other face.  The absolutist 
quality of colonial government made it possible to impose land-use management schemes 
that would have been very difficult to implement in Europe.  Indeed, policies to address 
desiccation and soil erosion, and to promote sustainable agriculture, were frequently 
perceived as heavy-handed attempts to control land use, and were often resisted by 
indigenous people, non-indigenous local inhabitants and private companies.  As Richard 
Grove states, these reactions could coalesce into a typology of resistance and were sometimes 
the catalyst of significant political change.57  In practice, a few administrations – the pre-Raj 
British East India Company was one – did to some degree appreciate the value of indigenous 
expertise and local knowledge, and occasionally developed land management schemes 
accordingly.   
  
 Fourth, in the post-colonial era many governments have repeated the environmental 
blunders of their colonial predecessors, but with vastly more destructive consequences.  
These mistakes include disregard of, and disdain for, indigenous and traditional knowledge; 
industrial-scale deforestation; and the destructive imposition of 'prestige' projects such as 
dams.  It is noteworthy that colonial governments were usually aware of the tension between 
short-term capital interests and the state's long-term environmental concerns, and were often 
 
55 Grove, Ecology, 11.  Mauritius was at this time known as the Isle de France. 
56 Quoted in Grove, Green Imperialism, 271. 
57 Grove, Ecology, 1-3, 147-178. 
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prepared to override the former in favour of the latter.  Moreover, the state wanted to prevent 
or limit environmental degradation that might have undermined long-term economic and/or 
political viability.58   
 
 The fifth reason is that environmentalism, and more specifically attempts to address 
climate change, are often viewed as anti-industry and anti-capitalist, whereas the colonial 
experience was sometimes the opposite.  Ideas about conserving the environment developed 
alongside endeavours to supply the raw materials demanded by new and expanding 
industries.  So far from being anti-industry, the 18th century's nascent environmentalism was 
an essential, if sometimes awkward and unwelcome, part of Enlightened capitalism.   
 
 Further, we often regard environmental consciousness as an offspring of the Romantic 
period, conventionally dated to begin in the late 1700s as a reaction against the 'satanic mills' 
of industry.  Clearly this is incorrect: environmental discourse long predated the Romantic 
era.  It arose as an intrinsic part of scientific discourse in response to the environmentally and 
socially destructive effects of colonial rule.59  Further, an important motivation for colonial 
conservation was aesthetic: from the mid-1600s to the mid-1800s colonial discourse was 
significantly influenced by ideas of tropical Edens and Arcadias.  The works of Edmund 
Waller (1606-87), Andrew Marvell (1621-78) and John Milton (1608-74) are among many 
that invoked paradisal, Edenic or Arcadian motifs.60  There is a grim irony in the fact that 
environmental conditions in home countries were often poorer than in the colonies they 
administered and exploited. 
       
 The sixth reason is that desiccation theories lacked a global perspective, and the 
concomitant perception of scientific rigour, until about 1840.  Very few people extrapolated 
from observations of climate change on islands to the belief that similar change could occur 
on a continental or global scale.61  This began to change with the publication of Alexander 
von Humboldt's account of his travels in South America from 1799 to 1804.  The fourth 
 
58 Ibid., 184. 
59 Grove, Green Imperialism, 485-486.  
60 For example, Waller's The Battle of Summer Islands, Marvell's Bermudas and The Garden, and of 
course Milton's Paradise Lost.  See also Grove, Ecology, 184-185. 
61 Grove, Green Imperialism, 365. 
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volume (1819), published in French and immediately translated into English, contained his 
observations on the effects of deforestation in Venezuela.  Von Humboldt noted that forest 
destruction and land-clearing caused natural springs to dry up, soil erosion, flash flooding and 
'dryness of the atmosphere'.62  Thereafter, expanding inter-colonial and international contact 
between scientists reinforced the perception of a global environmental crisis.  In 1858, J. 
Spotswood Wilson delivered a paper with the indicative title 'On the General and Gradual 
Desiccation of the Earth and Atmosphere' to the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science.  Wilson raised the spectre of global climate change and concomitant human 
extinction, though did not regard widespread deforestation as a sufficient explanation for 
what he regarded as 'geological changes' to the Earth's atmosphere and water.  Wilson's paper 
marked the activation of international research and debate on global climatic processes.63           
  
 It is clear from the above that colonial environmentalism provides some salutary lessons 
for 21st century attempts to address climate change.  Governments are able to restrain the 
desire of corporations for short-term advantage in favour of a state's long-term viability.  
Governments and societies are influenced by, and may act according to, prevailing aesthetic 
ideals.  Governments are influenced by their scientists, particularly when those scientists are 
members of international research bodies that can make pronouncements of global scope and 
significance.  Governments will probably encounter less resistance by imposing 
environmental schemes on a whole country rather than on discrete communities, because 
those communities may perceive they are being bullied by outsiders – redolent of colonialism 
– who want to foist their programs on locals.64  Conversely, if governments develop schemes 
which incorporate local concerns, knowledge and expertise, the result will probably be better 
schemes that provoke less resistance.   
 
 A further point concerns the long history of action to address local effects of climate 
change in contrast to lack of action to tackle global heating.  It may be that the global 
dimension of climate change is too general and remote to arouse effective action.  Better 
results might be achieved if global heating were framed primarily in terms of local effects. 
 
62 Quoted from ibid. 367. 
63 Grove, Green Imperialism, 469-470; Ecology, 17. 
64 Recent elections in the United States and Australia, and the Brexit referendum in Britain, provide clear 




 We tend to think of climate change as a recent phenomenon, and that addressing it is 
now imperative.  This is misleading: the concept of climate change has been part of our 
collective psyche for centuries, and the imperative to do something about anthropogenic 
global heating has been recognised for over half a century.  We have noted some precedents 
for such a delay.  Here is a further example: there was half-century hiatus between knowing 
about the pain-killing properties of nitrous oxide (laughing gas) in 1795 and its use as an 
anaesthetic.  In other words, for 50 years people undergoing surgery endured excruciating 
pain, and often fatal shock, when a remedy was available.  Consider a parallel situation: 
having identified a cure for dementia, what if we failed to implement it until 2060?  The 
generations after us would want to know why, and would probably look for explanations in 
deep-seated social, political and human problems.  It is to some of these fundamental 





Madness is rare in individuals – but in groups, parties, nations and ages it is the rule.1 
 
The flood of precise information and brand-new amusements makes people smarter and more 
stupid at once.2 
 
Our civilization is not only going to be destroyed by power and avarice gone berserk but by 
sheer incompetence.3 
 
Chapter 3  
Folly: a venerable and formidable foe 
 
Overview 
 Climate change has been recognised for decades, and governments have occasionally 
listened to scientists, so why can't we seem to do much about global heating?  The reason we 
most readily invoke is that our failure constitutes a momentous act of folly.  But what is folly 
and why might recognising it be a critical step in confronting global heating?  Folly is a 
formidable entity that enjoys a venerable and celebrated heritage.  Indeed, it is folly to 
underestimate it. 
 
Folly – more than stupidity 
 Stupidity is a precursor of folly, but folly is more than stupidity.  All of us occasionally 
make stupid mistakes, but it is folly to repeat what you previously recognised as a mistake.  
Such repetition is not mandatory: it is also folly to act stupidly in situations where the 
stupidity of one's act is plain to see.  Folly is interesting, and worrying, because it appears to 
resist comprehension.  We can make sense of a poor or stupid decision by examining its 
mistaken assumptions and inaccurate weighing of factors, but rational criticism seems a wan 
instrument to shed light on a decision that a person's own experience had previously shown to 
be wrong or where that person disregarded obviously better alternatives.  Instead, folly 
 
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, #156. 
2 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, Edmund Jephcott trans. 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002) xvii. 





appears to invite psychological investigation of problems such as group-think, or political 
investigation of matters such as conflicts of interest, or simply head-scratching despair.  It is 
hardly surprising, then, to find that folly has received little attention from philosophers, 
though stupidity has been less neglected.4  It is to stupidity, therefore, that we first turn.  
 
Kant: stupidity as erroneous judgement 
 Immanuel Kant's explanation of stupidity is relevant to at least one important aspect of 
the current debate about climate change.  Kant regarded stupidity as a deficiency of 
judgement:  
 
The power of judgement is a special talent which cannot be taught … the absence of 
which cannot be remedied by any schooling. … Deficiency in the power of 
judgment is really what we call stupidity, and there is no remedy for that.5  
 
In Kant's transcendental schema, understanding is the capacity to form concepts or rules, and 
judgment is the capacity to apply them – that is, to judge whether something falls under a 
given rule.  Understanding is capable of being educated and better equipped with concepts, 
whereas judgment cannot be taught; one either has it or lacks it.  As Kant notes, this is why a 
judge may know a lot of juridical rules, and may even be able to teach them, but still blunders 
in applying them.  For our purposes, the attraction of Kant's view is that it can explain at least 
some acts of folly: if I lack innate judgment, and if I erroneously judge that something applies 
under a given concept, then it will not be surprising if I repeat that mistake.   
 
Errors of judgement 
 For example, one principle that attracts a surfeit of erroneous judgment is freedom of 
speech.  In America this freedom is protected under the first amendment of the Constitution.  
In essence, freedom of speech safeguards a person's right to criticise institutions and people 
who are more powerful than she or he is.  Given that governments and powerful individuals 
 
4 Probably the most famous work on the subject is Praise of Folly by Erasmus.  This is largely a satire on 
society, an attack on church dignitaries and theologians, and an appeal to simple Christian piety.  It is not 
an analysis of folly itself.  




and organisations are able to criticise with near impunity, when they complain about freedom 
of speech we can be fairly sure they are not referring to the same principle to which the rest 
of us refer.  Their abuse of the principle distorts its legitimate application.  For example, 
some have interpreted freedom of speech to include the right to harass women at the entrance 
to abortion clinics.  In response, various courts have ruled that anti-abortion proponents may 
not encroach within a specified distance from a clinic.  Proponents have interpreted these 
rulings as restrictions on their constitutional or legal freedom to express their opinion.  Kant's 
view would be that these people lack judgment.  Even if they possessed a sound theoretical 
grasp of free speech, they are incorrect in categorising their activities under it.  For Kant, 
freedom of speech concerned a citizen's public right to discuss and criticise laws and 
complain about injustice, and the freedom to publish those criticisms and complaints.6  Kant 
was particularly alert to suppression of public freedoms, having himself been temporally 
banned from lecturing and publishing on religion.  His response to those who protest outside 
abortion clinics would be that they misunderstand the concept of free speech.  They already 
possess and exercise this freedom in that they are allowed to criticise governments about, and 
publish their views on, abortion, but they are simply wrong if they further maintain that this 
freedom includes the right to bully those with whom they disagree.    
 
 What about appealing to Kant's view that an individual should refuse to comply with a 
law that, if obeyed, would compel that person to act immorally?  This does not justify 
harassing women, because those campaigning against abortion are not being compelled to do 
anything.  The state is not prescribing abortion, merely allowing it.  Moreover, Kant would 
condemn the use of coercion, let alone violence, to resist something that the state permits.7 
 
 Appeals to free speech are frequently made by those who oppose taking action on 
climate change.  For example, David Whitehouse (an astrophysicist who is a global heating 
sceptic) rejects the view that 'free speech does not extend to misleading the public by making 
factually inaccurate statements'.  He notes that the principle of free speech, which took 
millennia and cost many lives to achieve, 'does not mean that you have to be factually 
 
6 For a good summary see Peter P. Nicholson, 'Kant, Revolutions and History' in Essays on Kant's Political 
Philosophy, Howard Lloyd Williams ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) 249-268. 
7 Nicholson, 251. 
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accurate'.8  Again, Kant would respond that Whitehouse lacks judgment.  Kant certainly 
agrees that attainment of free speech was a long and costly struggle, but would add that 
Whitehouse misses the point.  The struggle was sustained and difficult because it was against, 
and about the right to criticise, more powerful bodies – the state or various institutions.  It had 
nothing to do with the 'right' to mislead fellow citizens.9  Whitehouse is attempting to 
conflate the struggle against action on climate change with the struggle for free speech.   
 
Hume on obtuseness 
 Deficiency of judgement is usually accompanied by obtuseness: if you lack judgement 
then you probably won't realise how obtuse you are.  A good example was the forum in 
which leading climate scientist Stephen Schneider answered questions from an audience of 
52 climate change sceptics.  Schneider more than satisfactorily answered every question put 
to him, yet by the conclusion of debate only two people had tentatively changed their views.10  
David Hume – qua historian rather than philosopher – would not have been surprised.  In his 
History of England he notes there are certain matters about which some people will never 
change their mind:  
 
There are indeed three events in our history which may be regarded as touchstones 
of party-men.  An English whig who asserts the reality of the Popish plot, an Irish 
Catholic who denies the massacre in 1641, and a Scotch Jacobite who maintains the 
 
8 Whitehouse is quoted by Ian Johnston in 'Climate-change sceptic says they should have right to "mislead 
public" because of free speech', The Independent (30 March 2017). 
9 Similarly, those who regard compulsory wearing of face masks (to prevent infecting others with Covid-
19) as an infringement on their civil liberties are appealing to the wrong category.  A government's 
directive to wear masks is no more an infringement on personal liberty than a law to obey speed limits.  In 
both cases the government is rightly deciding that your desires – to drive as fast as you want, or not to 
wear a mask – carry less weight than the rights of other people not to be killed by your dangerous driving 
or be infected by you.  As John Stuart Mill stated, 'the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others' ['On 
Liberty' in On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) 14].           




innocence of Queen Mary, must be considered as men beyond the reach of argument 
or reason, and must be left to their prejudices.11 
 
Three modern equivalents might be: a neo-nazi who asserts that The Protocols of the Elders 
of Zion is factual, an Australian 'nationalist' who denies that indigenous people were 
massacred at Myall Creek, and a communist who maintains that Stalin is innocent of 
Trotsky's assassination.  A comparable fourth might be: people who regard climate change as 
a green plot.   
 
 Hume's point, however, is somewhat confused: if I am a member of a faction or party 
then it would be unsurprising if I maintained the beliefs of that group.  Perhaps, though, the 
point is cumulative: being a member of a party entails that I endorse its beliefs, or most of 
them, and if I also maintain its more outrageous beliefs then I am probably a 'true believer' 
and thereby very unlikely to be swayed by rational, factual argument.  Is true belief of this 
sort a form of stupidity?  Not necessarily, though it can degenerate into stupidity.  For 
example, among the many people who were true believers in Soviet communism, including 
its more outrageous claims, were some very smart people who exercised a good deal of 
critical acumen in formulating their views, but once these views were consolidated their 
intellect failed to prevent them from believing, or at least affirming, patent lies.12  
 
 In general, a person is surely engaging in a form of stupidity to the degree that his or her 
beliefs are not based on fact, where facts are readily available, and reasoned argument.  In 
other words, that person cannot provide a rational justification for holding those beliefs.  
According to Hume, there is nothing to be done with such people other than allowing them to 
wallow in their prejudices.  The parallels with those who deny climate change, such as the 
audience which rebuffed Stephen Schneider, are obvious.  
 
11 David Hume, The History of England, vol. I, part D, From Elizabeth to James I, (Project Gutenberg 
EBook – originally published 1754-1762) note N, p. 111.  The Popish plot of 1678 was a fiction about a 
Jesuit conspiracy to assassinate Charles II.  The massacre of 1641 was of about 2,000 Protestant settlers in 
Ireland; it provided fodder for English propaganda and Cromwell's reprisals of 1649-50.  Hume's third 
example is less convincing: it is likely, but not certain, that Mary Queen of Scots was complicit in the 
murder of her husband, Lord Darnley.    
12 Such as the claim that Soviet citizens enjoyed a free press and freedom of religion.  These were 'patent 
lies' because there was ample evidence to prove otherwise.   
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Epistemic efficacy and vitality of stupidity 
 Can stupidity be useful?  Catherine Elgin has argued that stupid people may occasionally 
know more about something than smart people.  She uses the imagined example of Sherlock 
Holmes and Dr Watson sighting what looks like a superb starling in London.  Holmes knows 
that this distinctive and brightly coloured bird is a native of equatorial Africa, not Britain, and 
so concludes that it is more likely to be a vividly marked local bird.  Watson knows what a 
superb starling looks like, but does not know where it comes from and, unlike Holmes, does 
not understand the complex statistical correlation of avian colouring with temperature of 
habitat.  Watson concludes that the bird is indeed a superb starling.  He is right; this bird has 
escaped from London Zoo.  Holmes is wrong; his broader and cleverer purview has misled 
him.  According to Elgin, Watson's ignorance put him at an epistemic advantage: 'Watson's 
ignorance thus enables him to know what Holmes cannot'.  Further, Watson's inability to 
comprehend or appreciate the statistical correlation means that 'his stupidity, not just his 
ignorance' have enabled him to know something that is unknown by his more intelligent 
colleague.13  
 
 There are several fundamental problems with Elgin's argument.  The most significant is 
her too-limited understanding of both ignorance and stupidity.  Ignorance is not merely lack 
of knowledge about something.  For example, if I don't know that increasing the proportion 
of atmospheric CO2 will lead to higher global temperatures, then I can rectify my ignorance 
by, say, reading a scientific report on climate change.  But what if I simply do not want to 
know, because I could not be bothered or do not want to know anything that could 
compromise my affluent lifestyle?  At this point my ignorance is more than merely not 
knowing: it has acquired a moral dimension.  For instance, if we said to Watson, 'Your 
knowledge of birds is rather scanty', he might reply, 'I'm not much interested in birds, so I 
don't care to know more'.  Our response would probably be, 'Ah, that's all right then'.  On the 
other hand, if we said to a latter day Watson, 'Your knowledge of climate change is rather 
scanty', and he replied, 'I'm not much interested in it, so I don't care to know more', our 
response would not be, 'Ah, that's all right then'.  Rather, our sharp retort would be, 'Well, 
 




you ought to be more interested and you should try to know more'.14  In this example, it is 
possible that Watson might get fewer facts wrong than somebody who is campaigning to 
address climate change but whose grasp of the science is rather haphazard.  Is Watson, 
therefore, at an epistemic advantage over that person?  Not unless we allow that 'epistemic 
advantage' can include being intentionally and irresponsibly ignorant about a subject that 
demands epistemic commitment.   
 
 But how much commitment?  Elgin rightly asserts that one cannot know everything 
about a subject – birds and climate change are just two among myriad inexhaustible areas – 
so some or even a lot of information about a subject must necessarily be ignored.  After all, 
not even a climate scientist could make a statement about global heating if we demanded she 
know all there is to know about it before making a statement.  What, though, is the difference 
between the necessity to ignore information and latter day Watson's intentional ignorance?  
This difference is not a subjective assessment: we have already rejected the view that blithe 
ignorance about climate change is acceptable.  Elgin argues that the epistemic community 
decides what is important and how much is enough to know, and that 'epistemic resources 
count as accessible if they are available to normal members of the community'.15  Elgin is 
right, but her assertion also conceals a problem with acceptable knowledge of issues wherein 
the epistemic community's values and so on are largely irrelevant.  For example, if the 
community construes a certain level of knowledge about climate change as 'adequate', but 
that level is inadequate to address the issue – because it fails to motivate appropriate action or 
generate creative inquiry and so on – then the epistemic community is irrelevant (or plain 
wrong), not because it cannot construe epistemic standards but because those standards are 
clearly deficient in being fundamentally out of kilter with the scientific evidence they purport 
to understand. 
 
 There is a further, and related, matter.  The epistemic community not only decides what 
information is important but also, often inadvertently, locates the moral gravity of an issue.  If 
 
14 This dialogue is modelled on a similar exchange in Wittgenstein's 'A Lecture on Ethics', in Philosophical 
Occasions 1912-1951 (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1993) 38-39. 
15 Elgin, 308.  Elgin cites Gilbert Harman as the inspiration for this idea, but before Harman the idea of 
socially construed epistemic standards had been addressed by Wittgenstein in the Philosophical 
Investigations – particularly #241-242 – and in On Certainty. 
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the community demands a very high level of epistemic engagement with climate change, this 
level also (indeed necessarily) implies a moral statement.  In other words, this is not merely a 
demand for adequate scientific literacy – such as the expectation that people know they live 
in a heliocentric solar system and that Earth is more than 10,000 years old – of the sort that 
does not necessarily (or at all) imply a moral imperative.  Rather, this very high level of 
engagement is itself a moral imperative.  Why?  Because the overriding reason for the high 
epistemic level is to stimulate appropriate action to address climate change.  If anybody were 
to argue that this is not a moral imperative, there is an obvious retort: if we know what 
climate change entails, and we know the consequences of failing to act, and we do nothing, 
then we are morally culpable.  To suggest otherwise would be much the same as arguing that, 
if I saw a child wandering towards a busy road, my observation would not necessarily imply 
a moral imperative to act.  To the contrary, my observation clearly does entail an obligation, 
otherwise I have a pathological misunderstanding of the form of life in which I live and 
communicate, and in which children are implicitly protected.16  Indeed, to argue otherwise 
about children would be to misunderstand what an argument is.17  In this light, the venerable 
philosophical problem of whether an is can ever imply an ought seems rather jejune.18                                                             
 
 There is another, fundamentally important, problem with Elgin's argument: her equation 
of stupidity with an incapacity to understand something.  Watson cannot grasp a statistical 
analysis of bird colouration, but that does not entail he is stupid.  Indeed, most people 
struggle with statistics, even those who are supposed to understand them.  For example, staff 
and students of Harvard Medical School were asked the following: if a disease has a 
prevalence rate of 1 in 1,000, and if the test for it is 95 percent accurate (5 percent of results 
are false positives), what is the chance you have this disease if your test is positive?  About 
 
16 The term 'form of life' (Lebensform) is Wittgenstein's.  It refers to the intertwining of language, world-
view and culture that forms the ground upon which we communicate and invest our lives with meaning.  
For an overview, see Hans-Johann Glock, A Wittgenstein Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) 124-129.       
17 In brief, a debate should be about debateable matters, such as the appropriate level of funding for 
government schools.  There can be no real debate with people who deny the Holocaust, for example, as if 
the existence of these events were a debateable subject.           
18 As Ronald Kramer and Raymond Michalowski argue, our knowledge of climate change entails not only 
that we ought to address it but that it should be a crime not to do so, as it would be a crime if I allowed the 
child to wander onto the road ['Is Global Warming a State-Corporate Crime?' in Climate Change from a 
Criminological Perspective, Rob White, ed. (New York: Springer, 2012) 84]. 
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half of respondents thought the answer was 95 percent.  Fewer than one-fifth gave the correct 
answer of 2 percent.19  According to Elgin's criteria, this means four-fifths of Harvard 
Medical School are stupid.  This is unlikely, so either Elgin's example of statistics is a poor 
choice or, more likely, she overlooks an essential element of stupidity – absence of reason.  
You are not stupid if you fail a statistical test, but might be if you do something, or make a 
decision, that is patently irrational.   
 
 For example, in the 2016 presidential election the citizens of Whitley County, Kentucky, 
voted overwhelmingly for Donald Trump.  This was surprising because the number of 
Whitely citizens without medical insurance had declined dramatically under the Affordable 
Care Act ('Obamacare'), and because during the campaign Trump and the Republican Party 
said they would repeal this program.  When asked why they voted for Trump, given that so 
many relied on Obamacare and they were well informed about Trump's intention, people said 
they 'simply felt' he couldn't repeal a law that had done so much good for them: 'We all need 
it … You can't get rid of it'; 'I guess I thought that … he would not take health insurance 
away, knowing it would affect so many people's lives.'20  In other words, when people 
weighed two competing factors – voting in their own interests to retain something that is 
important to them, versus voting against their own interests in the vague hope that Trump 
would not do what he and his party clearly promised to do – they chose the latter.21  This is 
stupidity.  If in 2020 they again knowingly vote against their own interests, again in the 
irrational hope that a candidate will not do what he promises to do, stupidity will have 
evolved into folly.  
 
Education: a safeguard from stupidity? 
 Can we safeguard society from stupidity?  Surely a better-educated population would be 
less likely to commit acts of stupidity than a less-educated one.  This is clearly not the case.  
 
19 If 1,000 people are tested for the disease, there will be 50 – 5 percent – false positives and 1 correct 
positive result – 1 in 1,000 – so your chance of having the disease is 1 in 51, which is very slightly less 
than 2 percent.  The example is from Stuart Sutherland, Irrationality (London: Penguin Books, 1994) 208.  
Sutherland appositely concludes: 'Clearly high intelligence does not protect against making gross errors.'   
20 Sarah Kliff, 'Why Obamacare enrolees voted for Trump', Vox (13 December 2016). 
21 Note that people often vote against their own interests, but they do so in favour of the greater good.  This 
was clearly not the case for Whitley citizens.  
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For example, if we consider countries such as Australia, Britain and the United States, their 
respective citizenries are now vastly better educated than they were, say, at the close of 
World War II.  However, nobody could pretend that public or political discourse have 
similarly improved over that period.  To the contrary, there appears to be an inverse 
relationship between a society's general level of education and the quality of its public and 
political discourse.22  We might accept that better education does not preclude stupidity, but it 
seems perverse, and rather deflating, to think that education might compound stupidity.  
However, as René ten Bos observes, it 'can be very stupid' for a society or organisation to 
strive for intelligence.23  Ten Bos cites the age-old view that too much intelligence can hinder 
a person's capacity to make a decision.  The intelligent person entertains genuine and realistic 
doubts, rejecting any simple binary division of the world – black and white, us and them, and 
so on – preferring to engage with the more complex and nuanced grey areas of existence.  
However, 'the price this person has to pay for his or her unmistakeable intelligence is 
practical paralysis: no knot will ever be cut easily'.24  For organisations, too much intelligence 
can generate its own forms of stupidity.  Ergo, an organisation's quest to raise the 'intellectual 
IQ' of its people might well backfire.  Universities, for example, are full of highly intelligent 
people, yet they are usually administrative quagmires.25  In short, the idea that stupidity will 
disappear through additional 'inputs' of rationality and intelligence might itself be stupid.   
 
 Indeed, the notion that we can safeguard society from stupidity assumes that stupidity 
can and should be overcome.  To the contrary, ten Bos argues that some stupidity is vital if an 
organisation or society is to function properly.  This is because wisdom and stupidity – 
'wisdom's little stepbrother' – are entwined: some kinds of knowledge can be stupid.26  For 
example, modern strategic warning systems have become more sophisticated and intelligent, 
but to what end?  These systems are designed and developed to protect us from high-level 
 
22 Confirmation of this hypothesis is the famous series of debates between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen 
Douglas during the 1858 US senatorial campaign.  At that time, only a tiny percentage of Americans 
possessed a university education, yet the quality of these debates was immeasurably superior to any 
presidential/political debate of the last four or more decades.       
23 René ten Bos, 'The Vitality of Stupidity', Social Epistemology, vol. 21, no. 2 (April-June 2007) 140. 
24 Ibid., 141. 
25 In my experience as a low-level university administrator, programs to increase the intellectual calibre of 
administrators – by hiring more-qualified staff – resulted in more-glutinous quagmires.      
26 ten Bos, 139, 145.  Note that ten Bos tends to use 'intelligence' and 'wisdom' interchangeably.   
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threats.  In practice, the more successful and investigatively powerful they are the better able 
they are able to draw attention to comparatively obscure and lower level dangers – or non-
dangers such as Dr Haneef 27– but in doing so they divert attention from real and pressing 
dangers such as climate change, pollution and domestic violence.28  In other words, the 
increasing cleverness of these systems can produce increasingly irrelevant – or stupid – 
results.  An unfortunate consequence of this situation is that, when simple and efficient 
solutions are enunciated to address a problem, they are often dismissed because they lack the 
complexity and sophistication we have (stupidly) come to regard as hallmarks of an effective 
solution.29   
  
 For example, probably the most effective way to reduce CO2 emissions is through a 
carbon tax, and the simplest and least unpopular way of levying such a tax is by making it 
revenue-neutral, often referred to as a 'fee-and-dividend' system.  The simple rationale behind 
it is that fossil fuels are taxed at a certain rate per tonne of CO2-equivalent.  The revenue 
collected is then distributed equitably to citizens and businesses.30  Ergo, if you use less fuel 
than the average person or business you will be receive back more money than you paid in 
tax.  British Columbia introduced a version of the tax-and-dividend scheme in 2008, the first 
comprehensive carbon tax in North America.  The scheme has been a success, reducing the 
province's emissions, encouraging its transition to a low-carbon economy, and becoming 
increasingly popular as its carbon price rose.31  A 2014 study showed that if a tax-and-
dividend scheme were introduced in the United States, more jobs would be created than the 
baseline expectation, emissions would be substantially reduced, and there would be fewer 
 
27 Dr Mohamed Haneef was arrested at Brisbane Airport in 2007 and held for 12 days without charge.  He 
was the innocent victim of a complex data collection system that assembled a few vaguely related facts 
into a non-existent terrorist connection.   
28 One might add that these systems had very mixed success in warning about Covid-19.  
29 With domestic violence, for example, only a few states in America – none in Australia – have legislated 
for mandatory reporting by veterinarians of actual and suspected animal abuse, despite the long-
established link between animal abuse and domestic violence [Allie Phillips, Understanding The Link 
between Violence to Animals and People (Alexandria, VA: National District Attorneys Association, 
2014)].   
30 Though adjustments are usually made for low-income earners and people in rural areas.  
31 See Brian Murray and Nicholas Rivers, 'British Columbia’s revenue-neutral carbon tax: A review of the 
latest "grand experiment" in environmental policy', Energy Policy, vol. 86 (November 2015) 674-683. 
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premature deaths caused by air pollution.32  The benefits from, and simplicity of, a tax-and-
dividend scheme are clear, yet to date no other jurisdiction except Switzerland has adopted it.  
Instead, most prefer 'cap-and-trade' schemes of such eye-watering complexity and fiscal 
prestidigitation that they can operate 'successfully' within jurisdictions yet have nearly no 
effect on reducing aggregate global carbon emissions.33   
 
 What, then, about Trump supporters in Whitely County?  Would a hefty dose of 
rationality and intelligence have helped them to vote more wisely?  Probably not; we have 
already noted that attempts to augment rationality and intelligence might themselves be 
stupid.  Moreover, the county's votes were largely based on intangible or cultural criteria – 
such as invoking an industrialised past to 'make America great again' – that are often immune 
from rational argument.34  Ten Bos notes that stupidity has usually been understood as a lack 
– of knowledge, comprehension and so on – whereas it might sometimes be better understood 
as an excess – such as overthinking or unnecessary activity.35  Whitely voters appear to be a 
good illustration of such excess: they would have made a wiser choice if they had thought 
less about extraneous matters and more about simple self-interest. 
 
 One point to emerge from this discussion is that stupidity usually prefers complexity.  In 
and of itself complexity is not stupid, and over-simplifying complex situations can be stupid, 
but it is easier for stupidity to hide in a complex environment.  Over-simplification is often 
easy to detect, but a stupid decision in a complex system can remain hidden until it has 
infected the whole.  For example, during the Covid-19 pandemic a Victorian government 
official decided to use untrained, unskilled private security guards to monitor quarantine in 
Melbourne's hotels.  It was a patently stupid decision with fatal consequences.  A subsequent 
inquiry found that no-one, elected or appointed, in the government knew who made the 
 
32 Scott Nystrom and Patrick Luckow, The Economic, Climate, Fiscal, Power, and Demographic Impact of 
a National Fee-and-Dividend Carbon Tax (Washington DC: REMI and Synapse, 2014). 
33 Australia introduced a hybrid tax-and-dividend scheme in 2012.  Unfortunately, the additional 
complexity made the scheme both harder to sell and easier to target.    
34 It is interesting that philosophy which delves too deeply into the 'mysteries of the universe' and thereby 
becomes 'otherworldly' and 'impractical' is condemned by ten Bos as stupid.  I think ten Bos is overstating 
the matter, but his point (which I accept) is that a high level of rationality can be compatible with a high 
level of stupidity [ten Bos, 139]. 
35 ten Bos, 146. 
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decision.  The Byzantine complexity of Victoria's health and security systems entailed that an 
unidentified person could make a stupid decision that was not detected until its consequences 
were beyond recovery.  We are now on the cusp of folly.                             
 
Folly – three criteria 
 In The March of Folly, Barbara Tuchman investigates how apparently sane groups of 
people can make, and continue to make, patently stupid decisions.  She provides three criteria 
necessary for a decision to be labelled as folly.36  The first is that the decision was perceived 
as counter-productive at the time it was made.  Governments make plenty of stupid decisions, 
but some of these can be seen as counter-productive only in hindsight; few people or none 
might have forecast that a given decision would produce results that counteracted the intent.37  
The second is that a feasible alternative must have been available – and, I would add, known 
to have been available – at the time a decision was made.  A decision can hardly be called 
folly if there were no alternative, or if the alternatives were so onerous that most governments 
would not have been able to persuade their citizens that any of those alternatives was 
possible.  The third criterion is that the decision was made by a group, and not be the lunacy 
of an irrational individual.  The folly of mercurial dictators is not strictly relevant to this 
discussion because alternative views are rarely enunciated.  On the other hand, even within a 
democracy a group may be so dominated by an individual, or a dogma, that decisions can be 
made, and repeated, with which few in that group would personally agree.  
  
 Tuchman provides some historically significant examples of folly, such as the war for 
American independence, but commonplace examples are no less illustrative.  For instance, in 
2016 the New South Wales government wanted money to spend on infrastructure projects, 
and so decided to raise funds by privatising the state's land titles registry.  The government 
was amply warned for the following reasons that the registry should not be privatised: it was 
 
36 Barbara Tuchman, The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam (London: Abacus, Sphere Books, 1985) 
4. 
37 A good example would be decisions made to address 'stagflation' in the 1970s, wherein economic 
stagnation and high unemployment were unexpectedly accompanied by high inflation.  The situation was 
anomalous and its causes were largely unknown – they are still not well understood – so it is hardly 
surprising that governments made decisions which exacerbated the conditions they were intended to 
ameliorate.      
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a government-owned business that made a clear profit $130 million annually; similar 
decisions in Canada had led to tripling or even quadrupling of fees for registry services; and 
privatisation would jeopardise security of titles because the new owner/lessee would be more 
interested in profits than administrative precision.38  As if to facilitate the last-mentioned 
reason, the government enacted staff redundancies in an attempt to make the registry more 
attractive to potential buyers.  This loss of expertise coincided with the biggest error in the 
registry's history when it allowed more than 200 families to purchase properties that lay in the 
path of a future freeway.39  The registry was eventually leased for 35 years, for which the 
government received $2.6 billion, a trivial amount given that the registry would earn more 
than $4.5 billion (not adjusted for inflation) over that period.  As a former surveyor-general 
said, 'The government has had an attack of madness'.40  Further, not all of the money raised 
was to be spent on essential, and non-controversial, infrastructure like hospitals and schools.  
More than $1 billion was allocated for upgrading three sports stadiums, thereby ensuring 
even less public sympathy for the scheme.  By what other means might the government have 
raised the money to fund its projects?  It could simply have borrowed the money or issued 
bonds.  In either case the interest on $2.6 billion would be much less than the profit earned by 
the registry.  The entire episode is a paradigm of folly.    
 
Other characteristics of folly 
 In addition to the three primary criteria, there are several other important, and related, 
characteristics of folly.41  Not all of them are present in all acts of folly.  The first is 
continuous over-reaction to various situations.  As I write, Australia's government has been 
over-reacting to matters of perceived border security for about two decades.  This policy was 
probably intended as a vote-winner, but it has subsequently degenerated into folly.  The 
problems with over-reaction include irrational allocation of resources.  In Australia, border 
security is extravagantly funded, even though breaches of it pose very little danger to the 
public, whereas projects to mitigate climate change are allocated paltry amounts.  More 
 
38 'Experts say NSW land titles registry sell-off a disaster', Government News (24 February 2017). 
39 Esther Han, 'NSW Government's F6 property bungle caused by haste to privatise Land and Property 
Information Unit, say former staff', Sydney Morning Herald (3 November 2016). 
40 Esther Han, 'NSW Government refuses to debate the land titles registry sale and the F6 property bungle' 
Sydney Morning Herald (14 November 2016). 
41 Tuchman, 470-473. 
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importantly, over-reaction rapidly increases and expands under its own momentum.  'Border 
security' soon encompasses issues that have little or nothing to do with borders or security, 
but the label provides governments with a handy and expanding range of matters with which 
to accuse opposition parties and critics of being 'weak' on protecting the country.  Momentum 
is maintained by an avalanche of exaggeration and cliché.  'Better safe than sorry' is 
commandeered as a policy position for border security, but not for climate change.       
 
 Another characteristic is the absence of reflective thought on what we are doing and 
whether we are achieving what we want to achieve.  For example, during the global financial 
crisis America's biggest car manufacturers – General Motors, Ford and Chrysler – wanted 
public money to prop up their ailing companies.  Their CEOs went to Washington to plead 
their case, but each flew there in his company's private jet.42  It simply never occurred to 
these men, nor to their senior management, that appealing for taxpayer funds from the seat of 
a corporate jet would undermine their mission and credibility. 
 
 There is also what Tuchman calls 'wooden-headedness' – the inability to acknowledge, 
let alone accept, facts that plainly contradict one's position.  Some of the most egregious 
examples occurred during World War I.  The Third Battle of Ypres – better known as 
Passchendaele – began on 31 July 1917.  In preparing for this offensive, Field Marshall 
Douglas Haig and his staff ignored political advice, military intelligence warning that the 
enemy expected an offensive, meteorological forecasts of heavy rain, and warnings that a 
preliminary artillery bombardment would both alert the Germans to an impending attack and 
destroy the area's complex drainage system.43  Haig ordered the offensive to proceed, but it 
was immediately bogged in a sea of mud.  By early November, British and Dominion 
casualties were over 300,000 – Germany lost about a third fewer – and all that had been 
achieved was a small salient jutting awkwardly into enemy territory.  When the German army 
launched its spring offensive in 1918, the British abandoned this salient and withdrew to a 
 
42 'Big Three CEOs Flew Private Jets to Plead for Public Funds', ABC News (19 November 2008).  




more defensible position – behind the line from which Third Ypres began.  Haig's battle had 
achieved less than nothing.44                          
 
 Wooden-headedness is a significant problem for most governments.  Once a government 
has made a decision about a contentious matter, it will often defend its position even in the 
face of irrefutable evidence that this decision was wrong, and even though by maintaining its 
position the government is knowingly acting against its own and its citizens' best interests.  
For some governments, fear of 'losing face', of having to admit it was wrong, holds more 
sway than the desire to act reasonably and responsibly.  As rational parliamentary debate 
continues to decline, and as opinion dominates fact in what remains, manifestations of 
wooden-headedness are likely to increase.45     
  
Illusion of omnipotence 
 Perhaps the most critical of these additional characteristics of folly is the illusion of 
omnipotence.  A good example was the illusion of national potency and invulnerably fostered 
by America's successes in World War II and Korea.  This mirage was exposed when America 
intervened in Vietnam, where conflicts and problems were not amenable to solution by 
overwhelming force or strategies that had hitherto been successful.  There are at least two 
reasons that make the illusion of omnipotence especially dangerous.  The first is that it inverts 
the normal logical progression from question to answer.  Instead of examining a situation and 
asking how we might fix it, omnipotence provides us with a convenient collection of answers 
to which we then search for suitable questions.  If a country possesses overwhelming military 
power, its response to a novel situation is more likely to be with questions of how much 
power to apply to that situation rather than a genuine attempt to understand it and then do 
something appropriate.   
  
 The second reason is an offshoot of the first: if a country's past success has been based 
on technological superiority then it is more likely to tackle novel situations with a 
technological 'fix' rather than a more appropriate response.  To consider Vietnam again, both 
 
44 For a brief account see A. J. P. Taylor, The First World War (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1963) 146-
148. 
45 In my experience of parliaments, fear of being accused of committing a policy 'back-flip' or 'about face' 
is one of the most debilitating constraints on good governance.      
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Barbara Tuchman46 and Ronald Aronson47 provide insightful analyses of America's 
involvement, but neither mentions its infatuation with technological fixes.  This infatuation 
reached its peak during the Vietnam War (1965-1973), intensified by the acme of successful 
technology – America's Apollo space program.  In 1969, just eight years after President 
Kennedy issued his challenge about landing a man on the moon, American technology 
achieved what many (including many in the space industry) had thought impossible.  The 
message was hard to resist: if American know-how could conquer the moon, then subduing 
an apparently insignificant country like North Vietnam presented little challenge.   
 
 Besides military failure, this Apollo-powered illusion spawned two critical 
misapprehensions.  Firstly, all sectors of US technology bathed in reflected lunar glory, 
thereby diverting attention from the reality that many American industries, such as 
automobile manufacturing, were technologically obsolete.  The second was that the program's 
success masked its limitations.  By definition the program's goal was other worldly; its 
application to terrestrial matters was very limited.  Though the program was often justified by 
claiming it invented or fostered many spin-off technologies, such as freeze-dried food, these 
claims are usually overstated48 and they miss a vital point: if an Apollo program's worth of 
brain power and money were directed towards socially useful technologies then the number 
of spin-off inventions, and concomitant benefits to society, would have been vastly more.49  
In short, America's technological success was a harbinger not of prosperity but rather of its 





46 Tuchman, 290-474. 
47 Ronald Aronson, The Dialectics of Disaster (London: Verso, 1983) 137-187. 
48 For example, freeze-drying was used in World War II.  This technique was adapted to and popularized 
by the Apollo program. 
49 The Lucas Plan of the mid-1970s is a notable example.  The plan was formulated by employees of Lucas 
Aerospace, a weapons producer, in anticipation of cuts to Britain's defence budget.  The idea was to 
preserve jobs by using the company's technical expertise to develop socially useful products.  Employees 
put forward ideas for 150 products in categories such as medical equipment, energy conservation and 
robotics.  The plan was rejected by Lucas management.  The company no longer exists [Brian Salisbury 
and Phil Asquith, 'The Lucas Plan, Then And Now', Morning Star (22 November 2016)].        
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Ignorance and epistemic safeguards  
 When governments or organisations commit acts of folly, often our first reaction is to 
blame wilful ignorance.  We think that if governments or organisations cared to know more 
about the issue at hand they would be less likely to pursue folly.  It is not folly to act in 
ignorance when few people or none possess requisite knowledge, but wilfully ignoring 
information – wooden-headedness – may be a portent of folly.  Governments that ignore 
evidence about global heating are prime candidates for folly, and prime targets for 
accusations of wilful ignorance, but folly can thrive just as luxuriantly when perpetrators are 
well informed.  Indeed, some of the most egregious acts of folly have been committed by 
groups that were not only well informed but had even taken effective action to ensure they 
were.  Barbara Tuchman's observations on America's war in Vietnam are particularly 
apposite: 
 
All the conditions and reasons precluding a successful outcome were recognized or 
foreseen … during the thirty years of our involvement. … At no time were policy-
makers unaware of the hazards, obstacles and negative developments.50  
 
 Moreover, America kept itself informed: Washington always possessed adequate 
intelligence, and supplemented it with special investigative missions.  There was also 
extensive independent reportage and commentary.51  America's Vietnam folly was pursued, 
not in ignorance or in secret, but openly and with sufficient information and accumulating 
evidence that what it wished to achieve was both unattainable and self-destructive. 
 
 It seems there is no epistemic safeguard against folly, no level of knowledge that will 
afford immunity from it.  Therefore, it is worth asking: in addition to what is already known 
about an issue, what extra fact would have to be known by a government or authority that 
would save it from folly?  With regard to global heating, what additional fact would a 
government require, on top of what it already knows, that would motivate it to act?  To put 
 
50 Tuchman, 290. 
51 The best-known example was Walter Cronkite's prime-time television report in February 1968, in which 
he stated that the war was 'mired in stalemate'.  Cronkite was widely held to be the most trusted media 
voice in the country; he had gone to Vietnam to investigate what was happening.  Despite Cronkite's status, 
and his misgivings, America prosecuted its war for another six years.  
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this another way, would a government be able to specify something it does not currently 
know – for example, the precise global temperature at which New York will be submerged – 
such that remedying this ignorance would provoke it to action?  There are no such facts or 
epistemic remedies because governments already possess more than adequate information to 
address climate change.  Additional evidence, while welcome and necessary for directing 
policies and so on, is very unlikely to be an epistemic 'tipping point' for any government that 
has not already acted on existing information.        
 
Nothing new under the sun 
 Folly is so pernicious and ubiquitous that it is not surprising to find it has a long history, 
and even scriptural warrant.  Tuchman comments on two ancient episodes: the fall of Troy, 
and the division of Israel after Solomon's death.  Both have canonical status within our 
cultural heritage; however, Tuchman overlooks several points of significance.   
 
 The demise of Troy through Greek subterfuge is well known.  Once the Greek's wooden 
horse had been brought inside the city, the Trojans then debated what to do with it, and 'three 
policies recommended themselves'.52  Two were to destroy the horse; the third was to let it 
stand as a dedication to the gods.  The third was chosen because 'the city was destined to be 
destroyed'.  Tuchman states that we might demythologise this as humankind being 'addicted 
to pursuing policy contrary to self-interest'.53  There is, however, more to it.  The politico-
symbolic significance of the wooden horse is that the Trojans dragged inside their city the 
source of their own destruction.  Homer is careful to specify that the Trojans had three 
choices, whereas he could have presented his narrative as a dramatic either/or decision.  
Trojans had two out of three chances of saving themselves, even if they drew lots, but still 
made the wrong choice.  So stupid an error of judgment must have been divinely ordained, 
the decision of gods rather than people.  
 
 If we allow that the Odyssey was composed in the 700s BCE, the unusual cause of Troy's 
downfall exercised ancient minds for centuries.  In the 100s CE, for example, the Greek 
travel writer Pausanias asserted that 'anyone who does not suppose that the Phrygians 
[Trojans] are utterly stupid' would realise that the horse was 'an engineer's device for 
 
52 Homer, Odyssey, 8.500-515. 
53 Tuchman, 48. 
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breaking down the wall'.54  The extraordinarily well-travelled Pausanias thought it more 
likely that the legend was garbled than that a famous city could be destroyed by its own folly.  
 
Folly and Greek tragedy 
 Indeed, folly was incomprehensible to the degree that Greek tragedies tended to conflate 
it with divine fate.  As an example, it is worth considering Aeschylus' Persae (The Persians), 
the only surviving Greek tragedy based on a contemporary event – the defeat of Xerxes' 
Persian navy at Salamis in 480 and his army at Plataea in 479.55  Except for Prometheus, 
there is a common motif in Aeschylus' plays: human suffering has its ultimate origin in a 
foolish or evil act.56  In the Persae it is Xerxes' reckless decision to attempt the conquest of 
Greece.  Was this decision fated to be made or was it merely foolish?  Aeschylus has it both 
ways.  On the one hand, no mortal can avoid the 'deceitful deception of god'; 'benign and 
coaxing at first', it leads people into snares from which there is no escape [107-114].  Xerxes' 
mother inveighs against the 'hateful deity' who deceived the Persians [472], and the ghost of 
his father (Darius) laments that 'a great divinity' duped his son's reasoning [725].  On the 
other hand, though Darius acknowledges that Zeus would eventually bring calamity to 
Xerxes, 'when a man hastens to his own undoing, the god joins in' [742].  In his ignorance 
and youthful recklessness, Xerxes thought to chain the 'sacred waters of Hellespont' [746] by 
building a causeway of boats across it, an ambition indicative of a diseased mind.  Xerxes' 
mother then asserts that wicked men had misled her son by preying on his insecurity as the 
feckless son of a successful father [750-760].  Darius adds that Greece itself is the Greeks' 
greatest ally, because it starves to death any large enemy force that trespasses upon it [790-
794].   
 
 Aeschylus has explored the heart of the matter.  We (the audience) already know the 
outcome: Persia's forces were destroyed.  Xerxes' decision was so foolish as to appear the 
result of divine initiative, yet the gods did not absolve him from the consequences of his 
decision.  There might have been a doom on Xerxes, but the causes of his folly – his own 
hubris, and allowing himself to be goaded by corrupt counsellors – were entirely mundane.  
 
54 Pausanias, Guide to Greece, 1.23.10. 
55 Persae was first produced in 472, so survivors of both battles were among the audience.  
56 For a summary see Alan Sommerstein's 'Aeschylus' in the OCD.  For a fuller account see H. D. F Kitto, 
Greek Tragedy, 3rd ed. (London: Methuen, 1961) 31-116.  
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Moreover, the consequences of folly do not only destroy the fool; they also bring disaster to 
his descendants and to the broader community.  There is a further point, one with modern 
echoes: it is folly to think you can bend the natural world to your will.  The Hellespont was 
not a slave such that Xerxes could chain it to facilitate his plan [743-750], and the mainland 
of Greece could itself become a foe.  Two and a half millennia ago, Aeschylus condemned 
arrogance towards the natural world as a harbinger of disaster.                   
 
Biblical folly   
 With regard to a narrative in 1 Kings about the division of Solomon's kingdom, Tuchman 
misses the substance of this episode.  The narrative describes events set in the late 900s BCE.  
Tuchman regards this account as historical, but this is improbable given that the documents 
we know as 1 and 2 Kings were not written, or at least finally redacted, until the 500s BCE.  
It is much more likely, as Mario Liverani argues, that: 
 
This story serves to link the presumed Davidic-Solomonic 'United Kingdom' to the 
later reality of the permanent separation of two centres of political power in 
Jerusalem and Shechem.57 
 
The narrative's writers probably possessed the following: several inchoate sagas about the 
legendary kingdoms of David and Solomon;58 traditions of varying reliability, possibly 
documented with royal annals, about the kingdoms of Israel and Judah; and fairly reliable 
traditions about the destruction of both kingdoms.  The narrators' task was to explain how a 
once mighty kingdom had degenerated into two insignificant and, by then, defunct kingdoms. 
The writers could have selected from a variety of 'god-sized' causes, such as natural disaster, 
conquest by a powerful neighbour raised up for the purpose, or divine intervention.59  Instead, 
they attributed this seminal event in the region's history to an act of puerile folly. 
 
57 Mario Liverani, Israel's History and the History of Israel, Chiara Peri and Philip R. Davies trans. 
(London: Equinox, 2005) 104. 
58 'Legendary' kingdoms as opposed to historical.  For example, there is no archaeological evidence for 
Jerusalem having been a sizeable city, let alone the capital of an empire, during the supposed Davidic-
Solomonic period [Israel Finkelstein and Neil Asher Silberman, David and Solomon (New York: Free 
Press, 2006)].   
59 Such as Exodus 10.20: 'Yahweh hardened Pharaoh's heart'.  
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 The narrative relates how Solomon's son and successor, Reheboam, responded to 
requests from the kingdom's northern tribes for some relief from corvée labour.  The king 
consulted his older advisors, men who had served Solomon.  They counselled Reheboam to 
respond generously.  He disregarded their advice, and instead sought advice from the friends 
he had grown up with and who now attended him – an archetypal and stylised old-young 
opposition.60  The youthful hot-heads appealed to Reheboam's vacuous masculinity,61 
counselling him to oppress the northern tribes even more than his father had.  Predictably, the 
northern tribes rejected Reheboam's threat and seceded from the south.  Then, to add folly to 
stupidity, Reheboam sent Adoram, the man in charge of Solomon's forced labour and 
doubtless the most reviled person in the kingdom, to bring the northern tribes into line.  Very 
predictably, they stoned Adoram to death. 
 
 The significance and message of this narrative have been overlooked by commentators.  
We might have expected a dramatic and powerful narrative to explain this epochal event.  
Instead, we get bathos, a ludicrous descent from Solomonic wisdom and glory to a fool 
surrounded by his crude confrères.  We also receive a brief lesson in political power.  Leaders 
often make stupid mistakes, but it is folly to antagonise opponents and make threats while not 
possessing the power to enforce them.  The situation needed delicate handling, magnanimity 
and an authoritative (as opposed to authoritarian) decision.  Reheboam was immersed in a 
situation that required qualities he so patently lacked.  The narrators' message is clear and 
sobering: events of enduring historical, social and political strife can be caused by a single 
episode of folly.  This message was not lost on succeeding generations.  In the early 100s 
BCE, Yeshua Ben Sira wrote that Solomon was succeeded by 'the stupidest member of the 
nation, brainless Reheboam, who drove the people to rebel'.62  
 
60 For a brief account see Walter Dietrich, '1 and 2 Kings' in The Oxford Bible Commentary, John Barton 
and John Muddiman eds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 241. 
61 1 Kings 12.10: 'My little finger is thicker than my father's loins' – 'loins' being a euphemism for phallus. 
62 Wisdom of Ben Sira (also known as Sirach or Ecclesiasticus) 47.23.  It is interesting to note that perhaps 
the most lauded king in the Old Testament, Josiah of Judah (639-609 BCE), was killed when he recklessly 
confronted an Egyptian army near Megiddo (2 Kings 23.29).  Disregard of the vast disparity in military 
strength between Judah and Egypt might qualify as folly, a point Ben Sira quietly overlooks in his praise of 
Josiah (49.1-3).            
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 The significance of these accounts is confronting: unless we recognise the active 
malignancy of folly then we are disregarding its rich cultural trajectory and not taking it 
seriously enough.   
 
China's deadly folly – famine 
  The above examples are from the west's Greek and Hebrew inheritance, but folly's 
manifestations in other traditions are no less instructive.  The Chinese famine of 1958 to 
1962, for example, was not only one of history's deadliest episodes of folly; some of its 
characteristics also illuminate the debate about climate change.  The origins of this disaster 
lie partly in China's appropriation of Soviet pseudo-science, particularly the biological 
theories of Trofim Lysenko, who ruled Soviet agricultural science from the late 1930s to the 
early 1960s.  The reasons for Lysenko's dominance are instructive.  Having seized power, 
Stalin resolved that he and the party would decide which scientific theories were correct.  As 
it happened, the discipline most vulnerable to party interference was biology.  As Vadim 
Birstein speculates, this was probably because biology appeared to require fewer specialised 
skills than physics and chemistry, and therefore seemed more 'accessible' to party members.63  
This proved to be a fatal misapprehension.  Though Stalin had no training in biology, he 
participated in 'discussions' with experts on genetics and evolution.  It is noteworthy that 
similar discussions on physics and chemistry were abandoned because those disciplines were 
perceived as vital for military purposes.    
 
 Lysenko's theories were popular with the party because he dismissed Mendelian genetics 
as a bourgeois construction, replacing it with his own concoction of 'creative Darwinism' in 
which there is no intraspecies competition and where one species can transform itself into 
another.64  Implementation of Lysenko's theories, and those of his associates, transformed an 
agriculturally productive country into one hamstrung by permanent food shortages.  
Notwithstanding, the Soviet press continued to praise Lysenko's 'successes'.   
 
 Lysenko's ideas were a perfect fit for Mao Zedong's views on the class struggle: plants 
from the same 'class' would not compete against each other, so seeds should be planted close 
 
63 Vadim J. Birstein, The Perversion of Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: Westview Press, 2001) 45.  Birstein 
was a Russian geneticist (now living in America) who began his training while Lysenko was still in power.  
64 Birstein, 48. 
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together because they will help each other.65  In 1958, as part of the Great Leap Forward,  
Mao drafted a blueprint for Chinese agriculture.  Its eight points, all inspired by Lysenkoism, 
included new plant breeds, close planting, deep ploughing and pest control.  The astonishing 
results – all fantasy – were trumpeted in China's press.  Varieties such as sunflower and 
artichoke were crossbred to produce hybrids that combined characteristics of both.  A cotton 
plant was crossed with a tomato plant to produce red cotton.  Super-sized vegetables were 
produced, as were staggering rice yields.  Guizhou province took deep ploughing to extremes 
and claimed the biggest yield – 65 tonnes of rice harvested from just 0.17 acres.66  These 
results were nonsense, but they were congruent with, and expressions of, party belief.  
Government officials vied with each other to inflate production figures.  In this pipedream, 
China had so much surplus food there was debate over what to do with it.  People were 
encouraged to consume as much as they could; grain exports doubled from 1959-61 while 
food imports were reduced.  In reality, local granaries were emptying by the winter of 1958-
59; by the spring of 1959 millions were starving. 
 
 Further, one of Mao's eight points – pest control – exacerbated an already catastrophic 
situation.  Officials decided that sparrows were responsible for eating grain, and therefore 
began an eradication campaign in 1958.  By the time it ceased in April 1961, insects had 
proliferated in the absence of predating sparrows, and grain yields fell further.67  Reality 
rarely obtruded.  When Mao heard about food shortages, he concluded that people were lying 
or exaggerating and that peasants were hiding food.  By the time the Great Leap Forward 
exhausted itself, about 30 million people had starved to death.68 
 
 Even though mainstream American and European press carried accurate accounts of the 
famine, these reports were denied or ridiculed by high-profile people such as Felix Greene 
(prominent British journalist and brother of novelist Graham Greene), Edgar Snow 
(American journalist and China expert), Sir Cyril Hinshelwood (President of the Royal 
Society), Lord Boyd Orr (Nobel Laureate and first director-general of the UN's Food and 
Agriculture Organisation) and François Mitterrand (a senior politician when he visited China 
 
65 Jasper Becker, hungry ghosts: China's secret famine (London: John Murray, 1996) 68-69.  
66 Ibid., 73. 
67 Ibid., 76-77. 
68 Ibid., 270. 
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in 1961; president of France from 1981-95).  Mitterrand's report was slavishly unequivocal: 
Mao was telling the truth when he said, 'I repeat in order to be clearly understood: there is no 
famine in China'.69  Further, as Simon Leys observed, sinologists throughout the world 
refused to accept the famine existed, preferring to believe their own dogma about Mao's 
China.70   
 
 There are important lessons for climate change from China's famine and Russian 
biology.  First, nonsense can usurp proper science.  Loren Graham maintains that, in the 
Soviet Union, Lysenkoism was replaced because it was undermined by contradictory and 
more convincing scientific evidence.  Moreover, this replacement of Lysenkoism by western 
genetics 'was a disruptive discontinuity that violated Soviet ideological principles that had 
been developed over a period of several decades and was therefore resisted by the political 
establishment'.71  Graham's scenario is somewhat comforting: the weaker scientific theory is 
replaced by the stronger, despite political opposition.  It is also wrong, because Russian 
scientists possessed a world-class understanding of genetics and evolution before Lysenko's 
rise to power in the mid-1930s.72  The question that Graham fails to address is why a sound 
and thriving science was replaced by a pseudo-science that came close to undermining the 
state's viability, and why this pseudo-science was encouraged to flourish when evidence of its 
bankruptcy was abundantly available.  The worrying lesson of Lysenkoism is that states are 
willing to pursue ideas and practices that are manifestly contrary to their own best interests, 
simply because those ideas and practices are held to be compatible with prevailing dogma. 
 
 Further, Lysenkoism thrived in its self-created milieu of 'two sciences': Lysenko's 
biology was a product of proletarian science, while the classic theory of heredity – as 
enunciated by Gregor Mendel, Wilhelm Johannsen, Thomas Hunt Morgan and others – was a 
product of bourgeois science.  The importance of the two-sciences thesis had nothing to do 
with scientific application.  Rather, it was an exaggerated genetic fallacy (no pun intended) 
whereby it was held that the alleged political character of science fundamentally shaped the 
 
69 Ibid., 293. 
70 Simon Leys, The Hall of Uselessness (Collingwood, Vic.: Black Inc., 2011) 351-354. 
71 Loren R. Graham, What Have We Learned About Science and Technology from the Russian Experience? 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) 22-23. 
72 Birstein, 46. 
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content of a scientific theory.  In short, the content of bourgeois science inescapably 
expressed its bourgeois origin.  This had some important ramifications.  First, Lysenkoism's 
downfall owed a good deal to its own political success.  Bourgeois genetics served as a 
convenient scapegoat for the poor state of Soviet agriculture.  However, the more successful 
Lysenko was in eliminating bourgeois biology, the less blame it could attract for the failures 
of proletarian science.  Second, the two-sciences thesis supplied a ready answer to the 
question that Lysenko and his minions were thereby able to avoid asking: why were classic 
geneticists so deluded and misled?73  Without the convenient and dismissive riposte of 
'bourgeois science', an actual investigation into genetics would quickly have revealed that its 
practitioners were not deluded after all. 
 
'Two sciences' of global heating 
  The two-sciences thesis has some disturbing parallels with the science of global heating.  
First, climate science is stereotyped as the ideology of inner-urban middle classes – bourgeois 
science – while sceptics are stereotyped as outlying/rural-dwelling workers – proletarian 
science.74  Again, perceptions are not informed by science but by the genetic fallacy that your 
views necessarily reflect the social cohort to which you are alleged to belong.  Second, denial 
of global heating, though often effective, has been nowhere near as politically successful as 
Lysenkoism; it is unlikely to be undermined by its own success.  Indeed, denial thrives on 
sniping from the margins of debate, its scientific poverty masked by presenting a small target 
of distorted and decontextualized facts.  Only if it were to banish mainstream climate science 
to the periphery would denial's vacuity become patent.  We have, therefore, the anomalous 
situation in which denial is strong enough to exert considerable influence on government 
policy, while being marginal enough not to be scapegoated for climatic malaise.                                       
 
 A related point is that a leader or government may use ideology to divide people into 
imaginary interest groups whose main purpose is to diminish each group's capacity to discern 
 
73 For a brief but penetrating account see Jean Curthoys, Feminist Amnesia (London: Routledge, 1997) 61-
67. 
74 These stereotypes are convenient fictions used by politicians to control dialogue.  For example, the fact 
that a large percentage of farmers are convinced about global heating is usually overlooked in this handy 
bifurcation.  Nonetheless, many of these farmers vote for parties which deny global heating, an anomaly 
that entrenches the division.     
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its actual interests.  For example, rural areas will, for the most part, be more affected by 
climate change than urban areas, so rural people should be more invested in addressing global 
heating than urbanites.  However, 'wealthy urban elites' are accused of being able to afford to 
worry about global heating, while 'rural strugglers' are patronised as being unable to afford 
the luxury of worrying about something that will not pay the bills.  Each group is energised 
by demonising the other, and validates itself by doing so – a handy ruse that deflects from 
government some of the odium it deserves for failing to do anything.   
 
 A second point is that states are poorly equipped to assess the implications of scientific 
theories, let alone adjudicate between competing theories.  The disasters of Soviet agriculture 
are a prime example.  States have not evolved to respond promptly or appropriately to 
scientific evidence.75  Rather, and not unreasonably, their role is to balance or decide between 
competing priorities.  However, when scientific evidence is such that it must override 
competing priorities if it is to receive an adequate response – as it does with climate change – 
the state is usually ill-equipped to act.  Further, political leaders often perceive climate 
change as an 'accessible' area of science about which they can make pronouncements.  
Several recent prime ministers of Australia, and two presidents of the United States, have 
declared that global heating either does not exist or is not worth worrying about, whereas 
these men would never think of pontificating about a less complex area of science – that is, 
one with fewer variables – such as metallurgy.                              
 
 Thirdly, if states realise their activities are harmful then they are just as likely to pursue a 
course of action that exacerbates, rather than ameliorates, the situation.  America's war in 
Vietnam is a tragic example.  The reason for this apparent obtuseness is that pursuit of 
ameliorative action would be tantamount to admission of error, whereas states are usually 
more willing to pursue error than admit it.76  Moreover, if a state conventionally acts in 
 
75 This is not to say they are unable to do so.  America's Manhattan Project (1942-46) to develop nuclear 
weapons is a clear example of the state actively harnessing, indeed driving, scientific discovery.  Further, 
some countries responded quickly and decisively to the Covid-19 pandemic, clear evidence that states are 
able to act swiftly on scientific advice where their governments perceive they have the electorate's support 
to address a present or imminent threat.             
76 For example, as Willy Lam (Hong Kong University) states, the Chinese Communist Party never admits 
making mistakes because it propagates the fiction that its judgements and achievements are always 'great, 
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accordance with a given dogma then it is unlikely to choose a corrective course of action 
which contravenes that dogma. 
 
Holding folly to account 
 A fourth lesson is that those who commit acts of folly are rarely held accountable; 
indeed, they are as likely to be rewarded as penalised.  Further, those who criticise folly or 
strive to tackle it are more likely to find themselves ostracised than praised.  Mao stayed in 
power until his death in 1976.  On the other hand, Peng Dehuai, minister of defence and one 
of China's ten honoured marshals from the Korean War, saw what was unfolding and 
criticised the Great Leap Forward.  He was dismissed from his position, imprisoned in 1966, 
and persecuted until his death in 1973.  The case of Zeng Xisheng is even more poignant.  
Under his misrule a quarter of Anhui province perished – some 8 million people – even 
though state granaries in Anhui were full.  For reasons which are not clear, Zeng performed a 
volte-face in 1961.  He was dismissed in 1962, and executed five years later, not for causing 
mass death but for implementing reforms that were saving lives.77   
 
 At a much less (immediately) fatal level, leading climatologist James Hansen failed to 
receive funding for his research on CO2 following his testimony about climate change to a 
congressional hearing in 1982.  As Nathaniel Rich notes, it appeared as if Hansen were being 
punished for honestly reporting the findings of his research.78  In 2019, Maria Caffrey lost her 
job in the National Park Service after she refused to delete references to human causes of 
global heating in her report about the effects of rising sea levels on coastal national parks.79  
In Australia, reward for folly has evolved into a pathological meme.  The 2019 federal 
'climate change' election was won by a man well known for supporting coal to the extent of 
bringing a lump of it into parliament in 2017.  In the same election, the member for New 
England (Barnaby Joyce), widely and rightly criticised for his incompetence and hypocritical 
conduct, was comfortably re-elected.  A post-election investigation showed that the more he 
 
brilliant and huge'.  Quoted in 'Why searching for the truth about Tiananmen is more important than ever', 
Kirsty Needham, Sydney Morning Herald (31 May 2019). 
77 Becker, 87-92, 143-149.    
78 Rich, ch. 8. 
79 Maria Caffrey, 'I'm a scientist. Under Trump I lost my job for refusing to hide climate crisis facts', The 
Guardian (25 July 2019).  
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was criticised from outside his electorate, the more support he received within it.  Even 
though Joyce had mismanaged matters that directly affected his electorate – drought policy, 
water policy and cuts to Landcare – and had catastrophic consequences in Australia's largest 
river system, he was rewarded.  As one unsuccessful candidate lamented, 'Voters have 
mathematically rewarded Joyce for his conduct over the last two years, so it doesn’t follow 
logic'.80 
 
 An important corollary of accountability failure is cynicism.  If folly goes unpunished, 
let alone rewarded, then few in authority will act in accordance with common decency and 
truth.  The inevitable result is cynicism, both within and beyond government.  It signifies a 
crippling rupture between reality and ideology.  At its most basic, cynicism feeds off the 
familiar sight of a politician rehearsing the 'party line' when we know she or he does not hold 
that view.  Vastly more insidious is a government in which its leaders, or its slavish 
adherence to dogma, have created a milieu in which members operate successfully only by 
concealing their beliefs and judgments.  This degenerates into the wretched spectacle of a 
government that no longer believes in what it is doing, a citizenry that knows this, and a tacit 
collusion between the two.  As Elizabeth Farrelly rightly observes, 'we not only accept that 
truth has nothing to do with it.  We pretty much demand to be lied to.'81 
 
 The final, and probably most important, lesson is that if – as we have noted – states are 
capable of knowingly acting against their own interests then there is little likelihood those 
countries will act in the interests of others.  After all, a state uninterested in looking after its 
own people (or most of them) is not going to exert much effort to look after those beyond its 
borders.  A corollary of this lesson is that countries which look after their own people will 
also be more likely to act in the broader global interest.  It is not surprising to find, therefore, 
that countries with the happiest citizens – predominately, though not invariably, countries 
 
80 Gabrielle Chan, '"He's a maverick": why New England kept the faith with Barnaby Joyce', The 
Guardian, Australian ed. (15 June 2019).  Joyce received 2.5 percent more first preference votes than he 
did in the 2016 federal election. 




with high levels of social support82 – are also among the most active in addressing climate 
change.  Further, the happier people are the more likely they are to be politically engaged.83  
Again it is unsurprising to discover that citizens in these countries exercise high levels of 
political engagement and thereby have more influence on government policy. 
 
Folly or madness? 
 After the above litany of folly, one could be forgiven for thinking these were acts of 
sheer madness, and that our current tardiness in addressing climate change is likewise mad.  
The label might be convenient, but is misleading.  When an act explores the frontiers of evil 
or folly, labelling it as madness can be consoling.  For example, if we label the Nazi genocide 
of Jews as 'madness' then we can take some comfort in the view that it was committed by 
slavering psychopaths, crazy people with whom we have nothing in common and cannot 
understand.  This is wrong.  In fact, one of the most confronting characteristics of the 
Holocaust was the systemic rationality with which it was executed.  For instance, the main 
conference to plan 'the final solution of the Jewish question' was held at Wannsee, Berlin, in 
January 1942.  There were 14 participants, all high-ranking Nazi officials, seven of whom 
possessed doctorates.  The minutes – written in detached, bureaucratic language – reveal a 
highly organised and well-researched plan, with some consideration given to questions such 
as what to do with Jews who worked in essential war industries.84  Given that characteristics 
of madness include unclear goals, inability to imagine or weigh consequences, and 
organisational chaos, it is clear that the Holocaust was certainly not a program of madness.  
On the other hand, Nazi 'rationality' did not preclude folly: the flight of scientists from 
government-sanctioned antisemitism was a crippling loss to German science and industry and 
a windfall gain for the countries to which they fled.85              
 
 
82 The top five (in order) are Finland, Denmark, Norway, Iceland and the Netherlands [World Happiness 
Report 2019, John F. Helliwell, Richard Layard and Jeffrey D. Sachs eds (New York: Sustainable 
Development Solutions Network, 2019) 24].  
83 George Ward, 'Happiness and Voting Behaviour', ibid., chapter 3. 
84 The minutes, written by Adolf Eichmann, are in Lucy S. Dawidowicz, A Holocaust Reader (West 
Orange, NJ: Behrman House, 1976) 73-82.  
85 For example, nearly half of Germany's theoretical physicists fled [John Cornwell, Hitler's Scientists 
(London: Penguin, 2004) 139-141].  
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 A further misleading view is that acts of madness emanate only from mad, dysfunctional 
or crisis-ridden societies.  The problem with this view is that comparatively normal and sane 
societies seem no more immune from acts of madness than dysfunctional societies.  As 
Ronald Aronson notes about America's involvement in Vietnam, this 'madness … issued not 
from a society in crisis, but from a smoothly functioning society at the peak of its wealth and 
power'.86  For Aronson, madness is not a matter of psychology but of policy.  He observes 
that people involved in formulating government policy often invoke the concept of madness – 
'demented' and 'deranged' are also used – in the casual language of moral or political 
judgment, but not when they talk about serious policy analysis.  The reason is that high-level 
policy-makers usually possess high-level political and strategic awareness, and above average 
levels of intelligence and sensitivity – that is, they are not mad – but these qualities do not 
prevent them from enacting policies for which 'madness' seems the only apt description.  In 
Vietnam, America's presence was so patently violent and self-defeating that deeming it to be 
'a systemic rupture with reality is unavoidable'.87  Perhaps it is this rupture that not only 
makes us view some government policies as mad but also makes us feel we are being drawn 
into their madness.  After all, if a government's policy is defiantly non-rational then 
continually pointing out its lack of coherence with reality is a probable path to absurdity.   
 
Conclusion – the merry-go-round of folly 
 After surveying the political paralysis surrounding climate change, Elizabeth Kolbert 
wrote: 
 
It may seem impossible to imagine that a technologically advanced society could 
choose, in essence, to destroy itself, but that is what we're now in the process of 
doing.88  
 
On the contrary, having rehearsed the above litany of folly, little imagination is required.  It is 
manifestly clear that states and societies can knowingly act against their own interests, even 
to the point of ruin.  When Kolbert issued a second edition of Field Notes in 2015, she 
 
86 Aronson, 169. 
87 Ibid., 178. 
88 Elizabeth Kolbert, Field Notes from a Catastrophe: Man, Nature, and Climate Change, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Bloomsbury, 2015 – 1st ed. 2006) 189. 
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observed that Barack Obama, unlike George W. Bush, appointed prominent scientists to 
positions of environmental significance and promised to act on climate change.  She added, 
however, that his record on climate change was mixed at best.89  Surely this is because, 
though President Obama endeavoured to address global heating, he was frustrated at every 
environmental turn by a recalcitrant Congress.  However, this view is at odds with what he 
said in November 2018 at Rice University in Houston: 
 
I know we're an oil country and we need American energy.  By the way, American 
energy production, you wouldn't always know it, but it went up every year I was 
president.  Suddenly America's the biggest oil producer and the biggest gas 
[producer].  That was me, people. [applause]90 
 
 This statement, from a leader whom we credit with intelligence and integrity – certainly 
compared to presidents Bush and Trump – confirms Kolbert's anxiety about our self-
destruction, and prompts several corollary questions.  Are we willing to prevent 
environmental catastrophe caused by climate change?  If we are, how or where do we begin 
to act?  And even if we can answer those questions, how do we get off the merry-go-round of 
folly?     
 
 
89 Ibid, 206. 
90 Posted on Real Clear Politics (28 November 2018) – my transcript.  
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We all know the difficulty of carrying out a resolve when we secretly long that it may turn 
out to be unnecessary.  In such states of mind the most incredulous person has a private 






 Prima facie, one of the most effective ways to avoid folly is to undertake a thorough 
assessment of risks involved.  This should result in a correlation between risk and response.  
If global heating constitutes a high risk to our capacity to maintain a viable, sustainable 
society then governments should address it urgently and decisively, and it would be folly not 
to do so.  However, risk assessment is often confounding.  Erring on the side of caution could 
entail either taking action to mitigate global heating or doing nothing.  This chapter also 
discusses the costs of adapting to climate change, and the risks of leaving it for future 
generations to address.   
 
Ranking of dangers 
 The essence of risk assessment is to rank dangers so we recognise which ones to address 
and in what sequence.  This is far from straightforward.  Do we rank dangers according to 
their probability of occurrence, or how damaging they would be, or how much forestalling 
them would cost, or a combination of the three?  Further, in order to undertake a ranking that 
would be broadly acceptable, we need prior agreement on relevant criteria of danger.  This is 
difficult to achieve because different people and groups (including countries) worry about 
different risks.  For example, at the level of public policy there are four main areas of risk: the 
economy, crime, environment, and foreign affairs.  If you work for the defence department, 
you might regard foreign threats as highest risk; if you belong to a green organisation, you 
will probably regard environmental degradation or global heating as the biggest threat; if you 
are unemployed, economic risk is likely to dominate your assessment.  Further, those who are 
most concerned about foreign threats tend to be less concerned about environmental problems 
at home, while those worried about law and order on the streets tend to be less worried about 
 
1 George Eliot (Mary Ann Evans), Middlemarch, ch. 60. 
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matters such as income inequality, even though the two are related.2  In short, broad 
agreement about criteria of danger is unlikely. 
 
Proximity of events 
 There are additional complications.  Perceptions of risk are in part a function of 
perceived distance – geographical and chronological – from relevant events: events closer in 
time and space appear more threatening and are usually assessed as higher risk than those 
further away.  When an event is non-specific in space and apparently distant in time, such as 
global heating, our assessment of risk is often faulty.  We can understand why remoteness in 
time would diminish our sense of risk, but why should spatial non-specificity be a problem?  
After all, if something is a risk only to me, I would address it, but it is no less of a risk to me 
just because it also affects everybody else, so surely my desire to address that risk would be 
the same.  This may sometimes be the case – diabetes caused by obesity is a universal risk, so 
I address it by exercising and eating properly – but sometimes the general character of a risk 
diminishes our appreciation of it.  For example, imagine that, because of a permanent 
atmospheric aberration, climate change affected only Australia.  The Australian Government 
would probably take extravagant measures to curtail the nation's emissions and would, 
through the United Nations, vociferously demand that other countries follow suit.  However, 
even though the global effects of climate change do not in any way diminish the specific 
threat to Australia, its government is quiescent.  This is irrational.  If, for instance, you had 
been shipwrecked alone, you would make the most strenuous possible efforts to save 
yourself, but if there were a thousand other people on the ship your efforts would not be less 
vigorous just because a thousand were drowning alongside you.         
 
The future 
 Probably the main influence on assessment of risk is our sense of the future, and the 
main influence on that sense is poverty.  Unsurprisingly, there is a correlation between 
poverty and foreshortened perceptions of the future.  If you struggle each day to provide food 
for your family, you will probably live so wholly in the present that the future is beyond both 
 
2 Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982) 
2-3.  Recent events in the United States, Britain and Australia – and a host of other countries – suggest that 
this observation is more pertinent now than in 1982.  
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your imagination and your care.3  Unfortunately, this understandable concentration on the 
present is easily abused by those who have most to gain by maintaining fossil-fuel 
consumption.  Suggestions to address global heating are broadcast, often by those who have 
gained most from the current economy, as a threat to the jobs and financial security of people 
who have gained least.   
 
 This highlights a problem with our sense of the future.  Do perceived levels of risk 
diminish as a function of time?  We usually think they do: the more remote the event the 
more we discount its effects.4  If the trajectory of an asteroid takes it to within 1,000 
kilometres of Earth this year, and again on its return in 40 years, we perceive the sooner event 
as carrying more risk, even though the actual risk of a collision with Earth is the same for 
both events.  However, it can be misleading to assuming a negative correlation of perceived 
risk with time.  If I am buying a house in an area that is inundated by 1-in-100-year floods, 
my risk is lower if I intend to live in it for five years, higher if I plan to stay for 40 years.  In 
this example, my perception of risk, and actual risk, rises as a function of time.  What about 
predictive risk?  If my business plans are predicated on the identity of the political party in 
power, I can be somewhat confident about who is going to win next year's election, but have 
no idea who will win power in a decade.  Conversely, if I am investing in the stock market 
then my risk is higher if I invest for a year, lower if I invest for a decade.  This is because, 
despite the market's propensity to fluctuate alarmingly over the short term, over the longer 
term it reverts to the mean – which is rising.  In short, our perceptions of risk are not 
straightforward.   
 
 Part of our confusion arises from the natural tendency to project today's events onto the 
future: what happens today is thought to be a good predictor of what will happen tomorrow.  
This projection is often useful, even life-saving, but can also be fallacious.  If our ancestors 
 
3 Douglas and Wildavsky, 85.  Some of their observations are based on Oscar Lewis, 'The Culture of 
Poverty', Scientific American, vol. 215, no. 4 (October 1966) 19-25.  Lewis found that people can be poor 
without inhabiting a culture of poverty.  The culture of poverty is a dysfunctional way of life that 
perpetuates poverty and is transmitted from generation to generation.  The characteristics of this culture 
include living with few or no expectations of, or plans for, the future.   
4 Though, as Frank Ramsey rightly asserted, discounting the enjoyments of or costs to later generations is 
'a practice which is ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the imagination' ['A 
Mathematical Theory of Saving', The Economic Journal, vol. 38, no. 152 (December 1928) 543]. 
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failed to project today's predator attack onto the same situation tomorrow, they might not 
have survived.  On a more prosaic level, if on long weekends there is much more than the 
usual weekend traffic, it would be reasonable to predict that the next long weekend will also 
be busier than usual, so I should plan not to drive on those days.  Conversely, though, if the 
stock market falls today then investors are foolish if they project that fall onto tomorrow's 
market and sell their stocks accordingly.  
 
 Perceptions of risk with regard to global heating are closest to the above examples of the 
stock market – certainty increasing with time – and buying a house on the floodplain – risk 
increasing with time.  Herein lies an apparent contradiction.  We usually associate risk with 
uncertainty, but with global heating that association is inverted.  Despite short-term 
fluctuations, climate scientists are as certain as science can be that the globe's atmospheric 
temperature will continue to rise over the long term, and that concomitant risks – from 
heatwave, drought, extreme weather and so on – will also increase.5  The point here is that 
certainty and risk can be correlated.  Any sensible person would act to avoid nearly certain 
increased risk, so why can't we do the same when it comes to climate change?  One answer is 
that an equally sensible person might think the cost of acting is too high to justify averting the 
risked event.  In this case, a decision about climate change can appear like a callous actuarial 
exercise.  It is partly for this reason that governments don't treat decisions about global 
heating as 'decisions under risk', let alone 'decisions under certainty'; rather, they tend to treat 
them as 'decisions under ignorance'.         
 
Decisions under certainty, risk and ignorance 
 If a person is making a decision about buying a new car, she can choose between 
vehicles A, B or C.  She is certain about the outcome – if she chooses B then she knows the 
sort of car she will get – so her decision is to determine which car will best suit her 
requirements.  This decision under certainty can nonetheless be challenging because she still 
 
5 According to the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report, 'it is virtually certain that there will be more frequent 
hot and fewer cold temperature extremes over most land areas on daily and seasonal timescales, as global 
mean surface temperature increases.  It is very likely that heat waves will occur with a higher frequency 
and longer duration.'  Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and 
III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, Geneva: 
2014) 10 [italics in original]. 
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has to weigh whether she wants a car better suited to city driving or long-distance touring, or 
that favours fuel economy over performance, and so on.  If, however, she is buying a used car 
then she is not certain she will get what she especially wants – a reliable vehicle – but she has 
done her research and knows that C is statistically the most reliable of the three makes.  Of 
course, she does not know whether this example of C has been well looked after, but she can 
assign probabilities to make this decision under risk.  If she has to choose between makes D, 
E and F, about which she has little information and is unable to assign probabilities to their 
respective reliability, this is a decision under ignorance or uncertainty.  
 
 Decisions about addressing climate change should be classified as decisions under 
certainty or under risk.  If countries do little or nothing about carbon emissions then it is 
certain that global temperatures will increase, but by how much is less certain.  For instance, 
under an intermediate Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP4.5) for GHG emissions, 
the likely range for mean global surface temperature increase by 2100 is 1.1 to 2.6 degrees 
over the present mean temperature.6  This is a broad range: most countries could probably 
adapt to a 1.1 degree increase, whereas a 2.6 degree increase would render some densely 
populated parts of the world either marginal or uninhabitable.  Governments might be 
inclined to accept the lower cost but higher risk of an intermediate emissions regime and 
hope that temperatures do not rise by more than the lower estimate.  Whichever regime a 
government chooses, lower emissions are correlated with lower temperature increases, but 
the likely range of increase means that correlating a specific emissions target with a specific 
temperature increase is a matter of probabilities, involving decisions under certainty or risk.  
This all appears straightforward, so why do many governments present decisions to address 
global heating as decisions made under uncertainty?  An important reason is that 
governments are usually loath to make decisions based on probabilities; they are too nuanced 
and complex for the normal constraints of political discourse.  Further, a decision based on 
balancing of probabilities will tend towards the middle ground between extreme action and 
total inaction.  However, as Slavoj Žižek states, when it comes to global heating the worst 
alternative is to choose the middle way by taking limited measures because 'in this case, we 
will fail whatever occurs.  There is no middle ground with regard to ecological catastrophe.'7  
Žižek's view is that climate change presents governments with the dilemma of doing 
 
6 Ibid. 60. 
7 Slavoj Žižek, Living in the End Times (London: Verso, 2011) 428-429.   
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everything, and risking ridicule if disaster does not occur, or doing nothing, and risk losing 
everything.  Many governments seem to agree, ergo the attraction of an either/or decision 
which has the merit of presenting a controversial situation in binary terms that are easier to 
explain and sell to citizens, and defend from critics.  Moreover, a decision under uncertainty 
is easily translated into an either/or choice.  This uncertainty has very little to do with actual 
scientific doubt.  It is a conflation of ignorance about what other countries will do to address 
global heating with allegations of uncertainty about the scientific evidence.  In short, two 
different issues are fused in order to obfuscate both.   
  
The 'Prisoners' Dilemma' 
 The prisoners' dilemma is a paradigm of an either/or decision made in ignorance about 
the intentions of another party.  Briefly, two prisoners (A and B) jointly charged with a crime 
are held in separate cells.  Each is given the option of confessing to the crime or staying 
silent.  If both confess, they will each be sentenced to six years.  If neither confesses, they 
will be convicted of a lesser crime and serve two years each.  If one confesses and the other 
does not, the former will be released and the latter will be sentenced to 10 years.  Being in 
separate cells, neither prisoner knows what the other will decide.  This dilemma is 
represented by the following value matrix:    
 
      B confesses  B is silent    
 
  A confesses  A = 6; B = 6  A = 0; B = 10     
 
  A is silent  A = 10; B = 0  A = 2; B = 2   
 
The interesting result of this dilemma is that, no matter what the other prisoner does, each is 
better off confessing.  If A confesses, B is better off if he also confesses; if A does not 
confess, B is much better off if he confesses – and vice versa.  However, and here is the 
anomaly, the 'social' result (that is, the aggregate result) is worst if both confess (6 + 6 = 12 
years) and best if neither confesses (2 + 2 = 4 years).  The dilemma shows that what is 
optimal for the individual does not necessarily coincide with what is optimal for the group.8  
 
8 For a succinct account of the prisoners' dilemma, see Martin Peterson, An Introduction to Decision 
Theory, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) 236-242.  
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 Variants of the prisoners' dilemma have been applied to environmental matters.  For 
example, consider a cluster of smokestack industries (A, B, C, D and E) in a single airshed.  
Each industry has the choice of either maximising its profit and belching untreated smoke 
into the atmosphere, or accepting a lower profit and thoroughly filtering its smoke before 
emitting it.  If only one company emits untreated smoke, the airshed will remain reasonably 
clean, but if all do so then the airshed will be fouled.  Environmental regulations are 
infrequently and feebly enforced and can therefore be disregarded.  If you own A, and you do 
not know what companies B to E will decide to do, what choice should you select?  The 
following matrix helps to clarify the situation:    
      
        B-E pollute -  B-E don't pollute -   
        unfiltered smoke filtered emissions 
         
  A pollutes -    Max. profit  Max. profit 
  unfiltered smoke  dirty air   clean air 
 
  A doesn't pollute -   Lower profit  Lower profit 
  filtered emissions  dirty air   clean air 
 
It is very clear from this matrix that A should not filter its smoke: maximum profit and dirty 
air are better than lower profit and dirty air, and maximum profit and clean air are better than 
lower profit and clean air.  This result holds true for each company.  In other words, it is 
rational for each company to pollute the atmosphere.  Little wonder, then, that before laws 
such as the Clean Air Act industrial regions usually chocked on their emissions.  It would, of 
course, be better for everybody if each company agreed to filter its emissions and accept a 
lower profit.  However, unless that agreement were enforced, or unless companies could trust 
each other, it would be irrational for any company not to renege on it.  The necessity for 
stringent and well-policed environmental laws is clear.  
 
 The prisoner's dilemma has a disconcerting lesson about decisions made under ignorance 
of other parties' (such as governments) intentions: absent a substantial level of trust and 
cooperation, a rational decision to favour one party's utility will probably be a poor decision 
for the collective.  What, though, about decisions made under (alleged) uncertainty about the 
science of global heating?  The following construction will help to illuminate the matter.      
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Developing a value matrix for decisions under uncertainty about global heating9 
 In attempting to reflect common political perceptions, the first two points have been 
reduced to a binary choice. 
 
Point 1 – there are two available decision options: 
(1) Take action (entails activities on a scale that would involve significant cost) 
(2) Do nothing (as if the possibility of global heating were not of serious concern)  
 
Point 2 – there are two possible states of the world: 
(1) Global heating occurs (with significant consequences, such as coastal flooding, that we 
want to avoid) 
(2) Global heating does not occur (or does occur, but without significant consequences) 
 
Point 3 – there are four possible outcomes: 
(1) Take action, but heating occurs anyway 
(2) Do nothing, and heating occurs 
(3) Take action, and heating does not occur 
(4) Do nothing, but heating does not occur  
 
Point 4 – Assign values (from 0 to 100) to possible outcomes.  The worst outcome is for 
heating to occur despite vigorous efforts to avoid it.  The resources devoted to these efforts 
would have been wasted, so this outcome has a value of 0.  The best outcome is to do nothing 
and for heating not to occur, or not to any significant degree.  This outcome attracts a value of 
100. 
 
 What about values between the best and worst outcomes?  The cost of doing something 
is very significant, therefore (when considered only in and of itself) doing nothing clearly 
attracts a higher value.  But what if doing something thereby prevents global heating?  
Obviously that value, though high, is less than the value of getting the same result for 'free', 
so it attracts a value of less than 100, depending on the costs of action (say 25 value points, so 
 
9 Some of the following is based on Ronald N. Giere's account in Understanding Scientific Reasoning, 4th 




100 – 25 = 75).  On the other hand, if global heating occurs whether action is taken or not, 
then it is obviously better to have done nothing than to have taken action but still endure the 
same result.  Since we have assessed the costs of action at 25, then doing nothing is 25 points 
better than doing something but getting the same result.  The value matrix will therefore be 
the following: 
           
      No heating  Heating  Total  
 
  Take action  75    0   75    
 
  Do nothing  100    25   125 
 
 It is clear from this matrix that doing nothing is the best option: in practice, Žižek's 
dilemma favours inaction.  It is hardly surprising, therefore, that those who benefit most from 
inaction – more than a few politicians, and industries that produce or rely on fossil fuels – 
will present their decision as one made under uncertainty.  The obvious attraction of this 
matrix is its simplicity: apart from 0 and 100, only one other value – the cost of action – had 
to be assessed. 
 
 However, what about a political decision that reflected actual scientific opinion?  In this 
case, the decision would reflect either (a) the majority scientific view (global heating is real, 
its effects will be substantial, and its causes must be vigorously addressed) or (b) the view of 
a substantial scientific minority (global heating will be more severe than the majority think it 
will be, so we should address its causes with proportionately more vigour).  The view (c) of a 
tiny minority of scientists (global heating is scientifically controversial, which does not itself 
entail inaction but gives politicians an excuse not to act) would be dismissed as too peripheral 
to be relevant.  It is clear that restricting a decision about global heating to options (a) or (c) is 
both irrational (in that it appears to attribute equivalent weight to both options, which is 
misleading) and unfair (because the views of a substantial minority are disregarded).   
 
 However, if we transform this into a value matrix the result is not so different from our 
first example.  The best outcome is to take some action but still avoid severe heating, so it 
attracts 100 (the best result) – 25 (the cost of acting) = 75 points.  The worst outcome is to 
take vigorous action (which costs 50 points) but endure severe heating nonetheless, so it 
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attracts 0 points.  If we take vigorous action and thereby manage to avoid severe heating, this 
is worth 100 – 50 = 50 points.  If we take some action but endure severe heating, this is worth 
25 points because at least we have spent 25 points less than the 50-point cost of vigorous 
action.     
  
      Heating  Severe  Total  
         heating  
   
  Take some 
  action   75   25   100    
  (cost = 25) 
  Take vigorous  
  action   50   0   50 
  (cost = 50)   
 
 Scores in this matrix roughly reflect those in the first example: doing less is again the 
better option.  It is apparent that, for decisions made under uncertainty about the intent of 
other parties or the reality or degree of global heating, doing little or nothing is an attractive 
option.  The reasons are simple: first, agreements about climate change require the 
cooperation of all parties, but if one country decides to renege then it reaps any benefits from 
the agreement without having to pay the cost.  Second, taking action to address climate 
change constitutes a definite cost, whereas outcomes of that action are less definite.  More 
specifically, the former is quantifiable as a set of budget figures, whereas the latter is not only 
difficult to quantify but almost impossible to incorporate into a budget.  Given that a 
government's 'forward estimates'10 rarely extend beyond three to five years, and that 
governments seldom act on unbudgeted matters, most democracies are inadequately equipped 
to address long-term problems.      
 
 From the above it is evident that complex and controversial issues are unlikely to be 
resolved satisfactorily by presenting a basic 'payoff' matrix.  Ironically, the simplicity and 
apparent rationality of such matrices make them a convenient explanatory device for 
decisions that are frequently beyond their capability.                   
 
10 The official (albeit tautologous) name for a government's forecast budgetary position.  
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Costs of inaction 
 The above matrices are further misleading because there is at least one certainty about 
global heating: after a certain level of heating, taking action will most certainly be better than 
doing nothing.  This is for the simple reason that the costs avoided by doing nothing remain a 
constant – we cannot do less than nothing, so the amount saved does not change – whereas 
the deleterious effects of global heating increase exponentially as the temperature rises.  For 
example, a rise of 1.5 degrees would expose 14 percent of the world's population to at least 
one severe heatwave every five years, but with a 2-degree rise that percentage rises to 37 
percent.  Similarly, a 1.5-degree increase will reduce food yields for 32-36 million people, 
but at 2 degrees that figure rises to 330-396 million.11  In short, the costs of not acting will 
inevitably exceed the costs of acting.   
 
 It follows that any government should realise that risk from inaction will quickly 
overtake risk from action.  Given that most governments are risk-averse, the preference for 
action to address global heating should be clear.  However, this is not often the case.  While 
most governments are risk-averse, they are also act-averse because in certain circumstances 
there is greater perceived risk in acting that in not acting.  As we have noted, action involves 
a cost and sometimes the perception of an uncertain goal, whereas inaction appears 
comparatively risk-free because it does not upset the forward estimates.  Again, global 
heating requires a response that most governments are poorly equipped to provide.                       
 
Local versus global 
 If, in the pursuit of financial ammunition, we wanted to specify the point at which 
savings and costs intersect, we would encounter the fundamental problem that climate change 
is global but its effects are local, insofar as they have political relevance, and they vary 
considerably from place to place.  For example, global heating has adversely affected parts of 
Tasmania, particularly in waters off the east coast, but not to the degree that its government is 
willing to undertake substantial action.  On the other hand, California has endured 
unprecedented drought, wildfires and mudslides (caused by diminished vegetation cover) and 
its government is firmly of the view that substantial action is necessary and long overdue.  
 
11 Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy, 'Cities at the Forefront of Tackling Climate 
Change', New York Times (22 December 2018). 
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This global-local binary perception is a further reason for recalcitrance in developing a 
universally acceptable emissions policy.            
    
 This parochialism also illustrates Ronald Giere's point that, in decisions made by 
individuals, it is generally the person who makes the decision who benefits or suffers from 
the consequences of that decision.12  This is not the case with policy decisions made by 
governments.  Those who benefit from a decision might not be the same as those who suffer 
its consequences.  Therefore, it is important to establish who is determining options and 
assigning respective values in choosing a course of action.  Further, who determines whether 
a given state of affairs constitutes a satisfactory outcome, or whether to take a 'reasonable' 
gamble – reasonable for whom? – or to choose the 'safe' option – safe for whom?    
 
Future expectations  
 These difficulties are compounded by our assumption – often unconscious – that the 
future will be a continuation of the present and that existing institutions and social regimes 
will endure.  If we do not think they will persist then our expectations of the future will 
probably be uncertain and confused.  For some, this might not be a bad thing: uncertainty and 
confusion may well be more desirable than continuity of a repressive status quo.  However, 
when a whole society attempts to adapt to general uncertainty, the effect will be to undermine 
anticipated outcomes that hitherto appeared to be guaranteed by the endurance of institutions, 
modes of production and so on.13  The problems for addressing global heating are clear.  If 
endeavours to address climate change are perceived as adaptations to uncertainty, or as 
attempts to safeguard the future, then they undermine the current trajectory of society – by 
recognizing its uncertainty – and its future expectations – by recognizing the need to act for 
their preservation.  Little wonder, then, that older people are often sceptical about global 
heating and therefore resist action to address it, because action would constitute an admission 
that the present system – in which they have flourished and on which they depend – will not 
endure.14  There is a sociological anomaly here in that uncertainty clearly affects younger 
 
12 Giere, 289. 
13 Douglas and Wildavsky, 86-7.  They refer in particular to calling in of debts and concomitant refusal to 
lend – that is, general loss of confidence in the face of future uncertainty.  
14 See, for example, Wouter Poortinga at al., 'Uncertain climate: An investigation into public scepticism 
about anthropogenic climate change', Global Environmental Change, vol. 21, issue 3 (August 2011) 1015-
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people more than older people, because the former have to endure it for much longer than the 
latter, so in theory older people should be more willing to upset the status quo, having less to 
lose.  All of this might explain why that cohort is so divided over global heating: on one hand 
many older people are resistant to change, but on the other they are extremely well 
represented at rallies to address global heating.    
 
Intergenerational conflict 
 This situation highlights a further anomaly.  Hitherto, environmental catastrophe 
strengthened the links between generations.  A drought, for example, was perceived as an 
event that our parents' and grandparents' generations overcame, and that we and our children 
will also have to surmount.  A generation was linked to both past and future by its ability to 
survive drought and then thrive.  Global heating severs those links.  Past generations were 
(largely) unaffected by climate change, and current and future generations will blame their 
forebears for causing it.  Global heating shatters the environmental 'solidarity' that once 
bound generations together.  
 
Disaster capitalism 
 Intragenerational solidarity is also fragile, but global heating is not fundamentally to 
blame.  Environmental disasters used to bind disparate communities together.  Divisions were 
to some degree set aside and groups had to act together to restore their neighbourhoods.  This 
is no longer so.  As Naomi Klein observes, disasters are now 'moments when we are hurled 
further apart. … disasters themselves are major new markets'.15  Disasters provide the social 
rupture that generates business space for those corporations which thrive in the new realm of 
'disaster capitalism'.16  If public infrastructure, already weakened by cuts to government 
 
1024.  They found that scepticism about global heating was common among older people from lower 
socio-economic backgrounds who are politically conservative and maintain traditional values.   
15 Naomi Klein, 'Disaster Capitalism', Harper's Magazine (October 2007) 50.  Klein's hypothesis remains 
just as or even more relevant in the Trump era.  See George Monbiot, 'From Trump to Johnson, nationalists 
are on the rise – backed by billionaire oligarchs', The Guardian (26 July 2019).   
16 Disaster capitalism may be subsumed under Marshall Berman's observations about 'the bourgeois 
capacity to make destruction and chaos pay' [All That Is Solid Melts Into Air (London: Verso, 1983) 103].  
Disaster capitalism began and thrives in America, but has now spread to most countries.  In Australia, a 
paradigm is the National Covid-19 Coordination Commission appointed to 'anticipate and mitigate the 
social and economic effects' of the pandemic [Prime Minister's media release (25 March 2020)].  As if it 
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funding, is unable to cope with catastrophe, or is even the cause of it, then the private sector 
is called on, largely by those responsible for infrastructure deterioration, to take over roles the 
public sector is no longer able to perform.  Disaster capitalism does not replace public 
services and infrastructure so much as re-engineer the concepts of government support and 
responsibility.  Corporations can and do provide security and law-enforcement services that 
hitherto were the domain of police, and they own and operate a growing portfolio of 
infrastructure – including roads and airports – that traditionally were the responsibility of 
government.  Those who cannot pay for private security and infrastructure are ruthlessly 
segregated and/or ignored in the wake of disaster, while those who can pay are given 
privileged attention and services that have, through government contracts, been paid for by 
the public. 
 
 Every catastrophe affords an opportunity for disaster capitalism, but global heating 
provides a convenient and lucrative agglomeration of disasters.  Catastrophic climate change 
is not a single event; it comprises a series of familiar disasters – drought, flood, heatwave, 
storm surge and so on – exacerbated by global heating.  As a government cedes to private 
corporations its responsibility for disaster management, so its ability to respond adequately to 
crises dwindles to the point where it is little more than a facilitator for corporate activity, a 
conduit for public money to flow into private pockets.  Attempts to tackle global heating 
therefore face two additional hurdles: a number of large and influential corporations – 
including Lockheed Martin and ExxonMobil17 – have no real interest in fixing climate 
change because it will supply disasters of increasing frequency and profitability, while 
concomitantly governments are shrinking their capacity to both address the causes of global 
heating and respond to its effects.   
 
Adaptation to global heating 
 Having noted above the problem of diminishing returns from doing nothing, what about 
adaptation strategies, such a building coastal walls to protect low-lying areas from sea level 
 
were deliberately complying with Klein's thesis, the commission's membership consists almost entirely of 
high-level businesspeople, most of whom have connections to the fossil fuel and mining industries.   
17 Apart from its obvious interest in maintaining fossil fuel consumption, 'the oil industry has consistently 
managed to turn disasters to its long-term advantage', often by securing reconstruction funds for fossil fuel 
infrastructure [Klein, 57].  
89 
 
rise?  The problems with adaptation are manifold.  Firstly, adaptation also suffers from 
diminishing returns because the impacts of global heating are not linear.18  If it costs x 
percent of GDP to adapt to, say, a 1-degree rise in global temperature above current levels, 
then it will cost a lot more than 2x per cent to adapt to a 2-degree increase, and very much 
more that 3x per cent for a further degree, and so on.  It is clear that adaptation would 
eventually cost more than any country could afford.  Second, whatever the merits of 
adaptation, it obviously does not address the underlying cause, so no matter how widespread 
or apparently successful adaption strategies might be, they may be overtaken by the problem 
they purport to address.  For instance, if a sea wall were built high enough to protect Miami 
from storm surge until 2100, it would still not protect the city from flooding because water 
from higher sea levels already percolates through the porous limestone upon which the city is 
built.19  Third, any resources devoted to adaptation are resources not being used to address 
GHG emissions.  Fourth, there are some effects of climate change for which there are few or 
no feasible adaptations.  For example, regions of unsustainable farmland will expand 
because, above a certain temperature range and level of desiccation, farming becomes 
impossible, or the remedial inputs required become too extravagant to justify diminished 
agricultural outputs. 
 
 The problem of adaptation's diminishing returns has usually been overlooked by its 
champions.  For example, Bjorn Lomborg acknowledges that in the United States the costs of 
hurricane damage have been increasing, but he claims this is due to much larger 
concentrations of people and property in hurricane-prone areas, not to global heating having 
caused an increase in the frequency and force of hurricanes.20  Lomborg argues that, adjusted 
 
18 For example, if a rise of 2 degrees has y impact on human health, a 4-degree rise will have vastly more 
impact than 2y [Tim Flannery, Atmosphere of Hope: Searching for solutions to the climate crisis 
(Melbourne: Text Publishing, 2015) 20].      
19 Elizabeth Kolbert, 'The Siege of Miami', New Yorker (21-28 December 2015).  Kolbert's article included 
an interview with Hal Wanless, chair of geological sciences, University of Miami.  
20 See, for example, Philip J. Klotzbach and Christopher W. Landsea, 'Extremely Intense Hurricanes: 
Revisiting Webster et al. after 10 Years', Journal of Climate (1 October 2015) 7621-7629.  They found no 
significant change in the percentage or frequency of categories 4-5 hurricanes since 1990.  Other examples 
are not amenable to Lomborg's view.  For instance, high tide flooding of vulnerable US coastal areas has 
more than doubled since 2000, and this figure will double or triple by 2030, and increase up to 15-fold by 
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for population and wealth, hurricane costs were very consistent from 1900 to 2017.21  This 
statement may be true, but it is also misleading.  Hurricane costs per capita might remain 
stable, but costs exacerbated by global heating – from bushfires, desiccation, rising sea levels 
and so on – are all increasing.22  This means that the proportion of GDP available to 
ameliorate hurricane damage is falling as climate change-related costs – that is, adaptation 
costs – are rising.  It hardly matters, therefore, if hurricane-related costs per capita are stable; 
the problem is that the money available per capita to meet those costs is diminishing.23      
 
 Further, Lomborg's argument is predicated on his view that rising prosperity will more 
than offset increases in climate-related costs, but this is misguided.  GDP represents the total 
value of goods and services consumed and produced by an economy, but this has almost 
nothing to do with the availability and distribution of money for specific purposes.  In the 
US, for example, an increasing percentage of national wealth is accumulating in fewer hands.  
The richest 1 percent are now wealthier than the bottom 90 percent, and they receive more 
than 90 percent of newly created wealth, so this disparity is increasing.24  At the same time, 
local authorities receive a constantly declining percentage of GDP, and therefore struggle to 
maintain basic infrastructure or provide essential services for their citizens.  They are 
increasingly less capable of addressing infrequent – and therefore unbudgeted – calamities 
like hurricane damage.  Lomborg's assumption that countries will use their increasing wealth 
to address natural disaster is naïve and disregards relevant evidence.  For instance, it is 
instructive to compare the response by local and federal authorities to damage in New 
 
2050 [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Technical Report NOS CO-OPS 092, '2019 
State of U.S. High Tide Flooding with a 2020 Outlook' (July 2020) 11-12].    
21 Bjorn Lomborg, 'Report's sensationalist claim of "climate breakdown" is catchy but untrue', Weekend 
Australian (19-20 January 2019).  Lomborg is basing his argument on Jessica Weinkle et al., 'Normalized 
hurricane damage in the continental United States 1900-2017', Nature Sustainability, vol. 1 (December 
2018) 808-813.  
22 In fact the frequency of extreme weather has soared since 1980.  Economic losses from those events are 
now outstripping growth in global GDP, so adaptation strategies are becoming even less viable [William J. 
Ripple et al., 'World Scientists' Warning of a Climate Emergency', BioScience, biz088 (Nov. 2019) 2-3].    
23 Of course other costs, such as health and aged care, are also increasing per capita, but I am discussing 
only costs directly associated with climate change. 




Orleans caused by hurricane Katrina in 2005 – tardy, piecemeal and incompetent – with the 
government's response to the global financial crisis in 2007-08 – well-targeted and generous 
protection of wealthy financial interests.  In short, GDP is very different from fiscal priorities.  
Given that recent past behaviour is the best indicator of a country's future behaviour in 
allocating resources, and that in countries like America and Australia governments have 
patently failed to use their considerable wealth to address existing problems exacerbated by 
climate change, there is little reason to think that most governments will act more responsibly 
in the future. 
 
 Adaptation's diminishing returns are further exacerbated by 'tipping points' – thresholds 
beyond which there are irreversible and/or aggravated environmental effects.  Irreversible 
melting of the Greenland ice sheet is a good example: it would raise sea levels significantly, 
and the reduced albedo effect from diminished ice cover would increase global heating.  The 
problem for adaptation is clear: once a tipping point is exceeded the costs of adaptation rise 
suddenly and immensely.  In short, threat of a tipping point should constitute a state of 
emergency.  In this situation, urgency may be defined as the reaction time (t) to an alert about 
a threatened tipping point divided by the intervention time (T) remaining if we are to avoid 
that point.  If the reaction time is longer than the intervention time – that is, if t/T ˃ 1 – then 
we have lost control of that situation.  As Timothy Lenton and his colleagues note, if t = 30 
years to achieve net carbon emissions of zero, but T is rapidly approaching zero years in 
which to address emissions, then we have already lost the capacity to avoid one or more 
tipping points.25       
 
Depression mentality 
 Adaption assumes that a wealthier future will entail increasing resilience, but this 
assumption is misguided.  For example, before the Covid-19 pandemic unemployment in the 
United States was at its lowest level since about 1970.  Australia's unemployment was also 
low.  In both countries, however, almost no environmental disaster, including climate change, 
is deemed more important than the threat of job loss.  Government agencies regularly justify 
a proposed environmental outrage by bullying opponents from the moral high ground of jobs 
created by a certain project, or jobs forgone if it is not approved.  Such behaviour, however, 
 




is more redolent of the Great Depression, when unemployment was 25 percent.  Under 
conditions of nearly full employment and ample societal wealth this behaviour is fraudulent, 
merely an excuse to allow agencies to do what they like.  
 
Cultural purposes 
 Why, though, has this mentality continued to flourish in a very different era, particularly 
given that those who lived through the Depression are now either dead or well beyond 
working age?  The answer is that avoiding the disaster of mass unemployment became a 
powerful 'cultural purpose' in North America and elsewhere.26  Cultural purposes usually 
arise in response to events that are perceived to threaten the wellbeing or even existence of a 
society.  Whether these events pose an actual threat is largely irrelevant.  Cultural purposes 
are clung to tenaciously and occasionally elevated into a mythical motif that serves to define 
a society.  Removed from the conditions in which it arose, however, a cultural purpose can 
easily become a handy pretext to justify appalling decisions or perpetuate destructive and 
outdated ideas.   
 
 For example, after World War II the American automobile industry was seen as the 
overriding instrument through which unemployment could be avoided.  Few or no 
community or environmental values were allowed to impede the automobile: the national 
highway system, the erasure of inner city neighbourhoods, and even the removal of 
competition from public transport all facilitated, or were the results of, an industry whose 
mythology became more important than its reality.  In the 1950s, one-fifth of America's gross 
national product was dedicated to the automobile, and the country owned three-quarters of 
the world's cars.  The automobile defined and delivered America's cultural memes of limitless 
space and individual freedom to explore it.  Moreover, as Robert Hughes appositely noted, 
for most Americans a car was 'the most eloquent sculptured object in their lives. … [Cars] 
were designed and marketed as fantasies.'27  It was this potent mythology that underlay 
President Bush's statement at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro that the 'American 
way of life is not negotiable'.  However, the president was oblivious to the fact that America's 
automotive fantasy had long since betrayed its country.  Up until the oil crisis of 1973, 
America's car manufacturers changed the style of their products every year; ergo, most cars 
 
26 As Jane Jacobs observed in Dark Age Ahead (New York: Vintage Books, 2005) 55-60. 
27 Robert Hughes, American Visions (London: Harvill Press, 1997) 505-506. 
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were stylistically outdated a year after they were produced.  Underneath bigger tail fins, more 
sheet metal and additional chrome, however, this policy of dynamic obsolescence disguised 
mechanical platforms that remained crude and underdeveloped.  When cars from overseas 
manufacturers began to infiltrate the American market, local products could not compete.  
Designed and built by companies concerned with technology rather than mythology, foreign 
cars were more fuel efficient, better built, more reliable and handled better than the American 
behemoths they rapidly replaced.  The way of life President Bush sought to defend had been 
in retreat for a decade.  By the time his son repeated the same sentiment in 2001, America's 
automobile industry was almost on its knees, employing a fraction of its 1950s workforce.28  
President George W. Bush's statement was testimony to the endurance of a cultural purpose 
that had morphed from protecting jobs to a defining myth that it was un-American to 
consume less fuel.  
 
 There is a further consequence of America's automotive fantasy.  Cars, and the 
infrastructure to support them, have been overriding factors in reducing countries like 
America and Australia to very poor levels of energy efficiency.  Further, the automobile 
separates, and even segregates, people from each other, whereas most activities that are or 
would be effective in mitigating carbon emissions require communal cooperation.29  This is 
obvious for things like shared or public transport, but cooperation is no less required for 
improved planning, housing and distributed electricity generation.  Unfortunately, community 
spirit is not easily rebuilt.  As Jane Jacobs argued, 'not TV or illegal drugs but the automobile 
has been the chief destroyer of American communities'.30  This means that the cultural asset 
required to mitigate carbon emissions produced by cars – strong and effective community 
spirit and cooperation – has itself been vitiated by cars.  More broadly, a critical capacity for 
 
28 Asked whether President George W. Bush would call on America's drivers to reduce their fuel 
consumption, his press secretary replied, 'That's a big no.  The president believes that it's an American way 
of life.'  Quoted in Peter Singer, The President of Good and Evil (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 2004) 160. 
29 As Jan Gehl argues, cars were decisive in creating cities whose forbidding dimensions and confusing 
scales are antithetical to shared urban spaces and human wellbeing [Cities for people (Washington: Island 
Press, 2010) 55-57]. 
30 Jacobs, 37.  Jane Jacobs is probably best known for her fight to preserve SoHo, Lower Manhattan, from 
expressways proposed by Robert Moses, New York's Planning Commissioner.  Albert Borgmann similarly 
argues that automobiles were the 'catalyst of destruction' of urbanity [Crossing the Postmodern Divide 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) 129]. 
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the survival of any society – its ability to respond effectively to novel circumstances – has 
also been undermined because the infrastructure required by automobiles is probably the 
globe's most intransigent example of technological inertia. 
 
Technological inertia and maturity 
 Once a technology is entrenched, it can be difficult or even impossible to do something 
else.  This appears to contradict our taken-for-granted view that technology is constantly 
changing, and our individual fears of being left behind by new and unfamiliar gadgetry.  In 
reality there is no contradiction; it is just that our obsession with new technology, particularly 
electronic communication, often obscures the immobile antiquity of so much that we use 
every day.      
 
 A paradigm of technological inertia is the device I am using to write this monograph.  
The qwerty keyboard was invented to overcome problems with the ungainly and fragile 
mechanisms of early typewriters.  Keys were positioned to separate common letter pairs and 
thereby reduce jamming of the strike arms.  Ease of learning or using the keyboard were 
irrelevant.  Better typewriters, let alone electric typewriters and computers, rendered the 
qwerty layout obsolete well over half a century ago.       
 
Future generations can solve the problem  
 Notwithstanding technological inertia, the seduction of technology can persuade us to 
defer responsibility for CO2 mitigation to subsequent generations.  If we imagine that 
technology can fix a problem, then it is more likely that the next generation, which we 
assume will possess better technology than we have, will discover it, and more likely still that 
the generation after it will uncover a solution.  We take for granted that any future generation 
will enjoy superior technology over its predecessor.31  However, this assumption is only half 
right because technological progress is very uneven.  For example, Boeing's 747 has been 
 
31 In this context, 'superior' can be misleading.  For example, SUVs now comprise 40% of new car sales 
worldwide, up from 17% in 2010.  Their size, weight and poor aerodynamics mean they use more fuel than 
comparable cars.  Therefore, more people are choosing inferior technology – with reference to CO2 
emissions and climate change – even though much better options (for the environment) are available.       
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flying for 50 years.32  It has improved significantly over five decades, but remains 
fundamentally the same aircraft.  Compare this rate of technological development to the 40 
(let alone 50) years before it.  There were no jet engines.  Boeing's passenger aircraft of the 
late 1920s carried one hundred times fewer passengers than a 747 and flew nearly six times 
slower.  Clearly the rate of aircraft development has slowed dramatically.33  There are several 
reasons for this – airport capacity, fuel costs, airline requirements and so on – but the 
overwhelming reason is technological maturity.   
 
Technological maturity 
 A new technology is often characterised by developmental leaps that explore the 
technology's little-known potential; in a mature technology these leaps give way to 
incremental improvements.  Moreover, the resources – particularly money and time – 
required to achieve further improvements increase with maturity.  An input that might 
formerly have achieved benchmark development is later able to produce only minor 
improvement.  With regard to climate change the problem is confronting: most of the 
technologies available to address global heating – solar panels, wind turbines, batteries, 
hydrogen fuel cells and so on – are mature.  None of them is likely to improve more than 
incrementally.  Of course, this does not preclude a technological breakthrough in a different, 
and currently unforeseen, field.  Absent such a breakthrough, however, for at least the next 
few decades the technology available for mitigating carbon emissions will be much the same 
 
32 Both the 747 and the Concorde made their first flights in 1969.  It is noteworthy that we sometimes talk 
about 'nostalgia' for the Concorde, but this is misleading.  Nostalgia is a sentimental yearning for the past, 
whereas Concorde represents a level of technology we feel no longer able to attain.  Our feelings about it 
are more like a sense of wonder because Concorde upsets our assumption that we are more technologically 
advanced in all areas than previous generations.  
33 Perhaps the most striking example involves recent debate in Canada over whether to purchase America's 
F-35 fighter aircraft.  The F-35 was designed in the 1990s and notoriously has been plagued with 
development and design problems.  Its capabilities are generally thought insufficient for Canada's 
requirements.  As an alternative, some experts have called for the Canadian government to resurrect the 
Avro Arrow, a Canadian designed and built aircraft which first flew in 1958.  The Arrow project was 
controversially cancelled in 1959.  The idea that a 60-plus years old design could legitimately be regarded 
as equal, let alone superior, to the latest American military aircraft is sobering.  Compare this lack of 
progress to the 60 years before the Arrow.  At the beginning of this period, the Wright brothers were some 
years from making their first flight.         
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as we have now.  However, effective use of this technology has so far proved beyond the 
capacity of most governments.  Even though most countries have at least some renewable 
energy, and a few (such as Denmark and Sweden) have harnessed this technology to a 
significant degree, global carbon emissions continue to rise.34  In 2017, emissions rose by 1.6 
percent after three years of little to no increase.  Unfortunately, emissions did not return to 
previous levels: in 2018 they increased again (by 2.7 percent over 2017) mainly due to rising 
demand for fossils fuels.  Use of renewable energy technology continues to expand, but this 
growth is unable (or barely able) to offset increasing global emissions, let alone reduce those 
emissions to zero.   
 
Excursus – Covid-19 and risk assessment 
 The Covid-19 pandemic has shown how deficient most of us are in assessing risk.  This 
is particularly evident in widespread criticism of lockdowns.  This criticism is not usually 
directed at lockdowns per se but at apparent inconsistencies in their implementation.  For 
example, at one stage we were allowed to go to the supermarket or hairdresser but not to the 
farmers' market or local playground, even though, with social-distancing provisions, the risk 
of viral transmission was no more, and probably less, at the venues we were not allowed to 
attend.  These decisions were based partly, but not solely, on necessity.  Sure, we have to buy 
supermarket groceries, but some people obtain nearly all their food from farmers' markets, 
and we don't have to visit the hairdresser, so these decisions appear somewhat arbitrary.  Why 
shut venues C and D if attending them carries no more risk than going to A or B?  A lot of 
media commentators and citizens blamed the government for lacking common sense. 
 
 The answer is that, in this instance, risk is cumulative.  If A, B, C and D carry roughly 
the same risk, then I should not go to C and D – or B for that matter, even though it's open – 
if I have visited A.  If my risk in attending A is x, then my risk in also visiting B rises to 2x, 
and to 3x if I also visit C, and so on.  When the government issued a directive to close C and 
D, it was not necessarily saying these venues are more dangerous than A and B.  It was 
merely lowering risk by minimising opportunities for infection. 
 
 
34 R. B. Jackson et al., 'Global energy growth is outpacing decarbonization', Environmental Research 
Letters, vol. 13, no. 12 (December 2018).  
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 There is a contradiction here.  With respect to Covid-19, most governments err on side of 
caution by actively imposing restrictions, but with regard to climate change they exercise 
caution by refraining from action.    
 
Conclusion 
  Our individual and collective abilities to assess risk are modest.  Governments are risk-
averse, but their caution can be expressed in various or even contradictory ways.  In 
particular, most governments are willing to 'accept' risk about climate change on behalf of 
those who have no say in the matter – children and future generations.  As Ulrich Beck 
argues, risk has become: 
 
a kind of collective obsessional memory of the fact that our decisions and mistakes 
are behind what now confronts us.  Global risks are the embodiment of the errors of 
the whole industrial era; they are a kind of collective return of the repressed.35 
 
We have inherited the risk that former generations accepted on our behalf, and now find 
ourselves consumed by their mistakes and constrained in our capacity to rectify them.  In 
short, with regard to climate change risk has melded into folly.  The next chapter explores 
what can happen when folly and risk combine to produce tragedy.        
  
                      
 
 








 The destruction of Melos in 416 BCE is a paradigm of poor risk assessment combined 
with folly.  Thucydides' account of negotiations between Melos and Athens is instructive in 
providing a template of dialogic breakdown caused by incompatible versions of reality.  This 
episode provides an example whereby ancient and modern hermeneutic horizons are fused in 
order to throw light on both.   
 
Poor risk assessment: modern lessons from an ancient example 
 There is of course no historical precedent for the current global problem of addressing a 
self-inflicted climatic crisis, but there are numerous precedents for people, groups and 
governments making irrational decisions because they are influenced by the possibility effect 
and/or the certainty effect.  Daniel Kahneman defines the former as giving more weight to 
highly unlikely outcomes, and the latter as giving less weight to almost certain outcomes, 
than their probabilities justify.1  Under the possibility effect we tend to put too much 
emphasis on small risks and unlikely outcomes, whereas under the certainty effect we tend to 
put too little emphasis on highly likely outcomes.  In brief, probabilities can lure us into poor 
reasoning about them.  For example, gamblers indulge in the possibility effect by placing too 
much weight on their small chance of winning, while governments that were completely 
unprepared for Covid-19 had not given sufficient weight to the very high probability they 
would one day face a pandemic.  Governments that fail to address climate change were, and 
are often still are, misled by both effects.  They gamble on the very small possibility that 
global heating might not occur (or might not be severe) and underemphasize the near 
certainty that it will.        
 
 One of the clearest examples of what can happen when these effects are confused or 
disregarded was the destruction of ancient Melos.  This island (modern Milos) lies about 150 
km SSW of Athens, and about 175 km east of Sparta.  During the Peloponnesian War 
between Athens and Sparta and their respective allies (431 - 404 BCE), Melos endeavoured 
to maintain its neutrality.  This was unacceptable to Athens.  In 416, an Athenian fleet and 
 
1 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011) 311-314. 
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army arrived at Melos, its envoys demanding that Melos join the Athenian empire or face the 
consequences.  The ensuing dialogue between Athenians and Melians is recorded in 
Thucydides' history of the war.2  This exchange is a paradigm of what occurs when a 
government, faced unequivocally with its polity's obliteration, knowingly makes the wrong 
decision.  
 
Thucydides as historian and observer: lessons for all time 
 Near the beginning of his history, Thucydides wrote that his method in recording the 
numerous speeches delivered during the war was 'to make each speaker say broadly what I 
supposed would have been needed on any given occasion, while keeping as closely as I could 
to the overall intent of what was actually said'.  In short, the speeches were composed by 
Thucydides and reflect his view of what can be learned from various episodes.  His general 
aim was to provide 'a clear understanding of what happened – and, such is the human 
condition, will happen again at some time in the same or a similar pattern'.3  Thucydides is 
not proffering a crude theory of historical repetition but rather asserting the enduring value of 
studying how people and societies act.  More specifically, he is analysing political societies in 
which 'decisions are taken by rational and open discussion and in accordance with rational 
principles'.4  These societies are organised and act according to rational self-interest, but 
Thucydides wants his reader to discern that, in certain situations, this perceived self-interest 
can be irrational and self-destructive.  He intends his history to be instructive and insightful 
for all time.   
 
Melos faces existential threat 
 Prima facie, the destruction of Melos and the modern threat of climate change have 
nothing in common.  However, the response of this ancient state to the prospect of almost 
certain annihilation is instructive because the Melians rehearsed most of the reasoning and 
arguments advanced by modern states for not addressing climate change.  Indeed, there are at 
least 10 points of similarity – keeping in mind that global heating is to us what Athens was to 
Melos – and each point throws light on our modern situation.  
 
2 Thucydides 5.84-113. 
3 Ibid. 1.22. 
4 Oswyn Murray, 'Greek Historians' in The Oxford History of the Classical World, John Boardman, Jasper 
Griffin and Oswyn Murray eds (London: Oxford University Press and Book Club Associates, 1986) 195. 
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1. Do not give the people a voice 
 The Athenian envoys talked only to the Melian oligarchy; they were not given access to 
the people at large.  The envoys' view was that the privileged few clearly did not want the 
masses confused by 'seductive and unchallenged argument'.5  The oligarchs did not want the 
rest of Melos to hear arguments that might persuade them by appealing to unanswerable 
common sense.  The people were given no say, and their views were not canvassed, in a 
situation and about a decision that would decide their future.   
 
2. The situation is plain to see and the alternatives are clear 
 The Athenians possessed an army and navy that were magnitudes more powerful than 
anything Melos could muster.  The oligarchs knew, and were told, that their choice was either 
submission to Athens or destruction.  The Athenian envoys asked pointedly whether the 
Melians were meeting them with the 'explicit purpose of considering how to save your city in 
the present circumstances which are plain to your eyes'.6  The oligarchs agreed that the 
meeting was about Melian survival, and the envoys were clear that it was in both parties' 
interests that Melos should survive.  Thucydides is meticulous in presenting the situation such 
that the Melians could not be confused about or unaware of the consequences of their 
decision.   
 
3. Discuss irrelevant matters 
 The Melians appealed to the principle of the common good such that a state which found 
itself in danger should be able to make a case for less severe treatment.  They added that this 
was much more in the Athenian interest – 'given the massive retaliation you would face … 
should you fall from power'7 – than the Melian.  The envoys responded that this hypothetical 
gambit was irrelevant – 'a danger you can leave to us'.8  They made it clear that Athens was 
acting in its own interests, that what they proposed would save Melos, and that appeals to 
morality or justice were simply beside the point.  The Melians were arguing as if this were a 
dispute between roughly equal parties: if one argument did not work then they could advance 
another in stating their interest.  The oligarchs' arguments were reasonable and their points 
 
5 Thucydides 5.85. 
6 Ibid. 5.87 (my italics). 
7 Ibid. 5.90. 
8 Ibid 5.91. 
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were valid, but they did not address the stark reality that confronted Melos.  The Athenians 
put it baldly and factually: 'You are not in an equal contest, so questions of honour 
maintained or shame avoided have no relevance'.9  
 
4. Think about resisting an irresistible force    
 The Melians had their own prognostications about the future, but the Athenians 
continued to remind them that they should be thinking about their survival, not about 
resisting or trying to fob off a vastly superior force.  The envoys asserted that states like 
Melos were among those 'most likely to take an irrational risk and bring themselves and us 
into entirely foreseeable danger'.10   
 
5. Depend on hope and divine intervention 
 The Melians proffered a view that the uncertainties of war can overcome discrepancies in 
power.  If they gave in to Athens, all hope would be gone, but if they maintained hope then 
they could 'stand upright'.  The envoys replied that 'hope counsels risk' and is a delusory 
spendthrift.  Those who stake all on hope 'only recognize her for what she is when they are 
ruined and she has left them no further chance to act'.11  The Athenians again reminded the 
Melians that they were perilously close to destruction.  They warned the oligarchs not to do 
what others often do when under pressure: instead of choosing a practical and earthly means 
of deliverance, they turn to divination, oracles and other sources of unfounded and ultimately 
destructive optimism.  The Melians believed they were in the right and would therefore enjoy 
divine favour.  The Athenians replied that they also enjoyed divine favour, so Melian 
confidence in help from the gods was misplaced. 
 
6. Trust in unlikely events 
 The Melians believed that Sparta would come to their aid, which prompted the Athenian 
reply: 'we can only admire your innocence and pity your folly'.12  The envoys presented clear 
evidence that Sparta would look after its own interests first, and was most unlikely to send a 
 
9 Ibid. 5.101. 
10 Ibid. 5.99 (my italics). 
11 Ibid. 5.103. 
12 Ibid. 5.105. 
102 
 
force to Melos given that Athens controlled the sea.  Moreover, external threats had never 
before caused Athens to abandon a siege, so Melian beliefs were doubly groundless. 
 
7. Avoid confronting reality 
 The Athenians reminded the oligarchs that they were supposed to be negotiating for the 
survival of Melos, but they had failed to say anything that would signal that intent: 'so far 
there has been no logic in your attitude'.13  Indeed, the oligarchs themselves had most to lose.  
Their accustomed position as rulers of Melian life had given them a false sense of immunity 
from the vicissitudes of ordinary citizens.     
 
8. Base your choice on obstinate pride       
 The Athenians warned the Melians not to embrace the false sense of shame to which 
people turn when the danger they confront is obvious but they think their honour is 
threatened: 'the results are almost always catastrophic'.14  People are lured on by the seductive 
attraction of preserving their so-called honour, becoming victims of a 'mere word' by bringing 
a much bigger disaster on themselves and thereby incurring a greater loss of honour than the 
loss they were trying to avoid.  The Melians were counselled to make a decision based on one 
thought only: the survival of their state. 
 
9. Disregard advice and do what you have always done 
 The oligarchs decided to put their trust in the divine good fortune that had preserved 
Melos for centuries, and also look to Sparta for help.  They even proffered the following 
terms to Athens: 'to accept us as friends and neutrals, and to leave our land with a treaty made 
between us as best serves both our interests'.15  This decision simply ignored all warnings and 
evidence to the contrary. 
 
10. Disregard plain evidence in favour of hoping for the best      
 The Athenians' final response was a statement of straightforward common sense: 
Melians must be alone in thinking that 'the future is more certain than the evidence of your 
 
13 Ibid. 5.111. 
14 Ibid. 5.111. 
15 Ibid. 5.112. 
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own eyes, and regard speculation as present fact, as if mere wishing will make it so'.16  The 
Athenians further asserted that the more Melos trusted in Sparta, luck and hope, the greater 
would be their downfall.    
 
An inevitable result 
 After discussion ceased, Athens began a siege of the island's city.  Most of the Athenian 
forces then departed to deal with other matters, which allowed the Melians to capture a 
section of the siege wall and kill a few of the remaining garrison.  This small victory probably 
reinforced the Melian view that they made the right decision.  Their optimism was short-
lived.  Athens sent another force to continue the siege, and Melos surrendered 
unconditionally.  All adult men were executed, and all women and children were enslaved.  It 
is the best documented ancient genocide.17   
 
Points of similarity  
 There are points of similarity between Melian obtuseness and most governments' 
response to the threat of global heating:  
 
(1) In many countries (Australia is a prime example) a solid majority of people want action 
on climate change, yet governments prefer to listen to oligarchs and plutocrats, such as small 
groups of fossil fuel producers and other interested parties.     
 
(2) Evidence for global heating is clear, and the consequences of action or inaction are well 
known, so any response that does not address it is irrational. 
 
(3) Reality does not become less real just because we prefer not to address it.    
 
(4) Many governments have hoped, or have acted as if they hoped, that global heating will 
simply go away.  By the time they realise their hopes are illusory the opportunity to act 
effectively might have passed. 
 
 
16 Ibid. 5.113. 
17 See the case study of Melos in Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990) 65-73. 
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(5) If we stake everything on future events (such as new technologies) to fix global heating 
then we are setting ourselves up for disappointment or destruction.   
      
(6) It is worth asking any government, 'You must surely be invested in your country's and 
people's survival and wellbeing, but where and what is the evidence for it?'.  
 
(7) A mythical or cultural construal by which a polity defines itself can be so compelling that 
a government may act to defend that construal as if it were a matter of actual self-
preservation, but thereby imperil that polity's survival. 
 
(8) In refusing to address climate change, some governments are becoming dysfunctional, 
because refusal to confront reality infects other and eventually most areas of governance.    
 
Prospect theory 
 The destruction of Melos was a paradigm of prospect theory, of which the possibility and 
certainty effects are important factors.  An equally significant factor is the 'reference point'.  
When faced with decisions involving risk, we first determine a baseline, and thereafter 
evaluate gains or losses with reference to that baseline.18  For example, imagine you are given 
$1,000 and are then asked to choose between the following: a 50 per cent chance to win 
$1,000 OR definitely receiving $500.  Daniel Kahneman found that a large majority of people 
preferred the latter option.19   Now imagine you are given $2,000 and asked to choose 
between a 50 per cent chance to lose $1,000 OR definitely losing $500.  In this case, a large 
majority chose to gamble on the first choice.  If utility of wealth were all that mattered then 
each example should yield the same choice, because in both situations the options have 
identical results.  In both you can choose either the certainty of being richer by $1,500, or 
gamble on being richer by $1,000 or by $2,000.  Why, then, did most people not choose the 
same option in each situation?  The answer can be found in the reference point or baseline.  
In the first example, the baseline is $1,000 more than you currently have, and $2,000 more in 
the second example.  If you choose the $500 option under either example, the result, as we 
have noted, is exactly the same – you will be $1,500 richer – but you will gain $500 in the 
first example, and lose it in the second.  In short, the baseline determines your perception of 
 
18 Peterson, Decision Theory, 315. 
19 Kahneman, 280-282. 
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loss or gain.  This is important because we tend to be loss averse: we usually perceive losses 
as more significant than gains, even if the outcomes are equal.  Ergo, most people in these 
examples opted to choose the certain gain but gamble on avoiding the certain loss.   
 
 Kahneman thinks that this asymmetry has an evolutionary origin: organisms that 
regarded threats as more urgent than opportunities probably had a better chance to survive 
and reproduce.  The problem with this hypothesis is that organisms which exploited their 
opportunities, though initially enduring a higher rate of mortality, would be better equipped 
to survive and thereby gradually displace their less adventurous competitors.  My own view 
is more prosaic: 'loss' and 'gain' both carry considerable linguistic, sociological and 
psychological baggage, and we find it difficult, but certainly not impossible, to set aside such 
baggage in weighing risks and coming to a rational decision.20 
 
 The Melians demonstrated extreme loss aversion.  Their perceived baseline was the 
status quo – the situation they enjoyed immediately before the Athenians arrived on Melos.  
Their expected loss from that level was the single most significant factor in determining their 
decision.  They would have acted more rationally if they had located their baseline near the 
level of obliteration to which Melos would almost certainly have been reduced if Athens 
sacked the island.  Indeed, the Athenians told them as much: 'there is no disgrace in yielding 
to a great city [that has the power to destroy you] which offers you moderate terms'.21  
Instead of focussing on their potential gains – how much better off than obliteration they 
would be – the Melians focussed on their potential losses, weighing the latter as much more 
significant than the former, even though their loss from a baseline of neutrality to being a 
tribute-paying ally would be insignificant compared to their gain from a baseline of 
devastation to being an ally.  Congruent with his intention to show how people and societies 
function, Thucydides wanted to demonstrate that the Melian choice to risk catastrophic loss 
 
20 With regard to psychological factors, it is worth noting the link between physical pain and economic 
insecurity.  The prospect of economic loss and insecurity can be physically painful.  Ergo, when we see 
people wince as the stock market falls and their savings dwindle, they might be in actual pain.  This is a 
further reason for people putting more emphasis on avoiding pain than on an equivalent gain [Eileen Y. 
Chou, Bidhan L. Parmar, Adam D. Galinsky, 'Economic Insecurity Increases Physical Pain', Psychological 
Science, vol. 27, no. 4 (April 2016) 443-454]. 
21 Thucydides 5.111. 
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in the futile hope of maintaining their status quo was the product of normal decision-making 
in which emotional attachment to what people have vastly outweighs rational consideration 
of what they should reasonably expect.22  In short, when faced with bad options, decision-
makers act with predictable irrationality.   
 
Genocide averted 
 The Melians behaved predictably, but predictability is not inevitability.  To illustrate this 
thought it is worth comparing Melos's fate with that of Mytilene: the two form companion 
narratives in Thucydides' history.  In 428, Mytilene – a polis on the east side of Lesbos, about 
340 km by sea from Athens – revolted against Athenian hegemony.  The revolt failed and 
Mytilene was forced into negotiations with its Athenian occupiers.  In Athens, the assembly 
decided to execute those responsible for the uprising (they were being held in Athens) and 
also kill every man in Mytilene, and enslave the women and children [3.36].  The parallel 
with Melos is clear and deliberate.  A ship was dispatched with an instruction for the 
Athenian commander in Mytilene to carry out the assembly's decision.   
 
 On the following day, however, there was a general change of heart; a majority of 
citizens wanted a second debate.  Cleon, who had prosecuted the original decision, again 
argued in favour of punishment.  Diodotus, who had argued against Cleon's original motion, 
spoke again in favour of clemency.  Thucydides is careful to display the merits of both 
speeches; the reader is presented with good arguments for either decision.  Cleon's arguments 
are largely expressions of realpolitik: 
 
1. There is a difference between personal and political values 
 Athenians exercise a lot of trust in their everyday lives, but it is a mistake to extrapolate 
that attitude to dealings with other cities and peoples [3.37]. 
 
2. Hegemony is about strength, not pity 
 Athenian hegemony is imposed by force on unwilling subjects, not by making 
concessions to them.  An empire is not a popularity contest.  Displays of weakness are 
dangerous for Athens and elicit no gratitude from subjects.  
 
22 This point reflects Josiah Ober's view in The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2015) 217. 
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3. Vacillation is weakness  
 Consistency in decision-making is vital.  Imperfect laws reliably enforced are more 
effective than good laws erratically enforced. 
 
4. Appeal to the ordinary citizen   
 Citizens who are less intellectual and sophisticated have more common sense and make 
better decisions than clever people.  Good decisions are not produced by contests of wit and 
rhetoric.  
 
5. Volition equals guilt 
 Mytilene's revolt was not involuntary.  Its people knew full well what they were doing: 
'there can be sympathy only where there is no deliberate intent' [3.40].  
 
6. The crime merits the punishment   
 Cleon invoked the well-established and long-accepted principle of talio (punishment in 
kind).  Mytilene's punishment is deserved and will send a clear message to Athens' enemies 
that the penalty for revolt is death [3.40].   
 
 Diodotus responded to some of Cleon's arguments, but his main points appealed to 
broader ideas about Athens' interests.      
 
1. It is not a sign of weakness if a government changes its mind  
 Diodotus disagreed with those who objected to additional debate on major issues, who 
regarded a decision as inviolable, or who thought that revisiting a debate showed 
irresoluteness and ambivalence.  He deemed them as either fools or interested parties.  
Diodotus regarded haste and anger as the two biggest impediments to good decision-making: 
'anger is the fellow of folly, and haste the sign of ignorance and shallow judgment' [3.42].  
 
2. Bad ideas are usually propelled by bullying than by argument  
 Those who promote a bad cause usually realise the impossibility of giving a good speech 






3. A polity's dysfunction is evident in its inability to distinguish bad from good advice    
 Athenian politics had become so dysfunctional that 'good advice straightforwardly given 
is no less suspect than bad advice' [3.43].  The advocate of a disastrous policy can win 
support only through deception, but in a dysfunctional government the proponent of a good 
policy may have to lie if he is to be believed. 
 
4. Decisions should be based on long-term benefits, not short-term satisfaction  
 The issue Athenians should focus on was not Mytilene's guilt but the wisdom of Athens' 
response.  Diodotus would recommend neither execution nor clemency unless that decision 
were 'clearly to the good of our city. … the decisions we should be taking are more about the 
future than the present' [3.44]. 
 
5. Decisions must be based on evidence 
 Diodotus observed that, in hoping to reduce crime, Athens had prescribed the death 
penalty for many offences, yet crime continued, 'so either we must find some still more 
powerful deterrent, or at least recognise that this deterrent has no effect' [3.45].  Cleon's 
proposal might satisfy some citizens' craving for revenge, but there was no evidence it would 
work in Athens' favour. 
 
6a. It is pointless to address a problem without tackling its underlying causes 
6b. Hope mixed with desire may blind a polity to clear dangers   
 The causes driving people to take extraordinary and dangerous risks were poverty and 
power.  The former leads to boldness propelled by desperation, and the latter leads to greed.  
Both are attended by hope and desire, and 'where desire leads, hope follows.  Desire develops 
the plan, and hope suggests that fortune will be generous.  Both are ruinous, because their 
invisible influence is more powerful than the dangers in plain sight.' [3.45]. 
 
7. Making the best decision might involve modifying, or abandoning, a long-held 
principle 
 Diodotus concedes that Cleon's appeal to justice is attractive because Athenians were 
still incensed about Mytilene's revolt.  However, this was not an argument about legal 
principles; 'this is a political debate about how best they can serve our interests' [3.44].  
Moreover, even if Mytilene were justly destroyed, Athens would be committing an act of 
injustice on Mytilene's common people (demos), who bore no responsibility for the revolt.  
109 
 
This would not serve Athens' future interests because it would signal to the demos in other 
cities that Athens does not discriminate between guilt and innocence, so people have nothing 
to lose if they join a revolt [3.47].  In other words, indiscriminate application of justice might 
have unjust consequences and work against Athens' own interests.     
 
8. Strength and aggression are not the same   
 Athens will demonstrate greater strength by adopting a well-reasoned policy towards 
opponents than by resorting to aggressive action that combines force with folly [3.48].   
 
 After hearing both speeches, the assembly voted, by a narrow margin, for clemency.  
Another ship was dispatched to Mytilene.  With dramatic intensity, Thucydides relates the 
second trireme's efforts to catch the earlier ship.  However, the latter had too much lead and 
arrived first.  The Athenian commander in Mytilene received the order and was preparing to 
carry it out when the second ship arrived.  As Thucydides drily noted, 'This was how close 
Mytilene came to destruction' [3.49].  It was also an observation that chance may play more 
of a role in our affairs than we care to admit.    
 
 Both speeches have points in common.  In particular, both are wary of rhetoric, yet both 
demonstrate high levels of rhetorical skill.  However, whereas Cleon condemns dazzling 
speeches for preying on the gullibility of an audience [3.38], Diodotus asserts that speech is 
the only medium by which action will be decided.  It is, therefore, a threat to the polis if 
people condemn a good speech and speaker as motivated by money.  In so doing they 
condemn Athens to losing the advice of those who have something important to contribute 
but are too unnerved to put themselves forward [3.42].   
 
 A further point is that, rather than addressing each of Cleon's arguments on its own terms 
and within its discrete area of discourse, Diodotus expands the area of debate.  For example, 
Cleon's argument might satisfy the assembly's short-term interests and demand for justice, but 
it fails in a discussion about the long-term wellbeing of Athens.             
 
Points of similarity  
 Like the Melian genocide, there are points of similarity between Athenian debates on the 




(1) Government decisions are not holy writ.  The modern Westminster idea that it is better to 
defend a poor decision than admit error or uncertainty is a sign of governmental fragility. 
 
(2) It is possible (if infrequent) for good decisions to sell themselves because they are better 
able to muster convincing levels of rationality and evidence in their favour. 
 
(3) A healthily functioning government is able to encourage, receive, assess and accept good 
advice. 
 
(4) A government that fails to discern its country's long-term interests, let alone act in them, 
is facing an identity crisis.  This is evident in its pandering to specious interests rather than 
citizens' long-term wellbeing.   
 
(5) Poor decisions based on short-term expediency, or immutable dogma, rather than 
evidence are likely to be repeated.  
 
(6) Failure to address underlying problems in favour of short-term spurious solutions may 
blind a government to clear and imminent dangers.  
 
(7) The consequences of a decision are not a function of the margin of disagreement over that 
decision.  A unanimous decision might have trifling consequences: a decision won by a 
single vote might be catastrophic.  Further, unanimity is no guarantee of a good decision or a 
poor one.  
 
(8) Some arguments appear rigorous and irresistible, but only within a circumscribed area of 
debate.  When the limitations of that area are breached, those arguments might become less 
potent or even irrelevant.   
 
Conclusion 
 Folly and poor risk assessment have venerable pedigrees.  The destruction of Melos 
reveals a polity acting against its own best interests, even though it knew the consequences 
and possessed enough information to make a rational decision.  The saving of Mytilene 
reveals a polity determined to pursue dialogue, partly because it was unwilling to accept that 
making a decision also entailed the end of discussion.    
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 There is a further point: in 431 BCE, Pericles delivered his famous funeral oration [2.35-
46], a panegyric on Athens and its democracy.  Democratic debate saved Mytilene a few 
years later, but a decade thereafter Athens destroyed Melos.  There is no reference to any 
debate over the fate of Melos.  Thucydides was well aware of the difference between 
sprouting ideals and living up to them.  He wanted to show how easily those who genuinely 
accept an ideal can be led to depart from and even deny it.23  We may cultivate and broadcast 
an ideal of who we are – rational, civilised people who deal fairly with each other and look 
after our children – yet act like barbarians.  Why, though, are our rational faculties so often 









Abstract or demonstrative reasoning, therefore, never influences any of our actions … 
reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition.1  
 
Chapter 6 
The Emotional Brain 
 
Introduction 
 Socrates believed that 'no-one does wrong willingly and that all wrongdoing is 
involuntary'.2  In essence this is a belief about knowledge: if I claim to know the right thing to 
do but instead do the wrong thing, then my claim is false and I acted in ignorance.  Plato 
never departed fully from this belief,3 but he does think Socrates overlooked non-rational, 
non-epistemic motivation.  In the Republic, for example, Plato discusses timocracy – 
government by those who are ruled by their passions [548] – and oligarchy – government by 
people ruled by their appetite for money [550-552].      
 
 Socrates is our dialogic and rational prototype.  We like to think that if we present sound, 
rational arguments then any opposition should be convinced about the merits of our position.  
But this is not how dialogue worked for Socrates, nor does it often work that way for us.  We 
know why and how we should address global heating, but appealing to and engaging our 
rational brain is not enough.  We must also engage our emotional brain if we are to act 
effectively. 
  
Thinking about PAIN 
 In Don't Even Think About It (2014), George Marshall argues that the most important 
reason for general lack of action on climate change is that most of what we know about it 
appeals only to our rational brain; the emotional brain remains largely disengaged.  Marshall 
cites evidence such as Joseph LeDoux's landmark The Emotional Brain to support his 
assertion.  According to Marshall, the problem concerning inaction to mitigate global heating 
derives from the trajectory of human evolution.  In short, our brains have evolved two distinct 
 
1 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge ed., 2nd ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1978) 414. 
2 Gorgias 509e. 
3 It appears in the Laws, for example, which is probably Plato's last work [731c, 860d-864c]. 
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information-processing systems: the rational brain and the emotional brain.4  The former is 
analytical and logical, and uses rational constructs like mathematics to describe and interpret 
the world we inhabit.  The latter is driven by our intuitions, experiences and emotions – 
particularly fear and anxiety.  Both systems use language: the rational brain uses language to 
define and describe, while the emotional brain uses story and narrative to communicate 
meaning.  This binary information-processing system clearly has adaptive value: if it did not 
then we would probably not be here.  Evolution of this system has allowed us to overcome 
the threats and challenges that might otherwise have terminated our species, and has given us 
the ability to detect opportunities and use them to our advantage.   
 
 A problem arises, however, when this binary system confronts a situation wherein our 
evolved responses are not adaptive, and may even threaten our survival.  Climate change is a 
paradigm of such a situation.  As Daniel Gilbert argues, we are poorly equipped to deal with 
global heating because our brains have evolved to respond to four key triggers, but climate 
change fails to activate any of them.5  The triggers form a convenient acronym – PAIN: 
 
 
4 George Marshall, Don't Even Think About It (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014) 48-51.  The labels 'rational 
brain' and 'emotional brain' are Marshall's, but they are more appropriate in this context than, say, 
'cognitive brain' and 'affective brain'.  It is important to note that this discussion refers only to 
neurophysiology: it has nothing to do with the ubiquitous but false binary of male reason and female 
emotion.  The difference between our emotional and cognitive brain is a brute fact about every person's 
neural make-up, whether female or male, and is a fundamental tenet within psychology and neuroscience.  
As an example, consider a situation in which an adult male is speaking with his authoritarian father.  The 
conversation appears normal, when all of a sudden the son explodes with rage at something his father said.  
So far as onlookers are concerned, the son is behaving irrationally: the father has said nothing to incite his 
son's rage.  However, they are not aware that something in the conversation – it might be merely a look or 
intonation – has triggered a powerful past memory, even though it has no bearing on the present 
conversation.  This response has put the son's frontal lobes temporarily 'off-line': the emotional brain has 
hijacked the rational brain.    
5 Marshall, 46-48; Daniel Gilbert, 'If Only Gay Sex Caused Global Warming', Los Angeles Times (2 July 
2006); Brian Kateman, 'Evolutionary Psychology of Climate Change' in State of the Planet (Earth Institute, 
Columbia University, 9 January 2012) – an interview with Daniel Gilbert.  Gilbert classified the triggers 




 Personal: we are highly adapted to think about human agency because social interaction 
is essential for survival.  We are thereby able to identify friends (those who cooperate) and 
enemies (traitors or people with bad intentions towards us).  However, for the most part 
climate change lacks an identifiable agent, presenting rather as an emergent property of a 
complex social and economic system.  
  
 Abrupt: we respond effectively to sudden changes in our environment, but ineffectively, 
or not at all, to slow-moving threats.  We fail to act on or even detect gradual changes that 
would generate emergency-level activity if they all occurred at once.  Indeed, though we are 
able to calculate that a certain event was exacerbated by climate change, it is not a 
phenomenon of which we have personal perceptual experience.  
 
 Immoral: climate change does not trigger the moral emotions – such as revulsion, anger, 
disgrace, or feeling insulted – that usually propel us into action.  Every society has taboos that 
generate outrage if transgressed, such as dumping garbage in somebody's home, but there is 
no equivalent taboo against dumping GHGs into the atmosphere.   
 
 Now: we have an ability to anticipate the future, but this is one of homo sapiens' less 
developed skills.  Ergo, we still give immediate or close threats more weight than distant 
threats, even when we know that the latter is far more probable and dangerous than the 
former.  For example, I know that climate change is a highly likely existential threat, but I 
also know it won't kill me tomorrow, whereas I'm not certain that my workplace won't be 
bombed by terrorists tomorrow, even though that is highly unlikely.  Nonetheless, I (and most 
governments) give more weight to the latter threat than the former.       
 
 In short, the character of climate change – lacking an identifiable personal enemy, very 
slow moving, not repulsive, and chronologically remote – means that we are particularly ill-
adapted to deal with it. 
 
 Prima facie, though, this observation does not explain much because there are plenty of 
situations in our world where our adaptive abilities are tested well beyond anything they 
might have met during our forebears' evolution.  For example, most of us have few qualms 
about entering an enclosed metal and carbon-fibre tube and allowing it to take us 10 
kilometres above sea level, yet of course the experience of flying is something for which we 
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have no evolved adaptation.  However, our prima facie observations are wrong: our brains are 
well adapted for flying because it activates at least two of Gilbert's four triggers.  Flying is an 
immediate and deadly threat, and the changes we experience – in temperature, sound and so 
on – are extremely rapid.  In other words, we perceive (very appropriately) that flying is 
exceptionally dangerous, and therefore take extravagant measures to ensure our safety.  This 
is probably the main reason flying is much safer than driving.  The latter does not activate our 
adaptive brain mechanisms nearly so much as flying, so we are lulled into a false (and 
sometimes deadly) sense of security.  The parallel with climate change is clear.  With regard 
to adaptation, global heating is much more like driving than flying, except that global heating 
fails even to activate any of the triggers that occasionally make us drive defensively.   
 
Climate change: a perfect threat 
 In summary, climate change comprises an almost perfect threat to human beings in that, 
while our rational brain can understand and analyse it, our emotional brain remains largely 
disengaged.  Why, though, does the emotional brain seem to override the influence of the 
rational brain?  Why can't we rationalise our way into effective action?  The short answer is 
that we can, and often do, act on rational apprehension of a situation.  This is why people will 
rally for causes, such as greater funding for scientific research, that do not necessarily engage 
them emotionally but which they rationally understand to be important.  However, these 
causes are rarely the subject of emotive public debate.  If I attend a rally to support science, I 
am not likely to encounter a rival rally against increased funding for scientific research, even 
though a small portion of the public probably believes funding should be cut.  Moreover, 
there are unlikely to be many people at such a rally – there were fewer than one in 500 of the 
population at the rally I attended – even though most of the population would agree with its 
aims. 
 
 What about issues that are the subject of emotive public debate, such as whether to 
recognise marriage by same-sex couples?  The mere fact that an issue is debated usually 
entails our emotional engagement.  Even though some of the debate will be conducted by 
rational argument, much of it will appeal to our emotional brain through story and narrative.  
Climate change is also an issue of public debate, so surely debate about it will be conducted 
in much the same manner as that over same-sex marriage.  Again, however, the problem 
centres on our emotional investment in the respective issues.  For example, in Australia more 
people attended rallies in support of same-sex marriage (and rallies against it) than attended 
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rallies in support of action on climate change.  From the above, we now know why: unlike 
global heating, the issue of same-sex marriage activates several and perhaps all of our 
adaptive emotional triggers.  For example, it identifies friends, enemies and human agency; 
on both sides it triggers moral disgust; it is an immediate threat to one side, while its denial is 
an immediate threat to the other; and it is affectively current, not future.   
 
 Important as it is, though, same-sex marriage is much less significant than climate 
change to the survival of human beings.  However, even though we understand the 
implications of that comparison, why do we usually fail to act accordingly?  Part of the 
answer can be found in Joseph LeDoux's study on neurobiology.  He notes that in mammals 
the neural connections from the amygdala (a primitive part of our brain in evolutionary 
terms) to the cortex (a more highly evolved part of the brain, which in humans is responsible 
for information processing such as thinking and reasoning) are considerably more than from 
the cortex to the amygdala.  This means that the amygdala has greater influence on the cortex 
than vice-versa.6 The adaptive advantage of this arrangement is clear.  The amygdala is like a 
hub in the wheel of our fears.7  If, for example, I am walking along a bush track and I see a 
snake, my thalamus passes 'crude' visual information to my amygdala and sends more 
detailed information to my visual cortex.  The latter proceeds to develop an accurate 
perception of the object – Is it a snake or a curved stick?  If it is a snake, is it dangerous? – 
but my immediate response is motivated by my amygdala.  This is because information via 
the cortex takes longer to reach the amygdala.  If, instead of my immediate response – 
jumping back out of range of snake bite – my reaction waited until my cortex had processed 
the visual information, I would not always react quickly enough to avoid danger.8  The 
potential ancestor who failed to respond immediately was thereby less likely to pass on his or 
her genes. 
 
 However, our well-adapted response to immediate danger is poorly adapted to a threat 
like climate change.  But why would our inherited ability to react mere fractions of a second 
quicker in response to danger be so deficient in confronting global heating?  After all, a 
reaction time measured in seconds is entirely irrelevant to long-term changes in climate.  The 
 
6 Joseph LeDoux, The Emotional Brain (London: Phoenix, 1999) 284-303. 
7 LeDoux's apposite metaphor, 170. 
8 LeDoux, 166. 
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answer lies in the above-mentioned imbalance of pathways between the amygdala and the 
cortex.  The greater connectivity of amygdala to cortex than cortex to amygdala means that 
connections from our emotional systems to our cognitive systems are stronger than the other 
way around.9  This entails that, while our emotions can overwhelm our consciousness, we 
have little conscious control over our emotions.10  Moreover, our single system of 
consciousness can be occupied by ordinary activities and matters of fact or by highly charged 
emotions, and the latter can much more easily knock the former out of our awareness than 
vice-versa.  In short, emotional arousal dominates our thinking.  Moreover, even though 
thoughts can easily trigger emotions – by activating the amygdala – we are not adept at 
consciously switching off our emotions – by deactivating the amygdala.11 
 
 As Jaak Panksepp and Lucy Biven found, attempting to make a reasonable decision 
about an affectively loaded matter is easier when emotional arousal is comparatively low.  In 
our frontal lobes, the lateral (cognitive) regions are in fluctuating balance with the medial 
(emotional) regions.  If you perceive an event affectively, the medial areas are more aroused 
than the lateral.  If you perceive the same event more cognitively and less emotionally, the 
imbalance is reversed: the lateral areas are more activated than the medial.  Panksepp and 
Biven conclude that feelings are very important when choices are to be made, but also that 
strong emotions and rationality do not work well together.12  They also found that our core 
values – manifest in the affective lives that lead us to treasure or detest the various 
phenomena in our world – arise substantially from evolved emotions concentrated in the 
medial subcortical regions of the brain.13      
 
 With regard to debate about climate change, some of the reasons for our inactivity are 
now apparent.  The issue of global heating does not sufficiently activate our emotional 
triggers, whereas activation is much easier for those who are opposed to action.  This is 
 
9 Note that neural pathways are not like telephone lines: they operate in one direction only.  
10 LeDoux, 17-20. 
11 LeDoux, 303. 
12 Jaak Panksepp and Lucy Biven, The Archaeology of Mind (New York: W. W. Norton, 2012) 416-417.  
Panksepp and Biven are pioneers in the new discipline of Affective Neuroscience (AN).  Unlike traditional 
neuroscience, AN sheds light on how our most powerful emotional feelings – raw primal affects – arise 
fully developed from the ancient neural network situated below the neocortex. 
13 Ibid. 480. 
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largely because our perceptions of risk are dominated by the emotional brain.14  Therefore, if 
we are comparing risks then the risk that is more proximate, that draws on our personal 
experience and speaks to us in stories, is the one that will dominate our decision-making.  
Ergo, if the perceived risk in mitigating climate change includes threats to our current way of 
life (proximate in both time and space) and requires activities of which we have little 
experience, and if its narrative (largely set in the future) is much less emotive and available 
than the narratives by which we currently live (such as 'fossil fuel has made us mobile and 
wealthy'), then those narratives will dominate our thinking.   
 
 Moreover, our perception of that risk is very stable.  Even if we endeavour to diminish 
the dominance of our emotional brain by constant attention to the facts of, and predictions 
about, climate change, we are unlikely to succeed.  Indeed, this endeavour would not be very 
different from trying to overcome anxiety or depression by 'rationalising' them away, and 
would achieve just as little success. 
 
 With respect to climate change, if the problems created by our rational and emotional 
brains were not confounding enough, they are exacerbated by the fact that emotions are 
primarily non-conscious processes.15  For example, we frequently have non-conscious 'gut 
reactions' to things or situations, but remain oblivious to the profound impact these reactions 
have on our decision-making processes.  Moreover, emotion also acts as a value system that 
appraises the significance of stimuli.  We become aware of something being meaningful 
when it rises from this system into consciousness.  As Daniel Siegel states, emotions create 
meaning in our lives, whether we are aware of those emotions or not.16  All of this entails that 
 
14 Marshall, 49.  The American Psychological Association addresses these matters in Psychology & Global 
Climate Change: addressing a multifaceted phenomenon and set of challenges, A Report of the American 
Psychological Association Task Force on the Interface Between Psychology and Global Climate Change, 
Janet Swim, Chair (2009).  The relevant sections are '(Not) Feeling at Risk', 'Discounting the Future and 
the Remote', and 'The Role of Culture in Climate Change Understanding and Reactions', 23-26. 
15 As Arthur Schopenhauer put it (long before Freud), 'The whole process of thought and decision seldom 
lies on the surface, i.e., seldom consists in a concatenation of distinctly thought-out judgements … 
Consciousness is the mere surface of our mind, of which, as of the earthly globe, we do not know the 
interior, but only the crust.' [The World as Will and Presentation, vol. 2, Richard E. Aquila and David 
Carus trans. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2008) 154]. 
16 Daniel J. Siegel, The Developing Mind, 2nd ed. (New York: Guildford Press, 2012) 157-161. 
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the dominant part of our brain in terms of how we perceive, react and give meaning to the 
world is itself largely beyond our awareness, let alone our control.  It follows that we are 
unlikely to do anything about global heating until it becomes a proximate threat, by which 
time any response might be too little and too late.  To put it crudely, we are applying to 
climate change the neurobiological tools that human beings have evolved to cope with 
ancient challenges, and these tools have so far proved inadequate to deal with the new threat.   
 
Summary 
 Debate over whether and how to address climate change has generally assumed that the 
winner will be the side with the best data and evidence.  This assumption is misleading: 
rather, the winner is more likely to be the side which engages our emotional brain, and so far 
that is the side advocating little or no action.  To win, the side supporting active mitigation 




 There is a further matter that confronts this debate.  So far we have assumed that 
information about psychological states within individuals can be extrapolated to, and can 
therefore explain the attitudes and actions of, social groups.  This is methodological 
individualism (MI), and at first glance the above appeal to neurobiology will suffer from the 
same shortcomings as MI.  Criticism of MI has a long heritage.  Probably the most well-
known and concise criticism is that of Karl Marx: 
 
It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social 
existence that determines their consciousness.17       
 
Emile Durkheim is similarly critical:  
 
 
17 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, S. W. Ryazanskaya trans. (Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1970) 21.  
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Every time a social phenomenon is directly explained by a psychological 
phenomenon, we may be sure that the explanation is false.18  
 
Despite these confident denunciations, the concept of MI is difficult to grasp.  For example, 
Steven Lukes accurately defines MI as the view that 'facts about society and social 
phenomena are to be explained solely in terms of facts about individuals'.19  As an example, 
he quotes Karl Popper's assertion that:  
 
all social phenomena, and especially the functioning of all social institutions, should 
always be understood as resulting from the decisions, actions, attitudes, etc., of 
human individuals, and that we should never be satisfied by an explanation in terms 
of so-called 'collectives' (states, nations, races, etc.).20    
   
 However, Lukes then fails to add that Popper concomitantly rejects psychologism – in 
this context, the view that social facts are ultimately reducible to psychological facts about 
human beings – because Popper recognises that individual psychology is often inadequate to 
explain a situation.  For example, if someone is looking to buy a house we may safely assume 
she does not want to raise the market price of houses.  However, the mere fact she has entered 
the market as a prospective purchaser, and thereby potentially increases demand, means that 
prices are more likely to rise.  In other words, her (psychological) intent produced an 
outcome that was entirely unintended.21  In this situation, the social fact – higher prices – 
cannot in any meaningful way be reduced to individual psychology.  Indeed, a property 
owner might well enter the market as a buyer because she wants house prices to rise.  In this 
situation, according to psychologism the one social fact could equally be explained by either 
of diametrically opposed psychological facts – an explanation that fails to explain anything.   
 
 
18 Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, Sarah A. Solovay & John H. Mueller trans. (New 
York: The Free Press, 1964) 104. 
19 Steven Lukes, 'Methodological Individualism Reconsidered' in The Philosophy of Social Explanation, 
Alan Ryan ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973) 121. 
20 K. R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol II, 4th ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1962) 98. 
21 Ibid., 96. 
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 Popper further argues that a person's actions are to a large degree explicable in terms of 
the role she plays in the situation in which they occur, but not fully explicable.22  For 
example, when we refer to 'irrational behaviour' we usually mean behaviour which is 
irrational according to the logic of a given situation.  Moreover, if we attempt to explain such 
behaviour by examining an individual's motives then we inevitably employ psychological 
analyses that presuppose a socially constructed standard of rational behaviour in a given 
situation.  In other words, the criteria by which we identify and assess individual motives are 
themselves unavoidably an expression of social interaction.  We can, then, make sense of a 
person's actions by discovering he is (say) a soldier, but will largely fail to explain his 
behaviour unless we understand how an army works.  Moreover, when we explain how the 
soldier fulfils his role it is highly unlikely that we will invoke no psychological criteria.  As 
Alan Ryan states, despite their label, most proponents of MI appear to occupy a 
methodological half-way house, even though this may not seem 'an attractive resting place'.23  
Ryan, like Lukes, considers it perfectly clear that observable social phenomena do exist – for 
example, procedures in a court of law – but that does not preclude the view that social 
explanations inevitably rely on psychological assumptions.  In practice, then, the half-way-




 The point of the above is to address the long-held scientistic 'ambition to reduce 
sociology to psychology and psychology to physiology, this paving the way for a complete 
reduction of the social sciences to the physical sciences'.24  This is an ambition from which 
recent neurobiology is singularly free.  For example, Daniel Siegel's interdisciplinary 
research is based on a broadly developed and agreed working definition of the mind as: 
 
an embodied and relational process that regulates the flow of energy and information 
within the brain and between brains.  … To put it simply, human connections shape 
 
22 Ibid, 97. 
23 Alan Ryan, 'Introduction' in Philosophy of Social Explanation, 10-11. 
24 Ibid. 3. 
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neural connections, and each contributes to mind.  Relationships and neural linkages 
together shape the mind.25                                
 
This definition is fundamentally different from the concept of a person – essentially a mind in 
a body – expressed by Cartesian dualism.  Indeed, Siegel refers to his research as 
interpersonal neurobiology.  Within mainstream psychology, Cartesian dualism is expressed 
by the split between behaviour and experience.  The former comprises a person's physical and 
verbal behaviour; the latter comprises the private, inner world of a person's thoughts, 
emotions and so on.  Behaviour is observable and therefore quantifiable, and its 
characteristics can be agreed upon by other observers.  Experience is inaccessible to 
observers and therefore a person's mental state has to be inferred from their behaviour.  With 
regard to the debate over climate change, the assumptions of Cartesian dualism are clear: if 
an individual fails to enact (say) some sort of mitigation strategy then we infer either an 
epistemic failure – the person does not know what to do – or a moral failure – the person 
knows what to do but could not be bothered doing it, or actively won't do it.  We do not 
normally infer an emotional failure or incapacity, either individually or (much less) 
collectively.   
 
 Within the paradigm of interpersonal neurobiology, however, a person's emotional 
incapacity with regard to global heating might have little or nothing to do with personal 
development and everything to do with absence of an affective narrative among the other 
people who co-constitute that person's world.  In this regard, interpersonal neurobiology has 
inherited the philosophical trajectory of existential-phenomenological psychology, within 
which a person and her world comprise an indissoluble interrelationship.  The individual and 
her world co-constitute each other: there is no meaningful sense in which one can be 
abstracted from the other.  In other words, the individual is 'located' and it is impossible to 
consider that person apart from her context.  Moreover, it is through the individual's 
locatedness that the meaning of her world emerges.  This meaning is not fixed; the meaning 
of an individual's life, and the meaning of her world, are in constant dialogue with each 
 
25 Siegel, 3. 
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other.26  This entails that a person's thoughts and actions are continuous dialogic exercises in 
gleaning meaning from and imparting meaning to her situation.  This situated freedom and 
obligation underlies our meaning-making interactions with other people. 
 
 Within this schema the importance of an appropriate narrative is clear.  If, for example, 
we replaced our standard narratives about resource exploitation and limitless growth with a 
discourse of ecological democracy then our meaning-making interactions with each other and 
with our environment would be fundamentally transformed.27       
                               
Conclusion 
 We know what climate change is, we know what to do about it, and we know the 
consequences of not acting.  However, in and of itself knowledge does not motivate us to act: 
the rational brain is engaged, but motivation to act derives largely from the emotional brain.  
This is clearly not a matter of epistemic failure, nor even of moral failure: most people have a 
genuine desire to address global heating, but motivation is missing from our political and 
social discourse.  Within the politics of climate change, this has diminished the role of 
knowledge to little more than a rational bystander.   
 
 There is a further matter: climate change is a global phenomenon and therefore requires a 
global solution.  Prima facie, this suggests that science and rationality are appropriate 
avenues by which to address the problem because they are universal.  However, this appeal 
concomitantly undermines their effectiveness as agents of change insofar as they neglect the 
emotive narratives which can inspire us to act.  This is because the most effective, and 
affective, narratives are more often local than universal.  Science and rationality are therefore 
hamstrung by a contradiction: their inherent strength – the ability to supply universal criteria 
 
26 Ronald S. Valle, Mark King and Steen Halling, 'An Introduction to Existential-Phenomenological 
Thought in Psychology' in Existential-Phenomenological Perspectives in Psychology, Ronald S. Valle and 
Steen Halling eds (New York: Plenum Press, 1989) 4-8.  
27 'Ecological democracy' is the preferred category of discourse advocated by John Dryzek.  One of its 
most important characteristics is to structure decision-making such that it listens to the non-human world, 
intentionally blurring the boundaries between social systems and natural systems [The Politics of the Earth 




for understanding the world – makes them less likely to supply the localised narratives that 
motivate us to save it.  
 
 There are, however, narratives that could be regarded as both universal and local: 
narratives that have claims to universality, yet whose appeal is mainly local in that they are 
defining elements of group identity.  The next chapter discusses one such narrative – the 






Child ant: Why do they make so many disaster movies, dad? 
Father ant: So when Armageddon comes we can go back to bed and say, 'I've seen it 
  already'.  [B.C. by Johnny Hart] 
 
The egoism which enters into our theories does not affect their sincerity; rather, the more our 
egoism is satisfied, the more robust is our belief.1 
 
Chapter 7 
The Parousia2 – worth waiting for? 
 
Overview 
 In the United States, most evangelical Christians deny the existence of climate change 
and voted for Donald Trump in 2016.  The latter seems highly unlikely because the 
president's character and habits are the antithesis of evangelical standards.  This phenomenon 
has little to do with rationality or emotion and more to do with group identity.  The following 
is a hermeneutic exercise in which social identity theory is used to interpret early Christian 
texts and thereby illuminate the puzzling connection between a playboy president and people 
who once comprised the core of the 'moral majority'.     
 
Introduction 
 Our emotional brains can, at least to some degree, explain why people make decisions 
that defy logic and common sense, but what about social phenomena for which appeals to the 
emotional brain seem, and probably are, inadequate?  For example, Noam Chomsky laments 
that: 
 
one of the difficulties in arousing American concern about global warming is that 
some 40 percent of the country's population believes that Jesus Christ will probably 
or definitely return to Earth by 2050, so they do not see the very severe threats of 
climate disaster in future decades as a problem.3   
 
1 George Eliot (Mary Ann Evans), Middlemarch, ch. 53.  
2 The Parousia (from the Greek parousia – presence, arrival) refers to the 'second coming' of Christ.      
3 Noam Chomsky, Who Rules the World? (London: Penguin Books, 2017) 264.  Chomsky’s information 
comes from 'Jesus Christ's Return to Earth', Pew Research Centre (14 July 2010).  This survey showed that 
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Chomsky further notes that a similar percentage of Americans are creationists – people who 
believe that God created our planet and its modern human inhabitants within the last 10,000 
years.4  Chomsky has correctly identified two significant, and often linked, tenets of Christian 
fundamentalism: belief in the Parousia, and subordination of mainstream scientific 
knowledge to the authority of scripture.  However, Chomsky makes a further statement that, 
at first glance, sits oddly with these beliefs: 'Americans are pretty close to the international 
norm in their concern for global warming'.5  Chomsky’s assertion is nearly correct.  For 
example, 39 percent of American adults regard climate change as a minor or no threat.  By 
comparison, the percentage for Sweden was 30; Canada, 34; Australia, 38; Russia, 51; Israel, 
58; the median was 29.  From 2013 to 2018, the number of adults who perceived climate 
change as a major threat rose by 19 percent in the United States, compared to 12 in Canada, 
15 in Germany, and 18 in the UK.6  It is evident that, though America is trailing global 
opinion, the gap is not significant and is closing.  But why is America anywhere near the 
norm when so many of its citizens believe that God is going to intervene dramatically and 
decisively in world history within the next three decades? 
 
Theo-logic 
 There are several straightforward explanations for this anomaly.  For example, belief in 
an imminent Parousia is consistent with accepting climate change as fact.  Indeed, many 
fundamentalists believe that Christ's return will be preceded by, and also bring an end to, any 
number of global calamities.  Within this apocalyptic construal, catastrophic global heating 
could be regarded as a harbinger of divine intervention.  Nor is there a necessary 
contradiction in believing that future generations will be harmed by climate change.  If one's 
primary belief about the second coming is that believers will be gathered to heaven – usually 
known as the Rapture – then those left behind, who would probably include friends and 
 
41% of Americans believe that Christ will definitely (23%) or probably (18%) return to Earth by 2050.  
For white evangelical Christians the figure is 58%.  These results are consistent with church history.  As 
Ernest Best noted, 'where belief in the Parousia has been strong it has almost always been accompanied by 
an expectation of its immediacy' [A Commentary on The First and Second Epistles to the Thessalonians 
(London: Adam and Charles Black, 1979) 360]. 
4 See, for example, Frank Newport, 'In U.S., 42% Believe Creationist View of Human Origins', Gallop 
News (2 June 2014). 
5 Chomsky, 130.   
6 Pew Research Center, 'A look at how people around the world view climate change' (18 April 2019). 
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family of raptured believers, will still have to confront global heating, though that might be 
the least of their worries.  On the other hand, even if your belief is that Christ will, upon his 
return, immediately establish a millenarian kingdom on a transformed Earth, a couple of 
generations or more might, until that event, have to endure the travails of global heating.  
Chomsky is probably right, though, in thinking that belief in an imminent Parousia is 
probably not going to inspire many people's most vigorous efforts to mitigate carbon 
emissions.7   
 
 Only within a very circumscribed area of discourse – millenarian theology – does any of 
this make sense, but it fails to explain why (for example) only 9 percent of black protestants 
supported Trump in 2020, compared to nearly 80 percent of white evangelicals.8  Given that 
differences in eschatological belief between black protestants (a group which includes black 
evangelicals) and white evangelicals are minimal, any answer to this question must be 
informed by social psychology.9  An area of social psychology that has proved fruitful when 
investigating millenarian movements is social identity theory (SIT).10 
 
Social identity theory (SIT)  
 At the heart of SIT is the question, 'Who do we, as a group, say we are?'.  Members of 
almost any group will either ask themselves that question or, more likely, assume they know 
 
7 'Probably' but not invariably right.  For example, in the late 1970s I was a member of an environmental 
group, some of whose members believed in an imminent Rapture.  In other words, their belief that the 
present world would end soon did not dampen their enthusiasm to preserve it.      
8 Pew Research Center, 'White Christians continue to favor Trump over Biden, but support has slipped' (13 
October 2020) and Tom Gjelten, '2020 Faith Vote Reflects 2016 Patterns', National Public Radio (8 
November 2020).  Note that only one in four black protestants identify as evangelical, mainly because of 
the label's racial connotation [Pew Research Center, '5 facts about the religious lives of African Americans' 
(7 February 2018)]. 
9 Eschatology is discourse about the last days (from the Greek eschatos, 'last').   
10 For an overview of social identity theory see Rupert Brown, 'Intergroup Relations' in Introduction to 
Social Psychology, Miles Hewstone et al. eds (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988) 381-410.  For its application 
to a New Testament millenarian movement see Philip F. Esler, '1 Thessalonians' and '2 Thessalonians' in 
The Oxford Bible Commentary, John Barton and John Muddiman eds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001) 1199-1219.  For the application of broader social science theory to early Christian and 2nd century 
BCE to 1st century CE Jewish documents, see Esler, The First Christians in their Social Worlds: Social-
scientific approaches to New Testament interpretation (London: Routledge, 1994). 
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the answer.  A significant part of the answer concerns people's need for a positive self-
concept.11  But how does this help to explain the vast overrepresentation of white 
evangelicals in the broader group of Christians who believe in an imminent Parousia? 
 
 The first clue to an answer lies in another point Chomsky noted.  The Republican Party's 
devotion to America’s wealthy elite has become so extreme that its policies now have little 
appeal to the broader community.12  Instead, it has attempted to attract voters by appealing to 
social groups whose identities and characteristics make them exploitable fodder in America’s 
recent and current political climate.  With this in mind, SIT suggests that such groups will 
exhibit the following general characteristics.  They will: 
 
 (1) perceive themselves as subordinate or minority groups rather than as mainstream and 
dominant;  
 (2) provide members with appropriate social interpretations and ideologies; 
 (3) furnish members with the memories, narratives and stereotypes that will maintain and 
protect their positive self-concept; 
 (4) have, and maintain, a clear position on salient issues and be very consistent in 
defending and advocating for that position;   
 (5) feel that out-groups tend to ridicule them; 
 (6) tend to 'lash out' at other groups in proportion to their view that, in the hierarchy of 
status and power, their position is insecure;  
 (7) tend to maximise differences from out-groups, even if that involves an overall cost to 
the group; 
 (8) perceive themselves as more homogenous than out-groups; 
 (9) regard the social status hierarchy to be unfair but also flexible – that is, they will have 
the view that there are ways out of their current malaise and that they are not doomed to 
inhabit a perpetual underclass. 
  
 
11 Matthew Hornsey notes that this need is fundamental to SIT ['Social Identity Theory and Self-
categorization Theory: A Historical Review', Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2/1 (2008) 
214].  
12 Chomsky, 265.   
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 More specifically, with reference to millenarian characteristics, these groups will exhibit 
the following: 
 
 (i) their millenarian ideology will provide a narrative of the past and future;  
 (ii) their orientation towards the future will provide a powerful cognitive sense of 
belonging and a concomitant sharp distinction between in-group members and out-groups; 
 (iii) their futurist mythology will emphasise the destination rather than the basis of the 
current social order; 
 (iv) their millenarian ideology will reinforce their social identity whenever they feel 
under threat from external agencies; 
 (v) they will perceive confronting events as controlled by divine forces.13 
   
 How, though, does the application of SIT, or indeed any other social-scientific model, 
better enable us to understand how a group works?  After all, might not this method be an 
exercise in Procrustean imposition, forcing a possibly inappropriate model onto a social 
situation and thereby deluding us into thinking we understand it?  Part of the answer is to 
realise that we inescapably impose social models on all situations we choose to investigate.  
Those models might be unacknowledged and unconsciously applied, but they are applied 
nonetheless.14  For example, if we want to analyse a late first century Christian community in 
terms of status, family, gender or religious purity, we will usually apply (consciously or not) 
interpretative models derived from modern experience, but those models may lead us to 
analyses that are not only ethnocentric and anachronistic but also ideologically gullible.  The 
point is to be aware of the models we use and, so far as we are able, to choose the most 
suitable exemplars.  But how do we know which models are more suitable?  Why should I 
choose a model based on SIT rather than, say, the structural anthropology of Claude Lévi-
Strauss?  Hermeneutics provides one answer: insofar as SIT facilitates our understanding of 
 
13 This schedule of characteristics has been developed from Esler (2001) and Brown – see footnote 10 
above; Eddy Van Avermaet, 'Social Influences in Small Groups' in Introduction to Social Psychology, 359-
360; and Hornsey, 206-215. 
14 Esler (1995) 4-8.  Esler regards this argument as 'irrefutable'.  My sole reservation is that conscious 
application of a model clearly implies a level of intention, and concomitant directedness, that is absent 
from unconscious application.            
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American evangelicals, it might also illuminate an ancient horizon which is fundamental to 
that group's identity – primitive Christian eschatology.     
 
 A landmark example is Philip Esler's application of SIT to his own investigation of 1 
Thessalonians, an epistle from the apostle Paul to the early Christian church in Thessalonica 
(now in modern Greece).  This letter was written in about 50 CE and is very likely the oldest 
extant Christian document.  It is important because it reflects the concerns of a church at a 
primitive stage in the development of Christianity.  One of the most important of those 
concerns was a perceived delay in the Parousia.  Like first-century Judaism from which it was 
an offshoot, early Christianity was eschatological.15  It followed standard Jewish belief that 
God would soon intervene to bring the current world order to an end and establish a new and 
better world.  Christianity's main eschatological difference from Judaism was its belief that 
Jesus would descend from heaven to establish the new kingdom.  The earliest Christians 
expected the Parousia within their lifetime – Paul himself was clearly of that view – but some 
members of the Thessalonian church had died, obviously predeceasing Christ's millenarian 
appearance.  Their surviving brethren were concerned about the status of these deceased 
believers.  Would they now not participate in the Parousia?  Would they miss out on sharing 
in God's new kingdom?  Were they already in heaven?  In one of the more remarkable, and 
ultimately influential, passages in the New Testament (1 Thessalonians 4.13-18) Paul allayed 
the church's fears.  Far from being overlooked when Christ descends from heaven, these 
deceased believers 'shall rise first.  Then we who are alive, who are left, shall together with 
them be caught up in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air'. 
 
 When we apply SIT to 1 Thessalonians the characteristics of this church are easy to 
recognise.  First, the church's orientation towards the future provides members with a robust 
sense of belonging to a distinct group.  Members identify themselves with reference to a 
specific and common future destiny.  Even though most of the congregation would have 
shared a common past, that narrative is largely irrelevant to their current identity, except 
insofar as it had been superseded.  This is important because Paul states that the 
Thessalonians had 'turned to God from idols' (1.9).  Members had in effect discarded their 
 
15 For an overview of Jewish eschatology see E. P. Sanders, Judaism: Practice and Belief 63BCE – 66CE 
(London: SCM Press, 1992) 279-303, and for early Christian eschatology see his Paul: The Apostle’s Life, 
Letters, and Thought (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015) 207-214. 
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social pasts by rejecting the civic cults of their city.  These cults and their various ceremonies 
and festivals were at the heart of a city's social life and cultural activities.16  By holding 
themselves aloof from these events, Christians (and Jews) were often accused of misanthropy 
and impiety, the latter charge because they eschewed the religions that underpinned and were 
an intrinsic part of economic and social order.  Acccordingly, early Christians often suffered 
the odium of being perceived as subversive.  It is not surprising to read that the Thessalonian 
church endured 'tribulation' (1.6).  Its members comprised a minority fringe group.  The 
church was regarded with suspicion and hostility because it maintained views that were 
alleged to, and possibly did, threaten tradition and stability.    
 
 Further, the group possessed a specific epistemic identity.  Members received, shared 
and disseminated a discrete body of knowledge; nobody could be a member of the church 
unless she or he imbibed that knowledge.  With reference to the issue of deceased believers, it 
is noteworthy that Paul imparted knowledge to the church not merely to inform members but 
also that members 'may not grieve as others do who have no hope' (4.13).  Whether these 
'others' (hoi loipoi) were pagans (most likely) or perhaps Jews and/or non-Pauline Christians 
is largely irrelevant.  Paul employs a common binary stereotype to reinforce his distinction 
between the Thessalonian in-group and everybody else (the out-groups).  One of the salient 
attributes by which Paul characterises the Thessalonians is their possession of 'steadfast hope' 
(1.3) in contrast to out-groups who lack hope.  In short, the in-group has hope because it 
possesses the requisite God-given knowledge, while out-groups lack this knowledge and 
therefore lack hope.  It is notable that, in his excellent commentary on the Thessalonian 
epistles, Ernest Best argues that Paul was wrong to assert that the rest of humankind has no 
hope whatsoever given that 'many philosophers had taught that the soul was immortal'.17  
Best's contention is largely correct, but misses the point.  The overriding purpose of Paul's 
stereotype is to strengthen in-group identity.  The stereotype works by establishing a salient 






16 Ramsay MacMullen, Paganism in the Roman Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981) 34-42. 
17 Best, 185-186. 
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Climate change denial – a core political belief 
 This stereotyping also works in reverse.  For example, many of President Trump's 
evangelical supporters identify themselves, at least in part, as climate change deniers.  Again, 
this is much more a matter of group identification than careful weighing of relevant 
arguments.  If some of the groups which oppose Trump are also those that support strategies 
to mitigate global heating, then almost by definition Trump supporters will oppose 
mitigation.  Moreover, this opposition will almost inevitably manifest itself as denial of 
climate change, even though it does not necessarily follow that if you oppose mitigation then 
you must also deny global heating.  For instance, Bjørn Lomborg accepts the fact of global 
heating (though understating its effects) while concomitantly asserting that substantial 
reductions in carbon emissions would not be wise.18  For evangelicals, the problem with 
Lomborg's position is that, for the purposes of group self-identity, it strays too far into the 
opposition camp.  If you define yourself, and your group, by rejecting a specified position, 
then it is largely self-defeating to accept the premises of that position.  In order to maintain a 
consistent self-perception you also have to reject those premises, or at least most of them.  
With respect to global heating, if you accept, say, the IPCC's evidence, then it seems 
inconsistent, even churlish, not to accept the substance of its conclusions.  Further, in 
accepting the evidence but denying what it entails you appear to be engaging in greyer, less 
socially distinct, views or arguments, which is antithetical to solid group identity.  Indeed, it 
is probably the least effective position of all because it appears irrational and insincere to 
both in- and out-groups.  With this in mind it is not surprising to find that, of 16 candidates 
for the Republican party's presidential nomination in 2016, most (10) either denied the 
climate was changing at all or denied that human activity had anything to do with it.  Many 
fewer (four) accepted the fact of anthropogenic climate change, though with the provision 
that the United States should not unilaterally curb its carbon emissions.19  In short, rejection 
of the science behind global heating has in America become a core political belief that 
defines who you are.  
 
 
18 Bjørn Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 317 ff. 
19 Lest readers think I have chosen a particularly obtuse cohort it is worth noting a 2014 poll which found 
that, out of 278 Republican members of Congress, only eight believed in anthropogenic climate change 
[Julie Kliegman, 'Jerry Brown says, "virtually no Republican in Washington accepts climate change 
science"', Politifact (18 May 2014)].    
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 It is largely due to the Thessalonian epistles that American evangelicals believe the 
second coming will mark the triumph of Christ over Satan.  They believe that the present 
world is dominated by evil forces which are pre-conditions for revealing 'the man of 
lawlessness, the son of destruction' predicted in 2 Thessalonians 2.3.  Based on these beliefs, 
evangelicals may find themselves in a curious win-win situation during the presidency of 
Donald Trump.  If the president turns out to be lawless and self-destructive, then evangelicals 
might regard him as a sign of the long-awaited and now imminent end-time.  On the other 
hand, if the president's policies turn out to benefit evangelicals, then they will feel justified in 
their political support for him.  Either way, during or shortly after the Trump presidency 
evangelicals might find themselves more comfortably off spiritually or materially and 
perhaps both.   
 
Hermeneutics and fusing ancient and modern horizons 
 What, though, about the basic problem of re-interpreting a passage of scripture to address 
a modern social context that is so utterly different from first century Thessalonica?  One 
important, and rarely enunciated, response to this criticism is that this hermeneutic 
manoeuvre is both unavoidable and given an imprimatur within the New Testament itself.  If 
we consider the Parousia, 2 Thessalonians 2.1-12 is itself a substantial reinterpretation of this 
doctrine's first expression in 1 Thessalonians.  As we have noted, in the first epistle Paul 
states that the end-time will come suddenly and unexpectedly.  In 2 Thessalonians, however, 
the writer – probably not Paul20 – states that the return of Christ will be preceded by certain 
identifiable events, such as the appearance of the above-noted man of lawlessness.  In other 
words, a later writer is addressing the Thessalonian church by passing himself off as Paul, 
and is substantially re-interpreting the apostle's original message for a congregation that is 
just one generation (perhaps two) later than the initial recipients.  The point is that from 
Christianity's beginning there was never a time when the church did not re-interpret scripture 
anew in order to address the always changing environments in which Christian groups arose.  
In this sense, American evangelicals are following a long and inescapable tradition of 
endeavouring to apply scripture to their own context.  It is from our present situation that we 
survey the horizon of the past, the horizon from which we have come and which is present to 
us in the form of tradition, and which, as Hans-Georg Gadamer argues, is itself always in 
 




motion.21  This implies that, from anyone's perspective, the meaning of scripture is constantly 
changing and must always address us anew.  
 
 What happens, however, when, instead of 'transposing ourselves' (as Gadamer put it) – 
opening ourselves to the possibility that our engagement with the changing horizon of 
scripture will overcome our own particularity – we narrow our horizons such that scripture 
not only says what we think it should say but also displaces our capacity for critical 
engagement within our own horizons?  This has happened all too frequently throughout 
Christian history, but in recent decades the Parousia has become a notorious example.  The 
reasons for this are not difficult to uncover.  In 1970, at the height of the Cold War and in the 
midst of widespread international strife, and coinciding with an upsurge of environmental 
awareness, Hal Lindsey published The Late Great Planet Earth.  It became the biggest selling 
book in English during the 1970s (excepting the Bible itself).22  Lindsey predicted that Christ 
would return very soon because modern Israel had been founded in 1948 (its rebirth was 
regarded as a sign that the end would arrive within a generation) and the world was perceived 
to be on the brink of catastrophe.  Of course, all of Lindsey's predictions were wrong, but the 
millenarian zeal his book, and others in that popular genre, inspired has never abated.  The 
Cold War ended with a whimper, and it is now about two generations since the rebirth of 
Israel, but fundamentalists still insist that the only dénouement for the trajectory of 
contemporary political and social ills is Christ's return.  Again, SIT helps to explain why.  
The doctrine of an imminent Parousia provides evangelicals with the following: a powerful 
myth which interprets and resolves perceived social and political malaise; a doctrine that 
supplies the ultimate distinction between in- and out-groups – those who are gathered by God 
and those who are left behind; and a narrative about and orientation towards the future that 
reinforce social identity and in-group cohesiveness.  In short, the Parousia is a paradigm myth 
for a group that is looking for salvation from the current social order.   
 
 Moreover, the Parousia myth is congruent with the view that evangelicals alone pursue 
and know the truth.  Consequently, if your in-group has a powerful cognitive sense and 
identity of possessing the truth, then out-groups are (by definition) wrong.  A problem arises, 
however, when one's legitimate and authentic pursuit of truth leads to a conclusion that 
 
21 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 304-305. 
22 Ehrman, 105.  I reluctantly admit to having contributed to its staggering sales success. 
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simply cannot be accommodated within the evangelical fold.23  In this case the person 
involved will most probably have to leave the group, because little or no leeway can be 
afforded in a group whose existence depends on maintaining its difference from out-groups, a 
difference that (in part) is propelled by its futurist mythology.  
 
SIT and contemporary American politics 
 In the 2016 presidential election, evangelical support was decisive in electing Donald 
Trump.  Prima facie this is anomalous given that, compared with all post-WWII presidents, 
let alone 2016 nominees from either party, Trump was patently the least 'Christian' (in any 
broadly observed sense of that term) and certainly the least appealing to evangelicals.24  
However, these apparent deficits counted for little to nothing, and SIT helps to explain why.  
If we consider the general characteristics of a social group that identifies itself as in some 
way disadvantaged and marginalized, the following are salient with reference to evangelicals, 
particularly white evangelicals, and the 2016 election.  To begin, many evangelicals have 
come to see themselves as marginalized because 'traditional' American industries and 
occupations have declined or vanished.  They regard free trade agreements as responsible for 
ruining their livelihoods and as having much less to do with free trade and much more to do 
with facilitating the activities of private corporations.  They are probably right.  They also 
note that their parlous financial situation is then condescendingly denied by those in 
government or business who profit most from such agreements.   
 
 Further, politics is perceived to be dominated by corporate lobby groups (again, they are 
probably right), liberal privilege and ethnic minorities.  Lobby groups are seen to both serve 
and corrupt ever more remote and alien financial and political elites.  Minority groups are 
perceived to be usurping traditional social and political arenas.  Liberals are seen as 
purveyors of secular humanism, relativism and, in the form of climate change mitigation, 
anti-American values.  In part, evangelical identity is constructed in opposition to these 
groups.  This opposition is both efficient and effective: it provides a clear and binding 
ideological difference from other groups, it provides the salient issues with which that 
 
23 Such as discovering that many of the New Testament documents were not written by the men whose 
names are attached to them.     
24 Clinical psychologist Mary Trump, the president's niece, leaves readers in no doubt that her uncle is not 
religious [Too Much and Never Enough (London: Simon & Schuster, 2020)]. 
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difference can be reinforced, and it allows evangelicals to feel under threat from dominant 
out-groups that are perceived to denigrate them.  Despite these differences, or perhaps 
because of them, evangelicals are not social fatalists.  Out-groups are not perceived as either 
permanent or invincible, therefore evangelicals do not see themselves as socially immobile.  
On the contrary, they have some investment ('faith' is too strong a descriptor) in the broader 
American aspiration to social mobility.  It is clear that a candidate like Trump, perceived as 
anti-establishment, beguiling to people who feel marginalized by the destruction of traditional 
industry, and who in general defines himself in opposition to many of the same groups 
opposed by evangelicals, was going to be broadly appealing to them. 
 
 Why, however, does this appeal override Trump's rebarbative characteristics – such as 
sexual misbehaviour and playboy lifestyle – that would normally make him repellent to 
evangelicals?  The answer is primarily that Trump is not one of them.  His appeal is not based 
on his being an evangelical – nobody could mistake him for one – so he was not assessed by 
criteria which define a member of the (evangelical) in-group.  This observation also helps to 
explain why other Republican candidates who were undoubtedly evangelicals and whose 
policies were much the same as Trump's, but who were not perceived as maverick outsiders, 
did not appeal as much to their fellow evangelicals.  In short, it was less important to be a 
member of the in-group than it was to be opposed to certain out-groups.  This also explains 
why most evangelicals do not suffer the cognitive dissonance that might be expected from 
supporting a candidate whom they would otherwise find repellent.  
 
 SIT helps to explain evangelical electoral proclivities, but the above analysis is quite 
broad and might equally apply to a number of non-evangelical groups.  For example, many of 
the in-group characteristics could probably describe the Ku Klux Klan.  However, the above-
noted SIT analysis of millenarian groups throws more light on evangelical distinctiveness.  
For example, millenarian ideology provides a narrative of a group's past and future.  For 
evangelicals, the most significant elements in the narrative of their past are those of social 
decay and marginalisation, and cultural failure.  These are not, however, cognitively 
sufficient to produce a robust sense of group identity and concomitant difference from out-
groups.  Rather, these are furnished by the evangelical narrative of, and orientation towards, 
the future.  The reasons for this are straightforward.  Even where evangelicals comprise a 
socially homogenous group, their narrative of similar backgrounds, social class, culture and 
so on is less potent that the mythology of a divinely ordered destination.  Further, the more 
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evangelicals feel under threat from out-groups, the more this millenarian myth will buttress 
their social identity.  In summary, millenarian mythology intensifies the perceived difference 
between evangelicals and the rest of society, and concomitantly intensifies their in-group 
identity.       
 
 This analysis enables us to understand some anomalies about President Trump's election 
that have mystified even well-informed church leaders.  For example, in late 2017 the 
Archbishop of Canterbury lamented his inability to comprehend the strength of American 
conservative evangelical support for Trump: 'I really genuinely do not understand where that 
is coming from'.25  Some 80 percent of self-identified white evangelicals say they voted for 
Trump.  Given that Trump stands about as far from mainstream Christianity as might be 
possible while running for public office in the United States, Archbishop Welby's 
bewilderment is understandable.  As we have seen, however, Trump's appeal for evangelicals 
has nothing to do with his lifestyle or sexual ethics and a great deal to do with his being 
perceived as an outsider, as someone who identifies himself as what he is not rather than 
what he is. 
 
 This analysis also throws light on the religious right's scepticism about global heating.  
For example, in 2014 the Reverend Professor Stephen Pickard, a bishop in Australia's 
Anglican church, sent a letter to all federal parliamentarians who professed Christian belief.  
His letter was aimed at conservative Christians who were sceptical about the science of 
global heating.  Rather than address their scientific doubts, Pickard argued about theology.  In 
particular, he tackled the matter of Genesis 1, in which God grants dominion over all living 
things – plants and animals – to humankind.  Indeed, God's first command to human beings is 
to 'fill the earth and subdue it' (Gen. 1.28).  Pickard argued that this chapter has been abused 
as a rationale for exploiting nature, a pretext driven by misinterpreting a biblical passage that 
'really talks about the interconnectedness of all things'.26  Pickard asserts it is not the natural 
world that needs to be subdued but rather 'the human proclivity to overwhelm and to take 
what is not ours to take'.  The bishop's letter 'was expressed in language to which, one might 
 
25 Harriet Sherwood, 'Evangelical Christians "uncritical" in support for Trump, UK bishop says', The 
Guardian (28 December 2017). 




have thought, devout conservatives might relate'.  Unfortunately, the letter changed no minds 
and elicited no appropriate response.  Given that the overwhelming majority of the world's 
religious leaders are of the view that climate change must be addressed, it is 'more than a 
little perplexing', Mike Seccombe suggests, that in Australia it is Christian politicians who 
lead the opposition to greenhouse gas reduction.27   
 
 From our SIT analyses, however, it is clear that Pickard's disappointment and 
Seccombe's perplexity are misdirected.  Conservative Christian scepticism about global 
heating is driven not by theology but by social characteristics such as the desire to maximise 
differences from out-groups.  As noted above under (7), members will pursue that desire even 
to the detriment of the group.  That this pursuit is also to the detriment of the nation is 
irrelevant: the group is driven by the need to augment its identity, not by thoughts of 
benefiting out-groups.28 
 
Blame The Fundamentals? 
 Mike Seccombe further notes that the only other country with similar political opposition 
to greenhouse gas mitigation is the United States.  Reverend Tim Costello is of the view that 
the reasons behind American evangelicals' scepticism about and hostility to climate change 
mitigation have their origins in the success of The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth, a 
series of 12 volumes published from 1910 to 1915.29  Among other targets, the anti-science 
Fundamentals attacked the theory of evolution and 'higher critical' approaches to the bible.  
The above SIT analyses suggest that Costello's explanation is much less likely than factors 
concerning group identity.   
 
 There is other evidence to support this assertion.  In 1977, James Barr noted that open 
conflict between Christian fundamentalism and science had greatly diminished over the years 
 
27 Ibid. 
28 This also helps to explain why so many American evangelicals resist wearing face masks, even though 
they are told that wearing them will help to protect others from Covid-19.  The need to reinforce in-group 
identity by refusing to wear masks is more important than accepting reasonable responsibility for the 
health of other people. 
29 Seccombe, 'religious right'.  Publication was financed by Lyman and Milton Stewart, wealthy laymen 
from Los Angeles [Sydney E. Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1972) 815-816.]. 
139 
 
and consequently the battle over evolution had receded.30  This might have been due in part 
to the American government's promotion of science following the Soviet Union's early lead 
in the space race and concomitant perceptions that the United States lagged behind Russian 
science.31  However, in the second edition of Fundamentalism (1981) Barr noted a recent 
upsurge in creationism.  This accorded with the observation of John Maynard Smith in 1983 
that: 
 
Something very odd has happened during the past five years or so.  The public has 
been persuaded that Darwinism, as an explanation of evolution, has been exploded.  
I find repeatedly, when discussing my work with non-biologists, that they are under 
the impression that Darwin has been refuted.32   
 
 Given that The Fundamentals' influence had clearly declined from the late 1950s, and 
there is no evidence of its return to prominence from about 1980, the reasons for this 
resurgence of creationism are probably to be found in changing social conditions.  For 
instance, it is no coincidence that evangelicals became more assertively conservative – by 
increasingly emphasising their difference from other groups – from the time social inequality 
in America began to increase.  Moreover, evangelical groups exhibit a high degree of 
congruence with SIT's millenarian groups.  Consider, for example, criterion (v) and the 
perception that confronting events are controlled by divine forces.  With reference to global 
heating, Republican congressman Tim Walberg stated that, 'As a Christian … I'm confident 
that, if there's a real problem, He [God] can take care of it'.33  
 
SIT compared with alternative models 
 In order to assess our SIT analyses it would be worth comparing the results with those 
obtained using different models.  To this end I have selected two models: one based on the 
cultural anthropology of Claude Lévi-Strauss (model A), and the other on the 'grid-group' 
 
30 James Barr, Fundamentalism (London: SCM, 1977) 92. 
31 Ronald Strahan, 'The Creationism crusade' in Confronting Creationism: Defending Darwin, D. R. 
Selkirk and F. J. Burrows eds (Kensington, Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 1987) 6. 
32 John Maynard Smith, Did Darwin get it Right (London: Penguin, 1993) 23.  The chapter in which this 
quote appears was originally published in 1983. 
33 Seccombe, 'religious right'. 
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model of Mary Douglas (model B).  Compared with SIT, these models might be more 
productive or not, and generate better analyses or not, but my hypothesis is that they should 
not produce significantly different results.  Both models have been successfully applied to a 
wide variety of cultures.   
 
Model A – Claude Lévi-Strauss's cultural anthropology 
 This model is based on Lévi-Strauss's assumption that one unconscious activity of the 
human mind is to impose structure on cultural content (such as myth) and that these 
unconscious structures are fundamentally the same for all people across all eras, regardless of 
a society's history, technological development and so on.  This clearly Kantian assumption is 
based on Lévi-Strauss's observation that myths collected from different periods and widely 
different regions of the world are nonetheless very similar.  The researcher's task is to find 
what they have in common and thereby draw up an 'inventory of mental patterns'.34  In 
grasping the structure underlying a certain institution and its practices, the researcher acquires 
a 'principle of interpretation' that is valid for application to other institutions and practices in 
other eras.35  With respect to mythology, this model eliminates the need to identify the 
earliest, truest or most authentic version of the myth under consideration.  Instead, the myth 
comprises all its versions, ergo this model's suitability for comparing a myth's manifestation 
in two completely different societies separated by almost two millennia.  The researcher 
breaks down the myth into its constituent units in an attempt to isolate 'the invariant elements 
among superficial differences' and thereby discern order behind the disorder of apparently 
arbitrary social data.36   
 
 With regard to the Parousia, Lévi-Strauss's method is particularly apposite because, as he 
sees it, any myth is driven by the need to resolve a paradox that appears to resist a solution.  It 
is, in other words, an attempt to make sense out of perceived chaos, to impose order on 
apparent disorder.  The purpose of a myth, then, is to provide a structure of thought that is 
 
34 Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Raw and the Cooked, John and Doreen Weightman trans (London: Penguin, 
1992) 10. 
35 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf trans 
(New York: Basic Books, 1963) 21, 208. 
36 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Myth and Meaning (New York: Schocken Books, 1995) 8-11; and Structural 
Anthropology, 216-230.  
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capable of surmounting the contradiction that generated it.  For example, if Jesus appeared on 
Earth to inaugurate God's kingdom, but the social and political order (Roman imperial rule) 
remained unchanged, then the mythological construal of an imminent second coming – to 
accomplish what the first failed to achieve – may resolve the paradox.37  With regard to the 
Thessalonian community, this construal was further developed to overcome the distressing 
incongruity of believers dying before Christ returned.   
 
 What happens, however, when the Parousia is delayed for so long that most or all of the 
original cohort of believers have died?  This was the situation facing the writer of Ephesians, 
a New Testament epistle written in Paul's name but which is generally agreed to date from 
after Paul's death.38  One reason for regarding Ephesians as pseudonymous is that the genuine 
letters of Paul insist on the future physical resurrection of believers, as we noted from 
1 Thessalonians.  In Ephesians, however, the writer states that God 'made us alive together 
with Christ … and raised us up with him and seated us with him in the heavenly places' 
(Ephesians 2. 5-6).39  In this construal, living believers have already experienced a spiritual 
resurrection and are already receiving heavenly blessings.  Clearly this is not a development 
of the Parousia myth.  For the writer of Ephesians, the Parousia myth was confronted with the 
impossible task of overcoming a real, rather than merely perceived, contradiction.  Ergo, the 
writer constructs a fundamentally different myth consisting of different structural elements.  
Importantly, by locating his new salvific myth in the past instead of the future, the writer 
abandoned the futurist orientation that reinforces the social identity and distinctiveness of 
millenarian groups.  It is probably no coincidence that Ephesians, lacking the characteristics 
that support group identity, was not directed to a specific congregation (unlike other Pauline 
epistles) and might instead be a 'catholic' or circular letter.  
 
 According to Lévi-Strauss – and again congruent with SIT – myth is also an attempt to 
explain a group's fate – what has happened or will happen to it.40  The main reason for this is 
 
37 'May', because other early Christian groups, such as those represented by the Johannine literature, 
developed very different mythologies and theologies to address this problem.  
38 On the authorship of Ephesians see J. D. G Dunn, 'Ephesians' in The Oxford Bible Commentary, John 
Barton and John Muddiman eds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 1165-1167. 
39 The Greek verbs in this passage are in the past tense. 
40 Lévi-Strauss, Myth and Meaning, 41-43. 
142 
 
the necessity to ensure that a group's future remains faithful to both its present and its past.  
This helps to explain why the Parousia myth needed to be revised and then replaced.  In brief, 
the Thessalonian church's future was beginning to appear as a betrayal of the original 
community.  Deceased believers had to be incorporated into a revised myth, and when this 
strategy was no longer viable the past was remythologised so that the group's future 
destination was faithful to, indeed indivisible from, its past.        
 
Model B – Mary Douglas's grid/group model 
 This model is the result of Mary Douglas's attempt to find better-integrated links between 
a people's culture, including cosmological ideas, and its social organisation.41  Douglas 
proposed a simple, versatile identification model comprising a vertical axis ('grid') and a 
horizontal axis ('group').   
 
    1  High         2  
      Grid   
  | 
  Weak_________ | _________ Strong  
  Group |  Group 
  | 
      Low 
    3  Grid         4 
  
 The grid axis plots the degree of congruence between individual experience and a 
society's system of identification, organization and evaluation.  In a 'high grid' society there is 
a high degree of fit between individual experience and these socially shared concepts.  In 
other words, individuals adhere strongly to their society's cultural patterns and perceptions.  
At the other end of this axis, 'low grid' societies exhibit a low degree of fit between individual 
experience and shared cultural norms and constructs.  Individuals have doubt about, or 
waiver in, their adherence to broadly accepted cultural perceptions.  For these individuals, the 
 
41 Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols, 2nd ed. (London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1973) 82ff.  For a more accessible 
description see Mary Douglas, A Course on Cultural Theory: The Group/Grid Model, lecture 1, 'A History 
of Grid and Group Cultural Theory' and lecture 2, 'Seeing Everything in Black and White' (Semiotics 
Institute Online, 2006).  
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(actual) world is largely incomprehensible because they do not adhere to the values, 
constructs and so on that enable other people to interpret the world as more or less coherent, 
consistent and comprehensible.  This is congruent with SIT characteristics (2) and (3): the 
social interpretations and narratives that protect and maintain group identity may be inimical 
to a group's capacity to understand what is happening around it.       
 
 The horizontal 'group' axis plots the degree of pressure exerted on individuals to conform 
to the values and constructs of the group to which they belong.  A 'weak group' indicates low 
pressure to conform, and thereby ambiguous group identity and vague distinctions between 
in-groups and out-groups.  To the right along this axis, a 'strong group' indicates strong 
pressure to conform, with concomitant robust identity and definite distinctions between in-
group and out-groups.  Strong groups exhibit a clear set of normative symbols, often 
expressed in rites, that define and replicate group identity.42  Any society will normally have 
the four cultural types represented in the diagram (for ease of reference I have numbered the 
quadrants 1 to 4).  Each cultural type generates its own distinct cosmology, and the various 
groups in each quadrant will define themselves in various degrees of opposition to groups in 
other quadrants.   
 
 The grid-group model is apposite to our investigation because social entities in the lower 
right quadrant (4 – low grid/strong group) are associated with millenarian, end-of-the-world 
groups.43  Among the characteristics displayed by groups in this quadrant is a dualist 
cosmology according to which the world is dominated by warring forces of good and evil, 
and concomitant views that in-group members are morally good and thereby not part of the 
'fallen' world, while out-groups are charged with exhibiting moral failure and possessing 
corrupted ideas of justice.  These characteristics intensify group boundaries and identity. 
 
 A fundamental quality of social entities in quadrant 4 concerns their use of knowledge.  
Congruent with our SIT analyses of the Thessalonian church and American evangelicals, in 
this quadrant knowledge is much more about epistemic identity than intellectual coherence.44  
 
42 For a good summary see Bruce J. Malina, Christian Origins and Cultural Anthropology (Atlanta: John 
Knox Press, 1986) 13-15. 
43 Ibid., 64. 
44 Ibid., 41. 
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Knowledge is used to maintain and enhance group identity rather than understand the world.  
More broadly across society, the introduction of new facts has little to no effect within any 
quadrant because conflict between quadrants is much less about epistemic matters and much 
more about organisational disputes.  As Mary Douglas deftly put it, debate between the 
quadrants is really a 'dialogue of the deaf', because any presentation of new facts will not 
change the opinion of social entities within their respective quadrants: 'whatever information 
is tendered, their differences are irreconcilable'.45 
 
 Further, and again congruent with SIT [characteristic (4)], each quadrant appears to 
behave irrationally from the perspective of other quadrants, but from the perspective of those 
within a quadrant such behaviour expresses group solidarity and identity.  Indeed, behaviour 
perceived (by other groups) as less irrational would probably be regarded as compromise and 
thereby deemed betrayal of the group. 
 
Conclusion 
 Application of SIT to the Parousia myth maintained by the New Testament's 
Thessalonian community has highlighted important characteristics – such as reinforcing the 
difference between in-group and out-groups, stereotyping of out-groups, and the role of 
epistemic identity – that help us to understand evangelical groups in contemporary America.  
Findings from our SIT analyses are congruent with those derived from social anthropology 
and grid/group models.  American evangelicals supported Donald Trump in 2016 largely 
because he was the candidate who best satisfied their need to preserve social identity through 
differentiation from perceived hostile out-groups and through belief in a futurist mythology 
that could legitimately claim the imprimatur of scriptural tradition.  Those who refer to 
climate change as an 'apocalyptic' threat may unwittingly, at least with regard to evangelicals, 
be expressing a social fact. 
 
 There is a further matter: if a person's or group's view on climate change is a product of 
their group identity, then rational argument with that person or group is almost certainly a 
waste of breath.  This prompts an obvious question: has group identity infiltrated government 
to the degree that most of an administration's decisions are products of its social identity and 
 
45 Douglas (2006), lecture 2.   
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concomitant dogma rather than rational consideration?  And if so, what does this mean for the 





The Principle of Unripe Time is that people should not do at the present moment what they 
think right at that moment.1 
 




 So far we have examined matters that contribute to poor decisions – folly, poor risk 
assessment, inadequate emotional response and so on.  But what about the decision-making 
process itself?  How do governments make decisions?  For example, if we think they decide 
things in much the same way as individuals do, then we will probably be disappointed and 
mystified at their apparent lack of common sense or inability to see what appears obvious to 
the rest of us.  Governments are often badly placed or poorly equipped to make rational 
decisions, but they are usually good at manipulating the discourse around those decisions.  
This chapter looks at J. L. Austin's speech-act theory to explain how discourse is manipulated 
and how some groups are silenced even when they speak. 
 
Policy and political dogma  
 We normally think of a decision as a choice made between two or more options: you 
choose the best option after weighing evidence and/or assessing relevant risks.  That option 
might be the best of a bad bunch, but it is still the best available.  Ideally, the essence of 
decision-making in the public realm is that each option is assessed against certain criteria – 
fairness, cost, timeliness and so on – and the option chosen is the one that best satisfies those 
criteria.  This is not how governments usually make decisions. As Richard Denniss observes, 
'the harsh reality is that democratic debate is ultimately not about evidence'.2  If it were then 
most governments would long ago have legalised many or most recreational drugs, invested 
far more in early years child support and public education, eliminated tax loopholes and 
havens for wealthy citizens, levied a hefty tax on sugar, and so on.  In practice, governments 
rarely make evidence-based decisions because that is often not, and might sometimes be 
 
1 F. M. Cornford, Microcosmographia Academica (London: Bowes & Bowes, 1964) 24. 
2 Richard Denniss, Dead Right: How Neoliberalism Ate Itself and What Comes Next, Quarterly Essay, 
Issue 70 (Carlton, Victoria: Black Inc., 2018) 49. 
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antithetical to, their desire to remain in power and implement policies that embody their 
political dogma. 
 
 To that end, government decisions are usually not ends in themselves but rather the 
matériel of parliamentary battle.  Policies are moulded or bent according to the 'exigencies of 
political warfare', and legislation is sometimes reduced to little more than a by-product of the 
struggle to attain and remain in power.3  Ergo, governments usually attend to a bill's political 
values rather than its legislative merits, a priority that also distorts arguments for and against 
a proposed law or regulation.  This process also makes it extremely difficult for governments 
to address any long-term national interests that require consistent work to achieve distant 
ends.4 
 
 A further problem is that an incoming government inherits the agenda and problems of 
the outgoing administration.  Of course this does not entail that the government's trajectory is 
a straightforward continuation of its predecessor's, but it does mean that the new government 
lacks a free hand and that the grounds of its legislative and administrative agenda are largely 
not of its own choosing.  The results can be disastrous.  For example, President Kennedy 
inherited the CIA's Eisenhower-approved plan to invade Cuba;5 President Johnson inherited 
his predecessor's escalating commitment of military 'advisors' to Vietnam; President Nixon 
inherited a full-blown war. 
 
 Little wonder, then, that governments often make decisions that leave us bewildered.  
They are prosecuting a legislative agenda that reflects dogma rather than evidence, often 
under conditions that are not of their own choosing.  The following examples illustrate this 
contention.  In 2003, the US Government – the president and congress – decided to invade 
Iraq.  However, as Michiko Kakutani observes, this decision was 'not made through a rational 
 
3 As Katharine Murphy observes, 'As long as the status quo delivers a pathway to victory, the climate war 
in Australia will go on being an artefact of partisan politics rather than a practical problem to be solved' 
['Scott Morrison and the Coalition are fiddling as Australia burns', The Guardian, Australian ed. (10 
December 2019)]. 
4 As Joseph Schumpeter notes in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 2nd ed. (Mansfield Centre, CT: 
Martino Publishing, 2011) 286-287. 
5 Resulting in the notorious Bay of Pigs fiasco.  
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policy-making process and the judicious weighing of information and expert analysis'.6  
Rather, it was the prosecution of a preconceived idea, propelled by ideological certainty and 
fuelled by cherry-picked intelligence.  These are the reasons why justifications for that 
decision have been embarrassingly feeble: for the most part, justifications work only if a 
decision was justifiable.   
 
 The second example is of a government whose decision-making powers have been 
dogmatically enfeebled to the point of being unable to make a decision even when a large 
majority of the electorate would agree with it.  In 2017, the Australian Government 
conducted a referendum on whether to allow same-sex marriage.  Despite clear majorities of 
citizens and parliamentarians, including government members, being in favour of same-sex 
marriage, the government refused to make a decision to amend the Marriage Act.  Its decision 
to commission a referendum was a choice not to make a decision.  The government abrogated 
its legislative responsibility by giving the decision to someone else – the electorate – at huge 
emotional and financial cost to the country.  The government's inherited dogma did not 
encompass same-sex marriage and it could not bring itself to decide otherwise. 
 
Policy inertia 
 In the context of debate over contentious issues like climate change, the main problem is 
that dogma produces policy inertia.  To the extent that policies are expressions of dogma, 
obviously the latter has to change before new policies can be developed.  If a dogma resists 
change – it usually does because its constituent ideas have been established through, and are 
abandoned only after, lengthy internecine party conflict – then policy change will be 
concomitantly slow and frustrating.  If you believe that a government makes decisions in 
much the same way as we do, and could therefore choose a better option, you will usually be 
exasperated by its apparent inability to change its mind.  As Barbara Tuchman observed, 'to 
recognise error, to cut losses, to alter course, is the most repugnant option in government'.7  
Ergo, when in 2019 the Queensland Government approved an application to open one of the 
world's largest coal mines in the state's Galilee Basin, its decision reflected a long-standing 
employment-over-environment policy rather than assessment of relevant issues, such as the 
mine's contribution to global heating, its effect on local water supplies, or even a 
 
6 Michiko Kakutani, The Death of Truth (London: William Collins, 2018) 31. 
7 Tuchman, Folly, 481. 
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straightforward cost-benefit analysis of the degree to which the mine will be subsidised by 
the taxpayer.           
 
 These observations help to explain why governments often pursue policies that are self-
evidently not the best available to achieve even their own stated objectives.  For example, in 
2018 the Australian Government's objective was to stimulate the economy by increasing 
consumer spending.  Clearly the best way to achieve this would be to maximise the 
proportion of consumer spending for every dollar retained by, or given to, citizens.  Instead, 
the government reduced income tax for most people.  These reductions mainly benefited 
wealthier sectors of the community; poorer sectors were only slightly better off, and 
unemployed people received nothing extra because they don't pay tax.  Wealthy people 
already have enough to spend on consumer goods, so any extra money they receive will 
largely be spent on mortgages, investments or other non-consumer items, whereas poorer 
people would spend a much larger portion of additional money on consumer goods.  If those 
without a job were given more money they would spend all of it on consumer products 
because they cannot afford a range of basic necessities.  Giving bigger tax breaks to lower 
income earners, none to higher earners, and increasing the unemployment benefit, had been 
touted by business leaders and economists – normally a conservative government's natural 
constituents – but the government resisted their recommendations.  If the government were 
carefully to assess the best way to achieve its goal, it would choose the option spruiked by 
business leaders and economists, so why didn't it implement that option?  The reason is 
simple: the government's dogma was to support high-income earners, not welfare recipients 
or those on low incomes.  In short, the best policy fell outside the government's dogmatic 
spectrum and was therefore beyond consideration.8  Moreover, as if to verify this contention, 
the government repeated this basic economic error in its 2020 Budget.  
 
8 As I write, the Republican-controlled US Senate refuses to approve financial assistance that would enable 
millions of Americans to endure the Covid-19 pandemic.  Republicans might not be concerned that nearly 
a tenth of the country can't afford adequate food or that 40 million are in extreme rent or mortgage stress, 
but they vociferously claim expertise in managing the economy.  Ergo, they supported early re-opening of 
shops and businesses, even though medical experts said this was reckless, yet they won't approve a 
financial package that would assist the economy, even though economists say this aid is essential to 
maintain consumer spending.  It is a clear example of a government knowingly acting against its own 
professed interests.          
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 Indeed, 'choice' of a policy because it lamely conforms to a dogmatic stance is an 
anaemic notion of decision-making.  In this vein it is accurate to state that the current 
Australian Government has never actually decided – after weighing of evidence and so on – 
not to do anything about climate change.  Rather, it simply does not address the issue because 
neither of its constituent parties believes in global heating to the extent that it would, or even 
could, develop a coherent policy.  In short, climate change is beyond its pale.  
 
 The implications for global heating are daunting.  Most of us no longer expect that, when 
presented with robust evidence for a problem and a range of effective strategies to address it, 
governments will examine these strategies, chose the best, and act accordingly.  This is rarely 
how governments work.  Participants in large environmental movements and demonstrations 
around the world are increasingly aware that governments are mostly deaf to appeals 
predicated on common sense and rationality.  But if governments make few evidence-based 
decisions, surely the electorate at least chooses the party to govern it.  
 
The voter decides 
 In discussing differences between individual and group decisions, Michael Resnik states 
that in the United States 'voters can decide general social and economic policy' by electing a 
president from one party rather than the other.  Moreover, insofar as he 'incorporates the 
national will', the president's decisions may be regarded as decisions of the nation.  Ergo, 
when President Reagan decided to invade Grenada in 1983, 'this also became a decision of 
the United States'.9  In the context of decision theory Resnik is strictly correct, but in these 
examples 'decision' has almost been emptied of meaning.  This is not a semantic quibble; 
rather, it points to a fundamental problem with our notion of political decision-making.  To 
begin, an election might appear to give citizens the opportunity to decide general policy, but 
in reality an election creates the illusion of choice while curtailing actual choice.  In the 
United States, for example, it is very unlikely that any candidate in a presidential election 
could even have survived the nomination process if he or she espoused policies that included 
effective gun control, increasing the corporate tax rate, paying a liveable minimum wage, and 
introducing a carbon tax.  By the time the election is held, the electorate's decision has been 
 
9 Michael D. Resnik, Choices: an introduction to decision theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press: 1987) 5. 
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reduced to a choice between two roughly similar candidates.10  What is presented as a choice 
is actually the denouement of a process that excludes electoral choice.  Consider a parallel 
situation in which a person is given the choice of any dish among 50 on a banqueting table, 
while another person is given a choice after 48 dishes have been removed.  The latter could 
rightly complain that calling both acts a 'choice' is a cunning ruse to fob her off by concealing 
the huge difference between each act.  In short, the idea that 'the voter decides' is often little 
more than a deceit.   
 
 Indeed, most people do not really think the electorate decides much at all.  After all, 
when a group makes a decision, it normally assumes some responsibility for that decision, but 
most people do not feel any responsibility for the actions of a government, even if they 
happen to be among those who voted it into office.11  Further, many people feel little 
sympathy for the idea that a leader decides something on their behalf, or speaks for the 
nation, when their vote for that person was based largely on him or her being slightly less 
odious than the alternative.                        
 
 The notion that an electorate chooses national policy is misleading in much the same way 
as the argument by some oil companies that they are not responsible for the decisions of 
consumers who choose to use their products.  Their view is that CO2 emissions are a matter 
of consumer choice, so we (qua consumers) are to blame for global heating.  As George 
Monbiot asserts, however, this is the biggest and most successful lie spruiked by fossil fuel 
companies because 'we are embedded in a system of their creation – a political, economic and 
physical infrastructure that creates an illusion of choice while, in reality, closing it down'.12  
For example, if you live in one of hundreds of towns or villages in the UK which lost its 
railway following the infamous Beeching report (1963), then you have no option but to use a 
car if you want to travel anywhere beyond walking or cycling distance.13  For an oil 
 
10 Further noting that a president can be elected by a minority of the electorate.  Both George W. Bush in 
2000 and Donald Trump in 2016 failed to receive a majority of the total vote.    
11 I note that T-shirts proclaiming 'Don't blame me.  I didn't vote for them.' have no counterparts stating the 
opposite. 
12 George Monbiot, 'The big polluters' masterstroke was to blame the climate crisis on you and me', The 
Guardian (10 October 2019).  
13 Some areas received replacement bus services, but many of those services lasted less than two years.  
See Railway Finances, report of a committee chaired by Sir David Serpell (London: Department of 
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corporation to say that residents in one of these areas are exercising their consumer choice to 
use petrol is a fraud.  
 
Covid-19 and evidence-based decisions 
 The 2020 Covid-19 pandemic forced the Australian and many other governments to 
abandon, at least temporarily, their ideological attachment to privatising government services, 
balancing budgets and so on in order to help businesses survive and support the confronting 
number of people who lost their jobs.  The Australian Government was forced to make 
decisions that were contrary to its usual dogma.   
 
 There are several points worth noting about these circumstances.  Firstly, it took a 
pandemic for the government to change its mind.  However, immediately before Covid-19, 
the country's worst ever bushfire season – over 30 people killed directly; widespread 
destruction of property and livestock; catastrophic loss of wildlife and habitat; major cities 
smothered by smoke for weeks14 – had no impact on the government's climate change 
policies, and its financial support for people and businesses affected by wildfires was modest 
and piecemeal.  Secondly, the government eventually listened to scientific advice about 
Covid-19 and acted accordingly, albeit tardily and inconsistently at times, whereas it has 
consistently failed to act on scientific advice about climate change.  Thirdly, the chasm 
between the government's pandemic response and its normal policies demonstrates the 
fundamental inadequacy of those policies in helping those who needed support before Covid-
19.  As noted above, the payment for unemployed people had been insufficient for well over 
a decade, yet the government changed its mind and increased the payment when the 
pandemic caused a huge number of people to lose their jobs.  The government assumed that 
these newly unemployed deserved more money, whereas those who were unemployed before 
Covid-19 had somehow been undeserving.  In fact, the government was confronted with the 
clear fact that the unemployment payment was so miserly there would be political 
 
Transport, 1983) #16.4.  The minister responsible for Dr Beeching's appointment, Ernest Marples, had 
been managing director of, and retained interests in, a road construction business. 
14 Until the 'second wave' outbreak of July 2020 in Victoria, Covid-19 had killed many fewer Australians 
than were killed by the 2019-20 bushfires [Calla Wahlquist, 'Australia's summer bushfire smoke killed 445 
and put thousands in hospital, inquiry hears', The Guardian, Australian ed. (26 May 2020)]. 
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repercussions when the 'deserving' unemployed were confronted with the poverty that the 
'undeserving' had endured for years. 
 
 The Australian Government listened to medical science to address Covid-19.  Will it now 
listen to climate science in order to address global heating?  Probably not, for the following 
reasons.  First, unlike Covid-19, climate change lacks novelty value.  The government had no 
experience of a pandemic, and possessed no relevant dogma to guide its response, and so 
sought advice from the only publically acceptable source of credible information.  None of 
this applies to climate change.  Indeed, the difference is visually clear: the prime minister was 
keen to appear in press briefings with the country's Chief Medical Officer, but has never 
appeared with the chief climate scientist.   
 
 Second, climate change lacks an appeal to immediate personal responsibility.  If I don't 
comply with medical advice about interpersonal distance, mask wearing and hand sanitising, 
I put my family and the community at risk of infection, but if I don't comply with scientific 
advice about reducing my carbon emissions, I put nobody at risk.  To put it another way, the 
effectiveness of government policy on Covid-19 depends on individuals being responsible 
and doing their bit, but doing your bit to reduce carbon emissions is ineffective unless the 
government itself is actively reducing the country's emissions.       
 
 There is a third reason, though it applies much less to Australia than to the United States, 
Great Britain, Brazil and Russia among others.  Responses to Covid-19 have demonstrated 
that some leaders and governments are prepared to disregard scientific advice even in the face 
of clear evidence that their neglect will jeopardise the safety of, or kill, their own citizens.  
Covid-19 satisfies the four PAIN triggers – it is personal, abrupt, immoral and now15 – but 
evidently this does not necessarily translate into appropriate action.  Given that climate 
change satisfies none of the triggers, there is scant reason to believe that responses to global 





15 The P, A and N triggers are straightforward.  The I is triggered by our emotional aversion more than our 




 The Australian referendum on same-sex marriage in 2017 (discussed above) was a 
paradigm of a government's incapacity to veer from policy dogma.  Among several other 
curious features to emerge from this matter, the 'public showed it was more willing and able 
to conduct a mature debate than the current parliament'.16  Given the poor quality of public 
debate in Australia this observation is rather sobering, but it points to a probable deficiency in 
contemporary Westminster-style parliamentary systems: parliaments do not provide a forum 
for debate, at least not in the sense of debate leading to a well-considered decision.  For those 
who have listened to a debate on, say, a controversial bill, this assertion will elicit no surprise.  
As we have seen, parliamentary debates are not conducted in order to examine facts or weigh 
options, let alone change a member's mind.  The position of respective parties on the bill's 
content is known in advance, and a vote on the bill will divide on party lines.17  In short, 
parliamentary debates are almost invariably expressions of party dogma, not arguments about 
evidence.   
 
 Does it matter that most parliaments fail to provide an adequate forum for debate?  After 
all, if you want to persuade people to your point of view you will usually be more successful 
if you appeal to their emotions and prejudices rather than employ rational argument.  As 
Eleanor Gordon-Smith observed after her own failures to change (male) minds through 
rational debate: 
 
How many times have you seen a TV discussion in which the defender of one view 
turned to their opponent and said, 'You know, actually, that's a pretty good point'?  
Ever?  And when you have changed your mind about something close to you, was it 
because of a rational argument, or was the process stranger and more difficult to 
map – like a subterranean rumble you weren't aware of until it was over? … So why, 
when we know that changing our minds is as tangled and difficult and messy as we 
 
16 Denniss, 51. 
17 Perhaps once or twice in a parliamentary term the parties will allow members to have a conscience vote 
– that is, members do not have to vote along party lines – but in my nearly 15 years working for a 
parliament only one member changed her mind as a result of such debate.    
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are, do we stay so welded to the thought that rational debate is the best way to go 
about it?18 
 
 One answer is that, taking our cues to some degree from Plato and Aristotle, most people 
have found it convenient to distinguish reason from emotion, rational from irrational.19  As 
Aristotle argued, we cannot be praised or blamed for having emotions or feelings – because 
we simply become angry or fearful, for example, rather than choose to become angry or 
fearful – but our emotions should be governed by reason.20  However, he is also clear that 
rational arguments in themselves are not enough to convince people to act rightly.  Rational 
arguments might be able to 'encourage and stimulate the generous-minded among the young', 
but they are incapable of persuading 'ordinary people toward noble-goodness'.21 
 
 Of course, this does not entail that all rational argument is futile.  Most of us have on 
occasion been persuaded by well-reasoned argument to change our minds about certain 
matters, but these tend not to be issues in which we have high levels of emotional investment; 
that is, they have more epistemic than emotional and/or moral content.  For example, I have 
been persuaded to remove some trees growing next to my house, because the epistemic 
content of the argument – the trees are highly flammable and frangible – outweighs the 
emotional/moral content of my opposition to tree removal.  On the other hand, over the 
decades of my support for voluntary assisted dying (VAD) legislation I have failed to change 
the view of anybody opposed to VAD.  Debate over VAD generates high levels of emotional 
investment and moral outrage on both sides, so it is hardly surprising that rational argument 
has changed few minds about the epistemic content. 
 
 A fundamental problem with the rational/emotional dichotomy is its tendency to 
reinforce the maleness of reason and concomitantly devalue emotion as female.  Reason is 
perceived as male (and therefore valued) and objective, whereas emotion is construed as 
female (and therefore inferior) and subjective.  The 'man of reason' transcends and is valued 
 
18 Eleanor Gordon-Smith, Stop Being Reasonable (Sydney: NewSouth, 2019) 11-13 (italics in original). 
19 The difference between our emotional and rational brains was discussed in chapter 6. 
20 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1105b30-1106a5; Eudemian Ethics 1219b35-1220a15.  
21 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1179b5-10. 
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more than the 'woman of emotion'.22  When, during the 2019 bushfire crisis Australia's 
Deputy Prime Minister, Michael McCormack, labelled those concerned about climate change 
as 'raving inner city lunatics',23 he was drawing on at least one familiar motif and dichotomy: 
the rational, self-sufficient and unemotive 'man on the land' in opposition to the hysterical 
feminised city-dweller.24  The fact that rural fire-fighters – many are women but most are 
men – were also 'ranting' about climate change was irrelevant to the deputy's attempt to 
dismiss global heating as a concern of the irrationally non-masculine and non-rural.  The 
deputy's assumed rational high ground fails to comprehend that those who rage about global 
heating are more objective about it because they are more partial and engaged, and they are 
so because they have more contact with and knowledge about the issue.  Like many people, 
McCormack thinks that the opposite of partiality is impartiality.  He is wrong; the opposite is 
indifference, just as the opposite of interest is boredom, not disinterest.25  The deputy himself 
is a paradigm of indifference masquerading as unemotional objectivity.  
                              
 A further problem is our assumption that language is fundamentally 'democratic', that it 
works much like a set of tools, so that if I have the right tool then my use of it will function in 
the same way, and have the same effect, as somebody else's use of it.  But what if 
governments and other powerful entities are able to ensure that one group's words do not 
function in the same way as another group's use of the same words?  As Eleanor Gordon-
Smith puts it:   
 
We built our landscape of public debate on the premise that words were tools that 
anybody could use, and that the clash of ideas would help us change each other's 
 
22 The classic work in this field is Genevieve Lloyd's The Man of Reason (London: Methuen, 1984).  See 
in particular 103 ff. 
23 David Crowe, 'Deputy PM slams people raising climate change in relation to NSW bushfires', The 
Guardian, Australian ed. (11 November 2019). 
24 It is noteworthy that this motif is nearly the opposite of its historical forebears.  In Nazi Germany, for 
example, the city was associated with rationality and detachment from community, to which the antidote 
was rural, communal anti-rationality.       
25 For an insightful discussion of engaged objectivity, see Max Deutscher, Subjecting and Objecting (St 
Lucia: Queensland University Press, 1983) 72-75. 
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minds and bring us closer to the truth.  But what if it turns out that discourse itself is 
as vulnerable to power imbalances as the problems we are trying to solve with it?26 
 
 For example, there is currently debate in several countries (Australia among them) about 
freedom of religion.  Religious freedom was once something craved, but not enjoyed, by 
many people who lived in the Soviet Union or China (to mention only two countries).  It was 
the longed for freedom of powerless people to practice their religion without being 
persecuted by state or local authorities.  In the context of current debate in Australia by a 
collective of church leaders, politicians and other powerful public figures, freedom of religion 
is the right to discriminate against people whose social class, disability or (especially) 
sexuality renders them undesirable to church-affiliated establishments.  The linguistic 
resonance of religious freedom for the powerless has been appropriated by a formidable 
group to evoke the suggestion that the religions it represents are being persecuted if they are 
not granted special exemption from laws (particularly those covering antidiscrimination) that 
apply to everybody else.  In brief, words used by one group have a very different effect and 
meaning when they are used by a much more powerful group.  Why and how does this 
happen?  
 
Doing things with words 
 One of the best explorations of this problem is from J. L. Austin's How to Do Things with 
Words.  Austin's analysis is based on his view that 'to say something is to do something'.27  
For example, if I say, 'this government must take action to address climate change', I am not 
only sprouting a sequence of words; I am also accusing the government of inaction and 
demanding that it act in an appropriate way.  In order to clarify what is happening, Austin 
considers speech in three ways: as locutionary, perlocutionary and illocutionary acts.  The 
first is relatively straightforward.  My statement about the government and climate change 
consists of familiar words in a familiar sequence – subject, verb and object – and its 
conventional semantic meaning is clear.  A perlocutionary act refers to the effects or 
consequences my statement will have.  This will depend on a range of factors, such as my 
social status and perceived expertise, the audience, the situation in which I speak, and so on.  
 
26 Gordon-Smith, 52. 
27 J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà eds., 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1975) 12 [italics in original]. 
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An illocutionary act is what I intend my statement to do – to act as an accusation and 
demand, and bring about some legislative action on climate change.  Again, this will depend 
on the situation in which I speak, and also what I'm attempting to do or think I can do.  
Sometimes I will perform an unintended illocutionary act because the felicity conditions that 
would facilitate my intention are absent or I have badly misread the situation.28   
 
 Illocutionary acts may have several further properties.29  If I were a judge, my above 
statement could be a judicial verdict on the government's failure to address climate change.  
In this context my statement is a verdictive act.  If I were prime minister, I might be 
enunciating an authoritative decision that the government is going to do something about 
climate change – an exercitive act – or I might be announcing the government's pledge to do 
something, though with only a vague idea about how to go about it – a commissive act.  If I 
were the victim of a prolonged drought, I might be reacting to and condemning the 
government's inaction – a behabitive act.  These classes of utterance help us to understand 
what is going on with the following statements made during the prolonged and catastrophic 
bushfire emergency in 2019-20.   
 
 We have already noted the Deputy Prime Minister's dismissal of 'raving inner city 
lunatics'.  He went on to say: 'We've had fires in Australia since time began, and what people 
need now is a little bit of sympathy, understanding and real assistance'.30  The Deputy 
Premier of NSW was more forthright: 'it is an absolute disgrace to be talking about climate 
change while we have lost lives and assets'.31  When the Premier of NSW was asked about 
the link between climate change and bushfires, she replied, 'I don't think it's appropriate to get 
into a political argument as to what the causes are at this stage'.  She added: 'when you face 
people who are protesting [about climate change], I say to them, why don't you help people 
 
28 The term 'felicity conditions' is not Austin's.  He talked about infelicities – when an utterance fails to 
achieve the desired performance because conditions under which it was uttered were unsuitable [Austin, 14 
and passim].  Most commentators therefore refer to 'felicity conditions' which must be satisfied for an 
utterance not to succumb to infelicity.  See, for example, Rae Langton, 'Speech Acts and Unspeakable 
Acts', Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 22, no. 4 (Autumn 1993) 301.  
29 For the following see Austin, lecture XII. 
30 Crowe, 'Deputy PM' (11 Nov. 2019). 
31 Alexandra Smith and David Crowe, 'Deputy Premier says climate change talk amid fire crisis a 
"disgrace"', The Guardian, Australian ed. (11 November 2019).  
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who have lost everything?'.32  The federal minister responsible for water, drought, natural 
disaster and emergency management said: 'I don't want to weaponise it [discussion about 
climate change] in the middle of someone's misery'.33  Former deputy prime minister, 
Barnaby Joyce, was not so circumspect in politicising the situation.  He suggested that two 
people killed by bushfires 'most likely' voted for the Greens,34 and that 'so many of the 
practicalities of fighting a fire and managing it have been stymied by the Greens'.35  When the 
Prime Minister was asked about climate change, he replied: 
 
I'm focussed on the needs of the people in this [emergency evacuation] room today 
… [and the] resourcing of our firefighters … to keep those firefighters safe and to 
protect as many properties as we can.  You've got firefighters out there saving 
someone else's house while their own house is burning down.  And when we're in 
that sort of situation, that's where our attention must be.36  
 
 As locutionary acts, these statements are mostly requests for sympathy towards victims 
and declarations that it is inappropriate to talk about climate change while bushfires are 
destroying property and people.  As perlocutionary acts, the statements' effects will vary but 
probably have at least one element in common: the general perception that, whatever your 
view about climate change and bushfire preparedness, or whether you live in a city or in a 
 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid.  It is worth noting that these statements are almost the same as those issued by the National Rifle 
Association after mass shootings in the United States.  For example, after 32 people were murdered at 
Virginia Tech in 2007, the NRA said, 'This is a time for people to grieve, to mourn, and to heal.  This is 
not a time for political discussions or public policy debates.' [Harry L. Wilson, Gun Politics in America 
(Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2016) 544].  The NRA's strategy is to avoid scrutiny and admission of 
culpability by expressing concern for victims and bereaved, and by imputing insensitivity to those who 
want to debate gun violence.  The NRA usually promises to engage in debate after an appropriate period, 
but this is a ruse to let the media cycle move on and thereby allow the public's attention to wander 
elsewhere.  
34 David Crowe and Max Koslowski, '"Take it down a few notches": Morrison urges calm as fire blame 
game escalates', The Guardian, Australian ed. (12 November 2019). 
35 Richard Denniss, 'Climate change makes bushfires worse.  Denying the truth doesn't change the facts.', 
The Guardian, Australian ed. (13 November 2019).  
36 Crowe, 'Deputy PM' (11 Nov. 2019). 
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rural community, governments are feckless and out of touch.  Nonetheless, for many people 
these statements served to stifle debate about climate change, even if other people were 
angered to more vigorous condemnation of the government.  As illocutionary acts, none of 
the statements performed as its enunciator intended, except to a limited degree.  However, 
this does not entail that those statements were wholly unsuccessful.  For example, all 
speakers intended to portray people who want action on climate change as political point-
scorers and heartless city-dwellers who possess no understanding of, or sympathy for, rural 
folk.  This intention was only partly realised, but it established an area of discourse that 
equated argument about climate change with lack of compassion, and was a declaration that 
the government will decide when and where debate about global heating may occur.  In 
particular, it was an assertion that citizens cannot use a disaster exacerbated by climate 
change to question the government's response to it.   
 
 The above are largely exercitive illocutions because they assert the speakers' power or 
influence to prohibit debate, or restrict or determine the field of discourse.  They are also 
behabitive illocutions – reactions against, and expressions of attitude towards, other people's 
and parties' alleged conduct.  Austin appositely noted that behabitives possess a 'special scope 
for insincerity'.37  The above speakers' confected outrage and duplicitous concern for 
firefighters – whose government funding had been reduced – confirm Austin's view.  None of 
these statements is a commissive illocution.  Even though the situation appeared to demand at 
least one commissive – enunciation of the government's commitment to address climate 
change – each speaker shaped the discourse such that the government's opponents uttered the 
content of this commissive.  However, lacking the authority to articulate a commisive or an 
exercitive illocution, opponents were reduced to expressing a range of rather feeble 
behabatives.      
 
 Government members' overall intent was to control the parameters and narrative of 
response to an event that is outside those areas of discourse in which the government is more 
comfortable and/or better able to control or direct communication.  These speakers recast the 
issue of global heating into a matter of group identity – particularly city against country, the 
former accused of trying to impose their will on the latter whom the government purports to 
defend.    
 
37 Austin, 161. 
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The government's eternal present 
 When a minister or prime minister is asked why their government was poorly prepared 
for widespread bushfires or what the government is going to do about climate change, the 
respondent often retreats into the eternal present: 'I'm concerned with people's needs right 
now, not with what is supposed to have happened in the past or what might happen in the 
future.'  This is a shrewd illocutionary manoeuvre.  By severely circumscribing the temporal 
limits of discourse, the government renders itself effectively immune from criticism, and 
thereby free to repeat its errors.  There can be no genuine discussion of a government's past 
inaction or plans for the future if it determines that only the present counts as a possible area 
of discourse.  The perlocutionary effect is to reduce or evade accountability for past failure, 
avoid the risk of having to enunciate ideas about the future, and restrict dialogue to a domain 
most governments control merely by being in power – the present.  Herein lies the key to this 
strategy: governments cannot manipulate narratives of the past or future in the same way, or 
to the same degree, as they can control the present. 
 
 The ramifications of this tactic are parlous.  A government that refuses to discuss its past 
is less likely to acknowledge its mistakes and learn from them.  Refusal to discuss the future 
entails an unwillingness to countenance uncertainties and to plan, let alone budget for, things 
that lie well beyond a government's term of office.  Covid-19, for example, exposed the 
failure of so many governments to develop even modest plans and infrastructure in 
anticipation of a pandemic.  The illocutionary intent of retreating into the present has the 
perlocutionary effect of constraining a government's capacity to do more than merely react to 
events.38                   
  
Frustration and disablement 
 What about statements from those who lack power, such as opposition parties and 
climate activist groups?  Like government speakers, they will experience perlocutionary 
frustration (failure to achieve desired effects) and illocutionary disablement (failure to 
perform the action intended) though to a greater degree, but unlike government members 
 
38 Timothy Snyder talks about the 'politics of eternity' with regard to Russia, but his point can be applied to 
governments unwilling to address climate change.  For example, 'eternity politicians' are adept at 
confecting crises in order to distract from their unwillingness or incapacity to undertake reform [The Road 
to Unfreedom (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2018) 8].      
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their lack of power entails more-severe communicative deficits.39  For example, when the 
government declares that now is not the time for debate on climate change, other groups do 
not possess the exercitive authority to declare otherwise.  It does not matter whether these 
groups raise the issue and lambast the government.  If the government declines to debate, 
then other groups may enunciate any number of evidence-rich and logically coherent 
arguments but those words will usually be ineffective.  If you are powerful, you can let other 
parties say what they like, but by controlling the conditions and domain of discourse you can 
also stop their words from counting as an intended illocutionary act.  As Rae Langton 
observed, 'powerful people can generally do more, say more, and have their speech count for 
more than can the powerless.  If you are powerful, there are more things you can do with your 
words.'40  This privilege extends to poor argument, flyblown cliché and outright lying.  In 
response to Barnaby Joyce's statement about Greens preventing adequate bushfire prevention, 
Richard Denniss rightly noted that, 'in a democracy, power is the ability to talk crap and get 
away with it'.41  Joyce's statement is manifest rubbish, but this is mostly irrelevant to its 
perlocutionary and illocutionary activity.  What counts is not whether his statement conforms 
to universal criteria of fact and logic, but whether it is authoritative for a certain audience in a 
certain domain – mainly those who are suggestible to feeling aggrieved about outsiders 
telling them what to do.  Indeed, when we (I include myself in this criticism) ridicule 
politicians like Joyce for the factual and logical bankruptcy of their statements, we are 
missing the point.  They are not engaging in rational argument in an arena where all speakers 
 
39 The terms 'perlocutionary frustration' and 'illocutionary disablement' are Rae Langton's from 'Speech 
Acts', 315.  
40 Ibid, 299.  Conversely, Miranda Fricker talks about 'hermeneutical injustice'.  She cites the example of a 
woman who suffered sexual harassment before this concept was generally recognised.  The victim could 
not adequately comprehend her own experience, let alone explain it intelligibly to others.  Compared with 
her harasser, the victim endured cognitive disadvantage and hermeneutic marginalisation caused by 
unequal participation in 'the practices through which social meanings are generated' [Epistemic Injustice 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 6].  In short, the victim was further victimised by the structural 
prejudice inherent in society's misunderstanding of, and incapacity to enunciate, what happened.  
41 Richard Denniss, 'Climate change' (13 November 2019).  Joyce's statement was both factually wrong 
and illogical: there has never been a Greens government in Australia and therefore the party has never been 
in a position to determine bushfire policy.  In reality, the main factors influencing bushfire preparation 
were government rejection of fire chiefs' advice, budget cuts to national parks, and diminishing climatic 
windows for hazard-reduction burns.   
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are linguistically equal.  Rather, the arena's felicity conditions ensure that statements by the 
less powerful have no exercitive authority or behabitive clout.  Ergo, Joyce's statement 
requires that Greens supporters have to respond by supplying corrective facts, but the domain 
in which to respond has been chosen by Joyce.  Declining to respond is not an option – 
because in this domain, silence is taken to imply that Joyce is correct – whereas any response 
not only fails as an authoritative speech act but also becomes tainted by the irrationality of the 
accusation that prompted it and of the arena in which it is enunciated.  The following is a 
paradigm of this process.  
 
The Vietnam War: rational argument in an irrational arena  
 In mid-1968, when the war in Vietnam was near its height, the United States was 
energetically preparing for November's presidential election.  Given the public's dismay over, 
and reaction to, political confusion, incompetence and deceit regarding the war, it appeared 
that debate over America's involvement had been won by its opponents.  Ergo, nearly all 
presidential candidates sprouted some of the rhetoric that had hitherto been the domain of the 
peace movement, and all candidates appeared to believe that the incoming president would 
have to withdraw troops from Vietnam.  Among many former supporters the war had lost 
whatever justification it might once have possessed.  Before his resignation as secretary of 
defence in late 1967, even Robert McNamara had lost faith in a conflict for which he bore a 
large measure of responsibility.42   
 
 However, by early 1970 America's engagement in South-East Asia had increased, not 
decreased.43  Endeavouring to account for this anomaly, the New Yorker noted a 'peculiar 
 
42 Paul Hendrickson describes McNamara as 'a kind of postwar technocratic hubristic fable.  He was an 
extraordinarily impressive person, almost a new Adam, who abused his trust, and knows he did' [The 
Living and the Dead: Robert McNamara and five lives of a lost war (Sydney: Vintage, 2000) 356].  
McNamara was the quintessential technocrat – ferociously intelligent, efficient and rational – who failed 
utterly to comprehend that most of a country's problems, let alone a war on the other side of the world, are 
not amenable to technocratic solutions.    
43 The number of American ground troops in Vietnam had declined from its height in 1968, but the United 
States had intensified its bombing campaign, and in April 1970 it broadened the war by invading 
Cambodia.  As Barbara Tuchman observed, this was 'the most provocative choice possible in the 
circumstances' [Folly, 457].          
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atmosphere of mental exhaustion' in which both sides of the debate seemed drained of their 
'forensic stamina': 
 
It is as though the public had shrugged its shoulders and decided to accept the war as 
something that cannot be affected by human effort.  The war has outlived the issue 
of war.44  
 
 Indeed, the conflict's fatal irony was not lost on its opponents and even on some of its 
supporters: America was destroying the country it had gone to war to save.  However, 
opponents also found it futile to repeat this and other familiar arguments.  The main reason 
was that the gap between official explanations and the realities people saw daily on television 
and read about in newspapers had become so extreme that those who persisted in rational 
argument felt they were becoming as obtuse and hare-brained as the government they 
criticised.  After all, pointing out discrepancies between official versions of events and their 
reality presumed that the war's prosecution was driven by a degree of rationality which had 
been demonstrated not to exist.  Indeed, the disparity was so great that public policy about the 
war was developing in response to the political situation in America, whereas the war's actual 
conduct was developing in accordance with the brutality and confusion into which it had 
become mired.  The war acquired a perverted and irrational life of its own, developing in 
ways that neither supporters nor critics anticipated.  It no longer had a purpose, or even the 
pretence of one.  At the height of America's engagement in Vietnam, neither the nation nor its 
military knew why they were there. 
 
Lessons from Vietnam 
 The lessons of America's war in Vietnam are sobering when applied to climate change.  
The first is that one side can 'win' the debate, but still fail to effect much or any change 
congruent with its position.  Second, prolonged, divisive debate can end in public exhaustion 
and ennui rather than a solution or compromise.  Third, the subject of debate can be engulfed 
by peripheral matters such that it is inadvertently sidelined into hand-wringing helplessness.  
Fourth, debate about climate change has, to a large degree, outlived the issue of global 
heating.  The debate has been transformed into expressions of tribal identity based on 
 
44 Quotes, and some of the general argument, in this section are from the Editorial, 'The Talk of the Town', 
New Yorker (18 April 1970) 33-34 [italics in original]. 
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economic division, geographical location, perceived elitism and populism, and general 
feelings of social resentment and disenfranchisement.45  Fifth, the gap between what a 
government says and what is actually occurring can be so enormous that, in continuing to 
point out the discrepancy, people feel mindlessly repetitive and simpleminded.  Perhaps this 
is why some of the most effective protests to address climate change have been made by 
children – people young enough not to be rendered mindless by pointing out the fantasies in 
which their governments continue to indulge.  Sixth, governments can knowingly act in ways 
that fatally undermine their own intentions, or they may have no idea what their intentions 
are, or their intentions are so ill-conceived they are unable to explain what they are or why 
they have them.46  Seventh, people in power often possess, or develop, the ability to do what 
they don't believe in.   
 
 There is a further lesson: governments have the power to assume they are the locus of 
rationality, the corollary of which is that anybody opposed to them is therefore irrational.  
Protests against the absurdity of conflict in Vietnam and Cambodia were often brutally 
suppressed, as if the government's increasing irrationality were correlated with increasing 
violence.  On 4 May 1970 at Kent State University in Ohio, the state's National Guard shot at 
unarmed student protestors, killing four and wounding nine.  It was an entirely foreseeable 
result of a government reserving for itself the right to declare that those who oppose it are out 
of control.  Less fatally, in 2019 when people protested (merely by linking arms across 
entrances) outside the International Mining and Resources Conference in Melbourne, police 
 
45 This point could be used to describe any number of social and political divisions.  With reference to 
Britain's Brexit fiasco, for example, the mutual loathing each side of the debate has for the other, and the 
widening gulf between them, have gone well beyond the issue of leaving the European Union.  Indeed, 
nearly all the social ills that propelled the pro-Brexit vote had nothing to with the EU; they were the result 
of British government policies.  Brexit was a timely and convenient controversy through which to channel 
a society's broader frustrations and outrage.      
46 America's war in Afghanistan provides another striking example.  In 2015, General Douglas Lute said, 
'We were devoid of a fundamental understanding of Afghanistan – we didn't know what we were doing' 
[my emphasis].  After 18 years of conflict costing more than $1 trillion, with more than 2,400 Americans 
dead and over 38,000 Afghan civilians killed, the United States still cannot extricate itself from a war that 
has been an abject failure.  It is clear that, having lied for two decades about Afghanistan, 'the American 
government refuses to be honest with itself' [Editorial Board, 'Lots of Lessons From Afghanistan; None 
Learned', New York Times (10 December 2019)].       
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reacted with a level of brutality that manifested a government's power to determine standards 
of, and criteria for participation in, public discourse.  As Anthony Kelly observed, police 
believe they are the 'rational centre' in a maelstrom of socio-political issues – 'unbiased 
protectors of democracy who face the challenge of balancing competing rights'.  This 
arrogation to themselves of rational oversight means they are often 'oblivious to, or wilfully 
ignorant of, their own unlawfulness'.47  Police, as an arm of government, occupy the 'rational 
centre' only in the sense of enforcing a government's ability to determine that protests and 
protestors are irrational.  In short, by virtue of their capacity to monopolise the domain of 
discourse, governments can determine whose words are meaningful and whose are not.  
 
 There is fundamental problem here.  Two main pillars of a (self-perceived) rational 
society are its facility to control knowledge and its capacity to withhold it.  The former helps 
to define the society; the latter helps to preserve its fragile self-worth.  Both undermine a 
society's ability to discuss problems openly and act on them.48  We assume that a rational 
society has the capacity to make sound decisions after well-informed debate, but that capacity 
is vitiated when a society arrogates criteria of rationality to itself.  Little wonder, then, about 
the paucity of good decisions on climate change.    
 
From scientific fact to public debate 
 Even when there is public debate, the ground of debate may overwhelmingly favour one 
side.  In discussions about climate change, the most devious manoeuvre was to transform a 
scientific subject into a public debate.  One side gained obvious advantages from this 
transformation.  In particular, labelling any matter as a debate implies – whether correctly or 
not is irrelevant – that the issue under scrutiny is debateable.  To consider a parallel example, 
even the historicity of the Holocaust has also been transmogrified into a debate.  Historian 
Deborah Lipstadt has responded by refusing to participate in any debate with a Holocaust 
denier.  As she states, the fact of the Holocaust is not a matter of debate, so to appear with 
somebody who denies that fact 'would give them a legitimacy and a stature they in no way 
deserve'.49  After Lipstadt refused an offer to debate a prominent Holocaust denier on national 
 
47 Anthony Kelly, 'Brutality checks on activists', The Saturday Paper (9-15 November 2019). 
48 See John Ralston Saul for some of these points [Voltaire's Bastards (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1993) 
295]. 
49 Deborah E. Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust (London: Penguin, 1995) 1. 
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television, the program's producer argued, 'but don't you think our viewers should hear the 
other side?'.50  At the heart of this question was an incapacity to distinguish genuine 
historiography from an ideological exercise driven by antisemitism.  In their concern for 
people to hear both sides of a debate, media producers became unwitting but 'important 
assets' in deniers' exertions to disseminate their claims.  The success of this strategy is beyond 
question: high school teachers in the United States find that students who have heard about 
Holocaust denial 'assume it must have some legitimacy'.51  Indeed, denial occasionally rides 
on the back of genuine debate about the Holocaust – such as the degree to which ordinary 
German citizens were culpable – thereby conflating and confusing legitimate argument with 
confected debate.   
 
 Similarly, denial of global heating has thrived on contrived debate.  It is naïve to think 
that those who entertain scepticism or denial about climate change must be uneducated or 
ignorant.  For example, prolific author, omnivorous reader and media critic Clive James 
wrote the following: 
 
In fact the number of scientists who voice scepticism has lately been increasing. … I 
still can't see that there is a scientific consensus.  There are those for, and those 
against.  Either side might well be right, but I think that if you have a division on 
that scale, you can't call it a consensus.  Nobody can meaningfully say that 'the 
science is in'.52 
 
All of this is factually wrong, but in itself that doesn't matter.  What does matter is that James' 
'scepticism' – though doubt based on easily-checked falsehoods is not scepticism but rather 
epistemic evasion, or sheer laziness – is perfect fodder for denial of global heating, because 
deniers do not have to win the debate; they merely have to ensure it continues.53  To that end, 
 
50 Ibid, 2 for this and the next quote [author's italics]. 
51 Ibid, 4. 
52 Clive James, 'In praise of scepticism', BBC Magazine (23 October 2009).  
53 This is reminiscent of a strategy employed by the tobacco industry.  As an industry document 
infamously stated, 'Doubt is our product since it is the best means of competing with the "body of fact" that 
exists in the mind of the general public.  It is also the means of establishing a controversy.  Within the 
business we recognise that a controversy exists.  However, with the general public the consensus is that 
cigarettes are in some way harmful to the health.  If we are successful in establishing a controversy at the 
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epistemic indifference, false claims, obfuscation and any other diverting strategy are all 
effective. 
 
 Why, though, do those who maintain the scientific consensus about global heating have 
to win the debate?  The main reason is that deniers enjoy the substantial advantage of arguing 
from the 'default' side of the matter – governments' general desire to do or spend as little as 
possible – whereas the scientific position has to win convincingly in order to effect 
substantial change.  So long as deniers keep the debate going they are more likely to achieve 
their objective – continued inadequate action – whereas the mere fact that debate exists 
makes it less likely that the scientific side will achieve its objective.  Moreover, the field of 
debate is unequal and favours denial.  Deniers can put forward almost any drivel as a 
debating point to which the scientific side must respond.54  If the latter does not refute a 
point, no matter how inane or thoroughly debunked, that point remains an argument to 
support inaction.  On the other hand, the scientific side can put forward, and make claims 
based on, just one point of view – scientific research.  The example of former professor of 
geology Ian Plimer is instructive.  Plimer claims that Earth's volcanoes emit more CO2 than 
the world's automobiles and industries combined.55  In fact, fossil fuel emissions alone are at 
least 23 to 56 times more than volcanic CO2 emissions.
56  However, once Plimer's claim was 
 
public level, then there is an opportunity to put across the real facts about smoking and health.  Doubt is 
also the limit of our "product".  Unfortunately, we cannot take a position directly opposing the anti-
cigarette forces and say that cigarettes are a contributor to good health.  No information that we have 
supports such a claim.  Truth is our message because of its power to withstand a conflict and sustain a 
controversy.  If in our pro-cigarette efforts we stick to well documented fact, we can dominate a 
controversy and operate with the confidence of justifiable self-interest.' [underlining in original].  Extract 
from 'Smoking and Health Proposal (1969)', Brown & Williamson Records, Truth Tobacco Industry 
Documents, 4-5.  I have quoted this document at some length because it demonstrates the sophistication of 
tobacco industry tactics and the capacity of people to believe that truth (however conceived) is on their 
side despite clear and sustained evidence to the contrary. 
54 As George Eliot (Mary Ann Evans) put it, 'oppositions have the illimitable range of objections at 
command, which need never stop short at the boundary of knowledge, but can draw forever on the vasts of 
ignorance.' [Middlemarch, ch. 45]. 
55 Ian Plimer, Heaven and Earth (Lanham, MD: Taylor Trade Publishing, 2009) 413. 
56 Calculated using data from the US Geological Survey: Volcano Hazards Program and the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency: Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data.  Note that volcanic emissions 
may vary greatly from year to year. 
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proved wrong, he either repeated it in another forum or simply moved on to another 
falsehood, such as his canard that the world is not becoming hotter.  As George Monbiot puts 
it with reference to live debate, it takes just 30 seconds to make a misleading statement, but 
30 minutes to refute it.  Ergo: 
 
By machine-gunning their opponents with falsehoods, the deniers put scientists in an 
impossible position: either you seek to answer their claims, which can't be done in 
the time available, or you let them pass, in which case the points appear to stand.57            
 
As with Holocaust denial, the problem is exacerbated by media insistence that both sides of 
an argument, even a phoney one, be presented.  To that end, The Spectator gave Plimer a 
cover story under the headline Relax: global warming is all a myth, and an interview entitled 
'The great climate change con trick'.58  Similarly, The Great Global Warming Swindle, a 
polemical and award-winning documentary, was broadcast on Britain's Channel 4, Australia's 
ABC, and in a number of European countries, in 2007.  Though this program was nothing 
more than a clever re-presentation of already-debunked theories, it gained considerable 
traction in the community, thereby confirming the above observation that denial has much the 
easier task.  
 
Speech-acts and climate change denial        
 Speech-act theory helps to illuminate the imbalance in arguments about global heating.  
Consider, for example, one of denial's more plausible assertions: a warming world will 
increase atmospheric water vapour and therefore increase cloud cover, which will in turn 
moderate or annul further temperature increases.  This claim is wrong,59 but it continues to 
appear in the standard arsenal of denial.  When this claim is enunciated, its illocutionary force 
is to exasperate, and nurture doubts about, mainstream climate science; to continue the debate 
about global heating; and to direct that debate into diffuse areas of irrelevance.  Its 
 
57 George Monbiot, 'This professor of denial can't even answer his own questions on climate change', The 
Guardian (14 September 2009). 
58 The Spectator (11 July 2009). 
59 In fact, increasing temperatures are likely to reduce lower-level cloud cover, thereby exacerbating global 
heating [Steven C. Sherwood, Sandrine Bony and Jean-Louis Dufresne, 'Spread in model climate 
sensitivity traced to atmospheric convective mixing', Nature, vol. 505 (2014) 37-42]. 
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perlocutionary force is to confirm the default position of doing little or nothing to mitigate 
emissions; to assuage our collective and individual sense of anxiety and urgency; and to raise 
immaterial questions, and unfounded doubts, about climate science and scientists.  
Importantly, denial suffers very little illocutionary disablement – having few positive 
illocutionary ambitions and nothing to prove – and concomitantly little perlocutionary 
frustration, because its effects are readily achieved.   
 
 On the other hand, refutation of the above assertion is a very different speech-act.  As an 
illocutionary act, a scientist intends to refute the denier's hypothesis and thereby extinguish 
forever its role in this debate.  Consistent with scientific method, a falsified hypothesis should 
be abandoned.  The scientist also intends that her refutation will go some way to convince 
deniers and sceptics, and those who listen to them, to change their minds and embrace the 
task of addressing GHG emissions.  None of this is likely to happen.  The scientist's intention 
to refute the assertion and thereby limit the area of debate will suffer illocutionary 
disablement.  Her falsification, though scientifically successful, will fail in this domain 
because the assertion's proponents do not observe the methods and etiquette of scientific 
discourse.  Instead, the assertion will reappear in another forum, necessitating yet another 
refutation of something already refuted.  To make matters worse, the scientist cannot avoid 
prolonging, and even legitimating, debate merely by participating in it.     
 
 The scientist faces a further problem.  In most situations, authority endues an utterance 
with illocutionary heft.  The scientist belongs to an authoritative group that is capable of 
exercising considerable influence within society; a good example was swift and effective 
political response to scientific alarm about the thinning ozone layer.  In the context of climate 
change, however, the necessary felicity conditions for scientific influence – in particular, a 
specified problem amenable to a specific and manageable solution – are not present.  This 
means that even within a domain in which science is (or should be) authoritative, its public 
authority is circumscribed by non-scientific criteria, such as political assessments of the 
problem being addressed.  Scientists are allowed to speak (in most countries they do not 
suffer from locutionary suppression)60 but they can be silenced – by illocutionary disablement 
 
60 It is worth noting, however, that the G. W. Bush administration appointed its own people to important 
public relations positions in order to muzzle scientists and redact agency reports.  NASA's James Hansen 
was one target.  Canadian prime minister Stephen Harper (2006-15) followed Bush's example.  By 2012, 
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and perlocutionary frustration.  Speech is not free just because you can say something.  
Rather, the defining character of free speech is that it 'enables people to act'61 – to do things 
with their words, such as protest, advise, and effect change.  In the situation under discussion, 
scientists often do not enjoy genuine freedom of speech because they can be prevented from 
doing what they want to do, or think they are doing, with their words.  Perversely, 
illocutionary and perlocutionary effectiveness is more often achieved by those who possess 
no authority in climate science, such as media 'shock jocks', because they enjoy more 
favourable felicity conditions.  What is going on here? 
 
Factual, rational and relational discourse 
 In essence, the problem stems from the difference between factual and relational 
discourse.  Our scientist is engaging in factual discourse – communication of a fact or facts to 
another person – though more specifically she is conducting rational discourse, a more 
refined and powerful form of factual discourse.  Rational discourse can certainly change 
minds, but only if participants conform to its rules.  Under those rules, for example, if a claim 
were shown to be without factual foundation – such as Ian Plimer's assertion about volcanic 
CO2 emissions – then it would sink without trace.  Given that Plimer's views, and those of his 
fellow deniers, remain extant and vigorous, it is clear that most arguments about climate 
change have little to do with factual discourse.  Instead, they haunt the domains of relational 
discourse.  The point of relational discourse is not to impart facts but rather develop and/or 
appeal to relationships.  This can be achieved through emotional connection, storytelling and 
shared narratives, building trust and respect, listening to and validating the other party's 
beliefs (or at least some of them) and identifying common values.62  Relational discourse is 
more nuanced, and requires more interpersonal commitment, than factual discourse.  
Moreover, in most public debates, wherein emotional content significantly outweighs 
epistemic substance, you must first engage in plenty of relational discourse in order to create 
 
90 percent of Canada's scientists said they could not speak freely about matters within their own fields of 
expertise, even if those matters concerned public health and safety [Otto, War on Science, 17-19, 30-32]. 
61 Langton, 328 (italics in original). 
62 Tim Dean, 'Changing minds', New Philosopher, 26 (Nov. 2019 – Jan. 2020) 34-37.  Dean found it useful 
to think about the two forms of discourse after reluctantly concluding, 'I used to believe that reason 
persuades.  I'm no longer convinced it does.'    
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the appropriate environment in which rational discourse becomes worthwhile.  Without this 
environment, rational discourse is usually ineffective. 
 
 Some of this helps to explain why certain politicians can be persuasive in counter-
intuitive ways.  For example, both Boris Johnson and Donald Trump appeal to anti-
establishment sentiment, even though the former is a product of Eton and Oxford and the 
latter inherited stupendous wealth from his father.  They don't persuade by fact or reason but 
by emotional identification with those who feel 'left behind'.  Moreover, their bumbling 
incompetence endues them with an 'authenticity' that reinforces this identification.  
 
 There is a positive aspect to the difference between rational and relational discourse.  We 
have noted that if our scientist wants to persuade people about climate change, she should 
first engage in relational discourse.  This might appear to be a circuitous way of conducting a 
debate, but the advantages include much lower chances of illocutionary disablement and 
perlocutionary frustration.  If you are engaging in relational discourse, your illocutionary 
intent should be to build a relationship, not win an argument, and the perlocutionary effect 
should be identification of shared values and emotions such that common ground is prepared 
for rational discourse.  By preparing and assessing your speech acts against these goals you 
are more likely to avoid frustration and disappointment.   
 
Speech acts and Aristotle's Rhetoric  
 While some of the above is different from our regular views of public debate, the 
counter-intuitive persuasiveness of some politicians is particularly confronting.  To see why, 
it is worth comparing this phenomenon to relevant sections of Aristotle's Rhetoric, the 
earliest surviving, and probably most influential, treatment of rhetorical persuasion.63 
 
 
63 It is noteworthy that Aristotle claimed he wrote about rhetoric because earlier writers had addressed only 
a small part of the subject (1354a10-15).  However, as G. E. R. Lloyd observes, it appears that Aristotle 
'exaggerated the limitations of earlier rhetorical treatises for his own polemical purposes' [Adversaries and 
Authorities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 86].  It seems appropriate that, in order to 
justify his work on rhetoric, Aristotle used the timeless rhetorical technique of exaggerating the deficits of 
one's opponents.          
173 
 
 Aristotle asserts there are three kinds of verbal persuasion.  They depend on the personal 
character of the speaker, on stirring the emotions of the audience, and on the demonstration, 
or apparent demonstration, provided by the argument itself.64  With reference to the first, he 
contends:  
 
Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so 
spoken as to make us think him credible.  We believe good men more fully and more 
readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely 
true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided.  But even this kind 
of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by 
what people think of his character before he begins to speak.  It is not true, as some 
writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by 
the speaker contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his 
character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he 
possesses.65    
 
 What qualities encourage us to think highly of a speaker's character?  Aristotle specifies 
three familiar virtues: phronesis (good sense, practical intelligence), arete (virtue, goodness) 
and eunoia (goodwill, kindness).66  Any speaker who is thought to have these qualities will 
appear credible and inspire trust.  Most of us would probably agree with Aristotle's nuanced 
view.  He is not saying that the speaker necessarily enjoys a good reputation but rather that 
this person must demonstrate by what he (Aristotle was not addressing women) says that he 
is a trustworthy character, and that this demonstration will augment his persuasiveness.  
However, little or none of this is congruent with what we have noted so far.  Most people are 
as, or even more, likely to believe a charlatan as to believe a credible person, even if the 
former is known or suspected to be a charlatan.67  Where there is room for doubt and 
alternative opinions, we are more likely to believe a person with whom we can identify and 
 
64 Aristotle, Rhetoric 1.2 (1356a1-5). 
65 Ibid. 1356a5-15. 
66 Ibid. 2.1 (1378a5-10). 
67 As former Republican strategist Rick Wilson observed, 'There are no consequences for being untruthful.  
It's become a feature, not a bug.  The audience expects them to lie.' [David Smith, 'The lies have it.  
Republicans abandon truth in Trump impeachment defence', The Guardian (15 December 2019)]. 
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who reinforces our existing beliefs and prejudices rather than a person of integrity.  Finally, 
we usually find a person's good character much less persuasive than his or her appeal to our 
venality.   
 
 Given this state of affairs, it is a relief to find that Aristotle himself was probably in two 
minds about some of these matters.  For example, books 1 and 2 of the Rhetoric do not 
cohere satisfactorily and neither is an appropriate introduction to the field.  While this might 
be the result of awkward editorial decisions, Jonathan Barnes' view is that Aristotle was in a 
muddle about the subject.68  Barnes might be right (I think he is) but Aristotle's confusion is 
understandable and reflects our own.  Like Aristotle, we prefer to think that logical argument 
(such as an enthymeme) is at the core of rhetorical persuasion, whereas attempts to arouse 
prejudice, anger, pity and so on have nothing to do with the substance of the matter but are 
rather emotional appeals to sway an audience.69  On the other hand, Aristotle's (and our) 
confidence in, and use of, logical argument is qualified: 
 
We must not carry reasoning too far back, or the length of our argument will cause 
obscurity; nor must we put in all the steps that lead to our conclusion, or we shall 
waste words in saying what is manifest.  It is this simplicity that makes the 
uneducated more effective than the educated when addressing popular audiences. … 
Educated people speak in generalities and abstractions, whereas uneducated people 
argue from common knowledge and draw obvious conclusions.  We must not, 
therefore, start from any old opinion but only from those of definite groups of people 
– namely, our judges or those whose authority they recognise. … We should also 
 
68 Jonathan Barnes, 'Rhetoric and Poetics' in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, Jonathan Barnes ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 262.  The surviving works of Aristotle are based largely 
on the collection put together by Andronicus of Rhodes in the first century BCE.  Andronicus grouped 
works together according to subject matter.  For example, he probably assembled six or more works to 
form the single treatise we know as the Topics.  However, even if the Rhetoric were awkwardly assembled, 
the parts are Aristotle's nonetheless.      
69 Aristotle, Rhetoric 1.1 (1354a15-20).  'Enthymeme' is Aristotle's term for a deductive argument that is 
appropriate for rhetorical situations – that is, less rigorous and detailed than would be appropriate for, say, 
scientific demonstration.  
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base our arguments on what happens for the most part as well as on what necessarily 
happens.70 
 
In short, an orator's argument and presentation will largely depend on the topic and the 
audience.    
 
 With reference to the topic of debate, an orator should avoid technical matters because 
they are difficult for an audience to follow, and avoid subjects of fixed and certain knowledge 
– 'things that could not have been, and cannot now or in the future be, other than they are'71 – 
but rather address matters for which there are alternative points of view.  In particular, this 
encompasses human activities: actions that are not invariable and do not necessarily comply 
with fixed rules.  With reference to an audience, arguments must not be complicated or 
follow a long chain of reasoning,72 and should be built on propositions that the audience 
already believes or is likely to accept.  It is clear that Aristotle anticipated what has become 
oratorical common practice.  It is also clear to see how proposals to address climate change 
are easily undermined: it is a technical subject with a high degree of epistemic certainty, 
while arguments against tackling it are amenable to simplistic assertions which appeal to an 
audience's pre-existing views.        
 
 What, then, about Aristotle's claim that the character of a speaker is his 'most effective 
means of persuasion'?  Aristotle does not explain why we should accept this assertion.  
Indeed, when Aristotle contends 'it adds much to an orator's influence that his own character 
should look right and that he should be thought to entertain the right feelings toward his 
hearers',73 he is close to stating that a speaker's image is more important than the substance of 
his argument.  
 
 It is further worth noting that at the beginning of book 3 Aristotle states: 
 
 
70 Ibid. 2.22 (1395b25-1396a5). 
71 Ibid. 1.2 (1357a5). 
72 Ibid. 1357a1-5. 
73 Ibid. 2.1 (1377a25-30). 
176 
 
In making a speech one must study three items: first, the means of producing 
persuasion; second, the language; third, the proper arrangement of the various parts 
of the speech.  We have already specified the modes of persuasion, which we have 
shown to be three in number.74 
 
Aristotle has introduced two new points – language and arrangement – neither of which was 
prefigured in the first two books.  However, any attentive reader would reasonably suggest 
that the two new points are also means of producing persuasion, a suggestion congruent with 
Aristotle's own view that 'rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given 
case the available means of persuasion'.75  In other words, by book 3 the significance of an 
orator's character has diminished from one-third of the modes of persuasion to a third of one-
third.  Aristotle's shifting opinion is not difficult to discern.  In book 1.1 he criticises sophistic 
rhetoric for its failure to address the most important part of rhetorical persuasion – pertinent 
and coherent argument – yet in 1.2 he reveals three modes of persuasion, two of which – 
arousal of emotion and apparent character of the speaker – are diligently exploited by 
sophists, and then in book 3 he introduces two further points, both of which are also exploited 
by sophists.76  Aristotle wanted to emphasise and preserve the integrity of argument, and this 
implied, or even entailed, the orator's integrity, but since (as noted above) integrity is 
demonstrated by what the speaker says, an appearance of integrity is just as persuasive as the 
real thing.  Indeed, appearance is even more persuasive if a speaker who possesses genuine 
integrity fails to convey that quality to an audience.  Aristotle's uncertainty is patent: he 
provides detailed examples and discussion of appeals to emotion, and about the language and 
structure of argument, but no examples and almost no discussion of argument based on good 
character. 
 
 At the heart of Aristotle's ambivalence is his view that 'rhetoric is the counterpart of 
dialektike'.77  Both can be used by anyone, both can be deployed on any subject, and neither 
requires specialized knowledge of that subject.  Both use deductive and inductive argument, 
 
74 Ibid. 3.1 (1403b5-10).  The three modes are stated above. 
75 Ibid. 1.2 (1355b25-30). 
76 It could be that these passages were written in reverse order.  Book 1.1 might be a later corrective to 
passages that follow.  
77 Aristotle, Rhetoric 1.1 (1354a1).  
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and both use the demonstrative force of argument to convince an interlocutor or audience.  
The main difference is that rhetoric concerns an audience.  An orator delivers a speech, which 
entails limited or no question-answer interaction between orator and listeners.  Further, the 
matters debated, and the delivery and reception of arguments, will reflect this activity's public 
character.  Dialectic, on the other hand, permits and usually requires greater logical rigour 
than rhetoric because dialectic may address complex and technical matters not suited to 
public debate, and a respondent's answers may necessitate a different and more precise 
argument.  This is all straightforward, but Aristotle rightly observes that, alone among the 
arts, dialectic and rhetoric can argue to, and draw conclusions on, both sides of a question, 
not (as Aristotle avers or hopes) to 'make people believe what is wrong' but in order to 
understand and thereby refute somebody arguing from the other side.78  Aristotle clearly saw 
that dialectic and rhetoric could be misused, but this capacity is less important with dialectic.  
For example, in an argument about the merits of idealist versus empiricist views of reality, 
the bad character of one interlocutor is probably of little significance.  The argument is 
unlikely to affect any matter of social or ethical consequence.  Rhetoric, though, deals with 
issues of public or forensic import.  Apart from goodness of character, Aristotle realised there 
is nothing to stop an orator from arguing in bad faith, attempting to persuade an audience 
towards a point of view he knows is either wrong or less desirable than the alternative.  After 
all, the rhetorician's purpose is to win the argument, not establish the truth.79  
 
Conclusion 
 Aristotle, like Plato and others before him, identified the sometimes perverse relationship 
between skilled orators and mass audiences, the former using their rhetorical brilliance to 
sway the latter, occasionally with catastrophic consequences.  Aristotle would have 
recognised the counter-intuitive influence of some current politicians as not a bizarre 
aberration but as evidence of their destructive ability to shape effective modes of persuasion 
for the topic and audience addressed.  The need for politicians of good character, and political 
systems that don't stifle it, is clear.  Absent this state of affairs, most of us would be satisfied 
with a system in which domination by one person or bloc, to the exclusion of other points of 
view, was impossible or at least unlikely.  What might such a system look like?                
 
 
78 Ibid. 1355a30-35. 




Hearing all Sides 
 
Overview 
 One of the most pressing needs in any polity is for a forum in which all sides of a debate 
can be heard, in which no side is silenced simply because another side has the power to 
suppress or ignore its voice.  This chapter discusses Stuart Hampshire's minimalist concept of 
justice as fairness in procedure, undergirded by the universal recognition that in any dispute it 
is unjust not to hear all parties to that dispute.  It concludes with a discussion about the 
internet as a forum in which all parties have a voice.   
 
Minimal conditions for dialogic justice 
 Stuart Hampshire argues that well-ordered societies and states require the following: one, 
an institution and procedure for settling disputes caused by conflicting claims/views 
advanced by individuals or groups within a society; two, a body to discuss available policy 
options and decide between them; three, in the event of disaster, a body of review to 
adjudicate between different causal explanations and, where appropriate, to assign 
responsibility.1  This proposal seems straightforward.  In Australia, for example, law courts 
perform the first function, parliament performs the second, and royal commissions more or 
less cover the third.  The point Hampshire wants to emphasises is that these institutions 'all 
involve the fair weighing and balancing of contrary arguments'.2  For justice to be done, and 
seen to be done, different sides of an argument must be presented and heard.  In short, justice 
requires procedural fairness.  Indeed, 'the basic concept of justice, taken by itself, is primarily 
procedural'.3 
  
 Hampshire's assertion is minimal.  Pace Plato, Aristotle, Kant, utilitarians and myriad 
others, Hampshire does not base his schema on the notion of a supreme good for human 
beings.4  The overriding reason for this is straightforward.  There are competing conceptions 
 
1 Stuart Hampshire, Justice is Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) 7-9. 
2 Ibid. 8. 
3 Stuart Hampshire, Innocence and Experience (London: Penguin Books, 1989) 61. 
4 This should not be taken to imply that Hampshire rejects the idea of a supreme good.  His own views are 
aligned with democratic socialism.    
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of human good, all advanced passionately and defended rigorously by their supporters.  They 
are based on, or manifestations of, irreconcilable or even antagonistic beliefs and views.5  If 
you back one of them then you are, at least to some degree, elevating its claims over rival 
views, or you might be in outright conflict with one or more of them.  For example, if your 
view of human good is inseparable from, or even predicated on, stringent environmental 
standards, but my view is based on the primacy of individual rights, then most likely, though 
not necessarily, we will profoundly disagree on ways to address climate change.6  We both 
seek the best way of life, but we see that 'best' differently.  You will assert the need for 
government intervention and compulsion, and I will accuse you of trampling on my right to 
freedom from excessive government interference.  As Hampshire observes of the human 
condition, conflict is a fact of human existence.  It cannot be eradicated and should not be 
regretted, any more than one should regret possessing a back, even though it occasionally 
aches.  According to Hampshire, we therefore require: 
 
a rock-bottom and preliminary morality of justice and fair-dealing … to keep a 
balance between competing moralities and to support respected procedures of 
arbitration between them.7 
 
 
5 As John Rawls states, this is 'a crucial assumption of liberalism … that equal citizens have different and 
indeed incompatible and irreconcilable conceptions of the good' [Political Liberalism (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2005) 303].  However, Rawls also recognised 'fixed natural characteristics … 
Distinctions based on sex are of this type … Thus if, say, men are favoured in the assignment of basic 
rights, this inequality is justified … only if it is to the advantage of women and acceptable from their 
standpoint.' [A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972) 99].  As Michèle Le Doeuff 
rightly reacted, 'Oh yes!  We saw this one coming … the appearance of some kind of anthropology in an 
argument alleged to be political-legal [The Sex of Knowing, Kathryn Hamer & Lorraine Code trans. (New 
York: Routledge, 2003) 183].  Rawls' view sits uncomfortably close to the conservative evangelical 
position that women are 'equal [to] but different' from men and therefore ordaining women as priests could 
be to their detriment. 
6 'Not necessarily', because the view based on individual rights does not preclude another party from 
arguing that individual rights require government intervention in environmental matters.    
7 Hampshire, Innocence, 72, and for the two brief quotes which follow.   
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 This is procedural justice, a negative quality because in and of itself it does not support 
or promote any particular moral schema or set of virtues.8  It is a bare minimum, but it is also 
the indispensable foundation that undergirds any system of morality or virtues which are, or 
purport to be, directed to the public weal.  Without procedural justice, 'society becomes an 
unstable clash of fanatacisms'.  As Alasdair MacIntyre baldly put it, 'our society cannot hope 
to achieve moral consensus'.  Modern politics, then, is not a matter of genuine moral accord; 
rather, it is more like 'civil war carried on by other means'.9  Procedural justice allows us to 
co-exist in fundamental disagreement with each other, without feeling we must resort to 
violence in order to be heard.  But what are the characteristics of procedural justice that 
facilitate this state of affairs? 
 
Justice as procedure 
 According to Hampshire, procedural justice possesses two essential elements: first, 'a 
universal rational requirement of two-sidedness'; second, 'respect for locally established and 
familiar rules of procedure'.10  The former appeals to our innate sense that a procedure isn't 
fair if it ignores one or more sides of an argument, while the latter provides an agreed and 
customary forum in which adversaries can be heard, rather than an alien forum imposed on 
them.  Regarding the former, Hampshire asserts that:  
 
Uniting all humanity, from the nursery to the grave, the practice of promoting and 
accepting arguments for and against a proposal is taken as the core of practical 
rationality.  The procedure is as well recognised and respected as the procedure of 
counting, and as unavoidable.11  
 
Hampshire notes elsewhere that prudential and moral rationality is a 'common human 
possession or potentiality', a quality most clearly evident in the just and fair weighing of 
 
8 It is worth noting that Hampshire's view is different from Rawls' in being more narrowly procedural and 
not presupposing a well-ordered democratic society.  As Hampshire wryly argues, 'political liberalism 
includes a definite, although incomplete, conception of the good which prevails principally among free-
thinking liberals in politically sophisticated societies' [Innocence, 188].    
9 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth, 1985) 252-253. 
10 Hampshire, Justice, 97. 
11 Hampshire, Innocence, 53. 
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conflicting points of view.12  The attraction of Hampshire's thesis lies in its appeal to 
commonly accepted views and practices, but his evidence for it is questionable.  He argues 
that each of us tries to balance pros and cons, and resolve contrary pulls and impulses, in our 
own minds, and that this inner process of hearing all sides of an issue is analogous to the 
resolution of political conflicts.13  Justice and fairness are achieved not in matters of 
substance – by, say, imposing what one group thinks is a 'just' regime over the citizenry – but 
in matters of procedure.14  But does a person's inner conflict/dialogue constitute an 
appropriate analogue for public debate?   
 
Inner and outer 
 Hampshire does not agree with the Cartesian paradigm of a solitary thinker attempting 
first to resolve her inner arguments and thereby understand the world, and from this inner 
debate she is equipped to engage in public debate.  Instead, Hampshire reverses the paradigm.  
He postulates that: 
 
we learn to transfer, by a kind of mimicry, the adversarial pattern of public and 
interpersonal life onto a silent stage called the mind.  The dialogues are internalized, 
but they still do not lose the marks of their origin in interpersonal adversarial 
argument.15 
 
It is of course in childhood, and usually within family relationships, that we first encounter 
interactions such as asserting, contradicting, deciding, approving, blaming and so on.  The 
 
12 Hampshire, Justice, 40.  It is noteworthy that ideas of fairness may be more ingrained than we usually 
think.  For example, anybody who owns two or more cats or dogs will (or should) know that their pets 
possess an acute sense of what is fair or unfair.  A famous study by Frans de Waal and Jason Davis showed 
that monkeys not only understood fairness but also protested against unfairness ['Capuchin cognitive 
ecology: cooperation based on projected returns', Neuropsychologia 41(2) (1 January 2003) 221-228].  It is 
possible that most higher animals possess the capacity to recognise a basic level of fairness.  However, 
what looks to us like a capacity for recognising fairness might be more accurately, and less 
anthropocentrically, described as an evolved ability of individual animals to get enough to eat without 
causing conflict within the group.     
13 Hampshire, Justice, 40-42. 




child 'soon finds no difficulty in a solitary imitation of these exchanges'.16  In short, 
Hampshire attempts to avoid the Cartesian 'prison' of inner dialogue as a prerequisite for 
public speech, but in avoiding Descartes he runs headlong into the opening argument of 
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (PI). 
 
 The PI begins with a refutation of St Augustine's idea that children learn to speak by 
observing adults as they gesture towards an object and utter a word that the child infers is the 
name of that object.17  This echoes the above quote from Hampshire about children learning 
adversarial argument.  According to Wittgenstein, this schema produces a very limited 
understanding of language.  In particular, it leads us to think that words name or stand for 
objects and that sentences are combinations of names, and that the overriding purpose of 
language is to communicate our inner thoughts.  However, it overlooks the myriad different 
ways in which we use language.  Wittgenstein illustrates his contention with the example of 
sending someone to shop for him.  He gives that person a slip of paper on which is written 
'five red apples'.  This person gives the written order to the shopkeeper: 
 
who opens the drawer marked 'apples'; then he looks up the word 'red' in a chart and 
finds a colour sample next to it; then he says the series of elementary number-words 
– I assume he knows them by heart – up to the word 'five', and for each number-
word he takes an apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer.18   
 
Wittgenstein uses this bizarre example to show that, even in a primitive statement consisting 
only of names, each word is used differently.  The shopkeeper might store apples in a drawer 
marked 'apples', but he would not, for example, store colours or numbers in drawers marked 
'colours' or 'numbers'.  And why would he look up a colour chart to check what 'red' is, and 
 
16 Ibid., 12. 
17 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 4th ed., G. E. M. Anscombe trans., P. M. S. Hacker 
& Joachim Schulte trans and eds (Chichester: Blackwell, 2009) #1.  In #32, Wittgenstein argues that 
Augustine's description is more like somebody going to a foreign country and trying to learn its language.  
This person already speaks a language, but not the new one.  This is very different from a child learning to 
speak.  The child does not have pre-linguistic thoughts she is endeavouring to enunciate.  Rather, her 
thoughts and language develop inseparably as manifestations of her immersion and growth in a complex 
cultural and linguistic community.     
18 Ibid., #1. 
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why does he enunciate the numbers?  'Apple', 'colour' and 'number' are all nouns, but clearly 
they are used very differently.  Wittgenstein is drawing our attention to the fallacy that for 
every noun there must be an 'occult appearance' of that object in the mind.19  I do not need to 
compare 'red' with a colour chart in my mind when one in my hand would do just as well or 
even better.  I do not need to compare an apple with its image in my mind when I can simply 
go to the drawer labelled 'apples', and I do not need to compare five objects with an 
equivalent collective in my mind when I can merely enunciate the numbers in order and stop 
selecting apples after I say 'five'.  Moreover, there is no personal connection – tone of voice, 
look of acknowledgement et cetera – between the person who wrote the order and the 
shopkeeper; this is language at its most basic and impersonal.  The words on Wittgenstein's 
slip of paper do not convey a state of mind but rather have a function – to achieve a purpose 
that makes sense only within a complex linguistic community in which there is a system of 
cardinal numbers and in which 'red' and 'apple' have broadly agreed referents and uses.  
Moreover, there is no deeper meaning to be uncovered: to ask what 'five' means in this 
example is superfluous and misleading – 'no such thing was in question here, only how the 
word "five" is used'.20   
 
 Returning to Hampshire, the point of this is to show that our notions of justice are not 
innate in the sense that, if I declare a procedure or situation is 'just', I do so by comparing 
them with an image of justice in my mind – one consisting, for example, of balanced debate 
and hearing all sides.  Of course, I might conduct such an inner comparison, but (as we have 
just noted) a written checklist of attributes would serve just as well.  'Justice', therefore, does 
not function as 'the name of an object that each of us identifies when we look inwards'.21  If it 
did, and if we all possessed different concepts of justice (which would be unsurprising) then 
we would find it almost impossible to discuss justice.  However, we are able to discuss and 
debate it because 'justice' has a meaning and use in ordinary language and discourse that we 
all learn and in which we all participate.  This does not require that we agree on the meaning 
of justice, or that it has a core denotation or essence which is common to all meanings and 
uses of the word.  It is rather that we are able to use 'justice' in ways which make sense within 
 
19 The term 'occult appearance' is Wittgenstein's from The Blue and Brown Books (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1960) 4.  
20 Wittgenstein, PI, #1. 
21 Marie McGinn, Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations (London: Routledge, 1997) 163. 
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the discourse at hand, a sense that arises in and is inseparable from the linguistic and cultural 
milieu in which we live.  Conversely, Hampshire's notion of procedural justice probably 
requires that the meaning of 'fair' in discussion includes the idea that various claims on us 
and/or the community are not discounted solely on the basis that we don't agree with or like 
them.    
 
 Wittgenstein's argument also disposes of Hampshire's assertion that 'discussions in the 
inner forum of an individual mind naturally duplicate in form and structure the public 
adversarial discussions'.22  There need be no analogue between what is going on in my mind 
and what is happening in public dispute.  Indeed, most of us could probably name a number 
of people who possess little or no sense of inner conflict because their epistemic narcissism 
does not admit other points of view.23  We don't have to possess acute psychological insight 
to make this observation.  Hampshire himself notes that processes such as adjudicating, 
deliberating and so on have 'both a public and inner mental use' and that the latter is 'best 
explained through reference to the observable public activities'.24  In short, there are plenty of 
people whose evident general obtuseness and unwillingness to acknowledge other points of 
view suggest they would reject Hampshire's minimalist position.           
 
 The above problems undermine Hampshire's appeal to our common experience of 
resolving inner conflict, but the idea of procedural justice is possibly more secure without it.  
By not appealing to shared experience and/or agreed ideas of justice, procedural justice is 
based on nothing more than the principle that all sides should be heard because justice is 
unlikely to be realised if somebody's voice is deliberately excluded.  It is important, however, 
that this principle not be regarded in essentialist terms as a sine qua non of justice.   
 
Justice and systemic silence 
 Procedural justice is a robust default position, but does not entail that 'hearing all sides' 
means the same in every situation or for every matter.  If one side has been systemically 
silenced, then an appeal to hearing all sides may be a cunning subterfuge to entrench existing 
 
22 Hampshire, Justice, 9. 
23 President Trump is an obvious example. 




injustice.  As Rae Langton rightly asserts, 'the ability to perform illocutionary acts can be 
viewed as a measure of authority, a measure of political power'.25  The hitherto silent party 
has an opportunity to speak, but does not possess the illocutionary power enjoyed by its 
oppressor and is therefore more likely to experience illocutionary disablement than receive 
justice if that oppressor is granted an additional voice.  The example of domestic violence is 
instructive.  If a man murders his wife and children, justice requires that the deceased have a 
voice such that their account – how they were living in constant fear but were unable to flee, 
for example – is heard, but justice is (probably) not served by hearing the man's point of 
view.  In this case, hearing the other side is tantamount to giving the perpetrator (whether 
alive or dead) a further opportunity to justify his actions.26  The only thing we want to hear 
from or know about him is information that might help prevent a similar crime, such as signs 
of pathological narcissism.  In this instance, 'hearing all sides' should be better construed as 
giving a voice to the silenced and affording them a forum in which their locutions are neither 
frustrated nor disabled.  
 
 There is a parallel here to the debate about climate change.  The requirement to hear all 
sides in a debate about the reality of global heating is particularly amenable to the contra side 
because it reinforces the perception that an argument exists, thereby deflecting attention from 
addressing the problem.  Further, this requirement might exacerbate the problem of dialogic 
'indulgence', where parties go to great lengths to give everybody a fair hearing and weigh 
their opinions equally, 'even when everyone involved in the conversation knows there are 
substantial differences in competence between them'.27  In a situation where heeding expert 
advice is vital, listening to incompetent opinion is procedurally bankrupt.         
 
Innate fairness or innate aggression? 
 One obvious objection to Hampshire's thesis is the idea that our innate sense of fairness 
might be significantly less universal and compelling than, say, an innate tendency to 
aggression, and therefore the fairness-based international cooperation required to address 
climate change is less likely than conflict over it.  Konrad Lorentz, for example, famously 
 
25 Langton, 'Speech acts', 316. 
26 The title and content of Jess Hill's See What You Made Me Do (Carlton, Victoria: Black Inc., 2019) are 
appropriate here.  I say 'further' opportunity because the male already possessed illocutionary power.  
27 Tom Nichols, The Death of Expertise (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017) 64-65. 
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asserted that human behaviour is inherently aggressive towards other human beings, 
particularly those in other clans or groups.  Lorentz postulated that if observers from another 
planet were to study human behaviour they would never think that our behaviour was 
'dictated by intelligence, still less by responsible morality'.  They would observe a great deal 
of irrational conflict, but be unable to explain what was going on.  According to Lorentz, 
human social behaviour is 'subject to all the laws prevailing in all phylogenetically adapted 
instinctive behaviour', and we know about those laws from studying the instincts and 
behaviour of animals.  For example, rats (like humans) 'are social and peaceful beings within 
their clans, but veritable devils towards all fellow-members of their species not belonging to 
their own community'.28  If this were explained to our interplanetary observers they would 
probably conclude that human beings are indeed innately aggressive because this instinct is 
the best explanation for their proclivity to fight one another.   
 
 Lorentz's theory is persuasive, largely because it matches our own perceptions of human 
history as a succession of wars, quarrels and so on.29  Indeed, we might even think it 
surprising if somebody who witnessed the horrors of World War II (Lorentz served as a 
medic in the German Army) did not conclude that human beings are inherently nasty to each 
other.  Hampshire himself was of this view,30 but he regarded it as less fundamental or 
important to the human condition than procedural justice.  The best illustration of this 
contention is World War II and its aftermath.  Allied countries fought an aggressive war for 
the rational purpose of defeating aggression – mainly Germany's and Japan's – and when 
hostilities ceased they conducted forensic trials in order to prosecute some of those 
responsible for war crimes.  The point is that aggression, conflict and even genocide were 
ultimately submitted to the jurisdiction of procedural justice, to the degree that both sides – 
 
28 Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression, Marjorie Latzke trans. (London: Methuen, 1966) 203-204. 
29 And, of course, periods of peace and cooperation are less memorable than wars. 
30 It is worth noting that Hampshire served in army intelligence during the war and he interrogated leading 
Nazis immediately after it.  The most infamous of Hampshire's interrogations was of Ernst Kaltenbrunner, 
a leading perpetrator of the Holocaust.  He was the highest ranking surviving member of the SS.  
Hampshire's experience of Kaltenbrunner and Nazism, combined with post-war revelations about Stalin's 
tyranny, convinced him that human capacity for evil is as natural and innate as its capacity for generosity 
and sympathy.  In short, Hampshire developed his ideas about procedural fairness while being fully aware, 
as few of us could ever be, of humanity's capacity for unmitigated evil.  See Hampshire, Innocence, 7-8.       
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prosecutors and defendants – were heard and judgement delivered according to a broadly 
familiar set of rules and precedents.31   
 
 The Nuremberg trials possessed several characteristics of procedural justice that 
appealed to, or were significant of, a universal sense of fairness.  First, even before the war 
ended there had been worldwide desire for leading Nazis to be 'tried by law and suffer 
condign punishment', as opposed to a sometime British proposal – several other nations 
proposed much the same – to execute the most hated Nazis without trial.32  A corollary point 
was that the trials represented the authority of a large group of nations, not merely one 
country.  Second, all trials, particularly the main trial, were conducted in public: justice was 
seen to be done (the main trial was filmed) and the tribunal wanted as many people as 
possible to see it.  Third, though German opinions of the trials were generally negative (as 
one would expect) few could deny that defendants were given a fair hearing.33  Fourth, since 
there was little precedent for a war-crimes trial, procedures were based on the broadly 
familiar protocols of criminal trials.  Fifth, a schedule of possible crimes was drafted 
according to universally accepted minimal values such as not waging wars of aggression and 
not killing civilians.  The Nuremberg trials were far from perfect – for example, Telford 
Taylor was of the view that Rudolf Hess was incompetent to stand trial34 – but they 
demonstrated that procedural justice could achieve broadly fair outcomes even where it had 
to be imposed – the German justice system having been thoroughly corrupted35 – and where 




31 As it happened, the tribunal's determination to observe the forensic rules and protocols established for 
these trials meant that some leading Nazis, like Walter Funk (economics minister) and Albert Speer 
(armaments minister), escaped the death penalty they probably deserved. 
32 Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (London: Bloomsbury, 1993) 634. 
33 It is noteworthy that Otto Kranzbuehler, defence counsel for Karl Dönitz, approved of the general 
purpose of the trials even though he was critical of some of the tribunal's procedures and new laws, 
particularly the crime against peace [Taylor, 627-635]. 
34 Taylor, 536-537. 
35 The German legal system's degradation under Nazism has been demonstrated by Ingo Müller in Hitler's 
Justice, Deborah Lucas Schneider trans. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).  Müller 
completely debunks the myth that Germany's judiciary did not acquiesce to the Nazi regime. 
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Institutions of fair adversary reasoning 
 Unlike immediate post-war Germany, most countries possess institutions which can 
preserve the bond of fair dealing between people, even though that bond is often weak and 
likely to fail when both sides of a conflict are passionately prosecuted.  There are ardent 
loyalties on both sides, but is there an 'overriding loyalty that will preserve the institutions of 
fair adversary reasoning when they are tested in a bitter conflict of values? … Any political 
philosophy needs to have an answer to this question.'  Hampshire's view is that the answer 
resides only in institutional loyalties, in our 'deep-seated habits of living together and arguing 
together'.36  In modern nation-states, this role is best filled by a long-established constitution 
and its concomitant institutions.  In the United States, for example, this role falls to the 
Supreme Court.  Nobody assumes that its decisions are infallibly just, but everybody is held 
to assume that its procedures are just in that they conform to the basic principle of adversary 
reasoning – that both sides are heard equally. 
 
United States Supreme Court 
 Hampshire's thesis seems sufficient, but what happens when the revered, or at least 
broadly accepted, institution reneges on this basic principle?  The example of America's 
Supreme Court is instructive.  In 2000, the country's presidential election was held on 
7 November.  In Florida, the ineptitude of America's electoral system descended into farce: 
many people cast their vote for the wrong candidate, and thousands of votes were unable to 
be counted because voting machines malfunctioned.  On 12 December, the U.S. Supreme 
Court reversed a decision of Florida's Supreme Court, thereby terminating a recount of 
contested votes in Florida and allowing the vote certification of 26 November to stand.37  In 
this certification, George W. Bush was just 537 votes ahead of Al Gore.  The Supreme 
Court's decision entailed that Bush received Florida's 25 Electoral College votes, which gave 
him one more than the 270 votes need to win office.  Across the country, Gore won the 
popular vote by over half a million.  In effect, the court's decision threw out Florida's 60,000 




36 Hampshire, Justice, 94 (my italics). 
37 It is noteworthy that Justice is Conflict was published in 2000, so the manuscript was completed before 
this decision.  It is interesting to speculate whether it might have caused Hampshire to modify his views.   
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the Court committed the unpardonable sin of being a knowing surrogate for the 
Republican Party instead of being an impartial arbiter of the law. … [The] institution 
Americans trust the most to protect its freedoms and principles committed one of the 
biggest and most serious crimes this nation has ever seen – pure and simple, the theft 
of the presidency.38   
 
 Hampshire would probably agree, because the Supreme Court's decision was clearly not 
based on a fair hearing of arguments, or on 'commonly and customarily accepted ideas of 
substantial justice', or on precedent.39  It is unsurprising that the Court's decision was self-
contradictory: in purporting to preserve the fundamental right to vote it decided that some 
votes did not count.  Hampshire asserts that when either of the two criteria for procedural 
justice – the rational requirement to hear all sides, and respect for venerable rules and custom 
– are violated then 'we should expect catastrophe'.40  The Supreme Court's dereliction of 
judicial impartiality satisfies both criteria.  It is here, though, that Hampshire's thesis is less 




 Procedural justice is oriented to prevention of wrongdoing rather than pursuit of a 
specified good.  With this in mind, Derek Edyvane goes a step further and suggests that civic 
virtues should be regarded not in affirmative terms, such as cultivating a catalogue of 
aspirational values and commitment to a certain view of social good, but rather in preventive 
terms – as the repudiation of sovereign evil.41  According to Edyvane, sovereign evil is not 
simply the absence of goodness; it is an entity in and of itself, a state of affairs which cripples 
a society's capacity to formulate aspirational values.  Sovereign evil has catastrophic 
consequences because aspirational morality is fundamental to the pursuit of a fulfilling and 
whole life.  Ergo, a society should endeavour to cultivate the habits, dispositions and qualities 
 
38 Vincent Bugliosi, The Betrayal of America (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press / Nation Books, 2001) 
41, 48. 
39 Hampshire, Justice, 96. 
40 Ibid, 97-98.  President Trump's appointment of Brett Kavanaugh to the Court in 2018 – an alleged sex 
offender nominated by a self-confessed sex offender – further undermined the Court's declining reputation. 
41 Derek Edyvane, Civic Virtue and the Sovereignty of Evil (New York: Routledge, 2013) 10 and passim. 
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that its citizens require if it is to avoid moral calamity.  Echoing Hampshire, Edyvane is keen 
for citizens to be aware of and appreciate the complexity of modern societies in which there 
are irreconcilable values and moral conflicts.  His view is that 'uncertain times call for 
uncertain citizens' – uncertain, not paralysed when confronted with competing moral 
claims.42  Edyvane wants us to be sufficiently uncomfortable such that we are prepared to 
acknowledge the defects and costs in the value choices all of us must make. 
 
Tension between aspiration and prevention 
 The inevitable tension between aspirational and preventive activity is exemplified in 
political life: the former activity aiming at realisation of ideals, the latter directed towards 
prevention of evil.  It follows that any realistic notion of public virtue will inevitably be a 
compromise between or uneasy fusion of those conflicting impulses.  Within that context, 
Edyvane attempts to answer the following: what if moral and religious conflict, and their 
attendant uncertainty and insecurity, are now enduring features of public life?43  If they are 
then we need an interpretation of civic virtue that neither exacerbates nor fails to address 
those conditions.  The dilemma for contemporary politicians and public figures is 
confronting.  Their customary response to uncertainty and insecurity is (naturally enough) to 
cultivate certainty and security, but almost inevitably this will promote aspirations that will 
compete against the values which produced the conflict in the first place.  In short, the 
customary response will exacerbate the situation.  What is required is politically counter-
intuitive: a disposition to acknowledge that uncertainty and insecurity are intrinsic to the 
complexity and sheer difficulty of citizenship, and a willingness to afford procedural justice 
to parties which many of us might regard as largely responsible for our uncertainty and 
insecurity.  These counter-intuitive dispositions manifest the civic virtues of citizens who are 
equipped to resist sovereign evil, whose outlook is robust enough to sustain anxiety about 
conflicting moralities, and who are reluctant to embrace wholeheartedly any set of 
aspirational values.   
 
Avoiding evil rather than striving for good 
 There is a further counter-intuitive element in Edyvane's thesis.  As Hans Jonas argued, 
the trajectory of moral philosophy from Socrates onwards has largely been about striving for 
 
42 Ibid., 145. 
43 Ibid., 134. 
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the good, whereas a better guide to action would be striving to avoid the bad.44  In other 
words, our fears may be a better guide to action than our desires.  The reason for this is 
straightforward: it is usually much easier for us to perceive evil than good.  Evil is more 
confronting and compelling; it can impose itself on us without our looking for it, and there 
are fewer differences of opinion about it.  Good, on the other hand, is often unobtrusive and 
unperceived until we have cause to reflect on it.  We know when evil comes or way, but good 
often passes by unnoticed.  We are usually quicker to decide and more certain about what we 
do not want than about what we want.  
 
 With regard to climate change, Edyvane's and Jonas' views appear entirely relevant.  We 
might disagree about good values to live by and societal goals to pursue, but almost all of us 
can agree that global heating is an evil that should be avoided.  The question is, why don't we 
make more efforts to avoid what we agree is evil?  The answer lies in those characteristics 
that make evil easy to perceive: it is confronting, compelling, obtrusive and so on.  For the 
most part, global heating lacks these characteristics.  It is subtle, slow-moving and distant, not 
a gun in one's face but more like a distant threat that, though real, is something we feel we 
can adapt to.  In short, the problem with climate change is that, while it fits our ideas about 
evil, it is much less congruent with our perceptions of evil.           
 
Contemporary fora of non-debate                   
 Edyvane's notion of civic virtue goes some way to preventing moral decay and 
concomitant injustice, and endorses Hampshire's concept of procedural justice, but both 
invite questions about the appropriate fora in which their preventive orientations might thrive.  
Dialogue entails debate, and proper conduct of debate requires engagement with another 
party's ideas, but at present most countries have political systems that preclude such 
engagement.  Instead, debate is transmuted into personality contests or culture wars.  
Reasoned analysis of issues is subordinated to false antitheses and infantile hyperbole and 
stereotyping.  For example, the jobs and wealth created by opening a new coal mine are 
vastly exaggerated; concern about climate change is dismissed as the preoccupation of 'latte-
sipping, inner-city trendies' rather than 'people from the real world'; and without coal-fired 
 
44 Hans Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Hans Jonas & David Herr trans. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1984) 27, 233. 
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power your lights will go out.45  Some of this degradation of debate is due to the 
professionalization of politics and party demands to 'stay on message', but some is also the 
result of social media.   
 
The electronic agora 
 Social media exacerbates one of the main challenges faced by democratic governments.  
Joseph Schumpeter noted that the efficiency of governments was impaired by the 
'tremendous loss of energy' caused by incessant battle waged by political leaders both within 
parliament and outside it.46  Much of the extra-parliamentary battle was conducted in the 
press, but Schumpeter was writing in 1942, well before the demands of current all-day news 
cycles.  Their insatiable hunger for news imposes additional burdens on politicians, whose 
own perceived need to engage with social media imposes even more.  Moreover, social media 
gives politicians almost instant feedback on a policy or decision, a situation that promotes 
instant gratification – for both the electorate and policy makers – over long-term priorities.  
Schumpeter's simile for a political leader remains starkly relevant: 'a horseman who is so 
fully engrossed in trying to keep in the saddle that he cannot plan his ride'.47  
 
 On the other hand, the internet provides a platform for otherwise voiceless people, 
thereby enabling openness and democracy.  However, while facilitating transparency, the 
internet and social media are also 'empowering the rule of the mob'.  Instead of fostering 
openness and tolerance, they have 'unleased such a distasteful war on women that many no 
longer feel welcome on the network'.48  What about the #MeToo movement's rise to 
prominence in 2017?  The late Ann Snitow's views are instructive.  She strongly supported 
#MeToo but also feared it had directed attention towards the crimes of individual high-profile 
perpetrators rather than the need for systemic change, and had intensified 'the richly recurring 
 
45 Andrew Clark, 'Joyce doubles down on climate change as an elitist issue', AFR Weekly (30-31 March 
2019).  The views and quote are from former deputy prime minister Barnaby Joyce.   
46 Schumpeter, Capitalism, 286. 
47 Ibid., 287. 
48 Andrew Keen, The Internet is Not the Answer (London: Atlantic Books, 2015) xiv.  Keen appositely 
notes that the internet has massively enriched 'a tiny group of young white men', indicative that many 
traditional bases of power – particularly race and gender – remain unchanged. 
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hatred of women who speak'.49  There may be a common theme here.  Most people entertain 
an assortment of views in private that they would be reluctant to air in public.  The demands 
of public civility and propriety, and perhaps a vocational requirement to exhibit impartiality, 
entail that one's views about certain people or groups remain private.  For some individuals, 
however, the private realm is that in which they indulge the fantasies, hatreds and 
irrationalities they would be loath to express publicly, except within discrete gatherings of 
like-minded people.  The internet, particularly the dark web, provides such people with a 
forum in which they can broadcast their views anonymously, without having to leave their 
private realm, without the constraints of public civility, and without the penalties – social and 
legal – such views might attract.  A misogynist tract of hitherto limited and local circulation 
can now be fed instantly to an international audience, while a women's support site can be 
attacked from anywhere with impunity.  In short, the internet has facilitated the public 
flourishing of private demons.  It is unsurprising, for example, that President Trump uses 
social media as his primary means of communication.  For a person who is keen to air his 
private views and cares nothing about public censure, social media is his natural haunt.   
 
 Part of this public flourishing of private opinion is driven by the internet's 'fantasy of 
secession from the real world' and of 'magically floating outside space and time' because it is 
not confined to physical locations and not governed by local jurisdictions.50  Even the words 
we use to describe the internet and its functions – cloud, cyberspace, global village and so on 
– evoke a placeless, de-located entity that pervades everywhere but resides nowhere.  The 
internet allows me to communicate anywhere at any time with people I don't know but who 
share my views, and to comment on situations I have never experienced and on matters I 
might know little about.  Hubert Dreyfus notes the eagerness of internet users to respond to 
the 'equally deracinated opinions of other anonymous amateurs who post their views from 
nowhere'.51  Rather than taking a stand on an issue that affects my milieu, being practically 
committed to it and willing to bear the consequences of that commitment, I can be an 
armchair activist whose commitment involves little or no cost, no risk and no responsibility.   
 
49 Ann Snitow, 'Talking Back to the Patriarchy', Dissent (Spring, 2018) 88.  She was right: enforced stay-
at-home regulations during the Covid-19 pandemic produced a rise in domestic violence, despite recent 
and well-publicised successes of #MeToo.   
50 Keen, 203, 215. 
51 Hubert L. Dreyfus, On the Internet (London: Routledge, 2001) 79. 
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 None of this is inevitable: the internet, the blogosphere and social media are neither devil 
nor saviour.  They can, however, amplify things already present, whether for weal or woe.52  
The #MeToo movement is a paradigm of the internet's capacity to empower women who had 
long been isolated and powerless.  In this instance, the internet's ubiquity was harnessed to 
cast light on and confront a ubiquitous crime.  For the most part, however, as your 
engagement with the internet and social media increases so your involvement in the physical 
world and physical interactions tends to decline.53  The outcome is a shrinking sense of one's 
'being in' the world.  Each of us is born into and inextricably immersed in a pre-existing 
world, and our notions of reality, purpose and meaning are generated from our social, 
intellectual and physical interactions within that world.  We are 'located' beings no matter 
where we are or go to, so anything that undermines our intrinsic locatedness almost 
invariably enfeebles or muddles our sense of reality, purpose and meaning.  Further, as 
Martin Heidegger asserted, the basic feature that constitutes all our involvements in the world 
is 'care' (sorge).54  Heidegger does not use 'care' as a psychological term – in the sense of 
worry, 'cares of the world' and so on – but rather as an ontological term to describe our 
unavoidable relationships with the people, entities and things that make up our world.  We 
have an ontological care about these things, and for people, because, as they make up our 
world, any diminution of that care is also a diminution of our being.55  The internet can 
expand our epistemological world, but can also contract our ontological world. 
 
 
52 As David Smith put it, the internet has become 'a defining feature of American politics: an incubator of 
both social activism and rancid tribalism' ['After a repentant Trump voter's one-man protest, what 
happened next?', The Guardian (22 August 2020)].  
53 Dreyfus, 102.  Dreyfus' view has been confirmed by subsequent research.  The effects of high internet 
usage are similar to those of an addiction: reduced socialization and impoverished work and life efficiency 
[Mari K. Swingle, i-Minds (Gabriola Island, BC, Canada: new society publishers, 2016) xvi].  
54 Dorothea Frede, 'The question of being: Heidegger's project' in The Cambridge Companion to 
Heidegger, Charles Guignon ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 63.  Heidegger 
developed the concept of care in Being and Time, Joan Stambaugh trans., Dennis J. Schmidt rev. (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2010) I.2 #12-13 and I.6 #41-42.  
55 It is worth noting that Heidegger's concept of care did not include Jews.  He saw Jewry as the archetypal 
de-located people and therefore an ontological threat to the German Volk.  As Pierre Bourdieu rightly 
argued, Heidegger's antisemitism was 'sublimated as a condemnation of rootlessness' [The Political 
Ontology of Martin Heidegger, Peter Collier trans. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991) viii].    
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 There is a related problem: the limitless range of information on the internet, and the 
search engines needed to comb through it, entail that browsers must be highly selective in 
what they want to see, thereby tending to reinforce existing points of view.56  Moreover, the 
trivial and fanciful is presented alongside the substantial and genuine.  An instructive 
example is the widespread and enduring belief that America's moon landings were faked.57  
As Richard Godwin observed, it took 400,000 employees and contractors of NASA to put 12 
men on the moon, but just one to spread the rumour it was a hoax.58  This disparity manifests 
an epistemic imbalance that has existed for millennia but is exacerbated by the internet: a 
single person can propagate a dubious idea, but the internet furnishes him or her with an 
instant and almost unlimited audience.  Any hare-brained idea can attract its true believers, 
but few of us are willing, or have the time and energy, to enter those bizarre and increasingly 
numerous realms in order to disprove claims that are patent nonsense.59  Moreover, by 
addressing an absurd claim you inadvertently give it energy, but if you don't address it you 
might allow it to metastasize.  
 
Covid-19 infodemic 
 The Covid-19 pandemic cast further light on this problem.  As Sylvie Briand, WHO's 
director of Infectious Hazards Management, stated, every pandemic is accompanied by a 
'tsunami of information', a wave accompanied by misinformation and rumour.  She notes that 
this situation existed in the Middle Ages, 'but the difference now with social media is that this 
 
56 More insidiously, Safiya Umoja Noble notes the phenomenon of 'algorithmic oppression' whereby 
racism and sexism are reinforced by web-search results.  She found that 'racism is a standard protocol for 
organizing behavior on the web' [Algorithms of Oppression (New York: New York University Press, 2018) 
4-5]. 
57 For example, 16% of Britons believe the moon landings were either 'definitely' (4%) or 'probably' (12%) 
staged [Victoria Waldersee, 'Which science-based conspiracy theories do Britons believe?', YouGov.co.uk 
(25 April 2019)].  
58 Richard Godwin, 'One giant ... lie?  Why so many people still think the moon landings were faked', The 
Guardian (12 July 2019).  The one man was Bill Kaysing, who had once worked in the rocket industry.  In 
1976, well before the rise of social media, he self-published We Never Went to the Moon.  Its enduring 
influence is due largely to the internet.   
59 As Aristotle sagely noted, there cannot be a demonstration of everything, and it shows lack of training or 
education not to recognise things for which demonstration may or may not be demanded.  A person who 
refuses to exercise reason in this regard is 'no better than a mere plant' [Metaphysics IV.4 (1006a)].  
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phenomenon is amplified; it goes faster and further'.  As the Director-General of WHO put it, 
'we're not just fighting an epidemic; we're fighting an infodemic'.60  Why, though, does the 
internet aggravate this perennial problem?  After all, misinformation and rumour spread no 
more quickly on the internet than correct information.  Part of the problem is simple 
chronology.  To reconsider the Apollo program, one's belief that the program was a hoax is 
neither time-critical nor deadly, but one's belief that Covid-19 is a hoax, or that eccentric 
treatments are effective, could prove fatal.  To put it another way, we have always needed 
time and energy to assess epistemic claims from any source, but a pandemic substantially 
reduces the time in which we can do so and concomitantly increases the penalty for getting 
things wrong.  The problem is made worse by mainstream media, which now has a large 
degree of cross-over with social media, thereby reporting some of the more egregious 
examples of misinformation.  
 
A forum for dialogue 
 Is the internet a forum for dialogue about climate change?  At least one objection to it 
can now be rejected.  The internet was thought to aggravate the problem of 'echo chambers' – 
the tendency of people to select only content that reinforces their beliefs and to share those 
beliefs only with like-minded people.  It was feared that this phenomenon would exacerbate 
the division between those who are informed about politics and those who are not, thereby 
increasing political and ideological polarization.  To the contrary, Elizabeth Dubois and Grant 
Black found that, while online echo chambers clearly existed, their usual participants were 
neither interested in politics nor users of diverse media by which they could check sources or 
discover new information.  Importantly, they comprised only about 8 per cent of the 
population.61  The internet probably has increased the number of echo chamber inhabitants, 
but only marginally.    
 
 
60 John Zarocostas, 'How to fight an infodemic', The Lancet, vol. 395 (29 February 2020).  Briand was 
referring to misinformation and rumour accompanying outbreaks of the Black Death.  The infodemic is 
particularly acute in Latin America, where social media networks are awash with conspiracies, sham cures 
and disinformation [Tom Phillips et al., 'Tsunami of fake news hurts Latin America's effort to fight 
coronavirus', The Guardian (26 July 2020)].    
61 Elizabeth Dubois and Grant Black, 'The echo chamber is overstated: the moderating effect of political 
interest and diverse media', Information, Communication & Society, vol. 21, no. 5 (2018) 729-745. 
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 On the other hand, there is now little doubt that digital media are affecting users' 
neurophysiology.  As Mari Swingle found, high levels of internet use result in higher 
neurophysiological arousal: 'our brains are speeding up, but not in a good way'.62  The 
consequences include diminished ability to observe everyday things and sustain focus on 
them, and reduced capacity to integrate information and be creative.  Further, altered brain 
states affect the way we socialize: 'the neurophysiological processes that regulate mood and 
behaviour are deregulating'.63  In other words, our heavy and increasing use of the internet is 
compromising some of the characteristics we need – such as patience, cooperation, creative 
use of new information, and longer attention spans – if we are to address climate change.   
  
 Some of this might account for the observation that searching the internet can result in an 
inflated sense of how much users know about a subject.  Tom Nichols describes it as an 
electronic version of the Dunning-Kruger effect: the least competent among those who search 
the web for information are also least likely to realise how little they are learning.64     
 
Embodied communication 
 The Covid-19 pandemic demonstrated the value of, and our dependence on, the internet.  
Schools and universities were able to maintain adequate teaching schedules, and businesses 
were, to varying degrees, able to operate.  However, businesses and teachers generally find 
that online meetings and teaching require more preparation, and are more exhausting and less 
effective, than physical meetings and classroom teaching.65  This is because effective (and 
affective) communication is embodied; it requires observation of, and appropriate responses 
to, dozens of social cues and rituals.  Some of these are preserved on Zoom, but much more is 
lost.  We have evolved, and been socialised, to perceive these cues, so when they are 
curtailed we find communication not only more difficult but also more enervating.  Loss of 
conversational nuances, and concomitant effort to search for non-verbal signals, mean that 
'virtual interactions can be extremely hard on the brain'.66  Telephone conversations are less 
 
62 Swingle, xviii. 
63 Ibid. xix. 
64 Nichols, 119.  
65 They also find that men talk over women more than they usually do in face-to-face meetings.  
66 For a brief discussion see Julia Sklar, '"Zoom fatigue" is taxing the brain.  Here's why that happens.', 
National Geographic (24 April 2020).  
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tiring because we cannot see the other person and therefore do not search for visual cues to 
complement the message, and because we realise we do not have to supply anything other 
than verbal cues to our interlocutor.    
 
 Further, online visual communication is nearly deaf and blind to mood.  Those who teach 
or talk to groups are aware of 'mood' in a room: heads nodding slightly in agreement or 
disagreement; bored looks or body language when the material is uninteresting; the teacher 
adjusting her or his body movements and location in the room – consciously or not – in order 
to emphasise certain points or change the dynamic of discussion.67  As Hubert Dreyfus noted, 
'mood governs how people make sense of what they are experiencing.  Our body is what 
enables us to be attuned to the mood.'68  Given that constructive dialogue about any 
significant and contentious matter requires, as a bare minimum, that participants be highly 
attuned to nuances of mood and message, it is unlikely that virtual will replace physical 
meetings to address climate change.     
 
 On the other hand, without social media, movements such as Black Lives Matter would 
have neither the catalyst (camera-phone recordings) nor energy (generated largely through 
online discussion and organisation) to bring crowds onto streets in America and elsewhere.  
Could a similar effect be achieved for climate change?  Probably not, because social media 
do not overcome the psychological hurdles that impede attempts to address global heating.  
Racism is personal, immoral, confronting and present, whereas climate change is impersonal, 
distant and much less confronting.  Almost all of us contribute to climate change, but we are 
not thereby (normally) regarded as immoral, though even if we were this would be a much 
lower level of immorality than racism and therefore not generate an equivalent sense of 
outrage.   
 
 
67 David Blair, lecturer in linguistics at Macquarie University, made this observation to Hubert Dreyfus 
[Dreyfus, 59-61].  Plato would agree.  In the Meno, for example, Plato uses dialogic mood to anticipate the 
indictment against Socrates [94e-95a].   
68 Ibid, 60.  Dreyfus is drawing on the concept of 'embodied perception' advanced by Maurice Merleau-
Ponty.  For example, in Phenomenology of Perception he states, 'It is my body which gives significance 
not only to the natural object, but also to cultural objects like words' [Phenomenology of Perception, Colin 
Smith trans. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2002) 273]. 
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Excursus – Conspiracy Theories, Fake News and Postmodernism.    
 As I write, various websites are spreading conspiracy theories about the dangers of 
vaccination, the 5G network, and Democrat paedophiles.  President Trump is asserting that 
plain facts, such as the number of people who have succumbed to Covid-19, are merely part 
of the liberal press's attempts to undermine him.  Who or what is to blame for this lunacy?  
Many blame the internet, but some blame should be directed at the legacy of postmodernism.  
For example, postmodernism's fundamental attitude is scepticism towards 'grand narrative' – 
that is, narratives that purport to offer a comprehensive explanation of what happened in the 
past or how the world works.  Marxism is one example.  The flip-side of this scepticism is 
that scientific and historical accounts have to compete against other narratives and 
interpretations of phenomena or events.  No account or narrative is regarded as having an 
intrinsically better claim to acceptance than any other.  Science is seen as the 'meta-narrative 
of the dominant culture'.69  Its pretentions to investigate and describe reality are dismissed as 
unfounded hubris.  
 
 Postmodern attacks on mainstream science have themselves been attacked.  Intellectual 
Impostures by Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont is probably the best-known demonstration of 
postmodernism's failure to understand science.  Notwithstanding, as Christopher Butler notes, 
postmodernism has 'very much changed the way in which the scientific disciplines are 
perceived within American and European culture, towards a more sceptical, and politicized, 
view'.70  Examples to support Butler's contention are easy to find.  For instance, senior 
American educators William Cobern and Cathleen Loving assert that: 
 
In today's schools there are often competing accounts of natural phenomena, 
especially when schools are located in multicultural communities.  There are also 
competing claims about what counts as science …  
 
 
69 Shawn Otto, The War on Science (Minneapolis: Milkweed, 2016) 194. 
70 Christopher Butler, Postmodernism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 
42, and see 14-15 and 37-43 for a succinct account of postmodernism and science.  For a wide-ranging 
introduction to postmodernism see John McGowan, Postmodernism and Its Critics (Ithaca: Cornell 




Western science would co-opt and dominate indigenous knowledge if it were 
incorporated as science.  Therefore, indigenous knowledge is better off as a different 
kind of knowledge that can be valued for its own merits [and] play a vital role in 
science education … 
 
[I]f science is deemed universal it not only displaces scientific pretenders such as 
creation science, it also displaces any local knowledge that conflicts with it.71              
 
The task for educators is to develop curricula that value knowledge in its many 
forms and from its many sources.72 
 
 These views are representative of curricula rationale throughout Anglophone countries; 
little wonder that their citizens are confused about the claims and roles of science.  My folk 
remedy for Covid-19 might clash with your scientific virology, but they represent 'competing 
accounts' and both should be valued.  Your claim that western science is superior to folk 
remedies can be dismissed as a standard hegemonic manoeuvre to dominate and repress 
cultural knowledge.73 
 
 Cobern and Loving were pursuing the laudable aim of preserving indigenous knowledge, 
but they have things the wrong way around.  They accuse science of hegemony, but fail to 
recognise its anti-authoritarian value.  For example, I accept that the Grand Canyon was 
formed over millions of years, and that it reveals geological strata laid down over hundreds of 
millions of years, but only a century and a half ago I would have acceded to the church's 
authority and said it was formed about 6,000 years ago in the biblical flood.  In this matter it 
was science, particularly Charles Lyell's Principles of Geology, that undermined the church's 
authority.  Am I not, then, merely replacing one authority with another?  Not at all.  The 
church made authoritative pronouncements on geology because it possessed intrinsic 
authority based on tradition and scripture, whereas scientific geology makes authoritative 
 
71 William W. Cobern and Cathleen C. Loving, 'Defining "Science" in a Multicultural World: Implications 
for Science Education', Science Education, vol. 85, no. 1 (2001) 51-52. 
72 Ibid. 63.  
73 Of course a folk remedy might be effective, but science can explain why.  The authority of the remedy's 
proponent is irrelevant to its virological success.    
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pronouncements because it has accrued extrinsic authority based on its explanatory success.  
The difference is stark, and is predicated on the assumption of an objectively existing 
physical world.  Questions of fact about it are decided through observation and testing, not by 
appealing to an authoritative body or tradition with no scientific credentials.   
 
 Indeed, any hegemony a scientific field might possess is most likely to be challenged by 
new findings within that field.  For example, we usually think of medicine as a paradigm of 
western scientific success, but until the late 1800s or early 1900s going to the doctor was 
usually more dangerous than the condition for which one sought a cure.  As David Wootton 
rightly states, 'for 2,400 years patients have believed that doctors were doing them good; for 
2,300 years they were wrong'.74  Part of the problem was rigid adherence to Hippocratic 
tradition about 'unhealthy humours' causing disease of internal organs.  The basic Hippocratic 
inventory of remedies continued to underpin medical practice until the mid-1800s.75  These 
therapies were ineffective at best, fatal at worst.  The authority of medicine's 2,300-year-old 
tradition was finally overturned from within, by practitioners and scientists who questioned 
its assumptions.         
 
 Cobern and Loving have conflated epistemology with ideology.  All scientists work 
within a given cultural context, so it would be unsurprising if their motivation or choice of 
research subject reflected that context.  However, it is a fallacy to then assume their results 
necessarily reflect that context.76  As Simon Blackburn argues, aircraft stay aloft because we 
are getting something right about nature,77 and the physics of aerodynamics apply 
independently of political or cultural context.  
       
 Cobern and Loving's program will not validate the knowledge of kids from multicultural 
backgrounds: rather, it is more likely to hinder them from participating in broader scientific 
discourse.       
 
74 David Wootton, Bad Medicine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 2.  Wootton adds, with 
commendable restraint, 'I think it is fair to say that historians of medicine have difficulty facing up to this 
fact.' 
75 Ibid., 35. 
76 The fallacy of 'bourgeois genetics' was discussed in chapter 3.  





 Hampshire's idea of procedural justice provides a sound, almost bedrock, foundation for 
dialogue: if parties can't agree that all sides have a right to be heard then we probably have no 
basis for dialogue.  And if one party has been systemically silenced, then 'hearing all sides' is 
in practice a demand for that party to have a voice.  There remains, however, a fundamental 
question: what is dialogue and why are we so poor at it?  In keeping with the hermeneutic 
strategy of fusing ancient and modern horizons, we now turn to the foundation of our dialogic 





Out of the Agora: Plato's dramatic settings 
 
Overview 
 The fusing of hermeneutic horizons not only entails that modern dialogic failure can be 
elucidated by examining Plato's dialogues, but also that the views and questions we bring to 
Plato are informed by this failure.  This chapter looks at how Plato uses dialogue, focussing 
on his works' dramatic settings.  Understanding these settings, and the characters who 
populate them, is vital in both interpreting a dialogue's philosophical content and discerning 
the dynamics of discussion.  This study uses prosopography and dramatic interpretation to 
demonstrate the interdependence between literary and philosophical readings of Plato.  In 
particular, we find that Plato abandons the agora as a place in which philosophy is pursued, 
and that his treatment of public and private dialogues is very different.  The aim of this 
chapter is to prepare the ground for developing a list of dialogic characteristics that can throw 
light on where and how modern dialogue has gone wrong.       
 
Socrates in public: possible areas of discourse 
 Most of Plato's dialogues, the Socratic dialogues1 in particular, display some or all of the 
characteristics of a dialogic forum: they are open-ended, they challenge dogma rather than 
reinforce it, and they are not dismissive or authoritarian.  In particular, most of the dialogues 
are set in public.  Xenophon's description of Socrates is apposite: 
 
Socrates was always in the public eye.  Early in the morning he used to make his 
way to the covered walks and the recreation grounds, and when the agora became 
busy he was there in full view; and he always spent the rest of the day where he 
expected to find the most company.  He talked most of the time, and anyone who 
liked could listen.2   
 
In this work Xenophon defends Socrates from charges – corrupting young people and not 
believing in the city's gods – that led to his trial and execution.  Xenophon portrays Socrates 
 
1 'Socratic dialogues' are those in which Socrates interrogates an interlocutor about a viewpoint, 
assumption, meaning of a concept and so on.   
2 Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.1.  Xenophon knew Socrates and was about 30 when Socrates died.   
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as a public philosopher whose private opinions were consistent with those he maintained in 
public.3  Since no-one ever saw Socrates do, or heard him say, anything that would have 
justified his indictment, the charges were clearly false.  Though there are fundamental 
differences between Plato's and Xenophon's renderings of Socrates – for example, 
Xenophon's Socrates never professes ignorance – both are consistent in portraying Socratic 
philosophising as a public activity.  It is, therefore, surprising to discover that only one of 
Plato's dialogues is set in the agora – the civic centre of Athenian life – and even then the 
setting is narrowly identified as 'the portico [stoa] of the King Archon'.4  Only Athenians 
would know that this portico stood at the northern end of the agora.  Given that most of 
Plato's dialogues are set in public, and he acknowledges that Socrates frequented the agora,5 
why was Plato so reluctant to specify it as the scene of his dialogues?  The answer to this 
question is important: public spaces are not all the same.  Some are more, and some less, 
conducive to dialogue, while others are burdened by their histories and become antithetical to 
dialogue.        
   
The Athenian agora 
 An agora was the gathering space where the public life of any polis – its quotidian social, 
political, legal and commercial activities – took place.  As Jacob Burckhardt lyrically put it, 
no dictionary translation of the verbal form (agorazein) can adequately convey 'the delightful 
leisurely mixture of doing business, conversing, standing and strolling about together'.6  In 
Athens, the agora was also where the boule (the Council of 500 citizens) convened.  The 
agora was a sacred area; its boundary was defined by marker stones and buildings.  In Athens 
these buildings included law courts, magistrates' offices and the bouleuterion (in which the 
Council met).7 
 
3 Plato also maintains this view.  In the Apology, Socrates states that his private and public opinions are the 
same, so anyone who testifies to the contrary is lying [33b].    
4 Euthyphro 2a. 
5 For example, Socrates states that the language he will use before court is the same as the language he 
uses in the agora 'where many of you have heard me' [Apology 17c], and in the opening scene of the 
Gorgias, Socrates says he arrived late because he was lingering in the agora [447a].  
6 Jacob Burckhardt, The Greeks and Greek Civilization, Sheila Stern trans. (New York: St Martin's Press, 
1998) 52. 




 For Plato, however, the agora is where Socrates was condemned to death on false 
charges.  Moreover, Socrates was peculiarly ill-suited to be a denizen of this political, legal 
and commercial hub of the city.  Socrates engaged in as little political activity or civic duty as 
would have been possible for an Athenian citizen;8 before his trial he had never been before a 
law court; and he was notoriously careless about material goods and his own lack of wealth.  
Further, Plato did not want to portray Socrates, who was indicted for heresy, as challenging 
the views of prominent Athenians within a sacred area.  Indeed, Plato is so keen to distance 
Socrates from the agora that he puts the following in his mouth:   
 
The philosopher grows up without knowing the way to the agora, or the whereabouts 
of the law courts or the council chambers [both are in the agora] or any other place 
of public assembly [Theaetetus 173d]. 
 
The context is a digression about the unworldliness of a true philosopher – who also would 
never dream of attending dinners or parties9 – but if this vignette were accurate then Socrates 
himself – habitué of banquets and the agora – could not be a philosopher.  Given that, so far 
as Plato is concerned, Socrates is the paradigm philosopher, what is going on here?  Ruby 
Blondell rightly observes that Plato's depiction of an ideal philosopher in the Theaetetus has 
evident similarities to and striking differences from the portrait of Socrates across the broader 
corpus of dialogues.10  The philosopher is embodied and earth-bound, but his mind soars 
above it; he spends time in the agora, but not for commercial, legal or political purposes; he 
attends banquets, not to indulge in dissipation but to expatiate on the nature of love.  In a 
complex dialogue about the characteristics of knowledge, the overall effect of this digression 
is 'a vivid expression of the fact that human epistemology cannot be explored in abstraction 
from who we are as complex beings at the juncture of the material and the divine'.11   
 
 
8 In his famous funeral oration, Pericles states that Athenians 'are unique in the way we regard anyone who 
takes no part in public affairs: we do not call that a quiet life; we call it a useless life' [Thucydides 2.40]. 
9 Theaetetus 173d. 
10 Ruby Blondell, The Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002) 298-300. 
11 Ibid., 302  
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 Blondell's is an insightful reading of Theaetetus and several other dialogues, but she does 
not notice Plato's reluctance to set his dialogues in the agora.12  Further, though she is correct 
in observing that many of Socrates' conversations take place in private houses, she does not 
also observe that Plato's dramatic setting of these dialogues can leave little doubt that he 
regards philosophy as a public activity, not as something pursued in a private or domestic 
setting.  Plato's dramatic aversion to the agora13 sits uneasily with his view that philosophy is 
done in public, but both are important facets in locating Socratic philosophy in its various 
settings.   
 
The Academy 
 Plato sets a number of dialogues in wrestling schools (palaistrai) and gymnasia:  
Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman are set in an unnamed gymnasium; Lysis in a palaestra just 
outside the east wall of Athens; Charmides in the palaestra of Taureas; and Euthydemus in 
the Lyceum.  All were public spaces, though not as bustling or significant to Athenian life as 
the agora.  Gymnasia began as sites for physical training, but increasingly became intellectual 
centres.  The Academy – home of Plato's 'school' from about 383 – and the Lyceum – home 
to Aristotle's from about 335 – were gymnasia.  Why, though, does Plato not set any dialogue 
in the Academy?  After all, long before it became the site of Plato's school, Socrates must 
have discussed philosophy there on numerous occasions.  Lysis even notes he had been in the 
Academy and was on his way to the Lyceum when he was intercepted by a group from the 
wrestling school.  The probable answer is that Plato saw the Academy as a place where 
philosophy was taught and cultivated, mainly through critical discussion, but 'doing' 
philosophy was, for the most part, a public activity.      
 
 
12 So far as I am aware, nobody else has noticed this reluctance. 
13 This aversion is sometimes obscured in translation.  For example, the opening lines of Menexenus in 
Paul Ryan's translation are: 
Socrates: Where is Menexenus coming from?  The market place? 
Menexenus: Yes, Socrates – the Council Chamber, to be exact. 
In the Greek text, however, Socrates' first words are ex agoras ('from out of the agora').  And just to make 
sure we get the message, Menexenus' first words are also ex agoras.  Ryan has, unintentionally, erased 
Plato's very specific dramatic directive that this dialogue has nothing to do with the agora.  Given that 
Menexenus consists largely of a commemorative funeral oration – which is of course a public event – 
Plato's directive has interpretive significance.    
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Plato's retreat into privacy, or into teaching? 
 Brian Donovan argues that Plato withdrew from teaching in the Academy's public 
gymnasium into his private garden next door, which is why his school continued to be called 
the Academy.  This separation of Plato's school from the city was significant of his 
abandonment of the ideal that philosophy's role was to teach arete (goodness, excellence) to 
denizens of the polis.14  According to Donovan, Plato's departure from the position that 
teaching arete is a philosophical priority was one of his most important legacies to the 
modern university.  Donovan is partly right, but mainly wrong.   
 
 To begin, the notion that Plato moved from a public area into his private domain is 
speculative; we don't know much about his earliest school, certainly not enough to support 
Donovan's assertion.  More importantly, the dialogues themselves supply ample evidence to 
the contrary.  Plato was traumatised by the failure of Socrates' public mission to challenge 
taken-for-granted views about virtue, piety and so on.  The Socratic gadfly became too 
irritating to be tolerated.  In order that philosophy should avoid provoking further martyrdom, 
Plato probably did conclude that the business of philosophy was not primarily about 
frequenting public spaces – especially the agora – to challenge the norms and opinions of 
citizens.  Nor, however, was it about withdrawal into esoteric privacy, or about wandering 
from one city to the next like a sophist.  Rather, Plato wanted to educate people who, 'by 
nature as well as by training … take part in both philosophy and politics at once'.15  The 
dialogues formed part of a student's training for public and philosophical life, and most of the 
dialogues are expressions in the Socratic spirit of philosophy being done in public.  
 
 Donovan is not alone in failing to notice the clear difference between Plato's treatment of 
dialogues set in public and those with private, indoor settings.  For example, Donovan 
regards Protagoras as 'probably the most comprehensive locus classicus on the ideal and 
reality of the city as moral school',16 yet he fails to observe that most of it is set indoors.  The 
setting alone precludes Donovan's assessment.    
 
 
14 Brian R. Donovan, 'The City and the Garden: Plato's retreat from the teaching of virtue', Educational 
Theory (Fall 1995, vol. 45, no. 4) 453.  
15 Timaeus 19e-20a. 
16 Donovan, 457. 
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Philosophy as literature and literature as philosophy 
 At this point it is appropriate to recall the importance of location in Plato's works.  We 
usually think of Platonism in terms of body-soul dualism, eternal verities not constrained by 
time or place, and so on, but these doctrines should not obscure the significance of setting and 
characterisation in the dialogues.  Michael Frede is right in arguing that the dialogues are not 
philosophy in disguise, not merely a literary device for presenting philosophical views and 
argument in a vivid and accessible way.17  Rather, the dialogue form itself, and the dramatic 
settings and characters of individual dialogues, are shaped primarily by philosophical rather 
than literary considerations.   
  
 It is probably no coincidence that most of the spurious dialogues attributed to Plato but 
almost certainly not by him – such as Demodocus, Epinomis, Halcyon, Hipparchus and 
Minos – have no dramatic setting.18  It is likely that Plato's imitators regarded dramatic details 
as superfluous and were unaware of their intrinsic importance to matters under discussion.  
These details are not window dressing with which the author has garnished the narrative.  
Rather, they colour how we think of and approach the various characters, themes and 
discussions.  Of course, a dialogue can be read without consideration of its dramatic setting, 
but to do so is to abstract participants and arguments from their locations.  Instead, Plato 
clearly wants his reader to understand that philosophy cannot be conducted in abstraction 
from places and people.     
 
 For Plato, Socrates is the dramatic vehicle of philosophical activity.  The dialogues are 
imaginative constructs, but Socrates is a real person, in familiar concrete situations with 
interlocutors who are usually drawn convincingly and who demand to be taken 
sympathetically or seriously by the reader.  It is worth illustrating the implications of this 




17 Michael Frede, 'Plato's Arguments and the Dialogue Form' in Methods of Interpreting Plato and his 
Dialogues, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 1992, James C. Klagge and 
Nicholas D. Smith eds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) 219. 
18 Theages, another spurious dialogue, is set in the agora (in the portico of Zeus), which shows that the 




 This dialogue is a good example of the necessity to engage with prosopography when 
reading Plato's texts; failure to do so will often result in a deficient or even misleading 
interpretation of what is going on.  The subject of discussion is sophrosyne (temperance or 
self-restraint).  Charmides himself, Plato's uncle, is in this setting a beguilingly attractive 
teenager with whom Socrates conducts his elenchus (the type of dialectical cross-examination 
for which Socrates is famous).  The other interlocutor, Critias, recommends Charmides as 
highly distinguished in body and soul.  Any adequate construal of the dialogue requires the 
reader to know that Critias became leader of the Thirty Tyrants and that Charmides was 
appointed by the Thirty to govern Piraeus.  Both were killed in a battle against democratic 
forces in 403 BCE.  Both were the antithesis of sophrosyne.   
 
 The dialogue's structure is significant.  It is narrated by Socrates, but there is no dramatic 
audience: he is speaking directly to us.  Whereas in some dialogues, such as Parmenides, 
Plato keeps the reader/listener at arm's length, in Charmides there is no intermediary.  It is a 
dialogue within a monologue.  In effect, we are the interlocutors, so at every turn in 
arguments about the definition of sophrosyne we are being asked for our opinion.  For the 
reader there is no escape: Plato demands our participation.     
 
 The dramatic setting is also significant.  Socrates has just arrived back in Athens after 
almost three years away with the army in the Potidaean campaign.  This war began as an 
Athenian invasion and then degenerated into a prolonged but ultimately successful siege of 
Potidaea.  However, the army then suffered defeat in a battle near Potideae, a disaster referred 
to at the beginning of Socrates' narrative [153b-c].  Socrates does not mention, though the 
reader is assumed to know, that he distinguished himself in this battle when he saved the life 
of Alcibiades.19  All of these details are important.  Socrates has survived a long military 
campaign, including a brutal pitched battle, and he is an exemplar of sophrosyne (in this 
context, self-possession and admirable conduct), but the man he rescued, and the two men 
with whom he is in discussion, are incapable of this virtue.  Indeed, the dialogue ends with an 
ominous reminder that, if Critias and Charmides decided to use force in any undertaking, they 
could not be resisted [176c-d].  Battle-hardened Socrates, embodiment of virtue, hailed in 
 
19 Alcibiades was a flamboyant aristocrat and ambitious demagogue.  Plato has Alcibiades describe this 
event in the Symposium [220e]. 
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 Unlike most of Plato's works, this dialogue has no specified dramatic setting.20  The first 
words are a question by Meno: 'Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is teachable?' [70a].  
Meno was wealthy, renowned for his physical beauty, and a thorough scoundrel.  According 
to Xenophon, Meno 'prided himself on his ability to deceive, the fabrication of lies, and the 
mocking of friends'.21  Plato presents Meno's question as an entry to the dialogue.  The 
answer, which the reader/auditor supplies as a resounding 'No!' given the questioner's 
identity, is not uttered.  Rather, it is provided by the informed listener, Plato's deft insertion of 
an unstated viewpoint into the dramatic framework.   
 
 This dialogue also introduces the character of Anytus, the most prominent of three men 
who brought charges against Socrates.  Anytus is the son of Anthemion, who became rich not 
through luck or someone's gift but through his own wisdom and diligence.  He was well-
mannered and not full of himself [90a].  He gave Anytus a good upbringing and education, 
'as most Athenians believe, for they elect him to the highest offices' [90b].  Socrates' praise of 
Anytus is backhanded: he is not the man his father was, and in any case the opinion of most 
Athenians is worthless given that within a few years they will back Anytus in condemning 
Socrates.  Further, Socrates pursues a point of timeless relevance: there are and have been 
many people who are good at running the city, 'but have they really been good teachers of 
their own virtue as well?' [93a].  After all, the matter under discussion is whether virtue is 
teachable, so did these good citizens know how to pass on the virtue they evidently 
possessed, or is it something that can't be passed on? [93b].  Socrates cites examples of 
renowned Athenians – Themistocles and Pericles among them – with sons who, though 
skilled in some things, were not as good and wise as their fathers.  The implication, again, is 
that Anytus is not, and indeed cannot be, the equal of his father.  In short, both Meno and 
Anytus embody the impossibility of teaching virtue.         
 
20 The only other genuine dialogues without a specified setting are Philebus, Ion and Cratylus.  Like Meno, 
they are set in unspecified public spaces.    
21 Xenophon, Anabasis II.6.26.  Meno met a nasty end (though Xenophon thought it appropriate) by being 
captured following a failed military expedition and then tortured for a year. 
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 Anytus' contribution to the discussion finishes with a veiled threat to Socrates [94e].  The 
dialogue concludes with Socrates' plea to Meno to persuade Anytus about the things he 
(Meno) has learned so that Anytus' anger might be allayed, which would be beneficial to 
Athens [100b-c] in that Socrates might not be condemned.  The idea that Meno might 
persuade anybody to better behaviour is risible, and forms an appropriate parallel bookend to 
Meno's opening question. 
 
 Meno is a compelling illustration of the way Plato conducts philosophy as an interplay 
between dramatic details and general ideas.  His inquiries into goodness and other desirable 
traits are both hypothetical and concrete, general and specific, and neither dominates nor 
excludes the other.  This dialogue's dominant themes – what is virtue, and can it be acquired 
or taught? – are mediated through discussion with two men who notoriously lacked virtue.  
Plato's choice not to use characters who themselves manifested virtue was deliberate.  He 
does not resolve questions about virtue, but the dramatic setting is a confronting reminder 
that if virtue were teachable then Athens would not have condemned Socrates.    
 
 In terms of general ideas, Meno is philosophically productive compared with other 
Socratic dialogues.  For example, it articulates 'Meno's paradox' [80d-e],22 and the idea of 
gaining knowledge through 'recollection' [81e-86a],23 and the view that 'true opinions' are 
equally beneficial as knowledge so long as they are tethered to the mind by 'reasoning out the 
cause' [98a].24  However, none of this is allowed to outweigh the defective characters of 
Meno and Anytus.  Plato does not let us forget that, while virtue might be granted by divine 
dispensation [99e], and philosophical speculation might pursue general truths, the exercise of 
virtue and the conduct of philosophy are inseparable from individuals in specific situations.  
 
22 The paradox is that you can't search for something if you don't know what you are searching for, but if 
you did know then you wouldn't need to search for it.  
23 Noam Chomsky refers to the Meno when discussing his theory that 'certain aspects of our knowledge 
and understanding are innate' [Language and Problems of Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988) 
3-4].  Socrates famously interrogated Meno's slave about geometry in order to demonstrate how knowledge 
gained in a previous existence can be recollected.  Incidentally, Chomsky regards this as the first recorded 
psychological experiment.   
24 Aristotle also associated episteme (knowledge) with an apprehension of aitia (cause).  After discussing 
the matter, Jonathan Barnes concludes that 'both Plato and Aristotle made a number of mistakes about 
knowledge' [Proof, Knowledge, and Scepticism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2014) 72]. 
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Good ideas and theories do not exist in a social vacuum: their efficacy depends on the right 
people being in the right situations. 
 
Dialogues not set in public 
 We have already referred to Plato's different treatment of indoor and public dialogues, 
but in what ways are they different?  The next section examines a selection of dialogues, 
beginning with those set inside private dwellings: Parmenides, Symposium, Timaeus and 
Critias, Republic, and Protagoras.  Only the last-mentioned is a Socratic dialogue, albeit only 
in part.  Crito and Phaedo are unusual in being Socratic dialogues not set in public.  
However, their subject matter, and Socrates' philosophical life narrative, demand they be set 
inside the prison in which he awaited death.  We are not looking so much at the philosophical 
substance of each dialogue as the ways by which Plato uses interior locations to express and 
frame the ideas he is addressing.  Again, Plato is showing that dramatic setting is 
fundamentally important to the ways in which philosophical dialogue is conducted.       
 
Parmenides 
 This dialogue begins in the agora, but after a brief greeting and inquiry about a 
discussion between Socrates, Parmenides and Zeno that took place years before, the 
interlocutors leave to find Antiphon, who can relate the discussion from memory.  The rest of 
the dialogue is set in Antiphon's house.  Plato is very clear that this dialogue does not take 
place in the agora.  Even Antiphon is described as having left the agora 'to go home just a 
short time ago' [126c].  In short, all participants have gone from the agora into a private 
dwelling.  Indeed, the dialogue is located doubly indoors: Antiphon relates a philosophical 
conversation that took place in the house of Pythodoros.   
 
 The whole dialogue is narrated directly to us (listeners/readers) by Cephalus (not the 
Cephalus of the Republic), who heard it from Antiphon, who heard it from Pythodorus, who 
heard some of it.  Plato goes to great dramatic length to ensure we are at several removes 
from the conversation.  Therefore, though Cephalus addresses us, we are not participants in 
this important and complex work in which Parmenides questions a young Socrates about his 
theory of eternal and immutable 'forms'.   
 
 It is appropriate that, in so challenging a dialogue, Plato demonstrates his awareness of 
the difficulties which a complex matter might engender.  For example, he observes that most 
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people regard philosophical hypothesising – in this instance, considering all sides of a matter 
and speculating about the consequences – as 'idle talk', and do not realise 'that without this 
comprehensive and circuitous treatment we cannot hit upon the truth and gain insight' [135d, 
136e].  Moreover, after reaching some sort of agreement about a matter, it might be necessary 
to 'go back again to the beginning to see whether things will appear the same to us as they do 
now, or different' [163b].  In other words, if a group has settled on a point of view through 
discussion and debate, perhaps it should revisit the original problem to see if it comes up with 
the same view.  And just in case it thinks this is adequate, 'let's go back to the beginning once 
more' [165e] to see if participants have truly understood the matter. 
 
 This dialogue is a paradigm of philosophical integrity and modesty.  Plato subjects his 
archetypical philosopher, Socrates, and one of his pet theories – the 'forms' – to genuine 
criticism by Parmenides, an esteemed older philosopher who also directs the course of 
discussion.  In modern terms, this might be the equivalent of a dialogue written by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein in which he subjects his ideas about private language to interrogation by 
Bertrand Russell.  Plato was prepared to challenge his own ideas – and using Parmenides to 
articulate the challenge shows Plato was in earnest – but the criticism was kept impersonal 
and at arm's length so that the matter under discussion could be rigorously and profitably 
examined.  The dramatic setting strongly suggests this is a dialogue for private pondering and 
discussion, not public participation.           
 
Symposium 
 This dialogue is Plato's artistic masterpiece, but its complicated construction is part of a 
deliberate strategy to detach the message from its author, narrator and audience.  It is narrated 
by Apollodorus, who was present at Socrates' trial and was the most emotional of those who 
witnessed Socrates' death.25  Plato's choice of narrator reminds us that this dialogue, replete 
with life and genius, is nonetheless framed by Socrates' death.   
 
 Apollodorus is asked by a friend to describe the proceedings of a banquet that was held 
some years beforehand.  Apollodorus was not at the banquet; he received his account from 
Aristodemus, who was present, and Apollodorus had asked Socrates to confirm some of the 
details in Aristodemus' account.  From the outset, therefore, the narrator is deliberately 
 
25 Apology 38b; Phaedo 117d. 
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positioned at some remove from his account.  Moreover, whatever pretensions to social status 
or narrative objectivity Aristodemus might have had are undermined by Apollodorus' 
description of him as 'a little fellow, always barefoot … one of Socrates most devoted 
admirers' [173b].  Further, Aristodemus fell asleep towards the end of the evening, and when 
he awoke was too drowsy to remember the arguments in which Socrates was then engaged 
[223].  Clearly the accuracy of Aristodemus' account is questionable, a point Plato reinforces 
by describing Apollodorus' character in a way that does not recommend him as a reliable 
narrator [173c-e].   
 
 Even Socrates' speech during the banquet is not his own; rather, it is 'the account of Eros 
I once heard from a Mantinean woman, Diotima' [201d].  Diotima is very probably a 
fictitious character, so Plato could have described her as a resident of any Greek polis.  His 
choice of Mantinea is instructive because it was the site of a momentous battle between the 
Hellenic states in 418, just two years before the setting of this banquet.  The irony of a speech 
on love from an inhabitant of Mantinea would not have been lost on Plato's auditors.      
 
 The narrative structure of the Symposium leads inexorably to the speech of Alcibiades, 
who 'gate-crashes' the party with Dionysian recklessness and whose speech is a paean to 
Socrates.  Plato's readers need no reminding that Alcibiades was an ambitious, dazzling 
demagogue who was murdered at the request of Athenian tyrants in 404.  They also know 
that, like Socrates, he was charged with impiety.  Within the dramatic context of the 
Symposium, Alcibiades is a tainted man: it was largely his ambition that drew Athens into a 
coalition that was defeated by Sparta at Mantinea.  The reference to Diotima is, therefore, 
doubly poignant.   
 
 The timing of Alcibiades' arrival – immediately after Socrates' discourse, so Alcibiades 
hears none of it – underpins the dramatic purpose of his speech: Socrates was not responsible 
for Alcibiades' political rashness and deceit.  Moreover, they are completely different 
characters.  Alcibiades is already drunk when he arrives, whereas Socrates, well known for 
being able to maintain sobriety, remains unaffected by his voluminous consumption of festive 
wine.  Alcibiades laments that Socrates resisted his amorous advances: in a scene that 
resonates with Socrates' trial, Alcibiades calls on the banqueters to act as judges of Socrates' 
hubris [219c].  Both men were charged with impiety, and Socrates also with corrupting the 
young, of which Alcibiades was the most notorious example.  Plato leaves readers in no 
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doubt that Socrates was not responsible for Alcibiades' behaviour; indeed, his self-indulgence 
was despite Socrates' influence.  Further, Plato uses this episode to convey his tacit support 
for the Socratic quest for definitions.  If both Alcibiades and Socrates were charged with 
impiety, but their actions and beliefs were fundamentally different, then the Athenian 
authorities stand condemned by Socrates' own method because clearly they do not know what 
impiety is.        
  
 Plato demonstrates his commitment to philosophy as a public activity by locating the 
banquet inside a private dwelling.  In order to attend, Socrates must withdraw from the public 
sphere in which he normally conducts his philosophical dialogues and enter into the private 
realm of Agathon's house.  After drinking and arguing all other guests under the table, he 
departs and resumes his regular daily activities in public [223d].  The only elenchus in the 
Symposium is a brief interrogation of Agathon himself, whose victory in dramatic 
composition, a considerable achievement for a dramaturge of his youth, was the reason for 
their celebration.  In other words, Agathon has just been publicly acclaimed and is the only 
person present who has not had to withdraw into somebody else's private realm.  Within the 
context of Plato's dramatic structure, Agathon is the only suitable candidate for Socratic 
interrogation.  Further, this elenchus occurs immediately before, and acts as a preamble to, 
Socrates' own speech.  It is Plato's avowal that the elenchus is an essential and inextricable 
element of Socratic philosophy and that, even if one withdraws into a private space, the 
philosophical spirit of Socrates cannot be evaded.  Finally, this elenchus closes with a 
statement that may, in this later work, serve as Plato's valedictory on Socratic questioning: it 
is not difficult to contradict Socrates, but one cannot contradict the truth [201c].                           
 
Republic 
 Though Socrates is the key figure in this dialogue, it is set not in Athens but in Piraeus, 
the port that served Athens, located slightly less than five miles from the city itself.  
Moreover, the setting is indoors, in the house of Cephalus, an aged acquaintance of Socrates.  
This very atypical setting for a Socratic dialogue is instructive: Socrates is not only well away 
from his usual Athenian public habitat but is also in a private realm.  Plato's listeners would 
have been aware that Piraeus had been (and remained26) the strongest centre of Athenian 
democracy, to the degree that it became the focus of resistance to the tyranny of the Thirty in 
 
26 According to Aristotle [Politics 1303b10]. 
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404/3.27  The cosmopolitan character of Piraeus was evident in its being home to a large 
number of metics – freeborn foreigners who were not Athenian citizens but who were 
allowed to reside in Athens and its surrounds, usually by paying a tax.  Cephalus is himself a 
metic.  Given the high proportion of inhabitants from elsewhere it is not surprising that 
Piraeus was also home to a number of foreign cults, including those of Isis and Bendis.  The 
latter was a Thracian goddess.28  Bendis is important in the Republic because the dialogue 
opens with Socrates beginning his return to Athens after having walked to Piraeus to attend a 
festival in her honour: Socrates' devotion to the gods is not limited to Athena.     
 
 Plato has constructed an opening scene in which every detail informs our reading of the 
remainder.  To begin, it is important to note that the Republic is not itself a dialogue; it is 
Socrates' recollection of a long series of dialogues from the day before.  However, Plato does 
not provide another party to whom Socrates relates these events and discussions, so there is 
no sense in which the reader/auditor can 'listen in' to Socrates regaling a companion with his 
account.  No citizen of any polis is being addressed: instead, Socrates is speaking directly to 
the reader/auditor.  We are being invited, or challenged, to think about the matters raised.  
Further, Socrates' narrative recollection does not itself have a dramatic setting; Socrates is 
speaking from nowhere.  In a dialogue about the ideal city-state, Plato's deliberate strategy 
not to locate the framing narrative suggests that the ideal polity is also nowhere.  Moreover, 
by concluding with Socrates' rendition of the myth of Er – in which justice outweighs 
injustice in both this life and the afterlife – Plato pulls the dialogic carpet from beneath us.  A 
constitution for the ideal city may be the subject of never-ending discussion, but it must be 
grounded on an unchallenged belief that 'the soul is immortal and able to endure every evil 
and also every good, and always hold to the upward path' [621c].   
        
 The first word in the Republic – κατεβην (kateben, 'I went down', from the verb 
katabaino) – immediately sets the tone for the remainder.  In Greek epic poetry, for example, 
the opening word is usually important because it both seizes the audience's attention and 
declares the matter at hand.  In the Iliad, the first word is μηνιν (menin, 'wrath'), which not 
only establishes the subject matter – the wrath of Achilles – but also captures the listener's 
attention.  With kateben, Plato is (quite literally) providing a direction for the dialogue: 
 
27 For more details see Robert S. J. Garland, 'Piraeus', OCD, 1185. 
28 Ancient Thrace occupied the area that is now Bulgaria, northern Greece and north-western Turkey. 
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Socrates went down to Piraeus.  Moreover, the word anticipates the famous allegory of the 
cave in book 7 (514a-518c).29  In this allegory, the prisoner who is released and taken 
upwards out of the cave in order to see reality, thereafter returns, out of pity for his fellow 
prisoners, back down (καταβας, katabas, also from katabaino) into the cave.  However, 
having returned to his original place, this man appears ridiculous because he can no longer 
compete against the others at identifying shapes in this world of shadows.  The other 
prisoners would say that this man's eyes had been dazzled and ruined by his journey upwards, 
so if anyone tried to free the remaining prisoners they would kill that person.  With one word, 
therefore, Plato has set the Republic against the background of Socrates' death.  Socrates is 
the philosopher who has ascended to glimpse reality and is now on a hazardous (and 
eventually fatal) mission in the earthly realm of shadows. 
 
  There is a further point: kataben might inform our reading, but it is hardly a resounding 
call to attention (unlike, for example, a dramatic shout of 'Wrath!').  Indeed, as an opening 
salvo it carries an element of bathos, but this is clearly deliberate.  Plato is suggesting there is 
nothing glamorous or exciting about the philosophical life.  Socrates' mission may take him 
to philosophise in unfamiliar places that are, literally and philosophically, lower than his 
comfortable haunts, with people not of his own choosing, whose responses to him vary from 
meek agreement through to boredom and on to outright hostility.  Plato did not intend the 
opening scene to frame a portrait of how philosophy should be conducted but rather of how it 
is conducted.   
 
Protagoras 
 This is both a complex dialogue and a dramatic masterpiece.  It is narrated by Socrates to 
an unnamed friend.  Very early in the morning, Socrates was awoken by his young friend 
Hippocrates, who asked him for an introduction to Protagoras, the foremost professional 
 
29 John Sallis thinks that kateben also anticipates the myth of Er with which Socrates concludes the 
Republic [Chorology: On Beginning in Plato's Timaeus (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999) 
23].  Part of the myth describes a judgment of the dead.  Those who had been unjust when alive were 
directed down (kato) into the earth to endure the horrors of the underworld [614c].  Sallis is unlikely to be 
right because in the two earlier references it is Socrates who descends, which is certainly not the case in his 




sophist.  Socrates questioned Hippocrates on what he hoped to achieve by submitting to, and 
paying for, Protagoras' teaching.  Socrates warned Hippocrates about the danger of buying 
learning from Protagoras or anyone else.  Then they depart for the house of Callias, where 
Protagoras was staying and where the remainder of the dialogue is set.   
 
 Every detail in these scenes is carefully contrived.  Plato could have presented the entire 
dialogue in direct speech; once again, the opening scene serves to keep the dialogue at arm's 
length from the reader/auditor.  Socrates' interrogation of Hippocrates sets the framework for 
his later elenchus with Protagoras, but there is no straightforward correspondence: one should 
not trust vendors of education, yet Socrates treats Protagoras with respect, neither of them 
emerges unscathed or victorious from their exchanges, and Plato's portrait of Protagoras is 
sympathetic and substantial.  Socrates observes that 'Protagoras spends most of his time 
indoors' [311a], an oblique comment on a fundamental difference: Socrates spends most of 
his time in public.  Indeed, even though his narrative is set indoors, Socrates relates it in a 
public place.   
 
 The dramatic setting in Callias' mansion is significant.  Callias was a disciple of 
Protagoras, but was most famous for squandering his enormous inherited fortune, largely on 
sophists.  In a dialogue that largely centres on whether virtue can be taught, Callias 
personifies the view that it can be neither taught nor purchased.  When Socrates and 
Hippocrates arrive at Callias' mansion, the doorman thinks they are sophists and so slams the 
door in their face [314d].  Andrea Nightingale rightly regards this as a topos of comedy,30 but 
there is more to it.  The anticipatory discussion between Socrates and Hippocrates has left 
readers in no doubt that Socrates is not a sophist.  Plato strikes the dramatic middle ground: 
the doorman is wrong about identity, but right in response – Socrates does not belong inside.  
Moreover, when Socrates and Hippocrates are finally admitted, they are confronted with an 
almost farcical tableau.  Protagoras is surrounded by acolytes who, with artistic precision, 
maintain a chorus formation behind him as he walks in one direction, and then another, 
around the courtyard [315b].  Another sophist, Hippias of Elis, is surrounded by attentive 
devotees, as is another – Prodicus of Ceos – though he is still in bed.   
 
 
30 Andrea Wilson Nightingale, Genres in dialogue: Plato and the construct of philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995) 6. 
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 Plato populated this dialogue with a broad range of well-known characters.  Besides 
Callias, Plato identifies 14 of those present who attend the three sophists.  These details might 
seem superfluous to the argument, and seem irrelevant for modern readers, but for Plato's 
contemporaries they provided a rich prosopography to illuminate a dialogue about the 
possibility of teaching virtue.  Among those named are some who committed sacrilege 
(Charmides, Phaedrus, Alcibiades and Adeimantus); others who were wastrels (Xanthippus 
and Paralus); one who was renowned for his degenerate passions (Callias, in addition to 
squandering the family fortune); several who met nasty ends (Alcibiades and Charmides; 
Xanthippus and Paralus both died of plague); one who was imprisoned for debt (Andron); 
one who was notorious for political violence (Critias); and some who achieved good 
reputations (Antimoerus, who was Protagoras' best student, and Agathon the playwright).31  
They provide a panorama of often controversial examples and counter-examples to 
undermine any preconceptions, let alone conclusions, an auditor/reader might entertain about 
the acquisition of virtue.  
 
 Further, the characters who attend the three sophists constitute an oblique comment on 
their mentors.  For example, both Paralus and Charmides attach themselves to Protagoras – 
no reputable teacher would wish to be associated with either – but so does Antimoeurus, of 
whom any teacher would be proud [315a].  Sophists might influence their disciples/students, 
but Plato clearly rejects the idea that they are responsible for their behaviour – as he rejected 
Socrates' responsibility for the conduct of some who attached themselves to him.  In 
particular, Critias is portrayed as arriving after Socrates [316a] and as not attached to any 
sophist: Critias alone is responsible for his political brutality.  In a dialogue that debates 
whether virtue can be taught, Plato's dramatic setting and characterisations form a nuanced 
backdrop to a question he allows to remain unresolved.  
 
Timaeus and Critias 
 These dialogues form a pair.  They are set on the same day, with Critias following 
immediately after Timaeus.  Socrates plays only a minor role in Timaeus and almost no role 
in Critias.  The former consists of a speech by Critias (almost certainly not Critias the tyrant) 
in which he outlines a forgotten account of ancient Athens and the destruction of Atlantis, 
 
31 For a comparable tableau, a modern reader could insert her or his own contemporary gallery of political 
opportunists, wealthy misfits, spectacular failures and worthy successes.  
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and then a long and rhetorically dazzling speech by Timaeus in which he describes the 
creation of the world.  Critias consists almost entirely of a long speech by Critias about 
Athens and Atlantis, the subjects he had earlier anticipated.  These works are set on the day 
after Socrates' has expatiated on the ideal state and its citizens.  Most commentators take this 
to be a reference to the Republic, or perhaps the first half of it,32 but Plato's dramatic setting 
cautions against this view.  Besides Socrates, Timaeus features three characters: Timaeus, 
Critias and Hermocrates.  The dialogue begins with a statement by Timaeus that Socrates had 
been a generous host to the three yesterday, so it is incumbent on them to be as generous in 
return.  However, none of the three appears in the Republic, and Socrates could not have 
acted as host to anybody because he was a guest of Polemarchus (son of Cephalus) in 
Piraeus.     
 
 Further, Timaeus is set during the Panathenaea [26e] – the festival in honour of Athen's 
patron goddess – whereas Republic is set during the festival of Bendis, which is two months 
earlier than the Panathenaea and not held in Athens.33  There can be little doubt that Plato 
uses the dramatic setting to segregate Timaeus from Republic in both time and place.  
 
 Further still, Timaeus – who might be Plato's dramatic invention – is described as a 
citizen of Locri in southern Italy and he is very likely a Pythagorean.  Plato uses this 
character as a mouthpiece for his creation myth; it thereby cannot be attributed to Socrates, or 
to himself, nor is it discussed or defended.  Neither dialogue is a work of philosophy in 
Plato's usual sense of public argument and participation.  Appropriately, therefore, they are 
located indoors, probably inside Critias' house. 
 
 Why is Plato careful to keep Timaeus (in particular) and Critias at arm's length?  The 
answer might be that the Timaeus is, for the most part, a work of theology.  One of the 
charges against Socrates concerned his 'innovating in theological matters'.34  Always mindful 
of Socrates' fate, Plato wanted to expound views without the possibility of their being 
misused against him in an accusation of heresy.  The indoor setting precludes any public 
 
32 For example, A. E. Taylor asserts that 'Timaeus unmistakably announces itself as in a way a continuation 
of the Republic' [Plato: The Man and His Work, 4th ed. (London: Methuen, 1960) 437]. 
33 Sallis, 22. 
34 Euthyphro 3b. 
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debate and thereby the possibility of corrupting anyone.  It is clear that Plato was not inclined 
to portray theology as a matter for public discussion. 
 
 Further, and more importantly, in these works Plato uses dramatic setting to demonstrate 
the limitations of dialogue.  Dialogue is able to expose slipshod thinking and to clarify 
matters, but it is much less effective than narrative for introducing challenging ideas or 
mythologies.  In the Timaeus, Socrates stands silently aside while Timaeus presents an 
imaginative and complex aetiological myth in which a divine craftsman (demiourgos – 
demiurge [28a]) imposes mathematical order on chaos; creates human, animal and plant life; 
establishes the geometry of solids, and so on.  In the Critias, the eponymous character 
narrates a primordial myth about the vanished kingdom of Atlantis.  In either dialogue, an 
elenchus would be inappropriate and counter-productive.  Timaeus challenges a reader's 
cosmology, and Critias demands a vigorous re-interpretation of Athens' past.  These are 
narratives of existential significance and novelty – stories about who we (Athenians) are, 
where we've come from, and how the world works.         
 
Crito 
 Alone among Plato's dialogues, Crito addresses a matter of practical ethics – whether 
Socrates should avail himself of his friends' plan to spring him from jail and smuggle him 
into exile.  The prison setting seems appropriate, but it also constitutes a comment on the 
subject under discussion.  The dialogue is about civic justice, but Socrates is the victim of 
injustice, and prison is as far from civic life and interaction as it is possible to be.  Further, he 
is alone with Crito, and Crito's arguments for accepting the plan are muddled and 
unconvincing, so Socrates conducts most of the dialogue with the laws of Athens personified 
as an interlocutor.  Ergo, in this matter of civic ethics – which should obviously be a matter of 
public discussion – Socrates is almost talking to himself.   
 
 It is worth knowing, though rarely noted, that Crito was the same age as Socrates;35 this 
is a conversation between two old men of about 70 – the life expectancy of a prominent male 
 
35 Apology 33d. 
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citizen at this time.36  When Socrates says it would be strange if somebody of his age were to 
complain about dying [43b], this is also an oblique comment on Crito.  When Crito replies 
that other people of Socrates' age have met similar misfortune but they have not allowed their 
age to stop them from resenting their fate, we are prompted to ask why Crito doesn't speak 
about himself.  Why doesn't he say that he would not accept the injustice that Socrates has 
suffered and would act accordingly?  Plato could have used a much younger and more 
vigorous man to converse with Socrates, so why did he utilise an unconvincing character who 
is also near the end of his life?  The likely answer is that Plato, who was about 24 when 
Socrates died, wanted to leave the question unresolved.  A man of 70 might accept his fate 
with equanimity, but the ensuing dialogue – with an old man and then with a personified 
legal code – is unlikely to persuade a much younger person, even though age should be 
irrelevant to the logic and outcome of the argument.   
 
 The dialogue ends peremptorily and unsatisfactorily: Socrates shuts down the discussion 
by asserting that the laws' arguments are so loud they drown out any to the contrary, so Crito 
shouldn't waste his breath [54d] – a very non-Socratic conclusion.  Plato is keen to show that 
Socrates is innocent of the charges against him, and that he punctiliously observes Athenian 
law, but he deliberately set the discussion in private so that it should not be regarded as a 
template for resolving issues of civic ethics.  Again, Plato is mindful of Socrates' fate.             
 
 Probably the most telling argument against exile is the personified laws' assertion that 
Socratic dialogue can be pursued only in well-governed cities [53b-53d], but these cities 
regard Socrates as a threat to their constitutions because he leads people astray, particularly 
the 'young and thoughtless', and makes them question the assumptions that undergird those 
constitutions.  For example, if the laws of a polis are predicated on the broadly accepted 
assumption that justice means treating friends well and enemies badly,37 then Socrates' view 
 
36 Menelaos L. Batrinos, 'The length of life and eugeria [happy old age] in classical Greece', Hormones 7.1 
(2008) 82-83.  Seventy years was the median lifespan for a well-known Greek male (that is, one for whom 
there is literary or epigraphical evidence) in the 400s to 300s BCE.   
37 A generally accepted view in most ancient societies.  For example, Solon (c. 640 - c. 560) prays that the 
gods will grant him prosperity, and 'to be sweet to my friends, and bitter to my enemies, respected by the 
first, a terror to the others' [fragment 13.5-6].  In the Old Testament, Psalm 7.4 states (when correctly 
translated) that 'if I have repaid my ally with treachery or spared someone who attacked me unprovoked' 
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that a person who is being treated unjustly should not act unjustly in return is clearly 
upsetting to the social order and contrary to most people's opinion [49b].  As the argument 
unfolds we are led to the confronting denouement that Plato's paradigm philosopher can 
neither flee nor has anywhere to flee to. 
 
Dialogues set in public – Apology    
 There is a further complexity.  Socrates argues it would be wrong for him to disobey the 
decision of a legitimate court, yet in the Apology he states that if the court were to allow him 
to live on the condition that he cease philosophising, he could not abide by that ruling: 'so 
long as I breathe and so long as I am able I shall never stop doing philosophy' because 'this is 
what the god orders me to do' [29d, 30a].  There is a hierarchy of claims here: the court is 
legally competent to condemn a person to death, even for spurious reasons, but according to 
Socrates it is not competent to override a divine command.  Plato presents us with, and 
inverts, a familiar conundrum: we do not think the law invariably judges rightly – a view 
which itself appeals to a higher concept of right than one manifested by a forensic assessment 
– but we (and Athenians) usually agree that a court's decision overrules any appeal to divine 
will.  After all, part of a court's job is to preserve the peace, and any number of antisocial 
acts, or worse, have been committed by those who invoke god's will to justify their activities. 
 
 There is the further point about Socrates' attitude to the law: when Socrates was a 
member of the Council – appointment was by lot – he alone opposed a decision of his 49 
fellow prytaneis to put ten naval commanders on trial together.38  Socrates regarded the 
decision as unjust and contrary to the law, as did the Council when it voted against the 
proposal.  On the other hand, when the Thirty oligarchs ruled Athens (404/3 BCE), Socrates 
disobeyed their ruling to seize a man from Salamis for execution in Athens.  Socrates refused 
because he thought the command was unjust [32d], not because it was contrary to law, given 
that commands issued by the Thirty were (strictly speaking) lawful.  Plato is very keen to 
demonstrate that Socrates was law-abiding, though keener still to show he confronts injustice, 
but this is not congruent with acquiescence to the injustice he suffers.  It is probable that Plato 
 
then I deserve to be punished.  Good must be repaid with good; evil with evil.  In the Republic, Plato 
attributes it to Polemarchus [332d].  
38 Apology 32b-c.  After a successful sea battle in 406, the ten were accused of failing to retrieve the dead.  
The fifty prytaneis constituted a committee responsible for preparing the Council's agenda.    
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wanted to portray his paradigm philosopher as someone who draws attention to and 
challenges injustice, except when he is its victim.  In this way Plato could preserve one of 
Socrates' most important characteristics – confrontation with thoughtless power – while 
avoiding accusations of self-interest. 
 
Euthyphro 
 Appropriately, the dramatic preface to discussions during Socrates' last days is the 
Euthyphro, in which Socrates is about to appear in the king archon's stoa to answer an 
indictment against him.  The subject of this dialogue is piety: 'is what is pious loved by the 
gods because it's pious, or is it pious because it's loved by them? [10a].  In other words, is 
something pious in and of itself without reference to what the gods think about it?  The 
tentative answer is yes: 'the pious is loved for the very reason that it's pious; it's not pious by 
reason of being loved' [10e].  The remainder of this dialogue between Socrates and 
Euthyphro concerns the type of conduct that might attract divine approval, but the discussion 
goes around in circles and resolves nothing further [15b-d].   
 
 The dramatic setting of this work is fundamental to understanding what is going on.  
Euthyphro is a seer [3e, mantis, soothsayer] who is bringing a lawsuit against his own father 
for killing, probably by neglect, a day-labourer who, in a drunken rage, had murdered one of 
his father's slaves.  Euthyphro notes that most people think he is being impious in proceeding 
against his father, particularly in a case like this, but Euthyphro dismisses their opinion 
because he knows what piety and impiety are, whereas they do not.  Given that Socrates is 
being indicted for impiety, he could not have found a more appropriate interlocutor than a 
seer who possesses overweening confidence about his knowledge of the gods.   
 
 Like most Socratic dialogues, the matter under discussion remains unresolved: 
Euthyphro says he has to attend another appointment, so Socrates is left lamenting a lost 
opportunity to become an expert in divine matters and therefore not be guilty of impiety.  
Christopher Rowe is not alone in thinking 'the discussion has come very close to finding out 
what piety really is – and that it is exemplified in the person, and activities, of Socrates 
himself'.39  Rowe has missed the point: Plato is not being evasive; he could have extended the 
discussion if this had served his purpose.  The problem is that Socrates himself is motivated 
 
39 Christopher Rowe, 'Introduction to Euthyphro' in The Last Day of Socrates (London: Penguin, 2010) 5. 
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and guided by a divine voice.40  His philosophising is an act of piety because he obeys the 
gods – that is, it is loved by the gods, therefore it must be pious.  There is no indication that 
his philosophising is loved by the gods because it is pious in and of itself.  In other words, 
Plato cannot leave piety as a substantive because that would contradict his portrayal of 
Socrates.  To this end, Plato is keen to show that, despite their different views about piety, 
Socrates and Euthyphro have a great deal in common – both attend the king archon's stoa, 
both are grappling with matters of piety, both possess divine knowledge – and Plato is happy 
to allow the argument to meander before ending inconclusively.  The point is that, for Plato's 
auditors and readers, the unfinished argument continues and is further informed, and framed, 
by Socrates's trial and death. 
 
Theaetetus and Euthyphro 
 There is an additional point: Euthyphro's association with Socrates' final days has 
obscured its dramatic placement within Plato's corpus – immediately after the Theaetetus.  
We are accustomed to place Theaetetus together with Parmenides – there are references to 
Parmenides in Theaetetus 180d and 183d-e – while the dramatic settings of Sophist and 
Statesman clearly place them in that order on the day after Theaetetus.  Indeed, the four 
works are usually classified together as later works,41 whereas Euthyphro is invariably 
regarded as an early dialogue.  These classifications might be correct, but if Plato wrote 
Theaetetus well after Euthyphro then his dramatic setting made sure the later dialogue led 
straight into the earlier: at the end of Theaetetus, Socrates says he has to leave his 
interlocutors because he must attend at the king archon's stoa to answer the indictment 
against him [210d].  In short, he walks directly to the beginning of Euthyphro.42  The 
juxtaposition of the two dialogues is significant.  Theaetetus is a sustained discussion about 
the definition of knowledge, but no agreed definition is reached before Socrates' departure.  
Socrates is then engaged in a discussion about piety, which also ends without resolution, but 
 
40 Apology 31c-d. 
41 For example, Timothy Chappell asserts there are six stages in Plato's philosophical development, and 
these four works, along with Philebus, represent the fifth stage [Reading Plato's Theaetetus (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing, 2005) 10-11] while Gregory Vlastos asserts they are products of Plato's middle 
(Parmenides and Theaetetus) and latest (Sophist and Statesman) periods [Socrates: ironist and moral 
philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 46-47]. 
42 Ruby Blondell, for example, notes the importance of Theaetetus being set on the day Socrates faces his 
indictment, but she does not mention Euthyphro [Blondell, 317]. 
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this time it is the interlocutor, not Socrates, who terminates the conversation.  Both dialogues 
conclude in epistemic dead-ends, but in both the journey to that point has clarified matters 
under discussion.   
 
 The chronology and characterisation of both dialogues leave little doubt that Plato 
wanted Euthyphro to be Socrates' last public philosophising.  The setting is deliberate: 
Socrates' final elenchus was about piety, with an 'expert' on the subject, in a sacred area, 
immediately before (in place and time) his indictment for impiety.  When Euthyphro 
terminates the dialogue, Socrates feels let down because he had not yet learned what piety is.  
Plato's point is that, in his last public elenchus, Socrates was abandoned by one of the few 
interlocutors who might have helped him.  
 
Gorgias 
 Indeed, there are times when dialogue is inadequate or simply fails.  Socrates begins this 
discussion with three interlocutors, but first Gorgias and then Polus withdraw, leaving the 
combative Callicles to continue.  The dialogue fails to flourish.  Socrates laments to Callicles 
that 'you and I are doing an odd thing in our conversation.  The whole time we've been 
discussing, we constantly keep drifting back to the same point, neither of us recognising what 
the other is saying' [517c].  Socrates' attempt to put the discussion back on track meets with 
only partial success.  He realises he has been reduced to stump oratory [519d], thereby 
confirming an accusation Callicles had levelled at him earlier in the dialogue [482c].   
 
 Plato has presented an ambitious and sophisticated dialogue, but has deliberately 
undermined both qualities: the discussion degenerates into an edgy impasse.  Socrates 
acknowledges he is under threat of death [521b-d].  He abandons dialogue and concludes by 
narrating an eschatological myth about the judgement of souls after death.  The dialogue is 
unable to resolve its central issue – Socrates' assertion that it is better to suffer wrong than do 
wrong – but thereby underscores the roles of myth and narrative in broadening our 
understanding of contentious matters.          
 
Phaedrus 
 This is the only Socratic dialogue set in a rural retreat.  It is a private conversation 
between Socrates and Phaedrus, who is going for a walk outside Athens to recuperate after 
spending an exhausting morning listening to Lysias the orator.  Lysias is the son of Cephalus, 
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whom we met in the Republic, and who lives in Piraeus.  Plato is setting a scene in which 
Socrates will again be venturing outside his 'comfort zone' within Athens' walls.  Plato even 
has Socrates agreeing with Phaedrus that 'it's more refreshing to walk along country roads 
than city streets' [227b], a sentiment completely foreign to the city-loving Socrates.  Indeed, 
when they reach a shady spot on the bank of the Ilisus, Phaedrus notices that Socrates 
'appear[s] to be totally out of place' because he 'never even set foot beyond the city walls' 
[230c-d].  Socrates agrees: he is devoted to learning, but 'landscapes and trees have nothing to 
teach me; only people in the city can do that' [230d], an avowal he makes immediately after 
delivering a brief oration of idyllic sentiment on the beauties of their surrounds.  Plato is 
constructing a dramatic framework of lyrical contradiction.  The city-dwelling Socrates, 
about to listen to Phaedrus read a speech that is not his – it is by Lysias – is able to speak with 
poetic feeling and insight on a subject and in a place which are unfamiliar to him. 
 
 The last section of Phaedrus contains a well-known criticism of written discourse.  The 
participants in a dialogue are responsive to one another, reinterpreting and reformulating 
arguments and so on, but if you question a written text about its meaning, it returns the same 
answer again and again [275d-e].  Moreover, for anybody who has written political 
discourses, if that person has knowledge of truth, and if he can defend his writings when 
challenged and thereby show how inferior his writings are compared to his speech, then he 
deserves to be known as a lover of wisdom rather than merely a writer of political treatises 
[278c-d].  Plato is engaging in both self-criticism and self-defence.  He is aware of writing's 
limitations, in particular that written discourse cannot distinguish between suitable and 
unsuitable readers [275e].  He therefore writes dialogues, which are usually open-ended and 
inconclusive and render a different interpretation with each reading.  Further, Plato uses 
detailed dramatic frameworks and characterisation to 'locate' his dialogues.  Ergo, though he 
cannot control readings or attempts to abstract ideas from their context, the dialogues are 
tailored to their participant characters (who are usually real people) and express the 
limitations that often attend spoken dialogue. 
 
 This is a masterfully constructed dialogue in which dramatic contradiction is intrinsic to 
Plato's intent.  Socrates and Phaedrus are having a private conversation, but they are out in 
the open and very far from being 'in private'.  Socrates lives and breathes Athenian life, yet is 
perfectly comfortable in a pastoral retreat.  Socrates criticises the unresponsive quality of 
written documents, yet his philosophy lives only through written dialogues, and Phaedrus 
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itself is a model of multi-layered meaning and fluid interpretation.  Socrates neither believes 
nor disbelieves local legends: rather, he is content to accept what is generally believed, 
because a broad-scale program to supply rational explanation for these myths would detract 
from more important pursuits [229c-230a].                                
  
Sophist and Statesman 
 Socrates has only a very minor role in both dialogues.  The Sophist is a discussion 
between Theaetetus and an unnamed philosopher from Elea in southern Italy, famous as the 
home of Parmenides and Zeno.43  Socrates introduces the discussion – about the 
characteristics of a sophist – and thereafter is silent.  The visiting Eleatic is also the primary 
interlocutor in the Statesman, this time with a young namesake of Socrates in a discussion 
about expert knowledge required by those who rule.  Again, Socrates plays no role apart from 
introducing the discussion. 
 
 The setting of both dialogues after the epistemological investigation of Theaetetus is 
significant.  Sophist concludes by arguing that a sophist mimics the characteristics of justice 
and virtue, but does not possess knowledge of what he is mimicking.  He is not self-deluded; 
he has suspicions that he doesn't have this knowledge and therefore pretends to possess it.  He 
is an 'insincere imitator', unlike 'sincere imitators' who foolishly and falsely think they 
possess this knowledge [268a].  If he can maintain his insincerity in public speeches then he 
is a demagogue, but if he speaks in 'private conversation to force the person talking with him 
to contradict himself' then he is a sophist [268b-c].  But isn't Socrates famous for arguing 
people into contradiction?  In the Gorgias, for example, Callicles (a young politician) berates 
Socrates for forcing Gorgias (a teacher of rhetoric) to contradict himself, which was 'just the 
thing you like. … Tell me, Socrates, aren't you ashamed, at your age, of trying to catch 
people's words and of making hay out of someone's tripping on a phrase?' [482d, 489b].  In 
Meno, the titular character says to Socrates, 'before I even met you I used to hear that all you 
do is get puzzled yourself and make others puzzled' [80a].  Isn't Socrates, therefore, a 
sophist?  The question, or accusation, is important because it shows how easily, and 
dangerously, dialogue can be misunderstood.  However, Plato made it clear that Socrates' 
intent was not to confound but rather to test the Delphic oracle's declaration that nobody was 
 
43 Zeno was Parmenides' protégé and is best known for his paradoxes. 
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wiser than himself.44  He found that those who professed to be, or were acclaimed as, wise or 
knowledgeable about something were nothing of the sort.  The oracle was right: Socrates was 
wiser than anybody he challenged because 'it is likely that neither of us knows anything 
worthwhile, but he thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not 
know, neither do I think I know'.45  While there is a clear echo of the earlier Apology in the 
later Sophist, the differences are no less clear: Socrates did not mimic anybody, because no 
person possessed the traits he might have thought worth mimicking; Socrates was not merely 
suspicious that he did not know things – rather, he avowed it – and he never pretended to 
know; Socrates was not a demagogue – and he did not make long-winded speeches to 
crowds.  Indeed, his sole extended public speech (the Apology) resulted in his being 
condemned to death.  Further, Socrates rarely tried to convince people in private 
conversation; his elenchus was an instrument of public participation.  Moreover, if Socrates 
were, like a sophist, to be evaluated according to the success of his methods, he would be 
assessed as outstandingly unsuccessful.  The elenctic dialogues usually end inconclusively or 
in Socrates' failure to change anybody's mind,46 yet he still managed to upset a lot of people.  
It is Plato's sober warning that public debate rarely achieves what we hope to accomplish.  
 
 In the Statesman, Plato has the Eleatic visitor compare three political systems: rule by 
one person – monarchy or tyranny; rule by a few – aristocracy or oligarchy; and rule by many 
– democracy.  The best system is monarchy, when one person rules according to law, but the 
worst is tyranny, when one person rules unfettered by law.  The second-best system is rule by 
an aristocratic few in compliance with the law, and the second-worst is rule by oligarchs who 
disregard it.  Democracy, then, is the worst system when the state is law-abiding, but is better 
than the others when the law is disregarded.  Whether worst or best, democracy has no other 
 
44 Apology 20e-21d. 
45 Apology 21d. 
46 The conclusion to Lesser Hippias is instructive.  Hippias, a famous sophist, is arguing against Socrates' 
view that the good person does injustice voluntarily, while the bad person does it involuntarily.   
Hippias: I can't agree with you in that, Socrates.  
Socrates: Nor I with myself, Hippias. … On these matters I waver back and forth. [376b-c] 
This is a striking example of Socratic honesty.  Though Socrates' argument to this point succeeded in a 
limited sense, it failed more broadly, as he realised.  Ergo, he disavowed the conclusion of his own 
argument.  The whole dialogue leaves us (and doubtless Socrates and Hippias) uncomfortably aware that 
winning an argument might count for little.   
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name [291e - 292a].  As Plato sees it, the broader problem is that so few – hardly more than 
one or two people – possess expert knowledge of governing.  Ergo, a large group is incapable 
of acquiring this or any other sort of expertise [297b, 300e].  Democracy is therefore largely 
impotent, the least effective for doing either good or evil compared to the other two systems 
[303a].  Then Plato draws a conclusion that is disarmingly modern: except for the few who 
possess expert knowledge, those who govern under any system are not statesmen but rather 
experts in party faction, 'leaders of bogus governments and themselves no less bogus, they 
are supreme imitators and sorcerers, the sophists' sophists' [303c].  
 
Plato's dramatic silence 
 It is significant that Plato does not speak in any of his dialogues.  Indeed, his sole 
appearance is in the Apology [38b] as one of four people who would act as guarantors if 
Socrates were let off with a fine.  Plato mentions himself in Phaedo, the narrative of Socrates' 
death-bed conversation, but only to record his absence – 'Plato, I think, was ill' [59b] – even 
though Phaedo names 14 others who were present.  Phaedo narrates this dialogue to 
Echecrates, a well-known Pythagorean, in Phlius, a Pythagorean refuge about half-way 
between Athens and Sparta.  Why is the narrative setting of this superb and important 
dialogue – Socrates' philosophical testament – so far from Athens, in a city that supports 
Sparta, and why is its recipient a Pythagorean rather than a recognised disciple of Socrates?  
The probable answer is that Plato wanted to demonstrate that, though Socrates almost always 
conducted his discussions in Athens, and though the city silenced him, his philosophy was 
still alive and was being embraced by people who lived well beyond Athens and whose 
political allegiance was not Athenian, who were not part of Socrates' circle and who were not 
even Socratic philosophers.  Plato's Socratic dialogues demonstrated that the 'gadfly' 
[Apology 30e] could not be silenced and was still pestering Athens, asking its citizens 
awkward questions; Phaedo showed that the gadfly had flown well beyond Athenian walls. 
 
 Plato's dramatic reticence is a manoeuvre to keep his dialogues at arm's length from 
himself.  No ideas or arguments are presented as his own.  There is no identifiable 
authoritative voice or doctrine of the 'master' to which readers/listeners must adhere, or which 
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must be taken on trust, or which is beyond criticism.47  It is interesting to note Karl Popper's 
well-known view that Socrates 'refused to compromise his personal integrity', whereas Plato 
'was led along a path on which he compromised his integrity with every step he took.  He was 
forced to combat free thought, and the pursuit of truth.'48  The obvious problem with this 
view is that Popper's Socrates is no less Plato's creation than those works which, as Popper 
argues, defend certain aspects of tyranny.  Socrates is eternally present in Plato's dialogues, 
and Plato allowed his Socratic dialogues to circulate, and be used in the Academy, alongside 
(presumably) later works such as the Republic.49  If Plato were the person depicted by Popper 
then he would have repudiated his earlier dialogues or suppressed them: he did neither.  More 
likely, Plato would have abandoned dialogue – he never did – to write treatises instead.  As 
Ruby Blondell rightly notes, a dialogue 'forces human plurality and difference on our 
attention' because it involves two or more characters. We are confronted with people who are 
in some sort of relationship, and if we are to understand them we must attend to their 
intellectual and psychological differences, and to the 'discrete physicality in which these 
differences are grounded'.50                                            
   
Laws 
 Ergo, even in the Laws, probably Plato's last work, and in which Socrates does not even 
appear, the three participants – Cleinias of Crete, Megillus from Sparta, and an unnamed 
Athenian – and their dramatic setting on Crete are presented in some detail.  The Athenian 
remains anonymous probably because Plato did not want this character's views associated 
with himself, the Academy, or any known citizen or party.  The three begin their discussion 
 
47 Plato's reticence is exactly congruent with Nietzsche's description of an educator: 'An educator never 
says what he himself thinks, but always only what he thinks of a thing in relation to the requirements of 
those he educates' [Will to Power, #980]. 
48 K. R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 1: The Spell of Plato, 4th ed. (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1962) 200. 
49 The dialogues are usually divided into early, middle and late periods, largely on the supposition that 
Socrates' influence on Plato declined over time.  This might be true, but the reasoning can degenerate into 
circularity.  Debra Nails argues, rightly in my view, that the dialogues' chronological order is used to 
establish facts about the historical Socrates, but views based on those facts are then used to establish the 
chronology [Agora, Academy, and the Conduct of Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1995) 70-
71].      
50 Blondell, 49 [author's emphasis].    
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as they embark on walking the considerable distance from Knossos to the shrine of Zeus on 
Mt Ida – that is, from the legendary home of Minos to the birthplace of Zeus.  In the opening 
exchange, Cleinias and Megillus state that the law codes of their respective cities have divine 
origins.  The Athenian reminds them that, every nine years, Minos consulted with his father, 
Zeus, and formulated laws for their cities according to the god's pronouncements [624].  The 
dramatic setting is clear: the interlocutors are on a pilgrimage, discussing a hypothetical 
society governed by laws directing all aspects of life, and their destination is the shrine of a 
divine lawgiver.  The dialogue ends without their having completed the pilgrimage, an 
appropriately unfinished and open-ended frame to their discussion.  
 
Summary 
 We are accustomed to think of Plato as Raphael portrayed him in the Vatican's School of 
Athens fresco: Plato, pointing heavenwards, stands next to Aristotle, who is gesturing towards 
the ground.  This visual metaphor is not wrong, but it diverts our attention from the dramatic 
settings and characterisations through which Plato grounds his dialogues in everyday life.  
Plato's dialogues are thoroughly immersed in the social and personal exigencies familiar to 
his readers/auditors.  Dialogue can clarify matters beyond the capacity of individual 
participants, but it is also unpredictable, demanding, and sometimes threatening.  Plato's 
message is clear: philosophy appeals to eternal verities, but its practice is inextricable from 
the disappointments and dislocation, and occasional enlightenment and consolidation, of 
ordinary life.     
  
 This study has uncovered two novel points.  The first is that Plato deliberately avoided 
setting his dialogues in the agora.  The sole (and partial) exception – Euthryphro – is also a 
condemnation of the agora.  Second, the dialogues clearly exhibit a public/private dichotomy: 
those set in private are treated very differently from those set in public.  There is a dramatic 
tension here: Plato withdraws from the agora, but leaves no doubt that philosophy is a public 
activity.  This tension characterises some of the dynamics of dialogue that emerged from this 
study.   
 
Excursus 1 – Stuart Hampshire's appeal to the Republic 
 The following is a good example of what happens when insufficient attention is paid to a 
dialogue's dramatic setting.  In chapter 9 we noted Hampshire's argument that each of us tries 
to balance pros and cons, and resolve contrary pulls and impulses, in our own minds, and that 
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this inner process of hearing all sides of an issue is analogous to the resolution of political 
conflicts.51  Hampshire quotes a well-known episode from the Republic to support his 
contention: 
 
Leontius, the son of Aglaeon, was going up from the Piraeus along the outside of the 
North Wall when he saw some corpses with the public executioner nearby.  He had 
an appetitive desire to look at them, but at the same time he was disgusted and 
turned himself away.  For a while he struggled and put his hand over his eyes, but 
finally, mastered by his appetite, he opened his eyes wide and rushed toward the 
corpses, saying, 'Look for yourselves, you evil wretches; take your fill of the 
beautiful sight'. [439e-440a]   
 
 This seems to be a parable about conflict in the mind of an individual.  Leontius is angry 
with himself because his desires have compelled him to act contrary to his reason.  And just 
as there are different and often conflicting parts of the mind – appetitive, rational and 
emotional – so there are the corresponding divisions in the polity.  Concord is achieved when 
the rational part rules over the others.  Hampshire agrees with Plato about the analogy 
between individual and polity, but disagrees about being able to achieve harmony in either 
because there will always be disputes in both.   
 
 One significant problem with Hampshire's argument concerns his interpretation of the 
parable itself.  For example, Leontius was known for being attracted to youths with corpse-
like complexions.52  His desire to look at the bodies was probably sexual rather than a morbid 
fascination with death.  Both desires are appetitive, but the former is more instructive in this 
context.  Leontius was to the north of two parallel walls – the Long Walls – that formed a 
defensible corridor connecting Piraeus to Athens.  South of the parallel walls was the third 
Long Wall; it connected Athens to its other port of Phaleron.  Importantly, the walls were 
 
51 Hampshire, Justice, 40-42. 
52 Debra Nails, The People of Plato: a Prosopography of Plato and other Socratics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
2002) 186.  Ruby Blondell notes that Leontius 'stands out for his peculiar interest in corpses', thereby 
missing the significance of Leontius' sexual proclivity in Plato's portrait of a man who is fundamentally 
unlike Soctrates [Blondell, 62]. 
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associated with defending Athenian democracy.53  If Leontius had been on the southern side 
of the parallel walls he would have been inside the area formally controlled and protected by 
Athens.  By choosing to travel outside the northern wall, Leontius was literally and 
metaphorically outside the city, and he was using the path that, in times of conflict, was less 
safe.  Further, this route took him past the ravine into which the bodies of criminals were 
throw after their execution.  There is clearly a lot going on in this brief passage.   
 
 In a work that is largely about an ideal city, Plato intentionally located this parable 
outside the polis.  Further, the Republic opens with Socrates, accompanied by Glaucon 
(Plato's older brother), also walking from Piraeus to Athens.  Leontius' situation therefore 
echoes that of Socrates, which sharpens the contrast between them.  Leontius exercises 
rational calculation to put himself in a place that would titillate his appetites.  The character 
of Glaucon, well known for his love of boys – Plato teases his brother about it [474d-e] – is a 
reminder that Socrates was also attracted to youths,54 but his appetitive element, unlike that of 
Leontius, was controlled by his rational element.  According to Socrates, this parable 
'suggests that anger sometimes makes war against the appetites', so if a person's desires 
compel him to act against his reason (as with Leontuis) he becomes angry at himself [440a-
b].  Socrates further notes that, while a person's spirited element (thumos)55 might ally itself 
with reason, it is most unlikely to ally itself with the appetites to do something that reason 
decided should not be done [440b-e].  Clearly this parable is not a straightforward story about 
inner conflict.  Rather, it is an assertion that, in a battle between a person's rationality and her 
or his desires, the person's 'passionate sense of self' will take the side of the former, not the 
latter.  Leontius succumbed to his desires, so what happened to his thumos?  This is where the 
parable's locatedness becomes a vital factor in its interpretation.  The three elements that exist 
in a person – appetites, reason and spirited element – are analogous to the three classes that 
make up the ideal polis, and both individual and city will be just and work best if each is 
ruled by the rational part.  Leontius is outside the city – he is, as it were, beyond the Athenian 
 
53 As evident from Thucydides 1.107 and Xenophon, Hellenica 2.3.11.  In 404 BCE, the Thirty Tyrants 
assumed power immediately after demolition of the walls.  
54 See, for example, Charmides 155c-d.   
55 In this section, Robin Waterfield translates thumos as 'passion', while F. M. Cornford and Desmond Lee 
render it as 'indignation', probably because it can be in conflict with one's desires.  In this context, 'sense of 
self' or 'life force' might be more helpful translations. 
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'pale' – and his rationally calculating element does not rule his appetites but rather facilitates 
their indulgence.  He is Plato's cautionary vignette of what happens to people when they 
intentionally stray outside the polis, outside the civilised realm in which contrary ideas can 
adequately be heard and weighed, and into regions where appetites reign.   
 
 Of course, Leontius does have inner conflict and disharmony, and to that modest degree 
he illustrates Hampshire's argument, but this complex parable offers little support for 
Hampshire's thesis.  
 
Excursus 2 – The importance of opening words 
 
Timaeus 
 Those who think that the first words of Plato's dialogues are not as significant as I have 
asserted should ponder the opening words of Timaeus: 
 
 Socrates: One, two, three … where's number four, Timaeus? 
 
Socrates is referring to the number of guests who are supposed to be present, but for a 
dialogue containing passages of sophisticated mathematics and geometry this is a particularly 
apposite beginning.56  Moreover, Timaeus is portrayed as coming from an area of southern 
Italy known for Pythagorean philosophy.  The number four was sacred to Pythagoreans 
because it was the 'power' of the tetractys of the decad, upon which they swore binding 
oaths.57  In one line, therefore, Plato, has anticipated the mathematical and metaphysical 




56 I wrote this before discovering that M. R. Wright had also noted these 'deceptively simple' opening 
words [Introducing Greek Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010) 218].  Wright did 
not, however, notice the allusion to Pythagorean philosophy.   
57 The tetractys comprised 10 points arranged to form an equilateral triangle.  Each side has 4 points.  
Counting from the apex, the triangle has 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10 points.  For Pythagoreans, 10 is the 'nature' of 
number, and 4 is the 'power' of 10.  See G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers 




 We have already noted (footnote 13 above) that the first words of both Socrates and 
Menexenus are 'ex agoras' ('from out of the agora').  In this dialogue, Socrates recites to 
Menexenus a funeral oration he heard declaimed by Aspasia.  She taught oratory to Socrates 
and had been de facto wife of Pericles.58  Just before Socrates begins he notes that he and 
Menexenus are alone [236d].  Plato's dramatic setting is clear: Socrates is reciting a speech he 
did not compose and which has nothing to do with the agora, and he is declaiming to an 
audience of one rather than a commemorative assembly. 
 
 This speech is good example of the genre, but it is also a satire on standard patriotic 
versions of history.  For example, Socrates states that Athens was 'now governed by the best 
men', and that those who exercised power and held public offices were 'thought wise and 
good' [238c-e], views held by neither Socrates nor Plato.  However, this is not merely satire 
disguised as encomium.  It is also a paradigm of rhetorical method.  Ergo, the satire is far 
from unremitting; rather, it is calculated, restrained and – interspersed among passages of 
genuine commemorative ardour – effective. 
 
 Indeed, the dramatic setting and subtleties of this dialogue were soon lost on Plato's 
successors.  Shortly after his death, it seems one of Plato's students decided that Socrates' 
speech needed additional material to compensate for its perceived shortcomings.  He added 
an interpolation [244b-246a], but the inserted passage is anachronistic, has the wrong 
narrative direction, and lacks the sophisticated satire of the original work.  The interpolator 
failed to note Plato's dramatic directions: Socrates' speech was not for public recital and 
should not be read as if it were.                       
 
Excursus 3 – Plato's environmental observations 
 In the Critias, Plato notes that ancient (mythical) Attica used to be fertile and forested, 
but in Plato's day it was 'like the skeleton revealed by a wasting disease' because 'the rich 
topsoil has been eroded and only the thin body of the land remains' [111b-c].  Whereas 
rainfall now runs off the hard ground and into the sea, it used to be absorbed by the deep soil 
and thereby distributed 'to feed springs and rivers throughout every region of the country'.  
Proof of this could be seen in surviving monuments at long-dry sacred springs [111d].  Plato's 
 
58 Indeed, Socrates thinks she composed the famous funeral oration delivered by Pericles in 430 [236b]. 
237 
 
is a striking and perceptive observation.  He even knows that a top layer of clay soil acts like 
a reservoir to store the water beneath it.  Like most readers, Donald Hughes regards this 
passage as evidence that Plato understood the importance of forests and the harmful effects of 
deforestation.59  Hughes might be right, but Plato does not blame deforestation (or, for that 
matter, overgrazing) for Attica's soil erosion.  Rather, he attributes it to great floods that 
occurred sporadically over the preceding nine millennia.   
 
 The context is Critias' retelling of a story about ancient Greece that Solon learned from 
priests when he visited Egypt.60  Plato's auditors would have been familiar with Solon's poetic 
works.  Though only fragments have survived, Solon's views on human responsibility are 
evident and were well known.  He denied that Athens would be destroyed by the gods – 'Our 
city will never be destroyed by a dispensation from Zeus or the plans of the blessed immortal 
gods'; rather, 'the ruin of the city comes from unjust men'.61  However, overriding all is moira 
(fate), who 'brings good and evil to mortals'.  No-one knows how her or his plans and actions 
will turn out – Solon's affirmation of the view that human knowledge and action is subject to 
arbitrariness and uncertainty – yet by our own actions we may suffer calamity.  There is a 
contradiction here: humans are responsible for a city's demise, yet fate governs all.  This 
contradiction is reflected in Plato's observations.  In Solon's account, Attica's soil used to 
support dense forests, of which remnants still survived in Plato's day, 'but not long ago' 
[111c] mountains which now support only apiary grew large trees from which rafters were 
cut for use in huge buildings.62  Moreover, these rafters were still intact.  In other words, 
Plato observed recent deforestation caused by demand for lumber, yet still attributed Attica's 
loss of forest cover to primeval flooding.  Solon's etiological myth was more compelling than 
Plato's own observations.   
 
59 J. Donald Hughes, Ecology in Ancient Civilizations (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 
1975) 70-71. 
60 Critias' account begins in Timaeus [20d-27b] and is resumed in Critias.  According to Plato, Solon (c. 
640-560) was revered as the wisest of the seven sages [Timaeus 20d-e]. 
61 Fragments 4 and 9.  The fragments are translated by John Lewis in Solon the Thinker (London: 
Duckworth, 2006) 155-162. 
62 It is noteworthy that there is a lacuna in the text immediately after these words.  Diskin Clay inserts 
'lofty trees grew there' – a reasonable guess for the missing words.  It might be that a transcriber was 
confused by the contradiction between a landscape almost denuded by primeval erosion and deforestation 
caused by recent demand for roof beams, and so skipped over this passage, forgetting to return to it.      
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 This passage from Critias is usually regarded as the most graphic description of 
environmental destruction in classical literature.  Perhaps it is, but it is also a statement that 
we inherit an environment we did not make and tend to exacerbate problems we inherit.  It 
might be better read as an expression of despair over, or acceptance of, our limited ability to 
ameliorate the environment in which we live.       
 
Conclusion 
 Plato's dramatic artistry, particularly the interplay of settings and characters, is 
inseparable from his philosophy.  This entails that dialogue itself is as integral to our 
intellectual inheritance as more familiar Platonic doctrines such as the Forms – the contrast 
between invariant generalities and individual manifestations of things.  Indeed, dialogue 
could be considered more integral: whereas Plato often challenged what we regard as his 
fundamental ideas, he never abandoned dialogue.   
 
 The following chapter draws on the above to articulate a list of dialogic characteristics 
that may help to put us back in touch with a neglected part of our intellectual heritage: we 
will disagree about things, but we will never understand why we are disagreeing, or even 




At the heart of ecological ethics, therefore, is the principle of audi alteram partem, always 
listen to the other side.1  
 
Chapter 11  
The Dynamics of Dialogue 
 
Overview 
 Chapter 10's detailed study of Plato's dramatic settings showed how he used dialogue to 
effect his philosophical objective.  Our approach to and insights gained from that study were, 
in large part, a response to modern dialogic failure regarding climate change.  This chapter 
fuses ancient and modern hermeneutic horizons to develop a list of dialogic characteristics.  
These characteristics comprise a living heritage of dialogue.  They show us what dialogue is 
really like, challenging taken-for-granted assumptions and encouraging our participation in 
dialogue on matters we might otherwise think have moved beyond discussion.  To this end it 
is worth keeping in mind two salient points among several to have emerged from our study: 
Socrates never stopped engaging in dialogue, and Plato never stopped presenting philosophy 
as dialogue.     
 
Dialogue – warts and all 
 (1) Genuine dialogue is conducted in public, but this does not entail that all public 
dialogic space is equivalent.  The agora is Athens' paradigmatic public area, but Plato refused 
to set any dialogue (Euthyphro is a partial exception) within it.  The location of a dialogue, in 
terms of historical and cultural memory, will fundamentally influence, and cannot be 
segregated from, the content of that dialogue. 
 
 (2) By setting dialogue in public, Plato ensures that the auditor/reader becomes an 
observer or participant in the discussion.  Our opinion is invited or even required. 
 
 (3) Public dialogue is more difficult to control than private discussion.  Plato was acutely 
aware that the latter can be held at arm's length, whereas the public domain is open to 
 
1 James Tully, Public Philosophy in a New Key, vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
85.  Tully regards dialogue as the best way to break down 'broad oppositions' between, for example, 
development versus environment.   
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influences and factors that might be unanticipated and unwelcome.  Private dialogue may 
favour one party over another, not because it wins the argument but because it avoids the 
truth.  On the other hand, defences may be lowered in private, which might facilitate candour 
and compromise. 
 
 (4) In every dialogue set indoors (except the Republic) Plato is careful to keep the 
discussion at arm's length from the reader.  We as an audience are not participants, and have 
no role, in these dialogues.  We are observers, but only in the sense of privately 'listening in' 
rather than publicly 'listening to' what is going on.  In the Republic we are being addressed 
directly, but the dialogue ends with Socrates narrating a myth about post-mortem justice, 
confirming that some matters cannot be resolved or demonstrated through dialogue. 
 
 (5) Dialogue is never truly discrete.  It is usually framed by circumstances, particularly 
threats, which participants have unwillingly and/or unwittingly inherited and which will 
influence a dialogue's direction. 
 
 (6) Dialogue is a living thing.  Prognostications about its course are rarely accurate 
because its progression is upset and confused by unexpected responses to argument and 
counter-argument, personality clashes and so on. 
 
 (7) Dialogue never really ends.  Rather, it ceases at a certain moment that might be 
satisfactory or unsatisfactory, or concessional, to one or both parties.  Plato's open-ended 
dialogues assume the conversation has not finished and invite the reader to continue.  Even if 
one party concedes, dialogue challenges the idea that a matter is resolved and there is nothing 
more to say. 
 
 (8) By the same token, dialogue has to be sustained.  Some tactics, such as arguing or 
scaring an interlocutor into silence, can paralyse discussion.  In the Gorgias, for example, one 
of Socrates' interlocutors (Polus) was 'bound and gagged' and 'too ashamed to say what he 
thought' [482d-e] after being compelled to admit one of Socrates' points.  Polus contributes 
nothing further to the dialogue.  The possibility of dialogue evaporates if participants feel 




 (9) Dialogue is not about winning an argument.  The party that comes off worse in the 
opinion of spectators might be the one that has done most to facilitate the dialogue and 
produce a result.    
 
 (10) What we expect from a dialogue and what we receive from it are often very 
different.  It is quite possible for a failed dialogue to clarify matters, but we might not realise 
that until afterwards.  Dialogue might founder on disagreement, but be productive 
nonetheless. 
 
 (11) Participants might more or less agree on a matter, but the dialogue's framework and 
parameters may shift such that the hard-won agreement becomes less important or even 
superfluous.      
 
 (12) The outcome of a dialogue can change the meaning of an earlier one.  An 
unsuccessful dialogue, for instance, might throw a different or even suspicious light on a 
successful dialogue that preceded it.  The hermeneutic trajectory of the older dialogue can be 
fundamentally altered by the more recent.  For example, current dialogue about responses to 
Covid-19 has profoundly changed the way we view arguments from the 1980s and 1990s 
about the roles of government. 
 
 (13) Not even Socrates can prevent some dialogues from failing, but Plato never 
abandons dialogue as his prime method of conducting philosophy.   
 
 (14) Socrates is critical, occasionally acerbic and sometimes mischievous, but never 
condescending.  
 
 (15) Participants should be dealt with in good faith, even when we know or suspect they 
are scoundrels.  Recognising who we are dealing with is not the same as agreeing to descend 
to their level. 
 
 (16) We prefer to think that good ideas win arguments, and that dialogue should reach a 
conclusion based on the merits of matters under discussion.  However, the character and 
personality of participants are often more important that the argument.  Dialogue on matters 
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which appear straightforward and amenable to resolution can be derailed by inappropriate or 
uncongenial participants.  
 
 (17) The subject of a dialogue might appear to demand resolution by appealing to higher 
principles or rational argument, but this does not mean the matter won't be decided by 
venality.2  
 
 (18) Dialogue is premised on the view that rationality has a higher claim on us than 
social compulsion.  Appeals to social rank and dignity, or to financial and political power, are 
(or should be) dialogically irrelevant: interlocutors of vastly disparate rank or power are 
equals in dialogue.  However, this does not entail that the more powerful side will honour a 
rational result.      
 
 (19) No women appear as interlocutors in any of Plato's dialogues, yet the characteristics 
of genuine dialogue are more female than male.  As Carol Gilligan notes, women tend to 
construct moral problems in terms of care and responsibility; men in terms of rights and 
rules.3  For women, a moral imperative is an injunction to discern and alleviate a real and 
recognizable problem; for men, it is an injunction to respect and protect the rights of others.  
Ergo, men initially regard an obligation to others in terms of non-interference – negatively 
rather than actively.4  Male assumptions about non-interference and protection of rights may 
hinder dialogue that aims to address a specific problem.  
 
 (20) Dialogue helps to overturn false binaries – for example, the assertion that we must 
choose between the economy or the environment – because it is open to points of view that 
challenge, or are not constrained by, those binaries.  
 
2 For example, some delegates voted in favour of the 1948 UN resolution for the partition of Palestine, not 
because they carefully weighed competing arguments but because their countries were threatened with 
withdrawal of US economic assistance if they voted against the proposal [William L. Cleveland, A History 
of the Modern Middle East, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004) 264].   
3 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982) 73. 
4 Ibid., 100. 
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 (21) It is important to recognise when dialogue is going nowhere.  At that point it might 
be more productive to try a different strategy, such as narrative, or perhaps terminate the 
discussion.  
 
 (22) In almost any dialogue, the other side is very unlikely to see or assess the matter at 
hand as we do.  Further, things we see as unrelated or irrelevant may be seen in a very 
different light by our interlocutors.  A third-party observer may have difficulty in identifying 
what each side is arguing about, or even whether they are arguing about the same thing.5 
 
 (23) Intent and motive are often misunderstood.  All participants are usually assumed to 
be self-interested, but this might not be true.  Moreover, one party's idea of self-interest might 
be very different from another's.  For example, if two people are working to address climate 
change, is the one with children more self-interested than the one without children?  If neither 
person is working to address climate change, are they equally or differently self-interested?  
In both examples, assumptions of self-interest may be misleading.  
 
 (24) Genuine dialogue is a compromise, and without compromise there is no dialogue.  
The mere fact you are responding to, and engaging with, the other party entails that you are 
probably compromising your original dialogic strategy. 
 
 (25) Genuine dialogue requires genuine listening to the other party.  In a standard 
elenchus, Socrates' interlocutor expresses a personal belief (p), and then Socrates educes 
further beliefs (q and r) from that person which, taken together, entail a refutation of p.6  This 
technique demands apt responses based on close listening.  The aim, albeit difficult to 
achieve, is for interlocutors to be rationally convinced rather than browbeaten into 
submission or overawed by rhetoric.  
 
5 As Socrates observed, in many discussions 'it's not easy for the participants to define jointly what they're 
undertaking to discuss' [Gorgias 457c].   
6 So Vlastos, 266. 
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 (26) It follows that genuine dialogue can overcome interlocutors' defences.  The give and 
take of Socratic method can outwit dialogic ego fragility and circumvent or even dissolve a 
standard adversarial encounter.7   
        
 (27) There are certain ideas, interpretations and views that interlocutors should simply 
accept as adiaphora rather than question or attempt to refute.  If dialogue is to work, then 
participants must share at least some values, and agree on some facts, and be prepared to 
disregard some differences. 
 
The limitations of dialogue 
 For Plato, dialectic – the process of rational apprehension through question and answer – 
is the capstone of education.  No other subject is more important in the training of rulers.8  As 
Aristotle noted, however, its limitation is that we don't push our inquiries into a problem as 
far as we should because we are more inclined to direct our investigations 'not to the matter 
itself, but to the views of our opponents'.9  Ergo, while the result of a dialogue might be a 
better understanding of a matter than any single party brought to the discussion, it is equally 
likely that our attempts to anticipate responses to an interlocutor might constrain a bolder 
investigation into that matter.10 
  
 Further, there are situations where dialogue is or becomes inadequate or futile, when 
interlocutors must be silent and listen to fresh, different and cogent narratives about ourselves 
and our environments.  In short, interlocutors must deliberately engage with their emotional 
brain.  It is significant, then, that an important factor in our failure to address global heating is 
failure of imagination.  As Amitav Ghosh laments, the stories we tell ourselves, with their 
emphases on the journey of individuals, are incompatible with the dramas of climate 
 
7 As M. W. Rowe argues in 'Wittgenstein, Plato, and the Historical Socrates', Philosophy 82 (319) (2007) 
63. 
8 Republic 535d-e.  Dialectic includes the Socratic elenchus, but in the Republic dialectic has developed to 
embrace the method of rational argument by which philosopher-rulers gain understanding into the essential 
nature of things, and thereby into 'the good' itself.   
9 Aristotle, On the Heavens 294b5-15. 
10 Little wonder, then, that Aristotle wrote treatises in addition to dialogues. 
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change.11  In the Timaeus and Critias, Socrates encouraged his interlocutors to tell stories that 
fundamentally challenged the narrative identity of Athens.  The narratives we take for granted 
– probably because they have proved convenient and biddable – are mostly ineffective in the 
face of climate change.  Through dialogue we may achieve a better understanding of what we 
must do, but that understanding must also be emotionally compelling.     
 
A modern horizon: David Bohm's On Dialogue 
 In fusing ancient and modern hermeneutic horizons, the former is shaped largely by 
Plato's dialogues, while the latter is shaped by our own experiences and knowledge of 
dialogue, but the process can be facilitated by a work that both informs and encapsulates our 
modern horizon.  I have selected David Bohm's On Dialogue because it is a keenly observed 
attempt to understand 'the general feeling that communication is breaking down everywhere' 
– both between countries and within them.12  For Bohm, dialogue should possess the 
following characteristics:  
 
1 – In common rather than making common 
 Genuine dialogue is not about having an idea and trying to convince other interlocutors 
to adopt it, thereby making it common to all.  Rather, it is about disparate parties talking 
together to create a new idea which they thereby have in common.13 
 
2 – It's not about winning 
 Dialogue is not about point-scoring or trying to impose your ideas on everybody else.  
No party should be endeavouring to win or defend an opinion.  Dialogue is with interlocutors, 





11 Ghosh is an Indian novelist.  His views were reported by David Wallace-Wells in 'The Uninhabitable 
Earth', New York Magazine (9 July 2017).  
12 David Bohm, On Dialogue (London: Routledge Classics, 2004) 1.  Bohm was a leading figure in post-
WWII quantum physics.  It is noteworthy that Bohm does not mention Plato in this work.  
13 Ibid., 3.  
14 Ibid., 7. 
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3 – All sides should be heard 
 Each party should be afforded the dialogic space it needs to participate.15  This is not a 
rule so much as recognition that dialogue should be inclusive if parties are to feel they are 
participants rather than spectators.  This characteristic echoes Stuart Hampshire's concept of 
procedural justice. 
 
4 – Meaning rather than truth 
 If I am convinced I have the truth, and you are convinced you have it, but those truths 
don't agree, then we might not be able to talk.  Instead, dialogue should be less concerned 
with truth and more concerned with meaning, because if our meaning is incoherent then we 
will never arrive at truth.16  For example, if I believe we should adapt to climate change 
rather than reduce emissions, what do I really mean?  It might be that my underlying meaning 
– 'I want to preserve jobs' – is shared by others and that together we can arrive at more-
creative ideas about employment in a low- or no-emissions economy.  
 
5 – Dialogue, not negotiation 
 Negotiation implies a position from which to negotiate an agreement.  If each party 
regards its position as necessary, often in the form of an immoveable point beyond which 
negotiation is impossible, then dialogue becomes unworkable.  Dialogue can only proceed if 
parties are prepared to ask and answer the question, 'Is this point absolutely necessary?'.17  
They can then explore fresh concepts of necessity.  In 1992 when President Bush stated the 
'American way of life is not negotiable', he was, in effect, saying there is no point in dialogue 
unless other countries accede to America's position, which itself would render dialogue 
impossible.     
 
6 – Dialogue is a threat to leaders          
 Dialogue is a threat to the view that only leaders can get things done.18  Dialogue works 
best when leadership is subordinated to participation.  The problem with this characteristic is 
 
15 Ibid., 35. 
16 Ibid., 43. 
17 Ibid., 25-26. 
18 Ibid., 17. 
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straightforward: modern political leadership is about imposition, not participation, so genuine 
dialogue is usually anathema to leaders.  
 
Parallels with Plato 
 Bohm's points have clear parallels in Plato's dialogues.  With reference to points 1 and 2, 
for example, Socrates did not try to win arguments or impose his view on interlocutors.  
Instead, participants in a dialogue should try to learn from and teach each other [Gorgias 
457c].  Indeed, Socrates is anxious that he should not be thought of as eager to win against an 
interlocutor rather than endeavouring to elucidate the subject [457e]. 
 
 Point 3 is particularly apposite.  Plato is usually keen to hear all sides, and to that end 
seems occasionally to use more characters than are warranted by the dialogue; Protagoras is 
a good example.  However, this impression of over-characterisation is wrong.  Plato is aware 
that most issues cannot be decided by a straightforward argument for or against a matter.  
Other voices are important to remind interlocutors that each side of an apparently adversarial 
argument is informed by other views that are not amenable to a neat binary opposition.  
 
 At first glance, point 4 is different: Socrates is clearly invested in truth.  He states he 
'would gladly be refuted if anything I say is not true, and would gladly refute another who 
says what is not true' [Gorgias 458a].  In other words, he would rather lose an argument than 
win it if truth were on the other side.19  The difference between Bohm and Plato, however, is 
slight.  Both embrace the pursuit of truth, but both realise that dialogue is unlikely to reach it.  
Both are wary of interlocutors who claim to possess truth.  In Plato's dialogues, this claim to 
truth, to certainty about something, is usually challenged by Socrates.  For example, in the 
Republic Socrates questions Thrasymachus' blustering certainty to know what justice is – 
'nothing other than what is advantageous for the stronger' [338b].  Socrates' immediate 
response is to seek clarification of meaning: 'You say that what is advantageous for the 
stronger is just, but what on earth do you mean by that, Thrasymachus?' [338c].  By the end 




19 As Gregory Vlastos points out [Vlastos, 43]. 
20 The word translated as 'justice' is dikaios.  It can also mean 'right'. 
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 Point 5 is an extrapolation of 4: a position from which to negotiate is tantamount to 
claiming a position of certainty.  A condition of dialogue is the requirement to allow one's 
certainties and presuppositions to be questioned.  For all his bullying and condescension, 
even Thrasymachus endures an elenchus: he hurls himself into the dialogue [336b], but the 
price of participation is Socratic cross-examination. 
 
 Point 6 has probably the closest parallel: dialogue is inherently difficult to control, and 
most leaders are loath to cede control over anything to others.  After all, you aspire to 
leadership in order to take control, so relinquishing it seems to undermine your aspiration.  
Further, and congruent with point 4, dialogue may threaten the taken-for-granted meanings 
with which a leader prosecutes her or his agenda.  For example, Socrates' quest in the Laches 
for a definition of 'courage' (andreia – literally 'manliness'; it could also embrace qualities 
such as virtue and fortitude) would have been widely perceived as questioning an attribute 
that was regarded as essential for leadership.  Socrates is aware that some of those whom he 
questioned hated him, as did many who witnessed his cross-examinations.21                                           
 
Conclusion 
 Dialogue is a foundation of our intellectual tradition.  It can be constructive, but also 
destabilising; mutually beneficial and illuminating, but also confronting and divisive.  To 
succeed, it requires humility and generosity.  In an era of tribal politics wherein those 
qualities are conspicuously absent, what sort of forum might facilitate genuine and productive 
dialogue?   
 
Excursus – Jürgen Habermas on dialogue    
 No contemporary philosopher has examined dialogue more exhaustively than Jürgen 
Habermas.  It would be unsurprising, then, if some of the above characteristics of dialogue 
appeared to have parallels with Habermas's theory about the ideal-speech situation – the 
conditions under which rational consensus might be achieved.  For the most part, however, 
Habermas's ideas are fundamentally different from those I have enunciated.  The following 
are a few among numerous points of difference. 
 
 
21 Apology 21d. 
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 (1) In general, Habermas's ideas about dialogue are prescriptive, whereas the above are 
largely descriptive.  Habermas prescribes certain conditions under which rational consensus 
can occur, whereas Plato is demonstrating and accepting what dialogue is like – good or 
nasty, productive or inconclusive, conducted with integrity or deception, and so on.  
 
 (2) In The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas states: 
 
It belongs to the communicative intent of the speaker (a) that he perform a speech 
act that is right in respect to the given normative context, so that between him and 
the hearer an intersubjective relation will come about which is recognised as 
legitimate; (b) that he make a true statement (or correct existential presuppositions) 
so that the hearer will accept and share the knowledge of the speaker; and (c) that he 
express truthfully his beliefs, intentions, feelings, desires, and the like, so that the 
hearer will give credence to what is said.22  
 
In other words, the speaker is not suggesting something that transgresses social norms, is not 
being deceptive, and is being serious.  The problem is that this relegates a range of speech-
acts – such as jokes, stories and role-playing – to secondary uses of language.23  If this were 
the case then brilliant dialogues such as the Symposium would fall well short of Habermas's 
ideal standard.  As Agnes Heller noted, Habermas has 'a deep suspicion of poiesis [making, 
creating; whence 'poesy'] of all kinds'.24  For example, Habermas would not have agreed with 
Wittgenstein's idea that it would be possible to write a serious philosophical work consisting 





22 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, Thomas McCarthy trans. (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1984 – originally published 1981) 307-308.  [Italics in original]  
23 As Ross Poole notes in Morality and Modernity (London: Routledge, 1991) 82. 
24 Agnes Heller, General Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988) 4. 
25 This idea appears in Norman Malcolm's Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1958) 29. 
26 A well-known known example is Aristophanes' attack of hiccups in the Symposium [185c-e].    
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(3) Habermas asserts that:  
 
participants in argumentation who persist in trying to reach understanding … must 
be led by the gentle force of reasons to their own autonomous judgment.  No 
collective authority restricts the individual's room for judgment or pre-empts his 
capacity to make judgments.27 
 
Under an ideal-speech situation, participants in public debate are not coerced by external 
constraints that hinder or prevent an individual's assessment of evidence and argument.  
Further, each participant enjoys an equal opportunity to engage in and contribute to the 
discussion.  By contrast, for Plato external constraints are inherent in a dialogue's location 
and participants, but he exploits those constraints to progress the argument and throw light on 
unexpected matters.   
 
 Indeed, Plato's works subvert Habermas's views on dialogue.  For example, Socrates was 
executed – the ultimate external constraint on dialogic participation – but then appears as the 
central character in most of Plato's works, even though the shadow of Socrates' death falls 
over our interpretation of those dialogues.  In the Meno, for example, Plato uses the ominous 
figure of Anytus to advance the argument, even though we (auditors and readers) know that 
Anytus was the most prominent of those who indicted Socrates.  This dialogue is very far 
from Habermas's ideal-speech situation, yet it is a highly productive, insightful and serious 
work of philosophy. 
 
 (4) Further, Habermas asserts that: 
 
a communicatively achieved agreement must be based in the end on reasons.  And 
the rationality of those who participate in this communicative practice is determined 
by whether, if necessary, they could, under suitable circumstances, provide reasons 
for their expressions.28 
 
 
27 Jürgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, Ciaran Cronin trans. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2008) 75.  
28 Habermas, Communicative Action, vol. 1, 17.  Italics in original. 
251 
 
This view neglects discourse (such as narrative) that appeals to and influences the emotional 
brain.  Agreement is often based on shared stories, particularly when parties cannot settle on 
a common set of reasons.  Further, those who participate are not being irrational in 
acknowledging and using the power of narrative to effect an agreement.          
 
 (5) For Habermas, the ideal-speech situation is implicit in the nature of language in a 
modern society – the 'suitable circumstances' noted in (4).  It thereby provides an inherent 
critical standard against which deficiencies in current forms of dialogue can be assessed.  
This is an essentialist view of language against which Wittgenstein (in particular) railed.29  In 
Plato's dialogues, on the other hand, there is no underlying ideal-speech standard that might 
be revealed if we sloughed off the situations and characters in and through which a dialogue 
is propelled.  Habermas's use of (questionable) linguistic analyses to undergird his theory is 
fundamentally different from Plato's technique in which location and character are intrinsic, 
not incidental, to the message. 
 
 (6) Habermas's ideal of consensual transparency – that all parties could come to a 
rational consensus if they observed the rules of language – tends to preclude groups that are 
oppressed or regarded as different or deviant.  Consensual transparency may thereby become 
a linguistic vehicle of domination and exclusion rather than mutual agreement.30  Rather than 
listening to all sides (as Hampshire and Plato insist) the self-declared 'rational' bloc may 
arrogate to itself the right to declare that other viewpoints are irrational.  
 
 (7) Like the vast majority of researchers in this field, Habermas focuses on the 
characteristics of positive, productive communication, whereas negative, hostile and 
disingenuous communication is much less studied and sometimes regarded as a type of 
psychopathology.  Plato's dialogues, on the other hand, often develop on the back of 
communicative failure with characters who are actively hostile or passively aggressive, or 
just plain dim-witted. 
 
 
29 See, for example, Garth L. Hallet, Essentialism: a Wittgensteinian Critique (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1991) especially chapter 6: Sources of Essentialism. 
30 As Ross Poole rightly observes (Morality, 82-83). 
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 It is worth illustrating the difference between Habermas and Plato by considering the 
parlous state of politico-religious dialogue in America following four years of Donald 
Trump's presidency.  According to Habermas, there exists an ideal-speech situation against 
which the inadequacies of such dialogue can be measured.  Further, the structure of 
participants' communication 'neutralizes all motives other than that of the cooperative search 
for truth'.31  This is too limited and neglects an important point – that lying, deception and 
myth-making may be inherent in, and the purpose of, such discourse.  Habermas's ideas about 
the potential for rational consensus are of little use in attempting to understand, let alone 
combat, the counter-rational manipulative authoritarianism that drives dialogue by the 
evangelical right.  For Plato, however, this group would provide a rich source of characters 
and irrationality with which to investigate and illuminate a religious movement's perverse 





31 Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Christian Lenhardt and Shierry 




A Model Forum for Dialogue 
 
 Chapter 11 was an exercise in hermeneutics, fusing primordial and modern dialogic 
horizons to establish the characteristics of dialogue.  The result is an enriched understanding 
of the dynamics and complexities of dialogue.  The dramatic settings by which Plato frames 
his dialogues are integral to their philosophical substance, and the ways those settings and 
their interlocutors influence, vitiate, disorientate and occasionally clarify matters under 
discussion can inform our own approaches and reactions to dialogue.  But what sort of 
setting, what sort of dialogic forum, might produce the level of comprehension, procedural 
justice and productive discussion that could address a crisis such as climate change?  From 
our study of Plato's dialogues, and our own dialogic failures and occasional successes, the 
following attributes have emerged.  A forum should: 
  
 (1) be adequately informed; 
 (2) be in public, or at least in a place where lack of integrity, particularly in argument, is 
exposed; 
 (3) be accepting of failure and therefore of changing one's mind; 
 (4) be open-ended, recognising that not every issue before it is capable of resolution; 
 (5) possess legislative clout, or at least be recognised by the legislature.  
  
Concomitantly, a forum should not:  
 
 (a) produce perlocutionary frustration or illocutionary disablement; 
 (b) be regarded as a body where every issue before it has an answer or can be resolved; 
 (c) be based on dogma or an unexamined set of beliefs; 
 (d) be smug, dismissive and authoritarian. 
 
 These are broad criteria and do not specify a particular type of forum.  For example, a 
law court goes some way to satisfying criterion (2).  Courts are mostly held in public, and 
lack of integrity in argument is often exposed.  This latter point is probably the main reason 
why no party in an Australian court has argued its case on the basis that anthropogenic global 
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heating does not exist.1  Though climate change denial is rife in some sections of the media 
and government, it fails to satisfy basic forensic standards of evidence and reasonable 
inference that would allow it to be aired in court as the grounds for a defence or a claim.  
Unfortunately, courts are unlikely to satisfy criteria (3) and (4), let alone (a) and (b), and so 
do not fulfil other desirable characteristics.   
 
A 'model' forum – New Zealand's youth mental health program 
 In the early 2000s, New Zealand's rate of teenage pregnancy was among the highest in 
the developed world.  In 2009, Prime Minister John Key appointed Peter Gluckman, a 
paediatrician, as the country's first Chief Science Advisor.  Key asked Gluckman about 
establishing a committee to study adolescent behaviour.  Gluckman's view was that a 
standard 'stakeholder' committee would not be effective.  These committees are politically 
popular because they give most stakeholders – the various groups that have a vested interest 
in or perspective on the matter – a voice at the table, so most parties are tolerably satisfied 
they have been heard.  This feature is congruent with Hampshire's requirement to hear all 
sides of a matter, but such committees are often epistemic disappointments, contributing no 
additional knowledge or fresh points of view to the matter under investigation.  Their 
recommendations are often expressions of banal compromise rather than specific directives. 
 
 Gluckman suggested that the academic community be commissioned to write a review of 
what was known and not known about issues relevant to teenage mental health.  The report 
would investigate peer-reviewed literature only, and then itself be peer-reviewed.  This report 
was compiled by a science committee, which culled any contributions that were perceived to 
stray beyond the data and/or introduce bias. 
 
 The prime minister then appointed a committee consisting of senior policymakers; its job 
was to come up with recommendations based solely on the report.  These recommendations 
were reviewed by a further committee, chaired by Gluckman, to determine which of them had 
the best chance of succeeding and to ensure nothing important had been overlooked. 
 
 
1 Sean Ryan, 'Recent development in Australian climate change mitigation litigation – case studies in 
incrementalism' (Seminar, University of Tasmania, 27 April 2017).  Ryan is from the Environmental 
Defenders Office, Queensland. 
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 In 2012 the prime minister announced 22 new programs to address young people's 
mental health, a considerable financial impost on a small country recovering from the global 
financial crisis and the Christchurch earthquake.  Key emphasised that these programs were 
based on the best available evidence, but that no-one could be certain they would all work.  
Therefore, an evaluation program was included so that experts could assess which programs 
were or were not effective.  As Gluckman later said, 'everybody avoided hubris'.2  Most 
politicians want to announce programs they know are very unlikely to fail, whereas Key 
candidly admitted that some of the new measures might not work.  Moreover, the public 
recognised this was the best possible response given the knowledge base available, and 
accepted that a government cannot always get things right.  Gluckman's summary is 
noteworthy: 'this was a very good example of how the science, policy and political 
communities can work together'.3  
 
 This example satisfies all the above criteria for a forum.  Under (b), for instance, the 
views and needs of young females, a group especially vulnerable to locutionary frustration 
and disablement, were central rather than peripheral to the process.  Under (2), the first stage 
of the process – the science committee report – was aggressive in eliminating points of view 
for which there was insufficient evidence.  This is important in addressing a potential 
weakness in Hampshire's requirement to hear all sides of a matter.  In practice, hearing all 
sides might amount to little more than an opportunity for airing hobbyhorses – for example, 
religious groups which reject VAD outright simply because they feel it is contrary to god's 
will – in which case the forum may degenerate into a shouting match.  Given the success of 
Gluckman's process in a very contentious and emotive area, it may be appropriate to 
articulate Hampshire's thesis more precisely: all sides should be heard, but only insofar as 
they contribute to the 'epistemic fund' that will inform a decision on the matter under debate.  
In other words, a forum's terms of reference should preclude any contribution for which there 
 
2 Quoted in Shawn Otto, The War on Science (Minneapolis: Milkweed, 2016) 391.  Otto interviewed 
Gluckman about the role of scientific advice in formulating policy. 
3 Ibid.  Though the rate of teenage pregnancy has fallen ['New Report on Maternity finds drop in teenage 
pregnancies', Ministry of Health media release (12 April 2019)] overall child mental health in New 
Zealand remains poor [Anna Gromada et al., Worlds of Influence: Understanding what shapes child well-
being in rich countries, Innocenti Report Card 16 (Florence: UNICEF, 2020)].  Even a model forum is no 
guarantee of success. 
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is no direct evidence and/or no reasonable inference from indirect or anecdotal evidence.  
This still allows for all sides to be heard, but constrains views that admit no grounds for 
argument or discussion. 
 
A model forum for addressing climate change? 
 If they were to succeed, the Gluckman committees required more than meeting the above 
criteria, and participants of constructive goodwill, and so on.  They also required: 
 
 (i) government support, including adequate financial provision that extended beyond the 
government's term of office.  An incoming government had to accept a financial burden 
imposed by its predecessor, and an outgoing government had to accept that the rewards of its 
endeavours might be reaped by its successor.  Most governments are loath to accept either. 
 
 (ii) a propitious political environment.  Good ideas are not acted on or implemented 
simply because they have intrinsic merit; they also require a favourable political climate.  On 
the other hand, bad ideas can thrive in certain conditions, not necessarily because we mistake 
them for good ideas but because their deficiencies are less obvious or are glossed over. 
   
 (iii) community perception and appreciation that the matter needed to be addressed.  This 
may require communication skills beyond the competency of most governments, not because 
governments are poor communicators but because the subject is not amenable to slogans and 
soundbites.  
 
 (iv) luck.  When criteria (1) to (5), and (a) to (d), and (i) to (iii) are aggregated, it is not 
surprising that good ideas are difficult to implement.    
 
Communicating climate change – 'Know thy audience, know thyself, know thy stuff'4 
 We have developed a list of dialogic characteristics, and know what an effective forum 
might look like, but dialogue about climate change presents a specific set of challenges that 
must also be addressed.  As Max Boykoff observes, most communication about climate 
change follows the traditional path of transmitting information with a goal to overcoming 
 
4 Stephen H. Schneider, quoted in Maxwell Boykoff, Creative (Climate) Communications (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2019) 190.  We met Schneider in chapter 3. 
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people's epistemic deficit and thereby changing their behaviour.  This 'hitting people over the 
head with science' approach to communication can occasionally succeed, but has clearly been 
a failure with regard to climate change.5  For decades scientists have been telling the world 
about global heating, yet carbon emissions continue to rise and more than a few leaders, and 
citizens in their countries, and have refused to listen.  In response, Boykoff proposes five 
rules for effective communication about climate change: (1) be authentic; (2) be aware; (3) be 
accurate; (4) be imaginative; (5) be bold.6  The first three encompass the pithy quote (above) 
from Stephen Schneider, but all are characteristics of Socratic dialogue. 
 
 (1) Be authentic – know thyself.7  This is about authentically communicating your 
passions (anger might be one of them) and concerns, particularly for those most vulnerable to 
climate change.  Confected anger, phoney concerns and clichéd calls to action are inauthentic 
and ineffectual.  This is not a demand for the 'right' sort of authenticity.  If you are cynical 
and abrupt, you can't be authentic by pretending otherwise.   
 
 Socrates is a paradigm of the endeavour to know oneself and be authentic.  In the 
Phaedrus, after giving an astute euhemeristic interpretation of a local legend, Socrates 
confesses he has no time to pursue such matters because 'I am still unable, as the Delphic 
inscription orders, to know myself; and it really seems to me ridiculous to look into other 
things before I have understood that' [229c-230a].  On the other hand, doesn't Socrates 
occasionally resort to crooked inferences and false arguments in order to win a point?  In the 
Protagoras, for example, Socrates' arguments about the meaning of a poem are almost a 
sham, while his assertion that more wise men are to be found in Crete and Sparta than 
anywhere else is a derisive irony [341a-342b].8  Gregory Vlastos argues that Socrates can 
indeed be tongue-in-cheek and craftily deceptive, but not when he is arguing seriously, not 
when engaged in elenctic argument in his search for the right way to live.9  As Socrates states 
 
5 Boykoff, 54-55. 
6 Ibid., 208-211. 
7 An inscription on the temple of Apollo at Delphi.  Socrates refers to it in several dialogues, such as the 
Protagoras 343b.  The inscription was γνωθι σαυτον (gnothi sauton, 'know thyself').  
8 Crete and Sparta were regarded as among the least intellectual communities in Hellas.  In the Republic, 
Plato equates them with timarchy – rule by people dominated by passions rather than rationality [545b-
550c].    
9 Vlastos, 133-135. 
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in the Charmides, even if he were to refute everything his interlocutor said, he would do so 
for the same reason that would motivate him to investigate his own words – 'the fear of 
unconsciously thinking I know something when I do not.  And this is what I claim to be 
doing now, examining the argument primarily for my own sake' [166c-d].  If Socrates were 
duplicitous and insincere in his quest, he would be cheating not only his interlocutors but also 
himself.  It is clear that self-discovery is an important part of authentic communication. 
 
 Socrates embodies authenticity in being both single-minded and multi-dimensional.  His 
quest is divinely inspired, and to it he brings his own irrepressibly human qualities: he is 
humorous and obstinate, and often disappointed; he is never ingratiating, and rarely generous 
to a flummoxed opponent.         
 
 (2) Be aware – know thy audience.  This rule includes being mindful of what your 
audience really cares about, as opposed to what you think it should care about, and being 
aware of effective or ineffective engagement.  The Socratic dialogues are exemplars of 
tailoring arguments to audiences.  Socrates knows most of his interlocutors.  Within a single 
dialogue he will adapt his manner and approach to each interlocutor: friendly and respectful 
to one, provocative to another, and so on.10  Plato assumes, or even demands, that his 
readers/listeners are aware of the characteristics and circumstances of Socrates' interlocutors.  
Indeed, Plato usually blames these interlocutors for Socrates' frequent lack of dialectical 
success, a sober warning that even comprehensive knowledge of one's audience does not 
ensure success.         
 
 (3) Be accurate – know thy stuff.  This is more than knowing facts about climate change.  
It includes being able to translate scientific knowledge into information that is relevant and 
salient for decision-makers.  Boykoff notes that the 'information-deficit model' of 
communicating scientific knowledge has repeatedly been exposed as inadequate, yet most of 
us continue to assume that poor choices are the result of an information deficit, and therefore 
additional knowledge will lead to better choices.11  The reasons for this model's endurance 
are instructive.  Molly Simis et al. argue that scientific training – the 'rational processing of 
information to draw conclusions based on empirical information' – leads practitioners to 
 
10 As Ruby Blondell observes, particularly with regard to the Republic (Blondell, 187).  
11 Boykoff, 60-61. 
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believe that public audiences 'can and do process information in a similar manner'.12  This is 
often not the case.  For example, Ralph Keeney notes that the biggest killer of Americans is 
not cancer, heart disease, obesity or smoking.  Rather, it is their inability to make choices that 
are not self-destructive.13  Michael Specter cites the British example of Cherie Blair, a 
prominent public figure and QC.  Blair was 'in two minds' about whether to vaccinate her son 
Leo (born in 2000) because she had listened to people 'whose views I respected' and who 
were 'vociferously against all forms of vaccination'.14  Specter contrasts Blair's irrational 
ambivalence to the rational evidence-based confidence of her husband's prime ministerial 
forebear, Robert Walpole, who in 1724 obtained vaccinations for George I's children to 
inoculate them against smallpox.  It is confronting that, after nearly three centuries of clear 
evidence, the very intelligent Blair was less able to assess the benefits of vaccination than 
George I.  As Specter despondently concludes, 'even when the scientific evidence is 
overwhelming, people don't always believe it'.15              
 
 Further, Brianne Suldovsky found that the public information-deficit model was driven 
by 'the role of science as an epistemic authority' because 'it forces communication to function 
in a top-down, one-way structure where knowledge trickles down from an epistemic authority 
(scientists) to a knowledge-deficient audience.'16  The epistemic authority model does not 
usually work well for the public, but it does work for scientists because it offers an 'intuitive 
and optimistic' explanation for the gulf between science and society.  Part of the problem here 
is that if scientists were to engage in dialogue more than dictate they might (with reason) feel 
they were yielding some of their epistemic authority and moving beyond their comfort zones 
of communication.  As Carina Cortassa put it:  
 
 
12 Molly J. Simis et al., 'The lure of rationality: Why does the deficit model persist in science 
communication?', Public Understanding of Science, vol. 25(4) (2016) 401. 
13 Noted in Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational (New York: HarperCollins, 2009) 166.  Keeney estimates 
that about half of US citizens will make a lifestyle decision that will result in premature death.  
14 Michael Specter, Denialism (London: Duckworth Overlook, 2010) 86-87.  Leo was eventually 
vaccinated. 
15 Specter, 87.  It is interesting that Tony Blair decided to join America's invasion of Iraq in 2003, a 
decision based on flimsy evidence that most people with only modest interest in the matter knew was false.     
16 Brianne Suldovsky, 'In science communication, why does the idea of the public deficit always return?  
Exploring key influences', Public Understanding of Science, vol. 25(4) (2016) 420. 
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Once the starting status of ignorance has been established, the task is to apply the 
correctives needed – to inject cognitive resources – periodically assessing progress 
until the pursued levels of literacy are achieved.17 
 
One is reminded of Dickens' Thomas Gradgrind, whose pedagogical method was to 'have 
imperial gallons of facts poured into [his pupils] until they were full to the brim'.18  This 
model assumes a positive correlation between a society's scientific knowledge and its 
capacity to appraise scientific matters.  There is evidence to suggest otherwise,19 but that is 
not the real issue – which is that general scientific literacy is not a function of the quantity of 
scientific information we are collectively supposed to have imbibed.  Rather, it is much more 
a function of how a society uses scientific knowledge.  A society might regard itself as 
scientifically enlightened, but this assumption is worth little if its store of scientific 
knowledge is unable to inform or mobilise a response to a threat like climate change.   
 
 Prima facie, Socrates can have nothing to say about this rule, given that he disavows 
possessing knowledge at all.  However, his epistemic concern was solely with knowledge in 
the moral domain.20  Indeed, Socrates personifies the difference between epistemic certainty 
and moral certainty: more importantly, he embodies the view that neither is required as a 
condition for action.  For example, in the Laches Socrates asks his interlocutors for a 
definition of courage – that is, the quality all acts of courage have in common.  He mildly 
rebukes them because they provide examples rather than a definition.  His message is clear: 
knowledge of examples does not entail the more fundamental knowledge of something in and 
of itself.  Conversely, though, lack of epistemic certainty does not preclude an ability to act.  
Among the participants in this dialogue, Laches and Nicias are well-known Athenian 
generals.  They are not able to define courage, but that does not nullify their capacity to act 
 
17 Carina Cortassa, 'In science communication, why does the idea of a public deficit always return?  The 
eternal recurrence of the public deficit', Public Understanding of Science, vol. 25(4) (2016) 449 for this 
and the previous quote. 
18 Charles Dickens, Hard Times, ch. 1. 
19 Cortassa cites a number of studies and examples.  See also the excursus at the end of this chapter. 
20 As Gregory Vlastos points out [Vlastos, 237].  Indeed, in the Menexenus Socrates states that 'all 




courageously.  Indeed, if we demanded epistemic certainty as a prior condition for action, we 
would probably do little or nothing.21   
 
 This observation illuminates an important question: what level of evidence, though 
falling short of epistemic certainty, is enough to support the degree of moral certainty 
required to act prudently?  Gregory Vlastos argues that this level is reached when the cost of 
not acting, based on the doubt, would be prohibitive.22  Socrates would agree: if he and 
Laches had hesitated in their retreat from Delium because they were not sure whether a 
retreat could also be 'courageous', they would have perished.23  Similarly, if we are unable to 
achieve epistemic certainty about climate change, this does not absolve us from acting on it, 
given that the cost of not acting will almost certainly become prohibitive. 
 
 (4) Be imaginative: this rule 'involves a nimbleness, agility and ability to adapt to 
changing communication contexts'.24   It also involves a willingness to take risks and possibly 
make mistakes.  This is probably the most Socratic of the five rules.  As we have seen, Plato's 
dialogues are mostly set in public, a dramatic context that is constantly changing and subject 
to random events, and over which Socrates has little control.  He conducts his discussions 
with people who range from receptive to dismissive.  Importantly, Socrates does not merely 
refute arguments, as if they were disembodied thoughts possessing an independent existence 
apart from the characters who air them.  He refutes people, questioning their beliefs, social 
roles and ways of life.  As Mary Blundell argues, 'the elenchus is thus an intrinsically ad 
 
21 So Vlastos, 269.  This applies particularly to governments that demand epistemic certainty before they 
enact new or revised laws.  This perceived level of certainty is a false comfort because for any law there is 
potentially an infinite number of ways to interpret it.  Wittgenstein noted the paradox: 'no course of action 
could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule' 
[Philosophical Investigations #201].  For example, VAD bills are or were stalled for years because 
governments endeavoured to cover every possible situation and ramification.  This is not only impossible 
but also had the unintended (Wittgenstein would say 'foreseeable') consequence of making conditions 
unnecessarily difficult for terminally ill people to die on their own terms.           
22 Vlastos, 269. 
23 The Athenians were defeated at Delium, about 45 kms north of Athens, in 424.  The retreat is mentioned 
in Laches 181a-b. 
24 Boykoff, 210. 
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hominem form of argument of a particularly personal kind'.25  In other words, Socrates takes 
seriously the character and responses of each interlocutor and the context in which he 
interrogates them, and adapts his approach accordingly.  Unless we pay attention to dramatic 
characterisation and context we will appreciate neither the force of Socrates' questioning nor 
his elenchic flexibility. 
 
 However, this degree of flexibility also carries risk.  In the Protagoras, for example, 
Socrates suggests that he and Protagoras should exchange questions and answers, a 
suggestion to which Protagoras 'was altogether unwilling' [338e].  Though Socrates 
established the frame of discourse, he is soon floundering.  Protagoras asks him whether he 
thought two seemingly contradictory passages from the same poem were consistent.  Socrates 
replies that he did, 'though at the same time I was afraid that he [Protagoras] might be right' 
[339c].  Protagoras points out the obvious inconsistency, which wins a shout of approval 
from those present.  Socrates is stunned: 'my eyes went dim and I felt giddy, as if I had been 
hit by a good boxer' [339c].  Resorting to tactical cunning, he plays for time, asking a 
tangential question to Prodicus, a sophist and teacher of rhetoric for whom Socrates appears 
to have had some respect.  Socrates' contribution to the ensuing discussion is a mixture of 
skilful dialectic repair, questionable assumption and leg-pulling, but he steers the dialogue 
back to where he can resume his main argument.  Socrates ingenuously assures Protagoras 
that he has no other aim than to get to the bottom of problems that had always puzzled him 
[348a].  This dialogue is a master-class in adaptability and dialogic recovery.  It is also a 
paradigm of sincerity in argument and suitable respect for one's interlocutors.          
 
 (5) Be bold: part of this rule involves reducing or overcoming psychological barriers – 
and, I suggest, social and legal barriers – to engagement.  Few are bold without someone else 
having first kicked over a barrier: an initial act of boldness and leadership can become a 
catalyst for group solidarity.  
  
 Socrates' boldness could be confronting.  In the Apology he states he would be ashamed 
if he were not to stand firm and face danger on a battlefield when ordered by a commander to 
 
25 Mary Whitlock Blundell, 'Character and Meaning in Plato's Hippias Minor' in Methods of Interpreting 
Plato and his Dialogues, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Vol. 1992, James C. 
Klagge and Nicholas D. Smith eds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) 133 [italics in original]. 
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do so, but more ashamed if, from fear of death or something else, he disobeyed the god who 
ordered him to live a philosophical life [28d-29a].  Socrates recognised that through his 
questioning of prominent citizens he had made powerful enemies [Apology 21d], but even 
when threatened, as he is by Anytus in the Meno, Socrates does not resile from his mission.26  
He warns those, and us, who think to ally themselves with his quest 'that the majority of 
people don't agree with us'.27     
 
Excursus – scientific literacy, climate change and witch-hunts 
 We need at least a basic understanding of climate science if we are to understand global 
heating, and we assume that the more we know about it the more likely we are to address it.  
In other words, we assume there is a correlation between scientific knowledge and the desire 
to take appropriate action.  However, there are plenty of examples where this assumption is 
false.  One instructive example is the period of witch-hunting in early modern Europe.   
 
 Most of us regard witch-hunts as the product of medieval superstition and ignorance, as 
characterised in Monty Python and the Holy Grail.  We assume that people came to their 
senses following the rise of modern science.  In fact, witch-hunting increased after the 
medieval era: the period of most virulent prosecution was from the mid-1500s to the mid-
1600s.  In other words, witch-hunting's most lethal episodes coincided with the rise of 
modern science.  The reasons for this are complex and geographically diverse.28  It seems 
perplexing that even in England, which had many fewer witch trials and executions than most 
other countries, the last judicial killing of witches was in 1682, a decade after Isaac Newton 
had completed the scientific exertions which would later be published as Principia 
Mathematica (1687).  It is much less perplexing when we realise that Newton derived his 
concept of force, the Principia's foremost scientific theory, from notions of occult powers in 
the tradition of natural magic.29  Moreover, for Newton the most important part of that 
 
26 Meno 94e-95a.  Anytus became one of Socrates' accusers. 
27 Protagoras 352d. 
28 For a good account see Brian P. Levack, The Witch-hunt in Early Modern Europe, 2nd ed. (London: 
Longman, 1995).  It is salutary to realise that, per head of population, Scotland executed 12 times as many 
witches as England, yet for most of this period Scotland possessed four universities while England had 
only two.    
29 John Henry, 'Newton, matter, and magic' in Let Newton be!, John Fauvel et al. eds. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988) 143. 
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tradition was alchemy, so it is unsurprising to find that in about 1669 Newton began a 
detailed and long-term study of the subject.  Less well known is Newton's belief in 
Pythagorean harmonics and numerological correspondences.  He supposed, for example, that 
the spectrum of visible light would correspond to the seven divisions of the musical scale.30  
Consequently, generations of children have learned mnemonics about the seven colours of a 
rainbow, when in fact there are only six.  It is an astonishing survival of 'magical thinking' 
into the current era.  As B. J. Gibbons observed with reference to the work of Newton, 
Kepler, and even Wolfgang Pauli, 'far from inevitably dispelling the dark clouds of 
"superstition", science has often encouraged magical thought'.31  
 
 It is clear that scientific and non-scientific thought can, happily or uneasily, co-exist.  Of 
course science will eventually change or demolish at least some popular or non-scientific 
beliefs, but in turn some of those beliefs will influence science, as they did with Newton.  
Either way, there is no direct correspondence between scientific advances, broader scientific 
literacy and a society's actions.  In England, the witchcraft statute was not repealed until 
1736, even though general intellectual support for witch-hunting had long vanished.32  It is 
clear that a government's action can be uninformed by contemporary science, and may lag 
well behind, or correspond little to, the views of its citizens.  This is an accurate description 
of the current situation in Australia, and many other countries, with regard to climate change.  
 
 There are further, and disturbing, lessons from the era of witch-hunts.  Ideally, witchcraft 
should have been investigated by a stringent examination of evidence: if there were no 
evidence for the existence of witches, then witch-hunting should have stopped or been 
 
30 Penelope Gouk, 'The harmonic roots of Newtonian science' in Let Newton be!, 118.  The mnemonic I 
learned in school was 'Richard Of York Gave Battle In Vain' – red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, 
violet.  The last two are actually one colour – violet.  There is no indigo. 
31 B. J. Gibbons, Spirituality and the Occult (London: Routledge, 2001) 52.  Pauli (1900-1958) was 
possibly the most brilliant, certainly the most acerbic, of the second generation of quantum physicists.  His 
epistemology owed a great deal to Jungian archetypes. 
32 For example, as early as 1584 Reginald Scot's Discoverie of Witchcraft questioned the juridical evidence 
used in witchcraft trials, and Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan, part IV, chapter 45 (1651) undermined any 
scriptural and philosophical support for the existence of witches.  See Alan Charles Kors and Edward 
Peters eds, Witchcraft in Europe, 400-1700, 2nd ed., revised by Edward Peters (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2001) 392-425.    
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outlawed long before the mid-1600s.  The problem was, and is, that matters are rarely 
circumscribed to the degree that a single argument or investigation will settle the question.  In 
the 1600s, for example, theologians argued that if belief in witches were undermined then 
belief in other supernatural agencies would also decline.33  It was a standard thin-end-of-the-
wedge argument, and it has alarming parallels in the debate about climate change.   
 
 If you believe that your country's way of life is undergirded by fossil fuels then you 
might see an attempt to replace them with renewable energy as a threat to your lifestyle and 
ethos.  In 2019, for example, Labor Party policy to increase Australia's fleet of electric 
vehicles was construed as an attack on tradespeople and their 'utes', while a policy to increase 
renewable energy was interpreted as the end of family outings to football played under lights.  
These examples appear trivial, but they are driven by a very broad set of ideas.  For example, 
the University of Wollongong offers a degree funded by the Ramsay Centre for Western 
Civilisation.  The centre's chairman and one of its board members are former prime ministers 
– John Howard and Tony Abbott – and both are climate change sceptics.  Indeed, the centre's 
blurb lists repealing a carbon tax as one of Tony Abbott's achievements.34  Whatever one 
thinks about the centre, there can be little doubt about one of its subliminal messages: 
acknowledgement of climate change, let alone addressing it, is a threat to western civilisation.   
 
 There is a further lesson to be gleaned from the decline of witch-hunting.  As John 
Redwood notes, 'reason' and 'nature' were the words most frequently appealed to in debate 
during the late 1600s and early 1700s.35  Debate was ideally construed as a contest between 
reasonable suppositions and arguments founded on facts amassed from observations of the 
natural world.  Prima facie, this is also the appropriate procedure for addressing climate 
change.  However, as Redwood further notes, reasonable people, contemplating the same 
facts, came to very different opinions about the world and about the morals they should 
consequently espouse.  Reason and nature were not unifying concepts representing a 
consensus approach to understanding; rather, they were bones of contention, significant more 
of conflict than intellectual harmony.  The upshot was that matters of spiritual import, such as 
witchcraft, were decided as much by irony, wit and ridicule as they were by reasoned 
 
33 John Redwood, Reason, Ridicule and Religion (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976) 11. 
34 www.ramsaycentre.org/about-us/board-of-directors 
35 Redwood, 12-14, 215. 
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explanation and evidence.36  Witch-hunts were vanquished by laughter as much as by 
arguments from reason and nature.  Absent the efficacy of appeals to scientific reason, it 
might be that climate change deniers are best tackled by ridicule.                
 
Conclusion 
 Dialogue can be difficult, and dialogue about climate change can be especially thorny, 
but we know how dialogue works and how to communicate effectively about global heating.  
However, we also need a forum which not only hears all sides but also validates the views of 
those who have hitherto been voiceless.  In particular, this forum must listen to the views of 
people who currently have no voice at all – children and those not yet born.  As R. S. Scorer 
put it, 'we need people in our deliberations whose job it is to represent posterity'.37  In that 
sense, an effective forum would also entail the capacity to imagine ourselves in (say) 2060, 
wishing that our forebears had done things differently when they knew the consequences of 
their inaction.           
 
 
36 As Michel de Montaigne wryly commented, 'The witches of my neighbourhood are in mortal danger 
every time some new author comes along and attests to the reality of their visions' ['Of Cripples' in The 
Complete Works, Donald M. Frame trans. (New York: Everyman's Library, 2003) 959].  Montaigne wrote 
this in 1588, a rare early disparagement of witch-hunting. 
37 R. S. Scorer, The Clever Moron (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977) 158. 
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What hope, at this rate, of extinguishing the taste of the bathos implanted by nature itself in 




 Our collective failure to address climate change is existentially confronting and 
intellectually debilitating.  Addressing a problem like global heating demands an ascent to the 
best of our abilities and vision, not a predilection for descent into bathos.  The most ominous 
conclusion that might be drawn from this study is that our intellectual and cultural heritage 
has left us lacking the wherewithal to tackle global heating.  However, it is equally possible 
to conclude that, by revisiting the primordial roots of our philosophical tradition, we can 
achieve the means to surmount our failures of dialogue.           
 
 This study was not novel in using an interdisciplinary approach, but the combination of 
disciplines is novel.  By comparison, an important text in this field says little to nothing about 
dialogue, narrative, hermeneutics or psychology.  When one contributor states, 'facts will 
always call forth our moral responses',2 we know from our study of the emotional brain 
(chapter 6) that it would be more accurate to substitute 'rarely' for 'always'.  
 
 Probably the most original part of this study is the fusing of hermeneutic horizons – 
ancient Greece's with climate change – so that each throws light on the other.  In this way, the 
genocide of ancient Melos was interpreted through the perspectives of risk analysis and folly.  
More importantly, modern failure to address climate change drove an examination of the 
dramatic settings of Plato's dialogues.  In addition to a list of dialogic characteristics, two 
unexpected findings were that dialogues set indoors are presented very differently from those 




1 Matthew Arnold, 'Culture and Anarchy' (1867) in The Portable Matthew Arnold, The Viking Portable 
Library, 545.  
2 Jenneth Parker, 'Towards a dialectics of knowledge and care in the global system' in Interdisciplinarity 




What about Iris? 
 Let us return to Iris, whom we met in the Introduction.  By 2060, Iris will probably be 
living in a world that has, to some degree, addressed climate change.  However, GHG 
mitigation strategies then in place are unlikely to offset the cumulative failures of previous 
generations to take effective action.  One or more environmental tipping points are likely to 
have been triggered, and governments will find that reducing emissions to near zero is only 
one step in the formidable task of reducing atmospheric CO2 to a more sustainable 380 ppm.  
Iris will probably feel resentment towards past generations.  How will she explain to her 
daughter (Ruby) why the generation in which Iris was a child did so little to reduce 
emissions, and why the four decades before it were significant mainly for their profligate and 
myopic consumption of fossil fuels?  Iris might explain to Ruby that failure to address 
climate change was a result of one or more of the following: 
 
• folly: the almost limitless human capacity to make poor decisions in the face of 
overwhelming evidence that they are, indeed, poor decisions;  
• flawed risk assessment: individuals and groups not only tend to be inept at assessing 
risk but are also inclined to 'accept' risk on behalf of those who, like Iris and Ruby, 
have no say in the matter;  
• lack of appeal to the emotional brain: the failure of previous generations to overcome 
the problem that climate change does not trigger our evolved emotional responses;      
• bewildering sociological phenomena: the identity of some groups is based 
substantially on their difference from other groups, to the degree that group identity 
becomes more important than the values maintained by, or even the wellbeing of, 
those groups;   
• poor governance: most governments, particularly those in the Anglophone world, are 
poorly equipped to address a problem that requires a fundamental change in the way 
we live. 
 
 Perhaps Iris will also explain that, underlying these reasons, was an inability to imagine a 
different way of doing things.  As Fredric Jameson stated in the mid-1990s, 'it seems to be 
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easier for us today to imagine the thoroughgoing deterioration of the earth and of nature than 
the breakdown of late capitalism; perhaps that is due to some weakness in our imaginations'.3  
 
 Perhaps, though, by 2060 climate change might have been addressed to the extent of 
reducing atmospheric carbon to the levels of 2020.  Iris may be able to point to improvements 
in the way groups and governments discussed and resolved a global problem.  She might 
even explain to her daughter that, fed up with dialogic failure, people returned to their 
dialogic heritage and rediscovered the rewards that come with participation in dialogue, and 
concomitantly established fora in which Ruby's generation was given a voice in decisions that 
were going to affect it.  
 
Back to the agora! 
 Sometime after Socrates' death, Plato retreated into the Academy.  The agora had been 
Socrates' haunt, but it was too confronting and dangerous a space in which to conduct 
philosophical dialogue, even in writing.  Only one of Plato's works is set in the agora, in front 
of the building in which Socrates was about to face his indictment.  Plato's condemnation of 
the agora is palpable, but he leaves us in no doubt that genuine dialogue, the primordial 
method by which we clarify our thinking and discuss important issues, is a matter of public 
participation.  If we are to address climate change we need to reclaim the modern agora, the 




3 Fredric Jameson, The Seeds of Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) xii.  Some of the 
matters adumbrated by Jameson have been thoroughly examined by others and therefore have not been 
discussed in this monograph.  See, for example, Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway on campaigns to 
mislead the public about the science of climate change [Merchants of Doubt (London: Bloomsbury 
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